International regimes for effective and equitable management and use of water resources by Kibaroğlu, Ayşegül
Ѵ Г - Г :
\  -·ϊ ■.·
· .1 -Ѵ ' / ,-i><··'.* '..b·*·'.
¥  ;? · ί  r - ^
^  .· *1
,f^ . 'і'У'' 'C'^ '■i* >^’·
t:l-.' ■,>/■ ’;Ц· V,' :ç  vü;/ ,■.
У Ѵ ! , '  ^ '^’
- .4¿*:.,-;..^v V v‘>^ ·^·; A Ъ‘ 'V'“^ r- ' ' іУ"·? · '«7::î i· ' /· Г·, r ./  ^ /  ;■ ·'■ '
■ ·^  > >''!/;· ·' ■'·*·'; '·, '' *;'?■  ^ ”;7 '^J ,’i “ ■ ■ -;î3**' ’i·': Vy·';^ . -iÿ**· C •■'-у-·/ ^
• ν'' '"?*>' ■'■'T "".'Г ••у .-*»· ; 'ö**'· ' ■^"· '■'•'Λ ·•/■■■W Ş ^ 'ry s-t
г :  > - ' Г ѵ t ■W"; v’;., τ '?  7 '^^  У'ѵ п Т 1 г г . - г }
Ъ ·^ ¡1 Ж .І АІй:ЁІ .ΐ5./ί^2β.Ι. Ί
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES FOR 
EFFECTIVE AND EQUITABLE 
MANAGEMENT AND USE 
OF WATER RESOURCES:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
EUPHRA TES-TIGRIS RIVER BASIN
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Department of International Relations 
of Bilkent University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for 
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
by
Ayçegül Kibaroglu 
April 1998
T è ,
і 8 г
І 5 а д
^ 1 4 2 5 8 7
Approved by the Institute o f Economics and Social Sciences
Prof Dr. Metin Heper 
Director
I certify that I have read this dissertation and in my opinion it is fully adequate in scope 
and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philisophy in International 
Relations.
Prof. Dr. Ersin Onulduran
I certify that I have read this dissertation and in my opinion it is fully adequate in scope 
and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philisophy in International 
Relations.
Prof. Dr. Yüksel İnan (Thesis Supervisor)
I certify that I have read this dissertation and in my opinion it is fully adequate in scope 
and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philisophy in International 
Relations.
Asst. Prof. Nur Bilge Criss
/JiAA,
I certify that I have read this dissertation and in my opinion it is fully adequate in scope 
and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philisophy in International 
Relations.
Asst. Prof. Meltem Müftüler Baç
I certify that I have read this dissertation and in my opinion it is fully adequate in scope 
and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philisophy in International 
Relations.
Asst. Prof Nimet Beriker
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This study has come out as a product of my lengthy deliberations in and out of 
Turkey in a number of distinguished institutions with the contribution of most prominent 
scholars and experts in the field of water studies. I would therefore like to express my 
indebtedness to them "in order of appearance" on and off in my research and writing 
period of some four years since the first Jean Monnet Fellowship in June 1994 that I was 
granted by the European Commission which provided me with the distinct opportunity to 
incur the fundamentals of international political economy thanks to the guidance of Dr. 
Henk OVERBEEK from the Department of International Relations at the University of 
Amsterdam. I should also thank Dr. Paul AARTS from the Middle East Research 
Associates (MERA) based in Amsterdam.
No one had a greater impact on my way of approaching water politics than Prof 
Tony ALLAN from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) of the University 
of London. His contributions to the very substance of this volume by providing me with 
his most recent works and thoughts, as well as his kind patience to bear with me all over 
the last four years by reading and commenting on my works are above all appreciation.
Similarly, Prof Thomas NAFF from the Associates of Middle East Research 
(AMER) of the University of Pennsylvania, PA. had no less a succor by making available 
to me at all times the most reliable and updated data one ever needs in such issue areas 
like the Middle East waters resources where very few dependable sources exist, and also 
by expressing his views on the parts of my work.
I should also express my deep gratitude to Dr. Sadık TOKSÖZ who currently 
teaches at Boğaziçi University in Istanbul following a period of extensive research in this 
field working with the most prestigious institutes in all parts the world. His "friendship" 
is most appreciated.
Throughout the research period, I had the chance to meet a number of leading 
scholars and experts in the field during various conferences. Their generosity in 
expressing their views about my presentations and my then-ongoing research was of 
highly significant value in putting my work right on track. In this regard, I should mention 
Dr. Peter GLEICK from the Pacific Institute based in Oakland, CA.; Dr. Stephen 
MERRET from the University College London; and Prof Alparslan ARIKAN from the 
Hydrogeology Department at Hacettepe University; and Dr. Asit BISWAS from the 
University of Oxford. Of the same value were the e-mail communications with Prof Oran 
YOUNG from Dartmouth College in New Hampshire, as well as intensive exchanges of 
views with experts and bureaucrats from Turkish state bureaucracy such as. Özden
BİLEN, Hüseyin YAVUZ, and Savaş UŞK_\Y from the State Hydraulic Works (DSİ); 
Osman KORUTÜRK, Yaşar YAKIŞ, Doğan SENCER, Lütfo BELÜL and Yavuz 
ÇUBUKÇU jfrom the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Tugay ÜÇÖZ from the 
Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade; and Barbaros ÖZDEMİR from the GAP 
Regional Development Agency based in Ankara.
This study took its final shape and thus won the "race against time" with the 
insightful supervision of Prof. Yüksel İNAN who at the "last moment" had very kindly 
accepted to replace Prof. Ali L. KARAOSMANOGLU with whom the fundamentals of 
this study was established. I'm therefore indebted to both of them. Dr. Meltem 
MÜFTÜLER-BAÇ from the Political Science Department at Bilkent University has been 
extremely helpful in overhauling the entire study prior to taking it before the dissertation 
committee. I'm so grateful to her. I'm equally thankful to other members of the 
dissertation committee, namely Prof. Ersin ONULDURAN from the Fulbright 
Commission in Ankara, Dr. Nur Bilge CRISS and Dr. Nimet BERİKER from the 
International Relations Department at Bilkent University for their approval of my work.
Last, but by no means the least, my very special thanks should go to all members of 
my family at large. My spouse Dr. Mustafa KİBAROĞLU has always been where he 
was needed the most. His contribution by overlooking the entire research period and his 
careful assistance with the intensely burdensome secretarial work and the details cannot 
be matched with any sort of appreciation. Is that what spouses are for? Likewise, had not 
my parents-in-law Nevriye and Ali Rıza KİBAROĞLU stood by us all over the last six 
years of our doctoral studies, this volume could not have come about. My parents Ayla 
and Metin ONAT as well as my brothers-in-law Siyam and Seyfi KİBAROĞLU deserve 
equally worthed admiration thanks to their endless support in all respects. Our son Onat 
who sometimes might have felt like being ioved in tandem with my dissertation has been 
so patient lately that he indeed was the one who made all this dream come true. Hence 
this volume is devoted to him.
11
ABSTRACT
Due to a variety of reasons, water resources on the globe are becoming more and 
more scarce. The degree of water scarcity and its political, economic, and social 
implications are felt much more severely in regions like the Middle East. The 
management and utilization of the waters of river basins there have been, and still are, 
sources of tension among the riparians. The Euphrates-Tigris river basin is one of them 
and the likelihood of a serious conflict is said to be much greater because of the obstinate 
claims of the downstream riparians that cannot be met by the upstream riparian. It is 
therefore assumed that unless cooperation is achieved among the riparians in the field of 
management, allocation and utilization of the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin, 
growing water scarcity may not only result in conflicts among the ripeirians, but may also 
result in further devastation of an extremely vital resource like water. Hence, in order to 
promote cooperation among the riparians, formation of a region-specific regime 
framework is suggested. Water has become the subject matter of lengthy deliberations in 
international conferences all over the world with the participation of experts and scholars. 
Similarly, water has entered the agenda of international law. These formal and informal 
meetings have shaped the general principles and norms of using and managing water 
resources effectively and equitably. Hence, references are made to the proceedings of the 
international conferences and the documentation of the international water law, with a 
view to putting forward the original principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures of the region-specific regime suggested for better management and utilization 
of the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin. Because the suggested regime is 
required to conform to the geographical and hydrological characteristics of the river basin 
as well as the hydropolitical history of the region, these matters are discussed by and 
large.
Ill
ÖZET
Çeşitli sebeplerden dolayı dünyadaki su kaynakları giderek kıtlaşmaktadır. Bu 
durumun sosyal, ekonomik ve siyasi boyutları, Ortadoğu'da daha ciddi olarak 
hissedilmektedir. Su kaynaklarının kullanımı ve yönetimi, kıyıdaş ülkeler arasında hep 
ciddi sorunlar yaratmış ve çatışmalara da neden olmuştur. Bugün de durum pek farklı 
değildir. Fırat ve Dicle nehirlerinin oluşturduğu nehir havzasında, aşağı kıyıdaş ülkelerin 
yukarı kıyıdaş ülkeden su miktarı taleplerinin karşılanamayacak boyutlarda olması 
sebebiyle, bu ülkeler arasında çatışmalara yol açacak gelişmelerin olacağı iddia 
edilmektedir. Dolayısıyla, Fırat-Dicle havzasında, suların akılcı kullanımı, tahsisi ve 
geliştirilmesi konularında işbirliğine gidilmediği takdirde, bu durum yalnızca kıyıdaş 
ülkeler arasında çatışmaya sebep olmakla kalmayabilecek, aynı zamanda son derece 
hayati ve kısıtlı su kaynakları kötü kullanım sebebiyle daha da israf edilecektir. Bu olası 
olumsuz gelişmeler göz önüne alınarak, Fırat-Dicle havzasında uluslararası işbirliğini 
geliştirecek bir uluslararası rejim kurulması önerilmektedir. Su kaynaklarının akılcı 
kullanımı, yönetimi ve geliştirilmesi konuları bir süreden beri uluslararası konferanslarda 
ele alınmaktadır. Bu konu aynı zamanda uluslararası hukukun da gündemine girmiştir. Bu 
gibi resmi ve gayri resmi toplantılar suların akılcı kullanımı ve hakkaniyete dayalı 
paylaşımı ve tahsisi gibi konularda genel prensiplerin ve normların oluşmasına yardımcı 
olmuştur. Dolayısıyla, Fırat-Dicle nehir havzasında oluşturulması önerilen rejimin 
kendine özgü prensiplerini, normlarını, kurallarını ve karar mekanizmalarını tespit ve tarif 
ederken, bu konularda evrensel boyutlarda ulaşılan seviye de dikkate alınmıştır. Önerilen 
rejimin, bölgenin coğrafi ve hidrolojik özellikleri ile hidropolitik tarihi dikkate alınarak 
düzenlenmesi gerekeceği için, bu konular kapsamlı olarak araştırılmıştır.
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GLOSSARY
AMER Associates of Middle East Research, University of 
Pennsylvania
.Aridity A measure of the dryness of an area, generally 
characterized in terms of the ratio of water supply to 
demand, i.e., of precipitation to potential 
évapotranspiration. The lower this ratio is, the more arid the 
area.
.Capacity building The process of building organizations, human resources, 
and the legal and regulatory framework needed for effective 
and efficient water resources management
.Comprehensive water resources management Water resources planning,
development, and control that incorporates physical, social, 
economic, and environment interdependencies
. Consumptive water use Water withdrawn from a surface or ground water body
that, because of absorption, transpiration, evaporation, or 
incorporation into a manufactured product, is not returned 
directly to a water body
Demand management The use of price, quantitative restrictions, and other devices 
to limit the demand for water
Demand management Use of measures and practices, including education and 
awareness programs, metering, water pricing, quantitative 
restrictions, and other devices, to manage and control the 
demand for water
Discharge Flow; volume of water per unit time
X
, Drainage The removal, by natural and artificial means, of excess
water from a given area; surface drainage is the removal of 
water ponding over a soil, whereas subsurface or 
groimdwater drainage is the removal of water saturating the 
soil from beiow'; the latter is accomplished by means of 
ditches or buried perforated tubes
Downstream riparian A country which lies along a transboundary river that
originates from another state
Drip irrigation A modem method of high-frequency, low-volume 
irrigation, by which water is dripped directly into the root 
zone
DSI Directorate General State Hydraulic Works (Turkey)
Enabling environment Environment in which the water sectors and institutions can
develop
ESA External support agency (generally an agency that provides 
support, monetary or nonmonetary for economic or social 
development). These organizations may be bilateral, 
multilateral, or non-governmental agencies
Evapotranspiration The sum of evaporation from the soil .and transpiration 
from plants in a particular area
Externality The side effect of one party's actions on another party or 
parties, including both the general public and specific 
entities
FAO
GAP
GIS
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Southeastern Anatolian Project
Geographic information system
XI
HEP
ICJ
ICWE
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IDWSSD
IHE
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Hydroelectric power 
International Court of Justice
International Conference on Water and Environment 
(Dublin 1992)
Institut de Droit International
International drinking water supply and sanitation decade
International Institute for Hydraulic and Environmental 
Engineering
International Law Association 
International Law Commission
Interbasin transfer The physical transfer of water from one drainage basin to
another
JTC
Market failure
MEWREW
Joint Technical Committee
A divergence between the (prevailing) market solution and 
the economically efficient solution
Middle East and African Water Review
Multipurpose development Development of a particular water resource to serve two
or more purposes simultaneously
NGO
OAU
O&M
Non-governmental organization
Organization of African Unity
Operations and maintenance
Xll
Opporunity cost The value of goods or services foregone, including 
environmental goods and services, when a scarce resource 
is used for one purpose instead of for its next best 
alternative use
Rainfed fanning Farming practiced in the relatively humid areas of the 
Middle East, where rainfall is sufficient to sustain crop 
growth
RBO
Riparian state
River basin organization
A state through or along which a portion of a river flows or 
a lake lies
River basin A geographical area determined by the watershed limits of 
a system of water, including surface and undergroimd 
water, flowing into a common terminus
Salinity
Semiarid region
SO AS
The content of salts dissolved in water, generally measured 
in parts per million (ppm)
In agricultural terms, a region in which precipitation is 
sufficient in most seasons for crops to grow, but in which 
droughts occur frequently enough to make the practice of 
rainfed farming a hazardous venture
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of 
London
Stakeholder Organization or individual that is concerned with or has an 
interest in water resources and that would be affected by 
decisions about water resources management
TSP
UN
Three Stage Plan 
United Nations
Xlll
. UNCED
UNDP 
UNEP 
, UNESCO
UNGA
. Upstream riparian 
User charges
USAID 
Virtual water
Waterlogging
United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (Rio de Janeiro 1992)
United Nations Development Program
United Nations Environment Program
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization
United Nations General Assembly
A country where a transboundary river originates
A charge imposed upon direct users of water for water 
withdrawal, instream use, or assimilation of waste
United States Agency for International Development
The water imported to the Middle East in terms of products 
especially wheat, that have been produced with the water in 
farming sectors in the United States and Europe
The process by which a rising water-table saturates a soil, 
which in an arid zone is generally accompanied by soil 
salinization; it can be prevented by means of drainage
Water resources assessment An examination of the aspects of the supply and demand
for water and of the factors affecting the management of
water resources
Water resources strategy A set of medium to long-term action programs to support
the achievement of development goals and to implement 
water-related policies
XIV
Watercourse A system of surface and underground water that constitute, 
by virtue of their physical relationship, a unitary whole and 
that flow into a coomon terminus
Watershed An area from which runoff drains naturally into a river or 
lake, also referred to as a catchment area. Natural 
catchments or watersheds are separated topographically by 
lines called watershed-divides.
WB World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development)
WMO World Meteorological Organization
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last three decades, in a series of international conferences 
convened by the specialized agencies of the United Nations, and in the works of 
the international water law community, serious efforts are devoted to furnishing 
general principles and norms for achieving effective and equitable management 
and use of transboundary water resources. Withstanding these efforts, it is 
widely acknowledged by concerned experts and scholars that tensions among 
riparian states in various watersheds in the world can be eased. ^  Hence, this 
study is designed with a view to applying some of these principles and norms to 
the Euphrates-Tigris river basin where water has become a significant bone of 
contention among the riparian states, namely Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, mainly 
due to poor management and use practices that is pervasive in the region.
Water, as the most vital resource for living, is reportedly becoming more 
and more scarce all around the world due to a variety of reasons ranging from 
rapid population growth and economic development, to inefficient management 
and utilization practices. It is therefore an ever-growing belief among the 
scholars, experts, journalists, and politicians that, a severe global water shortage 
is on the horizon. Moreover, according to some, scarcity of water resources may 
eventually lead to conflicts in certain regions as water will soon develop into a 
strategic asset. The likelihood of a conflict is said to be greater in semi-arid
ISee, for example, J. W. Dellapenna, "Building International Water Management 
Institutions: The Role Of Treaties And Other Legal Arrangements," in J. A. Allan and C. 
Mallat (eds.). Water in the Middle East: Legal and Commercial Implications, Tairus; 
British Academic Press, 1994, p. 58. Also see S. C. McCaffrey, "Water, politics, and 
international law," in P. Gleick, Water in Conflict, New York: Oxford University Press, 
1994, pp. 97-98.
regions like the Middle East where the resources of water are concentrated in 
certain river basins.^ The Euphrates-Tigris river basin as one of the significant 
watercourses in the region has been the subject of numerous studies mainly 
because of the controversial nature of the relations among the principal riparian 
states.
All three riparian states have initiated a number of concomitant agricultural 
development and thus large-scale irrigation projects since the 1950s. The 
initiation of huge but uncoordinated projects by each of the riparians resulted in 
their excessive demands for water from the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. 
However, the supply of these rivers are limited and also unstable due to the 
annual and seasonal variations in flow which depend solely on precipitation. 
Hence, with a view to guarantee a certain amount, and thus satisfy their demand 
for water, both of the downstream riparians, namely Syria and Iraq have 
proposed sharing the waters of the rivers based on a simple arithmetic formula. 
According to the sharing formula, riparian states would claim a certain amount 
of water that they would declare as their need. For instance, Syria proposed to 
Turkey to let two-thirds of the waters of the Euphrates river flow into the Syrian 
territory. Then, Syria and Iraq would in turn share these waters almost equally 
(48 percent and 52 percent, respectively). This would, indeed, mean that, 
regardless of the discrepancies between the riparians' actual needs for water 
which would depend on the size of their arable lands and their requirements for
^There were quite a number of references to water as a potential source of conflict in the 
Middle East. To cite a few, see Andrew Alexander, "Ever-Deepening Water Crisis Could 
Fuel Conflicts in the Middle East," Atlanta Journal & Constitution, March 19, 1989, p. 
lA; Andrew Gowers, "Water War in the Middle East," Financial Times, May 1989, p. 57; 
Caryle Murphy, "Middle East Faces Major Water Woes," The Washington Post, March 
10, 1990, p. A20; Alan Cowell, "Now a Little Steam Later Maybe a Water War," The 
New York Times, Febmary 7, 1990, p. A21.
industrial or domestic uses, the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin would 
be shared simply "equally", but not necessarily "equitably" or "effectively."
A sharing agreement was not considered as a feasible option by this study, 
because of several reasons such as the lack of complete and reliable information 
about the inventory of water and land resources of each riparian, as well as the 
pervasive uncertainty in the inter-riparian-state relations. In this regard, Turkey 
suggested the allocation of the waters of the rivers according to a plan that would 
satisfy the needs of the riparians rather effectively and equitably. Hence, Turkey 
proposed a comprehensive plan, namely the Three-Staged Plan (TSP) according 
to which coordination as well as collaboration of the riparians were deemed 
essential. The TSP proposed to determine the inventory of water and land 
resources with a view to reach accurate data first, and then suggest ways and 
means for optimum and equitable allocation, and hence utilization of the waters 
of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. Nevertheless, the leaderships of the 
downstream riparians did not agree with Turkey's proposal. The divergence has 
been on the methodology (sharing vs. allocation) of water utilization which 
resulted in a deadlock.
Throughout a transboundary river basin one observes an interdependent 
set of relations among the riparian states where the impact of physical effects 
generated in one state is delivered to the other via the river system. The 
Euphrates-Tigris river basin is also such a medium by which the effects of an 
action taken in one of the three riparian states are transported to the others. Since 
the end of the 1950s when all three riparians initiated major development 
projects on the rivers, they indeed began to function under the conditions of 
growing interdependence. Therefore, wisdom suggests that due to the
interdependent setting that exists, riparians would be better-off if they promoted 
cooperation. Notwithstanding, the continuation of the uncoordinated large-scale 
development projects to date, significant variations in the flow of the two rivers, 
and poor management and utilization practices, have altogether exacerbated the 
tension over water resources among the riparian states. It is therefore thought 
that, if interdependence is not a sufficient condition for cooperation and may even 
result in conflict, regimes may provide the necessary linL·ge between 
interdependence and cooperation.
In theory, international regimes can act as an intermediary among states, 
and facilitate cooperation. Therefore, substantial cooperation among the 
riparians through building the necessary institutions, within the framework of an 
international regime, for achieving efficient and equitable management and use 
of the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin is believed to serve a dual 
purpose. First, formation of an international regime in the Euphrates-Tigris river 
basin may avoid ineffective management and utilization, as well as the 
devastation of an extremely vital resource. Second, it may also diminish the 
likelihood of a conflict among the riparian states of the basin. Consequently, the 
aim of this study is to come up with a set of suggestions for the formation of an 
international regime whose principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures 
would conform to the hydropolitical developments in the riparian states, as well as the 
geographical characteristics of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin}
^It should be emphasized at this stage that the majority of scholars in the field, are well 
aware of the factors that make cooperation among the riparian states extremely difficult. 
For the time being, formation of a regime does not seem to be a politically viable option. 
However, these factors should not rule out the possibility of a change in the attitude of 
especially the downstream riparian states in the positive direction in the future. When the 
time is ripe for the formation of a regime among the three riparians, the premises of this 
study may be considered useful.
The primary sources of the principles and norms of the international regime 
suggested for the Euphrates-Tigris river basin can be found in the works of a 
number of international agencies during a series of conferences convened under 
the auspices of the United Nations. The outcomes of the lengthy discussions 
among experts and scholars during these conferences, as well as the works of the 
international water law community that are equally valuable efforts for the 
emergence, evolution and the codification of universal guidelines, yielded a set of 
principles and norms for effective and equitable management and utilization of 
transboundary water resources. These general principles and norms are 
considered to be applicable to specific watercourses in the world, taking into 
consideration the physical characteristics and the hydropolitical developments in 
that basin, where water resources are poorly managed an d /o r wasted by all or 
some of the riparians. Thence, the theory of international regimes can be used as 
a framework for the formation of an international regime among riparians of the 
Euphrates-Tigris river basin whose principles and norms would be derived from 
the general principles and norms provided by the work of the international 
organizations and the international water law community.
Accordingly, chapters of this study are designed to seek answers to the 
following questions:
1.. .H0W is the issue of cooperation over transboundary water resources 
treated by scholars and experts from realist, political economist, and 
institutionalist schools of thought?
2.. .What are the contributions of the international conferences to the efforts 
aimed at solving the general problem of ineffective and inequitable management 
and utilization of transboundary water resources?
3.. .What is the role of the international water law in supplying general 
principles and norms (universal guidelines) for better management and 
utilization of transboundary water resources?
4.. .What is the impact of the physical characteristics of the Euphrates-Tigris 
river basin, and the hydropolitical developments in the riparian states on the 
emergence of the water-related dispute in the region?
5 . .  .What could be the principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures for effective and equitable management and utilization of 
transboundary water resources that could be derived from the outcomes of the 
international conferences; efforts of the international water law community; and 
the existing protocols and arrangements concluded between the riparian states of 
the Euphrates-Tigris river basin?
Before an international regime is formed, basically three successive phases 
should be passed. These phases are: i) agenda formation; ii) institutional choice; 
and iii) operationalization.4 o f  these, agenda formation requires: a) the 
emergence of an issue on the political agenda; b) framing of that issue for 
consideration in international fora; and c) the rise of the issue to a high enough 
rank on the international agenda that would warrant priority treatment.^ 
Chapter 1 in Part I is thus an attempt to present how the agenda is formed first 
by the emergence of the water issue at the international level by means of the 
deliberations of scholars and experts. The spectrum of diverging and converging 
approaches to the water issue is indeed quite large, and provides invaluable 
insights for further deliberations on the subject matter. A group of scholars.
^Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young and Michael Zum, "The Study of International Regimes," 
European Journal o f International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1995, pp. 282-283.
^Ibid.,
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experts, and journalists are arguing that as water becomes scarce, conflicts 
among the riparians are inescapable.^ Another significant group of experts and 
scholars are arguing rather the opposite.^ In their contention, if necessary and 
sufficient economic measures can be taken, conflictual situations may be 
thwarted. A third group of scholars, on the other hand, argue that if necessary 
institutions can be established, scarce water resources can be managed and 
utilized effectively and equitably that would satisfy the demands of the parties, 
which would in turn ease the tension over water. ^  Building the necessary 
institutions, however, will admittedly call for the cooperative stance of the 
riparians.
The framework for cooperation by means of institution-building is 
provided by the theory of international regimes whose major premises are
^Thomas Naff and Ruth Matson, Water in the Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation, 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985; Joyce Starr and Daniel Stoll, US Foreign 
Policy on Water Resources in the Middle East, Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 1987; J. Starr 
and D. Stoll (eds.). The Politics o f Scarcity, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988; 
James Bulloch and Adel Darwish, Water Wars: Coming Conflicts in the Middle East, 
London: Victor Gollancz, 1993. Miriam Lowi, Water and Power, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993, p. 9.
^Daniel Hillel, Rivers o f Eden: The Struggle for Water and Quest for Peace in the Middle 
East, Oxford: OUP, 1995; Asit Biswas (ed.). International Water Resources o f the 
Middle East: from Euphrates-Tigris to Nile, Oxford: Oxford Univei'sity Press, 1994; 
Peter Rogers and Peter Lydon (eds.). Water in the Arab World:Perspectives and 
Prognoses, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994; Jad Isaac and Hillel 
Shuval (eds.). Water and Peace in the Middle East, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1994.
^David G. LeMarquand, International Rivers: The Politics o f Cooperation, University of 
British Columbia and the Waterloo Research Centre, 1977. P. H. Gleick, "Reducing the 
Risks of Conflict Over Fresh Water Resources in the Middle East," in J. Isaac and H. 
Shuval (eds.). Water and Peace in the Middle East, Amsterdam: Elsevier Pub., 1994, pp. 
41-54. P. Rogers, “The Agenda for the Next Thirty Years," in Peter Rogers and Peter 
Lydon (eds.). Water in the Arab World: Perspectives and Prognoses, Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1993, pp. 310-311. Natasha Beschomer, “Water and Instability 
in the Middle East," London: IISS, Adelphi Paper, No. 273, 1992, pp. 70-71.
adopted in this study with a view to come up with specific principles, norms, 
rules, and decision-making procedures ff r^ better management and utilization of 
the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin. Therefore, references should be 
made to the theory of international regimes in order to discuss the characteristics 
and functions of international regimes in general, and the concept of regime 
formation in particular. Regimes are generally formed either spontaneously; or 
imposed by a hegemon; or by negotiations among the parties. A basic assumption 
of this study is that, i f  a regime will he formed in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin, it 
will be a negotiated regime. Because, in the case of scarce natural resources, 
emergence of a spontaneous regime is believed to be hardly possible. On the 
other hand, the distribution of power among the states in the Euphrates-Tigris 
river basin is such that none of the actors can take on the hegemon's role and 
impose an order.
The second stage for agenda formation requires the framing of the issue for 
consideration in international fora. The issue of equitable, reasonable, and optimal 
utilization of transboundary water resources has been extensively discussed and 
reviewed during a series of international conferences convened under the 
auspices of the United Nations and its specialized agencies such as the World 
Bank, UNDP and FAO. Hence, Chapter 2 will discuss in detail when and how the 
early references were made to the water issue in international conferences. The 
first of these conferences was the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment gathered in Stockholm, Sweden in 1972. During the conference, full 
consideration was given to the right of permanent sovereignty of each country to 
develop its water resources. Moreover, it was agreed that advance notification 
was necessary when water resources activities are contemplated that may have a 
significant environmental effect in another country. Further, references were
made to the specialized agencies of the United Nations such as FAO, WHO, 
WMO, and UNESCO, of which FAO has established a Commission on Land and 
Water Use for the Middle East which aimed at promoting regional cooperation 
on water management problems in the region. Another major conference was the 
United Nations Water Conference gathered in Mar Del Plata, Argentina in 1977. 
The international issue that received utmost attention during the conference was 
the problem of shared water resources. The conference produced an Action Plan 
which influenced water development in developing countries, and issued the 
first set of guidelines and principles as to how to assess water resources. The Plan 
stressed the need to improve management, as well as the equitable and efficient 
utilization of water resources. More recently, other conferences were convened 
such as the one held in Dublin, Ireland in 1992. The Dublin Statement on Water 
and Sustainable Development was issued which incorporated several guiding 
principles that advocated the idea that effective management of water resources 
demanded a holistic approach, linking social and economic development with 
protection of natural ecosystems. The Statement also envisaged that water 
development and management should be based on a participatory approach. 
Moreover, it was asserted that water had an economic value in all its competing 
uses and should be recognized as an economic good. Finally, in Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil in 1992, issues relating to transboundary water resources were discussed 
in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. A set of 
recommendations were incorporated into the Chapter 18 of the final document of 
the conference, namely Agenda 21. The final document emphasized the 
importance of water in all aspects of life, and stressed the necessity of integrated 
water resources development and management. It was stated in the document 
that transboundary water resources and their use were of great importance to the 
riparian states, and cooperation among those states would be desirable in
conformity with the existing agreements an d /o r other relevant arrangements 
taking into account the interest of all riparian states. Therefore, Chapter 2 of this 
study will highlight the evolution of the guiding principles and norms, through 
the works of the international organizations, for better management and 
utilization of water resources. The aim here is to show the reader that the 
principles and norms that will be discussed at the end of this study within the 
framework of the regime suggested for the Euphrates-Tigris rivers basin have a 
solid basis which evolved over the last three decades with the remarkable efforts 
of the experts and scholars in the field from all parts of the world.
The third stage in agenda formation requires the rise of the issue to a high 
enough rank on the international agenda that would warrant priority treatment. 
Therefore, Chapter 3 will discuss in detail how and why this issue has ranked 
high on the international agenda that paved the way to the priority treatment 
within the international water law community. A clear-cut definition of the 
principles and norms together with the rules and decision-making procedures of 
a regime are mostly embodied in international treaties and agreements. This 
unavoidably leads to a very useful discussion within the framework of 
international water law by virtue of its engagement in the making of the 
principles and norms for effective and equitable management and utilization of 
water resources. The historical evolution of international water law incorporates 
the legal framework doctrines, as well as the works of the International Law 
Association, and the International Law Commission of the Lfnited Nations. Legal 
framework doctrines are developed through a process of claims and counter­
claims between the riparians along transboundary water resources. They are 
significant in that they explain what do the states claim as their rights (and 
obligations) regarding the utilization of water resources. In this context, the
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theories of absolute territorial sovereignty; limited territorial sovereignty; and 
the absolute integrity of the river will be discussed. The work of the International 
Law Association (ILA), on the other hand, is significant in that it regards 
equitable utilization as the dominant principle. Similarly, the work of the 
International Law Commission (ILC) which prepared the Draft Articles on 
international watercourses set forth principles and rules that may be applied and 
adjusted in agreements between states sharing international watercourses. The 
Draft Articles of the ILC, which are then made into a Convention, do not seek to 
produce a clear and concise formula which produces a definitive division of the 
water resources. Rather, equitable utilization is thought to enable and prescribe 
regional initiatives promoting efficiency, conservation, and economy of use. It is, 
therefore, the efficiency of existing uses, rather than presenting a formula for 
determining how much water each state is entitled to demand, that is significant 
in the work of the ILC .
Hence, the theoretical discussion in Part I of the study concerning the water 
resources in all respects is to prepare the ground for the application of the 
general principles and norms for effective and equitable management and 
utilization of water resources to a specific watercourse, namély the Euphrates- 
Tigris rivers basin chosen as the exemplary case in this study. Successful 
application of general principles and norms to a specific case requires 
acquaintance with the physical characteristics of the water basin, as well as the 
hydropolitical developments within and among the riparian states in the basin. 
Likewise, the rules and the decision-making procedures of the suggested regime 
should also be put in place within the same framework. The sources of these 
rules and decision-making procedures can be derived from a series of bilateral or 
multilateral formal agreements among the riparians, and from Turkey's
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initiatives like the Three-Staged Plan. Accordingly, Chapter 4 in Part II, will 
highlight the physical characteristics of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin, as well 
as the hydropolitical developments in the riparian states. It will include selective 
information about the geographical, climatic and hydrological characteristics, 
and the hydropolitical history of the region. The discussion in Chapter 4 is 
assumed to make clear that, those factors that are generally acknowledged by the 
experts and scholars all over the world as the main reasons for ineffective 
management and utilization of water resources, as well as the sources of conflict, 
do indeed abundantly exist in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin. To illustrate, the 
monthly, seasonal, and annual variation of the flow of the rivers which depend 
on precipitation only, semi-aridity of the region, salinity of the soil in certain 
parts are such factors that have significant impacts on the supply of, and the 
demand for, the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. Discussion in Chapter 
4 exhibits that, supply cannot meet demand in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin 
because of the expectations of Syria and Iraq from Turkey.
Apparently, unless cooperation occurs through building the necessary 
institutions for effective and equitable management and utilization of the waters 
of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, within the framework of an international 
regime, the situation is likely to get worse. Hence, the principles, norms, rules, 
and decision-making procedures of the international regime which is suggested 
for the Euphrates-Tigris river basin will be provided in Chapter 5. These 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures are the products of a 
careful study of the proceedings of a series of international conferences on the 
water issue, such as the Mar Del Plata and Dublin Conferences; substantive 
documentation that relate to the international water law, such as the Helsinki 
Rules and the 1997 Convention; the documentation that relate to the history of
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bilateral or multilateral negotiations among the three riparian states, such as the 
Three Staged Plan, and the 1987 Protocol; and the researcher's interviews and 
communications with the prominent experts and scholars from academia and the 
state bureaucracies in Turkey and abroad.
Finally, in a concluding chapter, an overall assessment will be made 
concerning the issues discussed throughout the study. The Conclusion will also 
include specific recommendations as to what Turkey should do with respect to 
the effective management of water resources regardless of whether a basin-wide 
regime is considered as a politically viable option or not by the current decision­
making mechanisms of the states in mention.
The study will be supplemented with Appendices where useful 
information will be provided including a number of documentation. These are 
the following: The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of Waters of International Rivers 
(Chapters 1, 2, and 6); The Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses; The Delft Declaration; The Dublin Statement on 
Water and Sustainable Development. There will also be an Appendix chapter on 
the necessary technical information about the Geographical Information Systems 
and Water Resources Management.
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PARTI
TRANSBOUNDARY 
WATER RESOURCES
&
EVOLUTION OF NORMS 
FOR EFFECTIVE 
AND EQUITABLE USAGE
CHAPTER 1. COOPERATION OVER TRANSBOUNDARY 
WATER RESOURCES: A DEBATE
Freshwater is a fundamental resource, integral to all ecological and societal 
activities, including food and energy production, transportation, industrial 
development, and hum an health. Yet, freshwater resources are unevenly and 
irregularly distributed. Some regions of the world are extremely water-short. ^  Most 
of the countries located in arid and semi-arid regions are already facing a water 
crisis, though the intensity and the extent of that crisis could vary from one country 
to another, and with time. If the current trends continue, the water crisis will become 
widespread and more pervasive in nearly all arid and semi-arid countries by the 
early part of the 21st century. There are many interrelated reasons which contribute 
to this crisis situation. The first is the global population which increases steadily, 
with attendant implications for water quantity and quality. Although, there is no 
one-to-one relationship between population growth and higher water requirements, 
as the standard of living increases, so does the per capita water requirement. Second, 
from an economic perspective, the amount of freshwater available to any country on 
a long-term basis is limited. In arid and semi-arid countries since nearly all the easily 
available resources of water have now been developed or in. the process of 
development, the cost of future development projects in real terms can only be 
higher. Third, as hum an activities increase, more and more waste products are 
contaminating the available sources of surface water and ground water. This, in 
effect, means that serious water quality deterioration could be considered as 
equivalent to reduction in the quantity of water available for various uses in the 
future. Fourth, is increasing delays in implementing new water projects. In addition
^Peter Gleick, "Water and Conflict: Freshwater Resources and International Security," 
International Security, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1993, p. 79.
^Asit Biswas, Management of International Water Resources: Some Recent Developments," 
in Biswas (ed.). International Waters o f the Middle East: From Euphrates-Tigris to Nile, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 186-188.
to escalating project costs, lack of investment funds, increasing technical 
complexities of new development projects, and other factors like social and 
environmental implications of the water development projects that are becoming 
increasingly significant, are all likely to delay project initiation time. All these and 
other associated issues imply that, since demand for water in the arid and semi-arid 
countries increases steadily, it is unlikely for them to have very many new sources of 
water that could be developed economically. In fact, in a large number of arid and 
semi-arid countries, international water resources which have not been developed 
yet due to legal, technical or financial constraints are the only new major sources of 
water that can still be economically developed. This is therefore why development 
and management of international water resources become increasingly critical issues 
in the 1990s and beyond.
The vital role of water for human beings and development has received world­
wide attention. Through the activities of intergovernmental and nongovernmental 
organizations since the beginning of the 1970s much of the emphasis was placed on 
the global status of water, namely the water scarcity in absolute terms, and a lack of 
access to clean water and sanitation.·^ Later on, some specific regions of the world 
were identified as the most water-scarce regions with shared surface and ground 
water resources between two or more countries which received much more attention 
than other parts of the globe. The Middle East is regarded as the most controversial 
region in that sense. Each and every reason that causes water scarcity globally is 
present in the Middle East, such as rapidly growing population, changing levels of 
economic development, limited amounts of water supply that is unevenly and 
irregularly distributed, misuses and poor water management and allocation
^Just to name a few: Conference on Human and Environment in Stockholm, Sweden (1972); 
United Nations Water Conference in Mar del Plata, Argentina (1977); International 
Conference on Water and Environment in Dublin, Ireland (1992).
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practices both within and between states. The Euphrates and Tigris rivers constitute 
one of the principal river basins of the Middle East along with the Jordan and the 
Nile river basins. Both the Euphrates and Tigris originate from Turkey (nearly the 90 
percent of the Euphrates and the 45 percent of the Tigris river) and flow into the 
Syrian territory before entering Iraq. While the Euphrates flows through Syria for a 
considerable distance, the Tigris river does not enter Syria entirely but does only 
form the border with Turkey before flowing into Iraq. The Euphrates and Tigris 
rivers have emerged as a regional question when the three riparians, namely Turkey, 
Syria and Iraq initiated major development projects for various purposes such as the 
expansion of the irrigation network, and generating more electricity which heavily 
relied on the waters of the system. These projects put exceeding pressure on the 
limited amounts of water supply. Moreover, the existing inefficient and inequitable 
water use and management practices of the three riparians exacerbated the tension 
among the three major riparians.
Under such striking developments, water was picked up as a sensational issue 
firstly by the media. ^  Next, scholarly interest joined them. Hence, there has arisen an 
ongoing debate among scholars from various fields of science on the issue of 
management and utilization of water resources, as well as on the likelihood of a 
conflict that would be a result of the worsening situation of Water supply and
^Some argue that this situation will exacerbate the existing deep-rooted tensions in the 
region.
 ^ In the headlines of daily papers and in certain colunuis of some outstanding magazines and 
journals, there were many references to water as a potential source of conflict with special 
references to the situation in the Middle East. See for example, George Moffet III, "By the 
Year 2000 Water, Not Oil, Will be the Dominant Resource Issue," Christian Science Monitor, 
8 March 1990, p. 10; Andrew Alexander, "Ever-Deepening Water Crisis Could Fuel Conflicts 
in the Middle East," Atlanta Journal & Constitution, March 19, 1989, p. lA; Andrew 
Gowers, "Water War in the Middle East," Financial Times, May 1989, p. 57; Carla Anne 
Robbins, "Bridge Over Troubled Waters," U.S. News & World Report, Aug. 27/Sept. 3, 1990, 
p. 26; Caryle Murphy, "Middle East Faces Major Water Woes," The Washington Poi/, March 
10, 1990, p. A20; Alan Cowell, "Now a Little Steam Later Maybe a Water War," The New 
York Times, February 7, 1990, p. A21; - "More Precious Than Oil, and Maybe as Volatile," 
The New York Times, March 17, 1991.
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demand over the water resources of the Middle East. In the debate one can delineate 
basically three groups of scholars and experts whose views can be associated with 
either of the three influential schools of thought in the international relations theory 
such as the realists, political economists, and the institutionalists.
Proponents of the first school of thought, namely the realists argue that disputes 
over water distribution in major watersheds of the Middle East are likely to lead to 
conflicts since there are striking asymmetries among the riparians in terms of 
resource and power endowments.^ In their contention, it is highly unlikely that 
cooperative outcomes could be achieved in such river basins since the upstream 
riparian, regarding its advantageous position, would not be motivated to come to 
terms with the downstream riparians. Further, they assert that, cooperation is only 
likely when it serves the interests of a dominant power (which implies the upstream 
riparian in most cases, e.g. Turkey, in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin), that takes the 
lead in creating cooperative arrangements and enforces compliance to their rules. 
This study does not adopt the propositions of the realists simply because of the fact 
that the Euphrates-Tigris river basin exhibits quite a number of differences from the 
situation described by the realists. Because, while on the one hand, Turkey is said to 
be the most powerful of the three riparians both economically and militarily, on the 
other hand, Turkey does not use its power to induce (or threaten) its downstream 
neighbors to reach a cooperative solution by way of imposition. Conversely, a closer 
look into the hydropolitical relations of the three riparians reveals that, it is Turkey 
that has been active in putting forward cooperative solutions for equitable and 
effective allocation and management of the Euphrates-Tigris river system.
^See, for instance, Thomas Naff and Ruth Matson, Water in the Middle East: Conflict or 
Cooperation, Boulder, Colorado; Westview Press, 1985; Joyce Starr and Daniel Stoll, US 
Foreign Policy on Water Resources in the Middle East, Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 1987; J. 
Starr and D. Stoll (eds.). The Politics o f Scarcity/, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988; 
James Bulloch and Adel Darwish, Water Wars: Coming Conflicts in the Middle East, 
London: Victor Gollancz, 1993. Miriam Lowi, Water and Power, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993, p. 9.
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Proponents of a second school of thought, namely the political economists, assert 
that, despite the dramatically worsening regional water balance in the Middle East, 
water has not been the source of a hot conflict over the last thirty years simply 
because of the fact that governments of the region managed to substitute water with 
cheap imported food staples through international trade. ^  Political economists 
believe that, by means of reallocation of water resources at the national level by 
shifting the major emphasis from irrigation, which is the most consumptive user, to 
domestic and industrial uses, countries compensated for the overall deficiencies in 
agricultural production by importing foodstuffs. This situation is likely to continue 
for the foreseeable future. Indeed, political economists offer a well-structured 
analysis for coping with the water stress in arid and semi-arid parts of the world 
such as the Middle East. But, still this study does not follow the policies suggested 
by the political economists on the grounds that their main arguments necessitate an 
overall change (restructuring) in the agro-economic policies of the riparian states in 
the Euphrates-Tigris river basin which seems highly unlikely. Because, agriculture 
accounts for a very significant place in the economies of the three riparians in all 
respects (e.g., food security, employment, etc..), especially for Syria and Iraq. These 
two countries follow a "food self-sufficiency" policy since the late 1950s. Moreover, 
Syria has a very weak trading capacity due to the huge amounts of its foreign debts, 
and its mineral resources are not as abundant as those of Iraq, though oil ranks first
O
among its export items. In the case of both Syria and Iraq, the definition of 
economic development has very strong agricultural implications. The reasons 
behind this emphasis are varied. First, it reflects a realistic assessment of the present 
situation in these societies where a significant part of the population lives in villages
^See Daniel Hillel, Rivers o f Eden: The Struggle for Water and Quest for Peace in the Middle 
East, Oxford: OUP, 1995; Asit Biswas (ed.), International Water Resources o f the Middle 
East: from Euphrates-Tigris to Nile, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994; Peter Rogers 
and Peter Lydon (eds.), Water in the Arab World:Perspectives and Prognoses, Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994; Jad Isaac and Hillel Shuval (eds.). Water and Peace in 
the Middle East, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1994.
 ^A detailed discussion about the political economy of Syria exits in Chapter 4 of this study.
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and engaged in agriculture. Secondly, in the case of Syria which has only modest oil 
revenues, funds needed for industrial development have to come from savings 
accrued in the agricultural sector. Third, the vision of the ideal society, as depicted 
by the political leaderships in both Syria and Iraq, includes an agriculturally 
prosperous countryside. And, finally, agricultural development may be seen as a 
means of attaining other goods apart from economic advancement, such as national 
unity, social justice, state power, and democracy.^
Meanwhile, a third group of scholars and experts, namely the institutionalists, 
claim that water-related disputes stem from the inequitable and inefficient 
management and utilization of limited water resources. Hence, they argue that 
achieving effective management and utilization of water resources may also 
ameliorate political relations between the riparian states. Institutionalists believe 
that, solutions to the water dispute cannot be spontaneous, whereas, they could only 
be realized through institution-building efforts of the concerned parties. The works 
of the international organizations and the international law community are 
instrumental in providing these institutions for better (effective and equitable) 
management and allocation of existing water resources. Institutionalists are of 
diverse disciplines such as political science, economics, law, natural sciences, and 
environmental sciences. Therefore, institutionalists adopt an interdisciplinary 
approach to avoid institutional deficiencies in water management and allocation.
filter Turan and Gün Kut, "Political-Ideological Constraints on Intra-basin Cooperation 
onTransboundary Waters," Natural Resources Forum, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 139-145, 1997. 
^^See David G. LeMarquand, International Rivers: The Politics o f Cooperation, University 
of British Columbia and the Waterloo Research Centre, 1977. P. H. Gleick, "Reducing the 
Risks of Conflict Over Fresh Water Resources in the Middle East," in J. Isaac and H. Shuval 
(eds.). Water and Peace in the Middle East, Amsterdam: Elsevier Pub., 1994, pp. 41-54. P. 
Rogers, “The Agenda for the Next Thirty Years," in Peter Rogers and Peter Lydon (eds.). 
Water in the Arab World: Perspectives and Prognoses, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1993, pp. 310-311. Natasha Beschorner, “Water and Instability in the Middle East," 
London: IISS, Adelphi Paper, No. 273, 1992, pp. 70-71.
20
If one would identify the entirety of the views and postulates coming out of 
these three schools of thought as analogous to a 'universal set', then each of the 
individual school of thought could be labeled as 'subsets' whereby the degree of 
intersection of each of them with every other would exhibit differences. Hence, the 
detailed survey that follows will reveal, among others, that the views expressed by 
the political economists and institutionalists have more in common than they each 
have with the views of the realists who hardly envisage any cooperative solution 
regarding the future context of the water dispute among the riparian states. The 
divergences between the political economists and the institutionalists, on the other 
hand, stem from the prominence they assign to the economic and political 
dimensions of the matter. Whereas the political economists stress the economic 
dimension of the matter, the institutionalists stress the political dimension.
The approach of the institutionalist to the issue of management and utilization 
of transboundary water resources is adopted in this research, to a very great extent. 
Hence, the main theme of this dissertation can be stated as follows: ineffective and 
inequitable management and utilization of the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin are 
one of the principal reasons of tension among the riparians states. Therefore, the 
establishment of institutions within the framework of an international regime that would be 
instrumental in achieving effective and equitable management and allocation of the ivaters of 
the Euphrates-Tigris river basin xvould also ease the tension in the region.
The knowledge and expertise accumulated during a series of conferences by the 
international organizations, and the works of the international law community on 
the issue of efficient and equitable management and utilization of the transboundary 
watercourses, provide the general framework of principles and norms within the 
context of an international regime. By applying these principles and norms to the 
specific circumstances of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin and supporting them with 
necessary rules and decision-making structures, a regime is suggested for in the
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region with a view to achieve better management and utilization of the existing 
waters resources. Hence, this dissertation is based on the major assumption that: 
international regimes on the efficient and equitable management and utilization of water 
resources make cooperation among Turkey, Syria and Iraq over the Euphrates and Tigris 
rivers more likely.
A. Realists: "Water is a potential source of conflict"
As the prevalent school of thought in international relations discipline, political 
realists argue that power and capabilities define relations in the international 
system. ^   ^ The anarchic structure of the international system and the notion of the 
unified and rational states as the principal actors within this anarchic environment 
constituted the major premises of classical realism. Hence, they argue that the 
political-structural condition of anarchy, and the absence of a common government 
in the international system has an impact on the (unjwillingness of states to engage 
in cooperation. Given this condition, states are motivated by fear and distrust, and 
their principal concern is their security and survival. Since, ensuring their security 
is their chief objective, states are preoccupied with their power and capabilities. 
Indeed, capabilities, in the form of economic, military, and political resources, are 
"the ultimate basis for state security and independence in the self-help context of 
international anarchy." In other words, according to realists, states have to rely on 
their own means that they can generate, and the arrangements that they can make 
for themselves. Before all else, states must make provisions for their security in the 
power struggle among states. The preoccupation with autonomy, power and 
security predisposes states toward conflict and competition.
For a comprehensive discussion about realism see Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among 
Nations, 4th Edition, New York: Knopf, 1966 (first published in 1948); Kenneth Waltz, Man, 
the State and War, New York: Columbia University, 1959; Robert Gilpin, War and Change 
in World Politics, Cambridge University Press ,1981.
Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America and Non-Tariff 
Barriers to Trade, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, p. 38.
^^Ibid. p. 39.
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Accordingly, in regard to the water dispute in the Middle East, realists assert 
that as the water in the region is becoming a more and more scarce resource, it will 
become a major source of a conflict that might escalate to an armed struggle. This 
school of thought includes scholars from political science and history, as well as 
experts on the Middle Eastern geography, with their rather timely interest in the 
emerging situation in the region. This group of scholars claim that, in major 
Middle Eastern watersheds, especially in the Jordan river where the supply is nearly 
exhausted, water "becomes a highly symbolic, contagious, aggregated, intense, 
salient, complicated zero-sum power and prestige-packed crisis issue, and highly 
prone to conflict and thus extremely difficult to resolve." In advocating this idea, 
they basically use the statements that are made by political leaders of the concerned 
countries for internal political reasons which in fact appear to contradict their actual 
policies of adjustment. Realists also share the view that "when a riparian dispute in 
an arid region unfolds within the context of a more comprehensive political conflict, 
the former can neither be effectively isolated from the latter, nor be resolved as 
such."^^ To illustrate, Miriam Lowi focused on empirical material which is drawn 
from the dispute over the waters of the Jordan river basin, namely a dispute that co­
exists with a larger political conflict among the states in question. Thus, she claimed 
that the riparian dispute in a protracted conflict setting is not simply about water, it 
takes on many of the attributes of inter-state conflict. Others also emphasized that 
water conflicts develop between countries which have already had prolonged 
conflicts that have severely strained mutual relations, and many of which are yet to
See Thomas Naff and Ruth Matson, Water in the Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation, 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985; J. Starr and D. Stoll, US Foreign Policy on Water 
Resources in the Middle East, Washington, D.C.; CSIS, 1987; J. Starr and D. Stoll (eds.). The 
Politics o f Scarcity, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988; James Bulloch and Adel 
Darwish, Water Wars: Coming Conflicts in the Middle East, London: Victor Gollancz, 1993.
Thomas Naff, Testimony on the Jordan before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US 
House of Representatives, Washington, DC, 26 June 1990.
Miriam Lowi, Water and Power, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 9.
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be resolved. Just like the way realists adopt in examining the behavior of the 
states, this latter group of scholars largely limit their analysis to power and interest 
orientations of the riparians. In other words, they primarily focus on the water as a 
scarce and essential resource and more importantly support their ideas with deeper 
analysis on power relations and structures of the riparians of a particular river basin.
Realists stress certain conditions for cooperation, such as the presence and 
acceptance of a dominant power (a riparian acting as a hegemon) in taking the lead 
to reach a basin-wide cooperation. That is to say, cooperation is likely only when the 
dominant power in the basin is induced to cooperate for one reason or another. By 
drawing sharp distinctions among the endowments of the riparians in political, 
military, economic and geographic terms, upstream riparians are thought to be in 
the most advantageous position. Hence, realists see almost no possibility for a 
negotiated order, and argue that once negotiations are initiated, the mid-stream and 
downstream riparians would sit at the bargaining table with an unfavorable 
position. They do not see any prospects for any fruitful outcome through a 
negotiation process either, largely because the least needy an d /o r most powerful 
riparian will derive little benefit from cooperating and relinquishing its most 
favorable position. However, realists equally argue that certain states which could 
act as a hegemon, relying on its military and economic power, might neither be 
sufficiently powerful to take on the role of a hegemon, nor would have any incentive 
to do so.^^ Such an outcome would certainly complicate the situation even further in 
river basins and would impair the likelihood of cooperation.
17
17 John Kolars and Yahia Bakour, "The Arab Mashrek: Hydrologic History, Problems and 
Perspectives" in Peter Rogers and Peter Lyndon (eds.), Water in the Arab World: Perspectives 
and Prognoses, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994, pp. 121-147.
Miriam Lowi, op. cit., p. 10.
John Waterbury, "Dynamics of basin-wide cooperation in the utilization of the Euphrates," 
Paper prepared for the conference: The Economic Development o f Syria; Problems, Progress, 
and Prospects, pp. 9-10.
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Nonetheless, realists admit that the benefits of cooperation are numerous: for 
instance through cooperation it would be possible to recognize the rights of each 
riparian that would in turn enhance predictability in use; similarly, an infrastructural 
integration could be built which would rule out the option of resorting to force 
among the riparians over water or any other issue.^^ A prominent figure of this line 
of thought, namely Nurit Kliot, analyzed three major river systems in the Middle 
East as complex systems influenced by complex physical (geographical, climatic and 
hydrological), political, economic and social processes. In her study, Kliot 
provided thorough perspectives on power relationships among the various 
hydrological units of the region. Meanwhile, she suggested that the principles of the 
Helsinki and ILC Rules be accepted as an appropriate standard for water sharing. 
Kliot's analysis focuses on the positive implications of these principles regarding the
likelihood of cooperation as well as a potential for conflict when the principle of
99equitable allocation is abandoned.
Studying the likelihood of cooperation solely within the theoretical limits of 
political realism impedes researchers to proceed further with producing more 
cooperative frameworks which could avoid the emergence of water conflicts that 
they often claim to be very likely to take place in the major river basins of the Middle 
East. The major drawback of the realist approach is that, it is short of proposing 
substantial cooperative solutions though they truly admit that water scarcity could 
lead to further tensions in this volatile region of the world. Hence, realists identify 
potential trouble areas related to the water issue, but do little good in the name of
John Waterbury, "Transboundary Water and the Challenge of International Cooperation in 
the middle East," in Peter Rogers and Peter Lydon (eds.) Water in the Arab World: 
Perspectives and Prognoses, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 62.
Nurit Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East, London and New York: 
Routledge, 1994.
It is worth noting that even realists have brought into their discussions the significance of 
institutions existing in local, regional and international level on the way to achieve 
cooperation.
25
providing tools for mitigating the problem. Their theoretical discussion stays at a 
rather abstract level and in isolation from the real-world practices of the riparians of 
the major catchments in the Middle East. Moreover, these analysts keep disregarding 
some recent shifts in the stance of each riparian within the framework of Middle East 
Peace Talks. For instance, Anthony Allan gives the example of two very important 
shifts in the approach to the allocation and management of water in Israel: first a 
remarkable amount of water that used to be allocated for agricultural practices is 
diverted to industrial and domestic uses, and secondly demand management 
principles are adopted, recommended for the region. Allan adds that realists did 
not devote any section to these striking developments in the region in their well- 
informed studies. Allan, therefore, argues that the international relations setting, 
which this community of scholars addresses has been subject to very dynamic 
changes in international politics over the last couple of years in the Jordan Basin in 
particular, and in the Middle East region and the global system in general. 
Moreover, realist arguments proved to be less insightful for the other two major 
river systems (i.e., Nile and the Euphrates-Tigris) as well. That is, even the most 
"powerful" riparians in these two river systems, Egypt and Turkey, respectively, did 
not engage in any kind of coercive practices to date. Quite to the contrary, they tend 
to ameliorate their cooperative postures which are in accordance with the rising 
necessity for efficient and equitable allocation and management practices in the 
water sector both at national and basin-wide levels.
B. Political Economists: "Virtual water"
In international relations literature, international political economy is defined 
as an integrated field that encompasses a number of specialized disciplines such as 
political science, economics and international relations. Political economists who are
^^John Anthony Allan, "The political economy of water: reasons for optimism but long term 
caution," in J. A. Allan (ed.). Water, Peace and the Middle East, London: I. B. Tauris 
Publishers, 1996, pp. 75-133.
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involved in the water issue base their arguments on the liberalist view concerning 
the political economy of international trade. Liberal theory ultimately rests upon the 
belief that economic specialization produces gains in productive efficiency and 
national income. Liberal theory also believes that trade enlarges consumption 
possibilities, thus international trade has beneficial effects on both the demand and 
supply sides of the economy. The liberal theory maintains that a nation's 
comparative advantage is determined by the relative abundance and most profitable 
combination of its several factors of production such as capital, labor, resources, 
management, and technology. More specifically, a country will export (import) those 
commodities which are intensive in the use of its abundant (scarce) factor.^'^ With 
these in mind, one group of scholars adopt a political economist approach while 
dealing with the water-related tensions.
Political economists who are involved in the water issue presuppose that 
agriculture is the major consumer of the water resources in economies even in 
circumstances that the water-scarce countries do not have comparative advantage in 
growing agricultural products. International trade in food staples between the 
water-scarce countries and the countries which have comparative advantage in food 
is seen by the political economists as the primary remedy to ease the tension over 
water resources. Prominent members of this school of thought assert that almost all 
countries in arid or semi-arid regions, particularly for those the water scarcity is a 
genuine concern, should reallocate their water resources by shifting the major 
emphasis from irrigation to domestic and industrial uses. They argue that, to 
compensate the overall deficiencies in agricultural production, such states could 
import food stuffs as "virtual water."
Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy o f International Relations, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1987, pp. 171-180.
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In view of the political economists, water has been and will be a potential 
source of tension in the Middle East. However, there is an increasingly persuasive 
group of political economists who argue that the past 25 years of the hydropolitical 
history of the Middle East in particular has been remarkable for the absence of overt 
hot conflict over water. They also point to the remarkable degree of economic 
adjustment to the tensions deriving from the mismatch of current water demand and 
supply. Thus, priority assigned to the water issue has not led to greater conflict so 
far. Rather it has tended to focus attention on the need to adjust. Political economists 
argue that realists would mislead those wanting to understand the current water 
management options and provide no signposts at all for those wishing to predict 
future opportunities. They emphasize that those analyzing the water problems of the 
region should tighten up their economic analysis so that they can track the political 
economy of water effectively and thereby understand apparently contradictory 
public and private statements and decisions.
The most important way the region has been able to meet its increasing water 
needs since the 1970s is with "virtual water", a term adopted by Tony Allan of 
SOAS.^^ According to Allan, virtual water is the water imported to the Middle East 
in terms of products, especially wheat, that have been produced with water in 
farming sectors in the United States and Europe. Allan comments that the 
international trading system has enabled the economies of the region to escape from
Prof. J. Anthony Allan is a leading figure in this school of thought. He published 
extensively on regional water issues and is the founder of the Water Issues Group at the 
School of Oriental and African Studies in London. The Water Issues Group focuses on 
freshwater as a key global renewable natural resource; their attention was first devoted to the 
Middle East as the region which has experienced the world's most serious and accelerating 
water deficits since the early 1970s. Through their analysis they concluded that the region's 
governments had been able to achieve remarkable economic adjustments to the apparently 
conflict-loaded water challenge in the region, and the emphasis has shifted to viewing the 
problem globally.
The Water Issues Group at SOAS has contributed facilitating this concept, namely 'virtual 
water' which is a term already used in the literature and the media; it featured in a current 
internet conference on water scarcity and river basin management convened by FAO.
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being trapped in the closed hydrological systems to which they have access. Hence, 
despite the dramatically worsening regional water balance there have not been any 
incidents of hot conflict over water, and that has prevented all but the most 
obsessive sensation mongers to recognize that the governments in the region have 
been very effectively solving their water problems very effectively.^^ Accordingly, 
Allan describes the economies of the major Middle Eastern countries as open 
political economies whose governments have been quite successful in avoiding 
conflicts over water through international trade.
To recall, the realists built their conflict-prone disposition on the assumption 
that each riparian performs in the geopolitical limitations of closed hydrological 
systems which impose them to act solely by power and interest calculations. In fact, 
realists did not give any weight to the interdisciplinary nature of water which may 
enable the researcher to be acquainted with the various constructive and cooperative 
proposals of social sciences as in political economy. Political economists evidently 
give significant place to the works of those scholars and scientists which make an 
overall assessment of the water disputes of the Middle East region in a 
comprehensive manner and produce a number of propositions for cooperative 
outcomes. ® They argue that this body of work is quite useful in providing a better 
analysis of numerous sources of the realists who have suggested that resource 
deficits will lead to hot conflict. Indeed, the arguments presented in those studies are 
cautious and utilize generally the tools of political analysis in an attempt to analyze
J. A. Allan, "Escaping water constraints in the Middle East; water, 'virtual water', some 
promising initiatives and the Peace Process," Middle East and African Water Review, Issue 4, 
September 1995, p.l.
For instance, the studies like Rivers o f Eden: The Struggle for Water and Quest for Peace 
in the Middle East, by Daniel Hillel, Oxford: OUP, 1995; International Water Resources o f 
the Middle East: from Euphrates-Tigris to Nile edited by Asit Biswas, Oxford; Oxford 
University Press, 1994; Water in the Arab World:Perspectives and Prognoses edited by Peter 
Rogers and Peter Lydon, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994; Water and 
Peace in the Middle East, edited by Jad Isaac and Hillel Shuval, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1994, 
are all reviewed in various issues of MEWREW of Water Issues Group at SOAS.
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the place of water in the international politics of the region. However, political 
economists claim that almost all of these studies ignore crucial concepts deployed by 
the political economy approach. In their reasoning, without such perspectives the 
past forty years of water management in the region cannot be explained since the 
solution to water shortages was linked more to the capacity of the region's 
economies to import 'virtual water' than to agreements for sharing inadequate 
indigenous resources.
Political economists assert that there are indeed incontestable signs of 
reassessment of the regional governments in the allocation of water resources among 
the competing sectors. Drastic changes took place in Israeli water policy since the 
drought of 1989 with reductions of water allocated to agriculture. However the 
developments are not always that straightforward: most of the countries of the 
region, including the ones facing water shortages like Iraq and Syria did not engage 
in such reallocations at all. One should also observe the fact that, over the last couple 
of decades, countries like Syria and Iraq have already practiced a great deal of trade 
in food staples either through imports or exports depending on the harvests of the 
year in concern. Political economists emphasize the need for urgent reconsiderations 
of water allocation and management practices primarily at the national level and 
subsequently at the basin-wide level. In their reasoning, local water remains to be an 
important element in national economies but it is of less and less significance as 
governments solve their water problems in international markets. Accordingly, this 
group of scientists, especially within the framework of the Water Issues Group at 
SO AS, have scrutinized the recent trends in world food markets by placing special 
emphasis on the need to determine the capacity of the global systems to enable the 
development and use of freshwater. Thus, between 1970 and 1995, regional 
hydropolitics were stabilized by the availability of unlimited subsidized quantities of 
food staples except for Iraq. However, with the emergence of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in Spring 1995, there has been a rapid increase in grain prices.
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With these developments, the Middle East started to face new circumstances in the 
political economy of global trade in food, and local governments would soon have to 
take these changes into account in their regional and international relations. These 
analysts proposed that increased trade within the region could be one of the 
principal means of tackling that wider problem of higher world food prices and 
tighter world supplies.
In addition to their vigorous arguments with regard to the options that political 
economy could offer for easing the tensions over water, political economists assign 
considerable weight to the studies of international agencies such as the World Bank, 
FAO and UNDP. They appreciate the contributions of these agencies with regard to 
their clear exposition on the basic economic concepts in relation to water along with 
the other key areas that these studies determine for water resources strategy 
formulation such as their analysis on institutional and human resources issues, 
stakeholder participation, information system issues, environmental and health 
considerations and international aspects of water issues. Political economists 
evidently accept the significance of these international agencies' attempts in 
introducing new institutions an d /o r ameliorating the existing ones at national and 
basin-wide levels for efficient and equitable allocation of water that would, in turn, 
facilitate the strategies for settling the disputes over water. However, they give 
foremost importance to the political economy of water. The analysts in this school 
maintain that attention should be focused on "problemsheds" not only on the 
watersheds. Problemsheds defines the complex economic and political relations of 
riparians of the major watersheds of the Middle East both within the region or with 
world markets. In other words, peoples and governments of the region live in 
political economies whereby water is subordinate to other political economies 
including that of the world trade in food. They keep stressing the point that 
evaluation of Middle Eastern water without concurrently addressing its regional and 
global contexts would mislead further research.
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Political economists have also utilized various recommendations of a third 
school of thought, namely the institutionalists, especially the ones related to the 
innovations in institutional settings for improving water policy and management. 
However, they assert that it is dangerous to consider institutions for water 
management as a sole remedy for deficiencies.^ Demand management practices are 
primarily essential in order to bring the ailocation and management of the scarce 
water resources into an environmentally and economically sustainable system. But 
for catchments like Jordan, demand management options need to be supported by 
international food trade. The Water Issues Group found out that international 
trade would stabilize the economies of the region at least for the medium term. In 
their opinion, the region will become further dependent on the global capacity to 
supply its food and water needs. However, in the long run because of the measures 
being urged by the World Trade Organization (e.g., hardening of prices worldwide 
and lifting of subsidies on imported cereals) countries in the region face uncertainty 
with regards to the availability of virtual v.' a^ter in reasonable amounts and prices. 
This team of experts concludes that, depending on continuing supplies, virtual water 
is an inescapable choice for the political economies of the regional countries, but it is 
the responsibility of those countries to establish the reliability of the supply of such 
water through diversification of their economies as well as integrating their 
economies to the world markets.
J. A. Allan, "The political economy of water: reasons for optimism but long term caution," 
in Allan (ed.). Water, Peace and the Middle East, London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996, 
pn. 81-82.
Allan apparently refers to the water problems of the Jordan river system where supply is 
almost exhausted and the application of demand management practices are really useful in 
this sense. However, he adds that at the end of the current phase of water management (1990- 
2020) which is characterized by demand management practices, in regions like the Jordan 
river, economic activities particularly in the form of international trade should support such 
activities. Introducing some institutional frameworks such as allocating the resource in an 
efficient manner even at the national level have faced opposition from various kinds of users. 
On the other hand, the physical, political and economic conditions of the Euphrates-Tigris 
basin is quite different from the Jordan basin in the sense that, currently there is still unused 
water in the system and building institutions and/or strengthening the existing ones would 
create numerous opportunities for efficient management and allocation of the two rivers.
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In the political economist perspective, major problems with successful 
development of water resources lie in the refinement of economic analysis.^ ^  In their 
opinion, to fully appreciate water policy options and how they are evaluated, it is 
necessary to understand how economics is used and misused in the water area. 
Political economists acknowledge that politics ultimately control water resource 
planning, however, the ability to understand and manipulate the economic analysis 
may significantly improve the final outcome. Meanwhile, they state that the major 
attention paid to economics in their studies should not be taken to mean that the 
institutional and technological dimensions are unimportant, but rather the pay-offs 
from improving the economic dimensions are currently larger than those from other 
areas of concern.
In sum, political economists view water as part of complex national and 
international political economies of the Middle East, and draw an optimistic picture 
of the region by utilizing the powerful explanatory economic models, namely the 
advantages of international trade. They also support their arguments with the view 
that water entering the region through trade in food staples is a major reason for the 
past absence of conflict. Accordingly, they suggest that this will ensure the future 
absence of conflict, at least in the short and medium terms.
At this point, it should be emphasized that this study acknowledges the idea of 
the political economists that Syria and Iraq in particular should consider reallocating 
their limited water resources by shifting the utilization of their resources from
Peter Rogers, "Comprehensive Water Resources Management: A Concept Paper," World 
Bank: Policy Research Working Papers: WPS 879, Washington, D.C., 1992.
Thus, in subsequent works of Peter Rogers, one may clearly observe his increased 
attention on the institutional and technological dimensions of effective water resources 
management and allocation. See P. Rogers, "The Agenda for the Next Thirty Years," in Peter 
Rogers and Peter Lydon (eds.). Water in the Arab World: Perspectives and Prognoses, 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993.
J. A. Allan, MEWREW, Issue 3, April 1995, p.5.
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irrigation to the industrial and domestic sectors. This would relieve the stress on the 
demand from transboundary rivers, especially from the Euphrates. Moreover, this 
would support the actions towards water conservation. However, it should also be 
emphasized that, agriculture (and thus irrigation), as will be discussed in Chapter 4, 
still has a prominent place in the economies of the countries in the Euphrates-Tigris 
river basin in terms of employment, its share in GDP, and in export revenues. 
Accordingly, this study endorses the idea that various institutions that international 
organizations and the international law community offer for the equitable and 
effective management of the water resources provide more practical and rapid 
solutions rather than the arguments of the political economists who propose 
overhauling the entire economic structure.
C. Institutionalists: "Efficient and equitable management and utilization of 
water resources can also ease tension among the riparians"
Neoliberal institutionalism has emerged as a prominent field of study in 
international relations over the last couple of decades. Proponents of this school of 
thought attempt to make a synthesis of the realist and liberal approaches to 
international relations.^^ Therefore, neoliberal institutionalism is characterized by an 
approval and adoption of the key realist assumptions such as the anarchic nature of 
the international system, states being the principal actors in world politics, and the 
importance of self-interest and relative capabilities. Nevertheless, neoliberal 
institutionalists maintain that although realists are correct in so far as the condition 
of anarchy impedes cooperation, states in non-zero-sum situations can cooperate 
with the assistance of institutions. International institutions are considered by 
neoliberal institutionalists as organization'.! bodies that regularize and facilitate 
interaction between states and improve the proliferation of cooperative processes. By
Robert O. Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War," 
in David Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate , New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 271.
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means of international institutions, actors sharing common interests within the 
system can be motivated toward collaboration since the existence of such institutions 
increase the rate and scope of information exchange, and they serve as promoters of 
compatible state interests by coordinating negotiations. Institutions decrease 
uncertainty and reduce costs while enhancing cooperative elements such as 
predictability, harmony and convergence of interests, stability and transparency in 
the realm of international politics.
Neoliberal institutionalism as an intellectual construction takes the regulating 
functions of the international institutions within this anarchic system as the basis of 
its interpretation while attempting to explain the facts of the world. If these 
institutions are established appropriately, according to institutionalists, they can 
generate policy coordination among states and open the way to advanced 
institutional arrangements for water resources management and allocation. Yet, 
neoliberal institutionalists do not assume that international institutions are easy to 
build up or to keep. However, like functionalists, they are more optimistic about the 
potential for cooperation in economic and welfare matters than in military and 
security affairs. Similarly, institutionalists involved in the water issue argue that, 
realists focus very much on the role of water in international relations giving water a 
degree of strategic prominence which it does not necessitate. Thus, in the 
institutionalist viewpoint, water is regarded rather as a part of economic welfare 
matters.
Institutionalists have conducted distinctive research on the geopolitics of 
transboundary watercourses and elaborated the complex set of relations between 
resource politics, international security and environment. These analysts have made 
significant contributions to both the theoretical and practical discussions on 
understanding the connections between the environment and security. Hence, they 
focused on the links between shared freshwater resources and international
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disputes. When David LeMarquand wrote his book on the political basis for sharing 
international rivers, entitled International Rivers: The Politics of Cooperation in 1977, he 
tended to relegate international river issues to the "middle range of objectives", 
dealing with satisfying domestic, social, and economic demands, rather than to the
o r
"core objectives" regarding a country's territorial integrity or self-preservation.·^ On 
the other hand, nearly two decades later, Peter Gleick argued that not all water 
resources disputes will lead to violent conflict; indeed most lead to negotiations, 
discussions, and non-violent resolutions. As already noted, in certain regions of the 
world, such as the Middle East, water is a scarce resource that has become 
increasingly important for economic and agricultural development.^” Although, in 
these regions, water is evolving into an issue of high politics, and the probability of 
water-related violence according to the realists is on the increase. Institutionalists 
assume that water-related disputes are more likely to lead to political confrontations 
and negotiations short of violent conflict. In their reasoning, water wars are highly 
unlikely in the region, while there are real concerns over the equitability of 
distribution. In their contention, the core of the Middle East water crisis is clearly 
national water-plarming policy, which is a potential cause of instability but also the 
basis for solutions. They emphasize that water-related disputes are a consequence 
of, rather than a catalyst for, deteriorating relations between states. Moreover, 
institutionalists insist on the point that it would be a too simplistic a scenario to 
argue that upstream riparian, being the sole hegemon, would engage in unilateral 
appropriation or diversion of a shared watercourse without consultation, because
o r
David G. LeMarquand, International Rivers: The Politics o f Cooperation, University of 
British Columbia and The Waterloo Research Centre, 1977.
Peter H. Gleick (ed.). Water in Crisis: A guide to the World's Fresh Water Resources, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
P. H. Gleick, "Water, War and Peace in the A i^ddle East," Environment Magazine, Vol. 39, 
No. 3, 1994, pp. 6-42.
P. H. Gleick, "Reducing the Risks of Conflict Over Fresh Water Resources in the Middle 
East," in J. Isaac and H. Shuval (eds.). Water and Peace in the Middle East, Amsterdam: 
Elsevier Pub., 1994, pp. 41-54.
Natasha Beschorner, “Water and Instability in the Middle East," London: IISS, Adelphi 
Paper, No. 273, 1992, pp. 70-71.
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such an argument does not take into account the complex political and economic
O O
interrelationships among the riparian states. Institutionalists point out that there 
has been a significant trend towards collaboration, even though this is largely 
confined to technical matters: e.g. cooperation on the exchange of hydrological data, 
flood forecasting, joint hydroelectric power and water-recovery ventures. Thus, they 
assert that it is these small-scale confidence-building measures combined with re- 
evaluation of national water allocation, that are of interest to, and indeed are 
encouraged by, international financial and development institutions. Further, 
institutionalists claim that water war scenarios are misleading and mask the 
complexity of water resource management at the national as well as international 
level.
Institutionalists conclude that the water crisis, like the oil crisis, is a passing
on
problem of misallocation rather than absolute shortage. So, to alleviate the crisis, 
states should adopt policies to allocate water efficiently. However, this does not 
mean that the transitions involved will be painless. Institutionalists determine that if 
one considers together the nature of the conflicts and the magnitudes of water 
deficits in the Middle East, one would see that even the most expeditious and 
equitable resolution of the conflicts would make little improvement in reducing the 
scale of current or future water deficits. They assert that these looming deficits are 
the real problems. To overcome these water deficits, Peter Rogers puts forward an 
agenda for the next thirty years. That agenda would include such areas of concern as 
agriculture; municipal and industrial water use; hydrological and geophysical 
explorations, and institutional development.
38 Ibid., p. 3.
P. Rogers, “The Agenda for the Next Thirty Years," in Peter Rogers and Peter Lydon 
(eds.). Water in the Arab World: Perspectives and Prognoses, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1993, pp. 310-311.
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For agriculture, there is a great need to carry out detailed agro-economic 
studies to elucidate just how much water might be saved by these approaches for 
individual countries in the region. Meanwhile, the issue of municipal and industrial 
water use is also deemed very important since the bulk of the water saved from 
agriculture will go to urban supply. Detailed studies need to be made to compare 
and contrast conventional and non-conventional supply methods. For instance, as 
has been suggested, conservation of water for urban and industrial uses appears to 
be much more economically attractive than desalination in most situations. 
Institutionalists advise to carry on detailed geophysical investigations to establish 
the sources and amounts of river discharges. This would entail substantial work on 
the ground and with GIS, involving remote sensing and ground truthing.
Concerning institutional development, institutionalists recommend to build 
comprehensive water agencies as genuine full-sector water agencies to avoid the 
inertia and inefficiency in water policy decision-making. Moreover, they suggest that 
agricultural water user institutions should be built in a way to be flexible enough to 
arrange for water sharing within and betw^een years, and be able to manage water 
transfers between different user groups. Furthermore, institutionalists advise to 
build a series of multilateral or bilateral regional water agencies that would provide 
a forum for the exchange of technical and economic approaches to solve the 
problems of the region as well as providing venues in which water problems would 
receive some political prominence.
The crisis, in their opinion, relates fundamentally to the nature of water use and 
allocation within states as well as the water allocation between states. Thus, their 
arguments in that sense overlap with the political economists in explaining the major 
causes of water scarcity in arid regions of the world, such as the Middle East. 
Institutionalists stress that the governments of the water scarce region should 
implement such policies as water pricing and reduction of subsidies on water, staple
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foods and agricultural inputs as remedies to water-supply constraints. In this regard, 
they suggest certain specific measures to adopt instead of utilizing the powerful 
explanatory economic models which are expressed by the political economists.
Thus, the basic distinction between political economists and institutionalists is 
that the latter give utmost significance to the watersheds: in other words, they 
analyze the disputed waters of the Middle East as closed hydrological systems, and 
they attempt to ease the tensions in this region by utilizing, and giving more or less 
the same weight to the major premises of various fields of science such as political 
science, international law, economics and technical sciences, (e.g., hydrology). 
Notwithstanding, political economists either focus extensively on problemsheds 
where in their analysis the political economy of water is subordinate to the political 
economy of the world trade in food where substitutes for water could be found.^^ 
Further, institutionalists basically suggest policies to promote institutionalized 
patterns of behavior among the riparians of the disputed rivers, while political 
economists see institutions as a 'necessary but not sufficient' condition to be a 
remedy for water-related crisis.
Indeed, institutionalists emphasize the interdisciplinary nature of water, and 
determine some coordinated tasks for scientists, scholars and policy-makers in 
creating alternative cooperative models for the disputed waters of the Middle East. 
Further, they argue that the pressing problems of environmental degradation, 
regional and global poverty, and political tension and conflict are fundamentally 
interrelated, and that long-term solutions must consider these issues in an 
interdisciplinary manner.·^ ^  To illustrate, Peter Gleick suggests an interdisciplinary
J. A. Allan, "Escaping water constraints in the Middle East: water, 'virtual water', some 
promising initiatives and the Peace Process," Middle East and African Water Review, Issue 4, 
September 1995, p.l.
P. H. Gleick, "Water and Conflict," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1993, pp. 79-
112.
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approach in dealing with water related conflicts. He advises that hydrologists and 
water-resource specialists must begin to collect and more widely disseminate data 
on the supply and use of shared water resources, and on ways of reducing inefficient 
uses of water while international legal experts should better understand the links 
among natural resource needs, national sovereignty, and water rights; and academic 
and military scholars need to better understand the threats of conflict arising from a 
wide range of resource and environmental problems, and to invent the tools for 
preventing those conflicts. The problem of international water bodies can only be 
resolved through a multidisciplinary and holistic approach. Institutionalists assert 
that, in the area of management of international water resources, geopolitical 
considerations and hydropolitical implications between the co-basin countries 
cannot be divorced from technical, legal, economic and environmental issues. When 
water becomes scarce and is considered to be a strategic national resource, 
hydropolitics needs to be reviewed for rational management of international water 
bodies through an interdisciplinary approach. Thus, in the following sections of
^^Similarly, Aaron T. Wolf adopts an interdisciplinary approach in his widely researched 
book. See Aaron T. Wolf, Hydropolitics Along the Jordan River: Scarce Water and Its 
Impact on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Tokyo, New York, Paris: United Nations University 
Press, 1995. In the same manner, the study of Stephen C. Lonergan and David B. Brooks has 
been very valuable in conducting a wide range of interdisciplinary analysis: that is their study 
provides information and comment on the water resources of the West Bank by utilizing the 
tools of political, economic and legal analysis. See Stephen C. Lonergan and David B. 
Brooks, Watershed: The Role o f Fresh Water in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Ottawa: 
International Development and Research Centre, 1995. In addition to that, Jad Isaac and 
Hillel Shuval have prepared a powerful volume which was a collection of numerous papers 
on the cooperative management of the waters of the major catchments of the Middle East, 
namely the Jordan, which were presented in an international scholarly meeting in Zurich in 
1992. In that study, an interdisciplinary approach is tmly adopted by emphasizing the 
economic, political, social, historical and legal aspects of the issue through numerous 
valuable chapters written by distinguished scholars. See for instance: Tony Allan, "Economic 
and political adjustments to scarce water in the Middle East" in Jad Isaac and Hillel Shuval 
(eds.). Water and Peace in the Middle East, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1994, pp. 375-389; David 
B. Brooks, "Economics, ecology and equity: lessons from the energy crisis in managing 
water shared by Israelis and Palestinians" in Jad Isaac and Hillel Shuval (eds.)-, pp. 441-451; 
Gideon Fishelson, “The allocation and marginal value product of water in Israeli agriculture" 
in Isaac and Shuval (eds.)-, pp. 427-441. In addition to that, contributions on the historical 
context from Amon Soffer, "The relevance of Johnston Plan to the reality of 1993 and 
beyond"-, pp. 107-123., on legal aspects by Sharif Elmusa, "Towards an equitable distribution
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this chapter the institutionalist approach is discussed from the perspectives of 
various scholars having different backgrounds such as law, engineering, and 
economics.
i) International law
After giving an account of the physical, historical and political setting 
of the disputes, institutionalists suggest that institutional frameworks and 
particularly international law have significant roles to play in reducing the risks of 
water-related conflicts and supplying the universal guidelines for better 
management and allocation of international water resources. Accordingly, 
international law experts principally work on three sources of international law: the 
bilateral and multilateral treaties concerning international watercourses; the 
customary international law which evolves through the efforts of the international 
organizations in the codification of the water law, namely the works of International 
Law Association (ILA) and International Law Commission (ILC) of the UN; and the 
legal framework doctrines which develop through a process of claim and counter­
claim between riparians along a transboundary river.43
of the common Palestinian-Israeli waters: an international water law framework"- pp. 451- 
469 and Dante A. Caponera, "The legal-institutional issues involved in the solution of water 
conflicts in the Middle East"- pp 163-181; on political and strategic considerations by Peter 
Gleick, "Reducing the risks of conflict over fresh water resources in the Middle East," pp. 41- 
55.
A. H. Garretson, R. D. Hayton and Olmstead (eds.), The Law o f International Drainage 
Basin, Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1967.
Dante A. Caponera, "Patterns of Cooperation in International Water Law: Principles and 
Institutions," Natural Resources Journal, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 563-588.
Guillermo J. Cano, "The Development of the Law of International Water Resources and the 
Work of the International Law Commission," Water International, Vol. 14, 1989, pp.l67- 
171.
J. W. Dellapenna, "Building International Water Management Institutions: The Role Of 
Treaties And Other Legal Arrangements," in J. A. Allan and C. Mallat (eds.). Water in the 
Middle East: Legal and Commercial Implications, Tairus: British Academic Press, 1994, 
pp.55-93.
S. C. McCaffrey, "The Evolution of the Law of Transboundary Rivers," conference on 
Transboundary Waters in the Middle East: Prospects for Regional Cooperation, Bilkent 
University, Ankara, Turkey, 2-3 September 1991.
41
Based on their experience on the legal aspect of the water issue, these experts 
conclude that international water law with its inherent peculiarities could provide 
major principles and norms that can guide the states to build effective institutions 
for transboundary relations. However, J. W. Dellapenna argues that while 
practitioners of international law have formulated doctrinal schemes of considerable 
sophistication about the water issue, in many instances they have not been able to 
translate those schemes into effective institutions for the management of 
transboundary relations. And he emphasizes that institution builders, namely 
politicians and diplomats, must combine the sophisticated insights of international 
law experts with practical structures created by the political actors.^^ Similarly, S. 
McCaffrey comments that international law in general, being a decentralized system 
which relies for its enforcement principally on self-help, lacks such features as 
compulsory jurisdiction and centralized enforcement that are characteristic of 
domestic legal systems. However, almost all nations observe almost all principles of 
international law.^^
The above general argument is practically valid for international water law as 
well. That is, most principles of international water law derive from one of two 
categories of sources: treaties or international custom. Treaty-based rules are 
relatively easy to ascertain, although there is always the possibility of differing 
interpretations of individual provisions. Yet, norms of customary international law 
are somewhat more difficult to establish, but efforts at codification of those rules by 
organizations of high repute greatly assist the process. While the role of law in major
S. C. McCaffrey, "International Organizations and the Holistic Approach to Water 
Problems," Natural Resources Journal, Vol. 31, 1991, pp. 139-165.
W. Dellapenna, "Building International Water Management Institutions: The Role Of 
Treaties And Other Legal Arrangements," in J. A. Allan and C. Mallat (eds.). Water in the 
Middle East: Legal and Commercial Implications, Tairus: British Academic Press, 1994, p. 
58.
S. C. McCaffrey, "Water, politics, and international law," in P. Gleick, Water in Conflict, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 97-98.
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international water controversies differs from case to case, states have rarely shown 
a disposition to defy generally accepted principles of international law. Indeed, they 
usually rely on those principles in their diplomatic exchanges. McCaffrey adds that 
the more concrete and generally accepted the applicable legal principles become, the 
more likely is that they will play a major role in the resolution of international water 
controversies. Thus, international law experts contend that, the adoption of the 
Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses 
is a remarkable achievement in the codification and progressive development of 
rules of international law which would, in turn, assist the countries to build 
institutions to tackle the problems of mismanagement and misallocation in major 
international water controversies.
However, as Dellapenna asserts, international water law could only go as far as 
providing some universal principles and major guidelines, namely the "principles" 
and "norms" of the institutions which are to be built for effective management and 
allocation of troubled waters.^^ For instance, among the general principles set forth in 
the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses are those of equitable utilization, the obligation not to cause significant 
harm, the general obligation to cooperate, the obligation to exchange hydrologic and other 
relevant data and information on a regular basis. Those principles certainly provide 
useful references for the riparians of the disputed regions striving to conclude 
agreements, yet they have to be operationalized and institutionalized through the 
"rules" (rights and obligations) of specific regimes.^^ Thus, for instance the foremost 
principle of international water law, the equitable and reasonable utilization and 
participation, defines the equitable and reasonable use, development and protection
The principles of an international regime (institutions) reflect the aims and the premises of 
the members of the regime, and the purposes the members are expected to pursue whereas the 
norms of an institutional setting indicate what is legitimate or illegitimate (Thomas Bemauer, 
The Chemistry o f Regime Formation, UNIDIR, Darmouth: Aldershot, 1993, p. 55).
The mles of an international regime are prescriptions and guidelines for actions the 
member states are expected to perform or refrain from performing. Ibid., p. 55.
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of an international watercourse in rather general terms; and it just draws the 
framework of the actions to be pursued. States should make these principles 
operational, measurable and verifiable through the rules and "decision-making 
procedures" which are evidently more specific, and are often established by 
international treaties that relate to the specific circumstances of the concerned 
watercourses.
International law and international institutions have important roles to play to 
develop a satisfactory water law that is acceptable to all nations. The codification 
efforts of the ILA and the ILC have played an important role in developing 
guidelines and principles for international watercourses, but legal experts should 
continue to press for the adoption and application of the principles in water-tense 
regions such as the Middle East. An overview of bilateral or multilateral river 
treaties proves that they have been effective in the past, however they should 
consistently include all affected parties, they should include a joint management 
committee empowered to negotiate disputes, and they should be flexible enough to
adapt to long-term changes in hydrologic conditions.49
ii) International organizations
Water has certainly become a idgh priority issue in the strategies of key 
international agencies such as the World Bank, FAO and UNDP. The approach of 
international agencies to water resources took a significant turn at the beginning of 
the decade. The OECD had in the late 1980s focused on the need for policy 
integration and institutions for water and was amongst the first to draw attention to 
the urgency of improved water demand management.^^ The Bank has benefited 
from this early initiative and besides provided initially a policy paper which is an
48
49
Ibid., p.l06.
Ibid., p.l 10.
OECD, Water Resource Management: Integrated Policies, Paris: OECD, 1989.
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invaluable compression of a wide range of studies, papers, reports and its own 
conferences and discussions of the 1990s.^^ Later on, a rather voluminous work 
prepared jointly by the World Bank, FAO and UNDP came on the agenda.^^ These 
publications set new directions for the large and diverse community concerned with 
water allocation and management. They provide a lead for interested parties, 
namely national water resource authorities, the funders of water projects, as well as 
users of domestic, industrial and agriculturai water. The works of these international 
agencies are very authoritative, founded on lengthy and deeply researched reviews 
of the water management policies and practices prevailing world-\Vide. These 
papers summarize the status of the resources and outline the policies and measures 
which will have to be adopted in the coming decades to allocate and manage scarce 
water to gain maximum benefits.
The material accrued by the key figures of these agencies reflects the transition 
from the "old agenda" of providing household water and sanitation services to large 
numbers of people to a "new agenda" that requires sustainable, environmentally 
sensitive use of water resources. Moreover the shift from supply to demand 
management and the adoption of economic principles are emphasized in those 
studies. In their contention, stretching existing water supplies can help satisfy 
new water needs within countries as well as relieve tensions between countries. 
Accordingly, in line with the institutionalist approach, the works of these agencies 
point to the importance of reducing the demand for water through investments in
 ^^  World Bank, Water Resources Management: A Policy Paper, World Bank, Washington,
D.C., 1993; Jeremy Berkoff, A Strategy for Managing Water in the Middle East and North 
Africa, Series: Directions in Development, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1994.
^  World Bank, FAO and UNDP, Guide to the Management o f Water Resources, First Draft 
for review in the Expert Consultation on Methodology for Water Resources Policy Review 
and Reform, Rome: FAO Headquarters, 1995.
J. A. Allan, Reviews-books, reports and databases. Middle East and African Water 
Review, SOAS, University of London, Issue 4, September 1995, pp. 4-5.
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conservation, recycling and increased efficiency. Thus, the World Bank policy has 
moved away from an emphasis on developing new water supplies toward a focus on 
comprehensive management, economic behavior, policies to overcome government 
and market failures, incentives to promote users with better services, and 
technologies to increase the efficiency of water use.^^
As a matter of fact the World Bank staff focuses on three main aspects of the 
water issue: first, water should be viewed as a limited resource to be managed in an 
integrated manner to meet national objectives—economic, social, security and 
environmental—rather than as an input into specific sectors; second, institutional 
reform and capacity building are critical to sustaining policies, programs and 
projects; and third, international water issues should be given particular attention.
A great proportion of the World Bank's work is committed to delineating major 
guidelines for developing countries to manage and allocate water efficiently. Hence, 
the Bank prepared a guide addressing particularly the policy-makers in the 
developing world. The guide outlined the process of formulating water resources 
management strategy and related the major aspects of comprehensive water 
resources management to that process. These aspects include (a) institutional and 
human resources issues (including laws, regulations, and organizations), (b) the 
development of adequate information systems, (c) the participation of those
The large subsidies to water users in agriculture continue unchecked, discouraging 
efficiency investments and conveying a false message about water's scarcity and value. As a 
remedy institutionalists advise applying demand management techniques such as water 
pricing, water marketing, and application of efficiency standards which offer potential for 
water savings in domestic, agricultural, industrial, and other municipal uses as well. See 
Sandra Postel, "Changing the course of transboundary water management," Natural 
Resources Forum, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1997, pp. 85-90.
Ismail Serageldin, Towards Sustainable Management o f Water Resources, in the Series 
Directions in Developmen/, Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 1995, p. 30.
Jeremy Berkoff, A Strategy for Managing Water in the Middle East and North Africa, 
Series: Directions in Development, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1994, pp. xi-xii.
Institutionalists consider the lack of reliable global data as the foremost reason that 
resulted in very limited progress in terms of specifically solving the problems of individual 
river basins or by developing some generally acceptable mles which could be useful to
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concerned with or having interest in water resources (i.e., stakeholders) in the 
strategy formulation process, (d) the use of economic principles in water resources 
management, (e) consideration of the environmental and public health aspects of 
water resources management, and (f) working with other countries or regions to 
manage international resources successfully.^^
A conscious effort has been made to bring together disciplines that are all too 
often addressed separately. However political, economic, social, and environmental 
circumstances are different among developing countries, especially concerning the 
availability of water. Accordingly, experts in the World Pank stressed the fact that 
both the process of water resources strategy formulation and the major issues in 
comprehensive water resources management are meant to be adapted to each 
country's circumstances.^^ To illustrate, A Strategy for Managing Water in the Middle 
East and North Africa proposes a strategy that is consistent with the Bank's general 
approach which has been in existence since the publication of the Bank's Policy 
Paper. However it also takes into consideration the region's specific conditions, and 
the technical and economic characteristics of water, thus it proposes practical
countries attempting to resolve such difficult problems. Hence, the importance of assessing 
water resources as a prerequisite for rational and sustainable management of the resource is 
self-evident. The widespread lack of reliable data on such a limited resource is a fundamental 
pitfall for sound development planning under rapid population growth. Thus some argue that 
in order to find out remedies to the increasing water stress, the magnitude and the extent of 
the problem should be clarified immediately. Therefore, Biswas stressed the urgent need for 
an authoritative and up-to-date study which would provide a reliable picture of the extent of 
this problem globally. To this aim, in 1994 the UN Commission for Sustainable Development 
took steps towards a comprehensive freshwater assessment in order to bring out the basic 
facts and make it possible to assess the severity of the pending crisis. In order to find out 
whether a global approach is really called for, it is necessary to find ways of quantifying the 
crisis. The information available for this purpose is surprisingly poor, because of large data 
gaps, especially in the developing world. See Asit K. Biswas, "Further Momentum to Water 
Issues: Comprehensive Water Problem Assessment," Ambio, Vol. 24, No. 6, 1995, pp. 380- 
82.
Guy Le Moigne, Ashok Subramanian, Mei Xie (eds.), A Guide to the Formulation o f
Water Resources Strategy, World Bank Technical Paper, No. 263, Washington, D.C., The
World Bank, 1994, p.ix.so Ibid., p. viii.
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approaches that seek to recognize both the complexity and the urgency of the water 
resources issues faced in the region.
The works of these analysts in the World Bank suggest creating new 
institutions or ameliorating the existing ones for efficient and equitable allocation of 
water at national and basin-wide levels, and they conclude that this would in turn 
facilitate the strategies for settling the disputes over water. Moreover, they rely on 
the fact that different countries in water scarce regions confront different problems 
with their water sectors.” Though these studies essentially put forward major 
guidelines as the current status of international law does, they go further in 
describing the necessary tools to accomplish efficient and equitable management and 
allocation practices in the water sector of the developing countries. Towards this 
end, the Bank staff assert that to overcome the inefficiencies in water resources 
management and allocation, each country should give far greater emphasis to 
demand management whereby better use is made of existing water supplies instead
Jeremy Berkoff, A Strategy for Managing Water in the Middle East and North Africa, op. 
cit., pp. xi-xii.
^^Guy Le Moigne, Ashok Subramanian, Mei Xie (eds.), A Guide to the Formulation o f Water 
Resources Strategy, World Bank Technical Paper, No. 263, Washington, D.C., The World 
Bank, 1994, pp. 31-38.
H. D. Frederiksen, Water Resources Institutions: Some Principles and Practices, World 
Bank Technical Paper, No. 191, Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 1993.
Marie Leigh Livingston, Designing Water Institutions, Policy Research Working Paper, No. 
1227, Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 1993 
K. Frederiksen, Balancing Water Demands With Supplies, World Bank Technical Paper 
No. 189, Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 1993.
Guy Le Moigne, Shawki Barghouti, and Herve Plusquellec (eds.), Technological and 
Institutional Innovation in Irrigation, ibid., pp. 128-137.
Guy Le Moigne, Shawki Barghouti and Lisa Garbus, Developing and Improving Irrigation 
and Drainage Systems, World Bank Technical Paper, No. 178, Washington, D.C., The World 
Bank, 1992, pp. 13-45.
Abdul-Karim Sadik and Shawki Barghouti, "The Water Problems of the Arab World: 
Management of Scarce Resources" in Peter Rogers and Peter Lydon (eds.). Water in the Arab 
World, Cambridge: Mass., Harvard University Press, 1994, pp. 1-39.
Ismail Serageldin, Towards Sustainable Management o f Water Resources, in the Series 
Directions in Development, Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 1995.
World Bank, FAO and UNDP, op. cit., pp. 20-25.
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of automatically investing new supply capacity. Demand management, in the Bank's 
analysis, covers both direct measures to control water use such as regulation of 
water quality, technical interventions in all sectors to reduce unaccounted water loss, 
modernization of both distribution and on-farm systems, and indirect measures that 
affect voluntary behavior such as water charges, tariffs, market mechanisms, 
financial incentives and public education. Moreover, the World Bank staff assert that 
this balanced strategy for managing both water supply and demand must be 
complemented with institutional reform.
The World Bank analysts emphasize that institutional issues must in the first 
place be tackled with at the national level. International treaties with respect to 
shared water resources will also be an essential precondition for optimizing their 
development and management. The main idea is that the prominence of 
international rivers and aquifers in the Middle East limits the extent to which water 
problems can be resolved solely at the country level. Carefully documented 
assessment of its own water resources and objectives is clearly required before a 
country enters an international planning exercise and related negotiations.”·’ 
Accordingly, the World Bank staff essentially set out key principles for formulating a 
national water resources strategy. Amongst them, the following are particularly 
important:
(i) at national level the water sector should be fully integrated with each 
country's overall planning for economic and social activities;
(ii) institutions involved in water development, and delivery should strengthen 
the role of the users in water management, and operate within a framework of 
clearly defined law and policies;
(iii) international considerations can be included in the process of formulating a 
national water resources strategy. Regional cooperation should be strengthened
Jeremy Berkoff, op. cit., p. xi.
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through establishing a network among national hydrological data bases, joint 
hydrological networks and creating some kind of river basin organizations;
(iv) appropriate policies and actions are needed to promote management of 
water more as an economic commodity and less as a political asset or as a national 
privilege.
iii) Hydro-economics
Accordingly, institutionalists scrutinized the key issue of managing 
water as an economic resource. An expert argues that the symptoms of the water 
problem are quite observable for a number of pressing reasons (e.g., hydrological, 
environmental and financial). Thus, he claims that water is not managed effectively 
because there have been institutional, policy and market failures at a universal 
scale.” The syndrome of "water stress" is widespread simply because of the fact that 
water is mismanaged and misallocated especially within the states as well as among 
the co-riparians in the case of international rivers. And, in order to develop sound 
management practices in the water sector, one has to recognize its economic value.
Institutionalists present the causes of the water crisis under three main 
headings; the foremost reason being the under-pricing of water. The value of water 
has many social, religious, political and diplomatic overtones. However, the most 
basic reason why inappropriate habits of supplying and using water have persisted 
is that it has been under-priced as an economic resource. Accordingly, various kinds 
of costs are involved: opportunity costs, consisting forfeiting the value of water for 
alternative uses; the cost of provision; environmental costs; and in the case of finite 
sources such as groundwater, the cost of depletion.^^ Institutionalists who are more
Abdul-Karim Sadik and Shawki Barghouti, "The Water Problems of the Arab World: 
Management of Scarce Resources" in Peter Rogers and Peter Lydon (eds.), Water in the Arab 
World, Cambridge: Mass., Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 36.
James Winpenny, Managing Water as an Economic Resource, London: Routledge, 1994.
66 Ibid., pp. 7-11.
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concerned with the economic value of water argue that the value is not merely the 
price that water would obtain in a free market, but also national aims, and social 
policy are involved in the value of water. ' Institutionalists calculate the current 
value of water in certain disputed regions and each for several years in the future, 
including its social value, incorporating national aims as well as private demands, 
with the full value of water calculated, the value of the property rights can be 
assessed.^^ They calculate, in some water disputes such as the Jordan river case, that 
the property-rights dispute among the riparians is one over a sum sufficiently small 
that nations can negotiate it. That is, by monetizing the disputes, they expect to lead 
to its solution. They essentially envisage a water authority jointly operated by 
riparian countries. That authority will transfer water from one country to another at 
prices reflecting the full social value of water determined by each side. More 
specifically, they calculate the social value of water based on real costs (extraction, 
transport, and disposal) and on the sum of private demands in the region plus 
national water policy. The resulting figure is the social value of water at the border 
and, given this value, water can be transferred from one country to another at that 
price or a higher price. Each party would be better-off after the transaction than 
before. Stephen Lonergan and David Brooks comment that, abstract though it may 
be, this approach does show that water sales across borders would improve 
economic prospects for all the riparians of the river basin. This approach converts 
property rights to monetary claims, and, at the same time, provides the information 
needed to evaluate the profitability of alternative investments in new water supply 
systems, imports, or even conservation. Not only are the results reasonable, but this
Harvard University Kennedy School of Government, Institute for Social and Economic 
Policy in the Middle East created Harvard Middle East Water Project to investigate and 
propose a rational economic method for analyzing water issues that may help the parties to 
perceive the conflict and approaches to its resolution in a new way (Interview with Hillel 
Shuval who is a member of this Project, May 1995).
Stephen C. Lonergan and David B. Brooks, Watershed: The Role o f Fresh Water in the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Ottawa: International Development and Research Centre, 1995, 
p. 175.
^^Ibid., p. 178.
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approach demands perhaps the minimum of changes in internal water policies, 
requires the fewest policy decisions, and fits most easily with proposals for joint 
management of shared waters. This approach may also provide information of direct 
use in the water negotiations.
As a second cause of water crisis institutionalists suggest the "public good"
nature of water. That is, even if a society wanted to recover the costs of supply, and
charge polluters, the "public good" nature of the resource often makes this difficult.
However, institutionalists assert that, unlike clean air or law and order, water is not
bound to remain a public good. It is capable of being brought under greater control,
for public benefit. This requires the development of public opinion and legislation,
as well as the installation of administrative and charging structures well beyond
those now present in most countries. As a third reason of water crisis,
institutionalists mention environmental externalities. The use of water in
households, industry, agriculture and other sectors incurs various kinds of
environmental costs. These costs can, to some extent, be measured and subjected to 
71economic valuation.
Institutionalists evidently advocate that operationalization of market forces is 
the centerpiece of any reform program for an efficient and equitable solution to the 
future problems of the water sector. However, in order to promote more efficient use 
of water, action is required at a number of other levels such as;
(1) enabling conditions- action to change the institutional, legal and economic 
framework within which water is supplied and used;
Ibid., pp. 12-13.
James Winpenny; Values for the Environment: A Guide to Economic Appraisal, Her 
Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1991; Alan Kneese, Measuring the Benefits o f Clean Air 
and Water, Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C., 1984; Diana Gibbons, The Economic 
Value o f Water, Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C., 1986.
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(2) incentives- policies to influence the behavior of users directly by providing 
them with an incentive to use the resource more carefully. These actions include 
both market-based (active use of water tariffs, pollution charges, groundwater 
markets, surface water markets, auctions and water banking) and non-market 
devices (restrictions, quotas, norms, licenses; exhortations and public information);
(3) direct interventions- through investment, spending programs, or targeted
79program s to encourage the use of water-efficient and water-saving implements. 
Instutitionalists emphasize that the minimum conditions for an optimal economic 
allocation of water would be to price it at its true resource cost, and to internalize its 
environmental costs in prices and charges borne by the consumer. The growth of 
water markets would also allow the alternative use values of water to find some 
reflection in its price, which would help to improve its allocation. Further, they claim 
that water m arkets and banks have been instrumental in transferring water between 
farmers, and between agriculture and industrial and urban users. However, in the 
institutionalist perspective, the greater use of the m arket is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for the more rational allocation of water, because market forces 
will be frustrated unless other elements are present in the policy framework. Thus, 
enabling conditions include legal and institutional reforms affecting the water sector, 
and the creation of a macroeconomic context in which prices can function
effectively.74
Institutionalists argue that, the significant reason behind the scarcity and 
uneven distribution of freshwater resources are certain incentive structures and 
political and institutional problems that prevent riparian countries and their 
constituencies from collectively establishing and operating effective management
James Winpenny, op. cit., p. 29. 
Ibid., p. 106.
'7'^  Ibid., p. 107.
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systems for transboundary watercourses.^^ They assert that effective management of 
transboundary freshwater is a problem of designing and operating effective social 
institutions governing the use of freshwater resources. In that manner, some 
prom inent figures in the institutionalist school of thought use the basic concepts and 
assumptions of the theory of international regimes, and provide some insights 
concerning social governance system s.'” Similarly, this study argues that, a set of 
principles and norms that have come out through the works of international 
organizations and international law community would be very instrumental in 
achieving cooperation over the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin through 
the establishment of social institutions that would be the basic constituents of an 
international regime among the three principal riparians. Hence, the action plans, 
declarations, statements, guidelines which are the result of international conferences 
organized by the UN and its affiliated agencies, and which scrutinized the issue of 
using and managing water more effectively and equitably are dealt with in Chapter
2. Further, the legal framework doctrine? and the works of outstanding legal 
organizations such as the ILA and the ILC of the UN on the uses of transboundary 
watercourses (other than navigation) are analyzed in Chapter 3. Moreover, the 
physical and hydropolitical setting of the Euphrates and Tigris is introduced in 
Chapter 4 with special emphasis on the major causes of the water dispute in the 
region. Bearing in m ind that political, economic, social and environmental 
circumstances are different among countries, the guidelines (scrutinized in Chapter 2 
and 3) are meant to be adapted to the Euphrates and Tigris case in Chapter 5. It is, 
therefore, basically assumed that initiation of effective water use and management 
patterns by means of building the necessary institutions may constitute a framework
^^Thomas Bemauer, "Managing International Rivers," Paper prepared for the Dartmouth 
book project on International Governance in the Twenty-first Century, 1995; -,"The Effect of 
International Environmental Institutions: How We Might Learn More," International 
Organization, Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 351-377, 1995.
^^Marc Levy, Gail Osherenko, and Oran R. Young, The Effectiveness o f International 
Regimes: A Design for Large-scale Comparative Research, Hanover N.H.: Dartmouth 
College, Institute on International Environmental Governance, 1991.
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for solutions to the reportedly unavoidable water-related crisis in the Euphrates- 
Tigris river basin. This is because the concept of international regimes (i.e., patterned 
norm  and rule governed behavior among states in a particular issue area) is utilized 
as a theoretical construction in drawing the general framework for the establishment 
of institutions for better management and utilization of the Euphrates and Tigris 
rivers. This, in turn  is believed to lead to cooperation among the three riparians over 
the disputed waters. Accordingly, in the following section, major premises of the 
theory of international regimes are discussed to the extent that this theory provides a 
background for a better understanding of concepts like principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures being the main features of the international regime 
suggested in this study in Chapter 5 with a view to foster cooperation among the 
parties to the Euphrates-Tigris river basin dispute.
D. International Regimes: A Theoretical Framework for Cooperation 
Over Transboundary Water Resources
Interdependence characterizes the reciprocal costly effects among states within
the international system. In an interdependent setting each actor pursues a variety of
objectives which are m utually incompatible, yet some objectives sought by each may
77not be obtained w ithout cooperation from others. In this study, it is argued that 
the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers indeed impose an interdependent set of 
relations among the riparian states. In other words, whenever a riparian implements 
a water development project (e.g. construction of a dam  for generating hydropower 
or for irrigation of more lands), that project plays a direct impact on the supply of 
water received by another riparian either in terms of consumption or of pollution. 
Similarly, if one or all of the riparians keep utilizing the rivers ineffectively, the 
pressure on the already limited amounts of the supply does certainly increase.
For further discussion on the concept of "interdependence" see Robert O. Keohane and 
Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, World Politics in Transition, Boston: Little 
Brown, 1977.
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Moreover, such uncoordinated activities of the riparians, be they for supply- or 
demand-management, take place in an uncertain environment where the countries
n o
have hardly any knowledge of the physical conditions'® or hydropolitical 
conditions'^ of the river basin as a whole. This unclear situation is impaired with 
more difficulties. That is, even the minimal form of a negotiation setting, namely the 
Joint Technical Committee (JTC) meetings among the riparians of the Euphrates- 
Tigris river basin have been suspended since 1992. Thus, riparians do not have a 
negotiation platform to discuss issues pertaining to the development, use, and 
allocation of the waters to achieve cooperation in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin. 
Therefore, the theory of international regimes and its basic elements, namely the 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures are introduced to correct 
the so-called 'institutional deficiencies' that hinder cooperation in the Euphrates- 
Tigris river basin. First, the concept of 'international regimes' will be defined. 
Then, the origins of the theory of international regimes within the international 
relations theory will be elaborated with special reference to the characteristics of the 
regimes. A separate section will be devoted to the concept of regime formation. 
Basically, three types of regime formation, namely the spontaneous, imposed, and 
negotiated regimes will be discussed. Negotiated orders will be scrutinized with 
special references to the concept of 'institutional bargaining', as well as the concept of 
'leadership' which gains significance in the bargaining process. Further, the 
distinction between the international regimes and the ad hoc substantive agreements 
will be put forward by referring to the peculiarities of the Euphrates-Tigris case.
Data relating to the water and land resources.
Projects under operation, projects under constmction or planned; water use and 
management patterns.
The institutional deficiencies are defined as incomplete information on the water and land 
resources of the system, and the political, economic and social stmcture of each riparian, as 
well as their political and economic preferences, interests and capabilities; and the lack of 
regularized decision-making procedures such as the JTC which, in turn, increases the 
'transaction costs'.
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i) Definition of International Regimes
Regimes are generally defined as "sets of implicit and explicit 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor's 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations."^^ Since the 
beginning of the 1980s, there has been a growing interest, once again, in the problem 
of 'international governance.' As a reflection of conflict and war, international 
governance or international organization has traditionally been one of the central 
problems in international relations theory. Functionalists, neofunctionalists, and 
integration theorists have all dealt with the question of organizing and governing 
the anarchic relations among states as their principal theoretical concern.®"^ 
Functionalism was an approach associated with the major assum ption of the 
"spillover effect." That is, a process of integration which proceed from areas thought 
to be less contentious (technical issues) to further cooperation in other (political) 
areas automatically. Neofunctionalist theory is the successor of the functionalist 
approach and is different from functionalism by recognizing the importance of 
political authority compared to that of technical experts. Spillover of functional 
organizations and proliferation of cooperation were not viewed by neofunctionalists 
as processes occurring spontaneously. Cooperation and integration were possible 
only if political elites considered them to be closely affiliated with their self-
interests. 83
Moreover, the integration theories of functionalism and neofunctionalism gave 
way to the construction of new conceptual tools and theoretical frameworks such as
Stephen Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences, Regimes as Intervening 
Variables," in Krasner (ed.). International Regimes, Ithaca, London, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1983, p. 1-21.
Some scholars like David Mitrany, Ernst Haas, Charles Pentland, Donald Puchala, and 
Karl Deutsch worked on the theories of international integration, functionalism and 
neofunctionalism during the 1950s and 1960s.
Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting o f Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-57, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958.
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'complex interdependence' which is perceived by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. 
Nye to be a more instrumental and sophisticated concept than the realist 
formulations in comprehending contemporary world affairs.^^ Thus, functionalists, 
neofunctionalists and interdependence theorists refuted the realist contention that 
states are disinclined to cooperate. For them cooperation is the norm, and states are
I
becoming increasingly interdependent. As a result, they argue, states rightly 
consider each other as partners in grovrth and development. But the reality of 
international politics did not conform to the predictions or expectations of 
integration theorists. And, as some analysts argue, the problem of international 
governance disappeared from the scientific agenda during the first half of the
O C
1970s. In 1986, however, Kratochwill and Ruggie concluded that, "...that branch of 
study of international relations which calls itself international organization is lively 
and productive. It is once again focusing on the phenomenon of international 
governance, and it is pursuing its object of study in irmovative ways that are 
bringing it closer to the theoretical core of more general international relations 
work."®” The reason for this rather sudden rebirth of the study of international 
organization is the introduction of the concept of 'international regimes.'
0 7
Genesis of the theory of international regimes®' comes from two defections 
within the dom inant schoolg of international relations theory: one is the inability of 
the realist conceptions to generate an understanding of the complexities of 
interdependence, and the other is the inability of studies of formal international
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, p. 8.
Jan Q. Th. Rood, "The Functioning of Regimes in an Interdependent World," in James 
Rosenau and H. Trap (eds.), InteMependence and Conflict in World Politics, England: 
Avelury, 1988, pp. 61-82.
Friedrich W. Kratochwill and John Gerard Ruggie, "International Organization: a State of 
the Art on the Art of the State," International Organization, Vol. 40, 1986, p. 763.
The theory of international regimes was first presented comprehensively by a number of 
scholars in the journal of International Organization 1987. See S. Haggard & B. A. 
Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organization, Vol. 41, No.3, 
Summer 1987, pp. 491-517.
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organizations to explain the "new" forms of international organization. Effectiveness 
of international institutions varies in direct proportion to the level of 
interdependence among the participants. Rising levels of interdependence generate 
two distinct streams of incentives for actors to establish social institutions and to 
comply w ith their requirements once they are in place. In an interdependent world, 
actors are no longer able to pursue their own goals w ithout adjusting, and 
endeavoring to, regulate the actions of others. The claim of the regime theorists is 
that regimes may help to overcome the obstacles that hinder states in their efforts to 
cooperate in an interdependent world. An increasing likelihood of interaction is the 
essence of growing interdependence. And as the present international society is 
considered to be more and more interdependent, the chances of cooperation increase 
accordingly. But despite these favorable circumstances, cooperation often does not 
take place. Even w hen states have common interests, they are not able to coordinate 
their behavior in an optimal way. Hence, where interdependence is not a sufficient 
condition for cooperation, and may even result in conflict, regimes seem to provide the 
missing link between interdependence and cooperation. In the functional theory of 
regimes, regimes are explicitly presented as intervening variables between the
structure of power and interests and political outcomes. 88
Regime theorists attem pt to focus on the 'institutionalized' international behavior 
that lies between the two traditions: realism and idealism. The literature on regimes 
has introduced a conception of international institutions that differs markedly from 
the conception em bedded in the orthodox literature on international relations. This 
conception has already helped to identify constructive opportunities for 
reintegrating the subfields of international politics, economics, law and 
organization.^^ For a better understanding of world politics, one also needs to know
Stephen Krasner, "Stmctural Causes and Regime Consequences, Regimes as Intervening 
Variables," op. cit., p. 12.
Oran R. Young, "International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions," World 
Politics, No. 29, 1987, pp. 104-22.
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about institutions, not merely about the existence of 'anarchy' being a result of the 
lack of common government. One theory that bridges the gap between the present 
international system, and a new set of issue area based on decision-making 
structures, is the theory of international regimes.
Functioning on two levels, the regime theory first examines the norms in a given 
issue area, and then structures and directs the decision-making process towards the 
norms. Thus, international regimes operate at two levels. First, at the level of 
agreement (not necessarily in the form of formal treaties) on a given set of norms. 
Second, at the level of policy-making in keeping within the framework provided by 
those norms. Regime analysts assumed that patterns of state action are influenced by 
norms, but that such norm-governed behavior was wholly consistent with the 
pursuit of national interest. Hence, the regime literature can be viewed as an 
experiment in reconciling the idealist and the realist traditions. It should be clear 
from this statement that reconciliation of the two traditions has emphasized the state 
as the key actor and the instrumentality of regimes for state interest.
Regime theory proponents claim that the reality of the world political economy 
has changed drastically since the 1970s and that the concept of regime accurately and 
objectively identifies these changes.^^ The first analysis of the need for such a 
concept as regime is generally credited to John Ruggie's writings in 1975. More 
than two decades later, regimes set a firm commitment to state-centric analytical
frameworks. In the post W orld War II era, realists attem pted to modify some of their
93views in order to explain the cracks in the billiard ball' approach to nation states.
S. Haggard & B. A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," op. cit., p. 497.
R. O. Keohane & J. Nye, Power and Interdependence, Boston: Little Brown, 1977.
J. G. Ruggie, "International response to technology: concepts and trends," International 
Organization, Vol. 29, Summer 1975, pp. 557-583.
Uma Balakrishnan, International Regimes on Global Warming, Department of 
Government and International Studies, Notre Dame, Indiana, July 1994, A Doctoral 
Dissertation, UMI Press, 1995.
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This was the period of international relations that saw the rise of functionalism and 
scholarly interest appeared to abandon the nation state as a relevant actor in 
international relations.^^ However, neoliberalist theories evolved from filtering the 
realist and liberal modes of thought through events in history and changing 'reality.' 
Hence, neoliberals agree that the nation state is still the principal actor in world 
politics. Likewise, most students of international regimes accept the view that the 
members of these arrangements are states. But this does not mean that non-state 
actors and even individuals are irrelevant to the processes of regime formation. 
Increasingly, non-state actors loom large in framing issues for inclusion on the 
international agenda and in focusing attention on specific issues in a way that 
induces states to work toward the creation of institutional arrangements dealing 
with them. All this has im portant consequences for the nature of the political 
dynamics involved in both the initial creation and the reformation of international 
institutions. But it does not alter the fact that regimes are properly understood as 
social practices created to guide interactions among members of the international 
society (i.e., states) in identifiable issue areas. Early studies of regime formation 
treated participating states as unitary actors seeking to maximize some sort of 
national interest. But this practice has given way to a number of newly emerging 
lines of analysis emphasizing the fact that the participants in regime formation are 
complex collective entities.
ii) Characteristics of International Regimes:
Principles, Norms, Rules and Decision-Making Procedures
Regimes foster compromise in that they allow parties to negotiate 
responses to problems where the clear-cut definitions of power arising out of realist
See for more scholarly writings on functionalism: David Mitrany, The Functional Theory 
o f Politics, New York; St. Martin’s Press, 1976; Ernst B.Haas, Beyond the Nation State: 
Functionalism and International Organization, California: Stanford University Press, 1964; 
Ernst B. Haas: The Uniting for Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1958.
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and neorealist theories do not work. This is the reason why regimes as "intervening 
variables" are important. They allow for actions on behalf of powerful states while at 
the same time filtering power through an underlying purpose and creating means of 
cooperation^^ Regimes do not function in areas where the exploitation of resources 
is a zero-sum game. In other words, in such a situation the net benefit of one actor is 
the loss of others. Hence, cooperation would hardly be possible. Rather, conflict 
would be highly likely. Therefore, the prime area for the operation of an 
international regime is the intermediate arena between limited natural resources and 
a zero-sum options. W ater resources, in fact, are renewable natural resources 
through the hydrologic cycle. However, fresh water for hum an use is a fragile, finite 
resource. The diversion of fresh water to supply agricultural, industrial, domestic 
and municipal needs stretches hydrological systems, both natural and man-made, to 
the limit. Transboundary river issues are regarded as the "middle range objectives 
of the states" dealing w ith satisfying economic and social demands at the national 
level rather than evaluating the issue as the core objective of the states which would 
in turn  bring the zero-sum option such as territorial integrity or self-preservation to 
bear on the decision-making structure. This allows for negotiations based on the idea
that nations will share the benefits more or less equitably. 97
The norm ative governance of international regimes through their norms and 
principles distinguishes an international regime from all other kinds of political 
behavior that are merely responses to changes in power equations or behavior based 
solely on calculations of narrow  self-interest. Resource politics require normative 
behavior because traditional power calculations do not work in this issue area. That
Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as 
Intervening Variables," in Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1983, pp. 1-23.
World Resources 1994-95, World Resources Institute, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1994, p. 181.
John G. Ruggie, “Collective Goods and Future International Collaboration," American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 66, September 1972, pp. 874-93.
62
is, regime theorists emphasize that unless the states which possess rights to use a 
certain proportion of an international resource engage in cooperative activities with 
the others to allocate and m anage this resource effectively ànd equitably, it will have 
a devastating effect on the natural system by depleting and polluting the resource 
unsustainably. States should abide by certain norms within a regime framework to 
use that resource effectively. This, in turn, would eliminate the likelihood of conflict 
over that resource. Conversely, if states act as classical power-maximizers, seeking 
full sovereignty over their proportion of the international resource as part of their 
tangible capabilities, and use and manage them ineffectively and inequitably, this 
will certainly result in rising tensions in the region over that resource. International 
regimes represent an attem pt to remove decision-making procedures and 
form ulation of rules from narrow  calculations of military might and power. In the 
formation of natural resource politics which is part of an environmental politics is 
characterized by the need for non zero sum  approaches and is therefore a perfect 
operating arena for international regimes. Normative calculations lead to the 
convergence of expectations, which then give rise to international regimes.
Regimes m ust embody principles and norms as well as rules and decision­
making procedures. Otherwise, international regimes would be difficult to 
distinguish from any regular patterns of action in world politics that create common 
expectations about states' behavior. Principles involve goal orientations and casual 
beliefs cast at the level of general policy arenas, like economics, security or the 
environment. Norms, describe general rights and obligations that operate mainly on 
the level of issue areas, but they are still so general that it is often impossible to 
determine w hether or not specific actions violate them. Rules are specific 
prescriptions and proscriptions for action. They are often stated explicitly in the 
formal agreements on which regimes are commonly based, and they facilitate
63
QO
assessments of implemjentation and compliance/® Decision-making procedures are 
prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice. While principles 
and norms give the regime its identity and reason for its existence, rules and 
decision-making procedures provide the structure and expression of the nature of 
the regime. Thus, the principles and norm s that underlie a regime, form the corpus 
and personality, while the regime functions according to the rules and procedures. 
Although the latter two may change with the evolution of the regime, any change in 
the former two also changes the inherent nature of the regime itself.
iii) Regime Formation
If, indeed, the emergence of cooperation among self-interested states is 
dependent upon the existence of international regimes, insofar as the latter mitigate 
the problems of uncertainty, asymmetrical information and high transaction costs, 
how are, then, these cooperative arrangements arrived at? Recent work has made it 
clear that it is useful to divide the process of regime formation into at least three 
stages: 1) agenda formation; 2) institutional choice; and 3) operationalization. 
Agenda form ation encompasses the emergence of an issue on the political agenda, 
the framing of the issue for consideration in international forums and the rise of the 
issue to a high enough place on the international agenda to w arrant priority 
treatment. Institutional choice takes an issue from the point where it becomes a 
priority item on the international agenda to the point of agreement on the provisions 
of a specific regime. Operationalization covers all those activities required to 
transform an agreem ent on paper into a functioning social practice.
Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young and Michael Zura, "The Study of International Regimes," 
European Journal o f  International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1995, pp. 273-274.
The ability of international regimes to operate on general, environmentally friendly norms, 
while at the same time allowing for the discussion of specific mles and procedures embodied 
in protocols and agreements is particularly useful. In identifying an international regime 
within an issue area, one looks for principles and norms governing behavior that outline the 
boundaries of accepted action. These boundaries ihen define the regime.
Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young and Michael Zum, "The Study of International Regimes," 
op. cit., pp. 282-283.
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Much of the energy of those interested in regime formation has gone into efforts 
to identify specific factors that play a causal role in the process of institutional 
development and to assess the relative importance of these factors in actual cases. 
Three clusters of factors have emerged as the primary claimants for the attention of 
those concerned with regime formation: power, knowledge and interests. Realists and 
many neorealists view agreements setting forth the terms of international regimes as 
reflections of the distribution of power in the material sense. Regimes can therefore 
be expected to change from time to time in the wake of shifts in the distribution of 
structural power in international society. Those who stress the role of ideas often 
treat knowledge as a form of power that is distinct from structural power. They 
emphasize the role of consensual knowledge and social learning in the processes 
giving rise to international regimes. Analysts stressing the role of interests look to 
interactive decision-making and the search for solutions to collective-action 
problems as the m otivating force underlying regime formation. Empirical work 
on regime form ation has produced a num ber of notable conclusions about the role of 
these clusters of factors. Recent studies have provided little support for the theory of 
hegemonic stability, which stresses the role of dom inant states in the process of 
regime formation and has appeared for some time a central concern of those who 
focus on power factors. Research on the role of ideas has focused recently on 
argum ents pertaining to social learning and to the role of epistemic communities, 
construed as transnational groups of scientists and policymakers who became 
carriers and transmitters of ways of thinking about international problems and their
Beth Simmons and Stephen Haggard, "Theories of International Regimes," op. cit., pp. 
491-517.
Ernst Haas, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models o f Change in International 
Organizations, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.
Oran R. Young, "The Politics of International Regime Formation: Managing Natural 
Resources and the Environment," International Organization, Vol. 43 , No. 3, pp. 349-75.
To illustrate, recent complex arrangements for Antarctica and the Southern Ocean 
encompass not only the US as a superpower but also a number of other important powers 
working together as members of the Antarctic club. See Gillian D. Triggs (ed.),77ze Antarctic 
Treaty Regime: Law, Environment and Resources, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987.
65
solutions. Regime theorists provide classifications of regimes based on their mode of 
formation: spontaneous orders, imposed orders, and negotiated orders (institutional 
bargaining).
a) Spontaneous O rders
Spontaneous regimes evolve from a general consensus am ong 
the participants w ho have no conscious design in creating a regime. They exhibit no 
explicitly form ulated consensus and do not emerge as a product of focused 
negotiations either. As systematic responses to dem ands, w ith the weight of the 
status quo backing them  up, changes in these remarkably flexible regimes require a 
num ber of conscious decisions. Very few transaction costs and a low impact on 
perceptions of individual nation state sovereignty make this m ode of regime 
form ation ideal. Further, these regimes do not require any kind of formally stated 
justification for their existence. As for examples of spontaneous orders, Oran Young 
gives "natural markets" a t the national level and "balance of power" situations at the 
international level. A lthough ideal for long standing low impact problems facing 
the international system, the time dimensions involved in scarce natural resources 
do not allow the present social institutions the luxury of form ing spontaneous 
orders.
b) Im posed O rders
Structuralist hegemonic theory rooted in the realist and 
neorealist approaches to regime form ation explains the form ation of imposed 
regimes. Structuralists show  how  international conditions define possibilities for 
cooperation arguing that the international system structure m olds behavior. The
Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and 
the Environment, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989, pp. 84-87.
Among them see the pioneering works of Charles Kindleberger, World in Depression 
1929-1939, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973; Robert Gilpin, US Power and the 
Multinational Corporation, New York: Basic Books, 1975.
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structuralist approach rests on the assum ption of the pow er of one nation (i.e., 
hegemon) which creates and m aintains order so as to further its ow n interests. 
Hegemony implies the imposition of order on random  behavior by the power 
dom inant in a given issue area at a given time in order to create or m aintain 
predictable behavior patterns. According to this view, the rise, maintenance and 
decay of international regimes depends solely on the status of the hegem on and the 
level of its com m itm ent to the m aintenance of the regime. Structuralists see regimes 
not as the convergence of state expectations and norms, but more as the imposition 
of values on participating nations by the hegem on whose status is defined solely in 
relation to the issue area in question. Thus, in their point of view, regimes emerge 
w hen one state is powerful enough to m aintain the essential rules governing 
interstate relations and willing to do so.
There have been severe criticisms against the use of hegemonic theory to explain 
the creation of international regimes. As Kindleberger and others have pointed out, 
such overt hegem ony is alm ost certainly the exception rather than the rule even in 
international society. W hat is more common are various forms of leadership in 
which an actor that is m arkedly superior to others in natural and hum an resources 
or other bases of pow er play a critical role in designing institutional arrangements. 
Leadership differs from  overt hegemony in that it involves a distinct element of 
'negotiation' in contrast to processes in which an obviously dom inant actor simply 
dictates term s to others who have no other choice but to obey.*^^ In such cases, the 
distinction betw een im posed regimes and negotiated regimes begin to blur, and it is 
not helpful to insist on a hard-and-fast separation between the two. In effect, true 
hegem ony constitutes an extreme case, while leadership encompasses a range of
Uma Balakrishnan, op. cit., p. 89.107
Charles Kindleberger, "Hierarchy versus Inertial Cooperation," International 
Organization, Vol. 40, 1986, pp. 841-47.
Charles Kindleberger, "Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy," 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, 1981, pp. 252-4.
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cases in which one party possesses substantially greater bargaining power than the 
others. High transaction costs involved in the process of exacting obedience of the 
participants also plagues hegemonistic regimes. This factor in and of itself makes 
hegemony a rare phenom enon in international society t o d a y . T h e  resource 
politics issue area has m ade hegemony almost obsolete because undercutting the 
utility of force has forced nations to the bargaining table, leading also to the creation 
of separate coalitions for and against specific i s s u e s .^ F r o m  the perspective of 
those desiring to prom ote international cooperation through regime formation, since 
as many observers are coming to realize, hegemony is an extreme case in 
international society. All of this puts a prem ium  on a form of leadership that differs 
from the kind of unilateralism  or imposition that are ordinarily associated with the 
actions of a hegemon. Contrary to Charles Kindleberger's argum ent that "a hegemon 
presumably wants to do it in his ow n behalf" and that "a leader, one who is 
responsible or responds to need, who is answerable or answers to the dem ands of 
others, is forced to do it by ethical training and by the circumstances of position", 
leadership is not simply a m atter of motivation. Rather, leadership in connection 
with the form ation of international regimes is a m atter of entrepreneurship. It involves 
a combination of imagination in inventing institutional options and skill in 
brokering the interests of num erous actors to line up support for such options. A 
leader in this context is an actor who, desiring to see a regime emerge and realizing 
that imposition is not feasible, undertakes to craft attractive institutional 
arrangem ents and to persuade others to come on board of supporters. When 
commentators say that the UNEP played a leadership role in the development of the 
M editerranean Action Plan in the 1970s, they surely have this entrepreneurial 
conception of leadership in mind. And much the same is true when states become
Oran R. Young, "The Politics of International Regime Formation: Managing Natural 
Resources and the Environment," op. cit. p. 360.
 ^  ^  ^ Arthur Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World," in S. 
Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, op. cit., p. 117.
Charles P. Kindleberger, "Hierarchy Versus Inertial Cooperation," International 
Organization, Vol. 40, Autumn 1986, pp. 845-46.
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leaders in institution-building as the United States did in gaining agreem ent on the 
1987 Montreal protocol to the convention on ozone depletion.
c) Negotiated Orders
Negotiated regimes serve as a means for global cooperation. 
They are ideally suited to areas where power capabilities are diffuse and where 
problems dem and urgent solution. These are regimes characterized by conscious 
efforts to agree on their major provisions, explicit consent on the part of individual 
participants, and formal expression of the results. Any effort to understand the 
formation of negotiated regimes requires a careful analysis of the concept of 
bargaining. The existing body of theoretical and empirical work on bargaining can be 
brought to bear on the study of regime dynamics. Thus, even w ithin this category 
there are different approaches to the process of regime formation, both of which 
have different strengths. One may identify these processes as the institutional
bargaining and epistemic communities 113
c.l) Institutional Bargaining
O ran Young criticizes the main premises of both the power 
theorists (realists and neorealists) and the utilitarian models, and presents a new 
model called "institutional bargaining." The institutional bargaining model 
emphasizes negotiations between self-interested parties as means for dealing with 
collective-action problems. Bargaining implies a conscious and informal agreement 
by all the participants and affected parties on two levels-that a problem  exists and 
that there are certain specific steps required to deal with. Such bargaining 
characterizes this process of regime formation. The bargaining process overshadows 
the power variable allowing non-hegemonistic explanations for regime formation.
1 1 Mainstream utilitarians is an another analytical perspective that dominates the study of 
regime formation. They focus on the behavior of rational utility maximizers and typically 
assume that actors of this type will reach agreement on the content of mutually beneficial 
institutional arrangements.
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Although pow er remains important, it no longer forms the sole explanation for 
regime formation. The institutional bargaining approach accommodates the 
presence and functioning of institutions which act as prim ary facilitators and sustain 
the process of negotiation. The institutionalization process of bargaining on the other 
hand increases the predictability of nation state behavior and allows nations to 
address long term  interests even if the results in the short term  are not optimal. The 
institutional bargaining in international regime formation is m arked by a num ber of 
distinctive features. ^
Among these features, this study delineates the role of "leadership" in the 
formation of regimes through institutional bargaining. ^   ^^  It has been argued that
Oran R. Young defines the distinctive characteristics of the model of institutional 
bargaining as follows; Those engaging in this type of bargaining normally operate under a 
unanimity rule in contrast to some form of majoritarian role. In other words, once the problem 
is defined and the identity of the participants is settled, actors endeavoring to formulate the 
terms of constitutional contracts make a concerted effort to devise packages of provisions that 
all the participants can accept. Moreover, what saves the resultant bargaining processes from 
yielding nothing but broad formulas containing little content is that regime formation in 
international society typically involves a large element of integrative (or productive) 
bargaining in contrast to distributive (or positional) bargaining and proceeds under a veil o f 
uncertainty. Veil o f uncertainty is defined by Oran Young as the condition where the increase 
in number of alternatives available to decision-makers leads to an increase in the uncertainty 
of the outcome of any given option making the individual more likely to accept arrangements 
that can be termed 'fair'. For more detailed discussion on the concept of veil o f uncertainty see 
Oran R. Young, "The Politics of International Regime Formation: Managing Natural 
Resources and the Environment," op. cit., pp. 360-366. Also see Geoffrey Brennan and James 
M. Buchanan, The Reason o f  Rules: Constitutional Political Economy, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 28-31.
 ^ Oran R. Young had dealt with the theme of "leadership" with respect to regime formation 
in his two subsequent articles in International Organization: "The Politics of International 
Regime Formation: Managing Natural Resources and the Environment," International 
Organization: Vol. 43, No. 3, 1989, pp. 349-375; and "Political Leadership and Regime 
Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society" Vol. 45, No. 3, 1991, 
pp.281- 308. In his first article he explained that his analysis was relevant for several forms of 
leadership; states, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations and 
individuals acting as leaders. However, two years later, in his latter article, he pointed out that 
in order to overcome the resultant confusion concerning the contributions leaders make to 
regime formation, one should approach leadership in behavioral terms, focusing on the 
actions of individuals, differentiating analytically among several forms of leadership, and then 
analyzing the interactions among them. Yet, in this research "leadership" is considered at state
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efforts to negotiate the terms of international regimes are apt to succeed w hen one or 
more effective leaders emerge.^ In the absence of such leadership, they will fail. 
Those engaged in institutional bargaining m ust strive to invent options capable of 
solving major problems in a straightforward fashion and to fashion deals that are 
acceptable to all. To the extent that the participants have incentives to engage in 
integrative bargaining and to the extent that a veil of uncertainty prevails and 
linkages am ong problems allow for logrolling, the task of those negotiating the 
terms of international regimes will be m ade easier. But such considerations cannot 
eliminate the crucial role of entrepreneurship at the international level. Thus, 
leadership w ith regard to regime formation is a m atter of entrepreneurship and 
involves the combination of imaginative institutional options w ith skill in clarifying 
the overlapping interests of the parties to work on those options. There is room for 
entrepreneurship in all areas during the negotiations where imagination and 
creativity are needed to cope w ith uncertainties. A leader in this context is a political 
entrepreneur who sees a potential profit in organizing collaboration. Entrepreneurial 
leaders in regime formation are neither hegemons who can impose their will on 
others, nor ethically motivated actors wiro seek to find workable institutional 
arrangem ents as a contribution to common good. For entrepreneurship to 
emerge, not only m ust there be a potential social gain to be derived from the 
formation of an international regime, but the entrepreneur m ust expect to be able to 
gain more himself from investing in the regime. Such actors are surely self-interested 
in the sense that they seek gains for themselves either in the form of advantageous
level, thus facilitating institutional bargaining which may lead to regime formation in the 
Euphrates-Tigris river basin.
 ^^  Raino Malnes, "Leader and Entrepreneur in International Negotiations: A Conceptual 
Analysis," European Journal o f  International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 95.
 ^  ^^  Raino Malnes relates the "entrepreneurial leadership" to the "problem-solving leadership" 
which, in his words, often involves efforts to change the constraints and opportunities of 
social interaction. Malnes explains that in order to set the others on a new course, state as a 
leader may have to alter the structural conditions that surround their decisions so as to present 
them with new incentives. Ibid., p. 93.
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institutional arrangem ents if they are states or in the form of enhanced reputations 
or rew ards if they are individuals.
In addition to entrepreneurial leadership are the leadership categories of 
structural leadership and intellectual leadership. The former relates to a leader 
who devises effective ways to bring the state's structural power to bear in the form 
of bargaining, while the latter relates to a leader who relies on the power of the ideas 
and experiences to shape the way in which the participants in institutional 
bargaining understand the issues at stake. Different types of leadership are inclined 
to appear large in one or another of regime formation stages. Whereas intellectual 
leadership is particularly prom inent at the agenda formation stage, entrepreneurial 
leadership is more im portant at the stage of institutional choice.
C.2) Epistemic Com m unities
Regime theorists point out the significance of epistemic 
communities in the form ation of international regimes. Epistemic communities are 
"network of professionals w ith recognized expertise and competence in a particular 
domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge w ithin that domain 
or is su e -a re a ." ^ E p is te m ic  community approach basically focuses on the 
significance of knowledge and cognitive processes in the form ation and the 
maintenance of international regimes. Thus, the epistemic community approach 
regards scientists and scientific knowledge as the key elements in explaining and 
analyzing international reality.
In his illuminating work, R. Malnes defines intellectual leadership as discretional 
leadership which is based on particular ways exercising influence. It is a question of directing 
people (or states) by molding their interests, values, beliefs, rather than coercing them to do 
things they would rather not have done. Ibid., p. 94.
Peter M. Haas, "Obtaining International Environmental Protection Through Epistemic 
Consensus," Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, Vol. 19, Fall 1990, pp. 347-63.
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Haas argues that epistemic communities function as the prom oters of 
cooperation by decreasing or sometimes by completely eradicating the 'uncertainty' 
factor which hinders cooperation over the international resources. Hence, they 
spread knowledge and facilitate the learning processes which consequently 
motivates states to reconsider and reperceive their preferences. Epistemic 
communities have influenced international relations by generating national interest 
and by prom oting institutional learning. Members of these communities share 
common beliefs, in the casual structure of the issue area, in the possible technological 
solutions to the problem, and in the policy applications of these technologies. 
Epistemic communities help define the problem and narrow  the range of options 
available to decision-makers. They help integrate environmental concerns into 
economic and political decision-making. The epistemic community approach 
auspiciously articulates the crucial fact that for making a clear-cut evaluation of 
interests, goals of the states, policy-makers should be in a position to comprehend 
the technical aspects of different problems. Epistemic communities can function very 
well across national boundaries because the scientific community has transnational 
traditions. This makes them  a good base for conducting negotiations on 
transnational problems. The epistemic community theory has a substantial weight in 
the international relations discipline. It fosters cooperation by providing information 
and reducing uncertainty and transaction costs. Resource politics dem ands an 
interdisciplinary approach and a balance between the scientific study of the problem, 
subsequently generating solutions, and applying scientific solution to society 
through the political process.
Epistemic communities, according to some scholars, have played a significant 
role in the negotiations on the water issue during the Middle East Peace Process. For 
instance, Tony Allan emphasizes that meetings such as the one that took place in
120 Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination," International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1, 1992, p. 13.
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Zurich in 1992 enabled a palpable shift in opinion amongst the Israeli, Palestinian 
and international participants which, in turn, influenced the negotiations among the 
water issues group in the M iddle Peace Process. The Zurich meeting was convened 
by scientists from Israel, and Palestine (including some experts from the West). It 
was an occasion where num erous scholars had the opportunity to exchange views. 
Moreover, a substantial volume has appeared which captured the wide range of 
ideas in currency in late 1992 and helped those interested in the im portant and much 
misjudged issue of w ater in the Jordan catchment to realize how rapidly ideas were
evolving. 121
iv) Regimes and International Agreements
It is crucial to distinguish clearly between international regimes on the 
one hand, and mere ad hoc substantive international agreements, on the other. Two 
features of the international context are particularly important: w orld politics lack 
authoritative governm ental institutions, and it is characterized by pervasive 
uncertainty. In such a setting, a major function of international regimes is to prepare 
the necessary conditions for making mutually beneficial agreements among 
governments. Another major function of international regimes is to facilitate making 
specific agreem ents on matters of substantive significance w ithin the issue-area 
covered by the regime. International regimes help to make governments' 
expectations consistent w ith one another. Regimes are developed in part because 
actors in w orld politics believe that w ith such arrangements they will be able to 
make m utually beneficial agreements that would otherwise be difficult or impossible 
to attain. In other words, regimes are valuable to governments where, in their 
absence, certain m utually beneficial agreements would be impossible to 
consummate. In such situations, ad hoc joint action would be inferior to the results of 
negotiation w ithin a regime context. Regimes facilitate the making of substantive
121 See Jad Isaac and Hillel Shuval (eds.), Water and Peace in the Middle East, Amsterdam:
Elsevier, 1994.
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agreements by providing a framework of norms, principles, rules, and procedures 
for negotiation. Hence, if there is a lack of clear legal framework establishing liability 
for actions, information imperfections, and positive transaction costs, then the 
regimes are to be of value in facilitating agreements among governments.
This chapter was an introduction to the water issue as it turned out to be a 
subject of scholarly interest. Contending approaches that are pu t forward by the 
experts and scholars from various disciplines and different schools of thought are 
highlighted. The analytical discussion in the chapter revealed that w ater is mainly 
regarded by experts and scholars either as a potential source of conflict, especially in 
regions where water is scarce, or as an instrum ent for cooperation. In contrast to the 
realist conceptions that assign water a strategic importance and thus hardly see any 
prospect for cooperation over scarce resources, cooperation is seen likely by another 
group of experts and scholars who treat water as a private economic good. The
political as well as economic dimensions of the water issue are emphasized in
199 Suffice it is to say at this point that the current physical and political setting of the 
Euphrates-Tigris river basin is not ripe for concluding a sharing agreement. The physical, 
political and economic conditions of the region necessitate a regime rather than an ad hoc 
agreement. For one thing, data regarding stream flow, precipitation, évapotranspiration, water 
removals, return flow, salinity and a host of other variables in relation to land resources are 
notoriously scarce, incomplete, and open to question. Information relating to water and land 
resources of the region are poor and are not exchanged on a regular basis among the riparians. 
Negotiations between parties contending for limited amounts of water can only succeed in the 
long term if agreements are based on an accurate picture of what water is available. Hence, 
the quantity and quality of the information pertaining to the Euphrates-Tigris need to be 
improved before the parties engage in agreements which can be beneficial for all. Moreover, 
the operation of regularized institutions for water management and allocation are either 
suspended or such institutions do not exist at all. The negotiation process among the riparian 
countries came to a deadlock since the end of 1992. There have been 16 Joint Technical 
Meetings since 1980 and two ministerial meetings, not to mention the numerous technical 
meetings among the technicians of the three riparians during the initiation of the major 
projects in the 1960s. Further, an authoritative legal framework, namely principles and norms 
is lacking in the region. Hence, a proposed regime setting is important in providing 
established negotiated frameworks by lessening uncertainty on the one hand, and in helping to 
coordinate actor expectations by improving the quantity and quality of information available 
to the three riparians.
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tandem  by those who prom ote cooperation over water resources. While some 
scholars accentuate the significance of international trade for cooperation from a 
political economist perspective, others emphasize the importance of institutions in 
initiating and intensifying cooperation over water resources. The institutionalist 
approach rests on the idea that building institutions would not only promote 
cooperation and thus ease the tension among states, but would also result in the 
effective and equitable utilization of scarce water resources. This approach is 
adopted in this study. Neoliberal institutionalists argue that the theoretical premises 
of international regimes best suit the idea of institution-building. Therefore, in this 
chapter, the theory of international regimes is examined to the extent that it may 
constitute a fram ework for the suggestions pu t forward in Chapter 5 with a view to 
prom ote the initiation of a regime among the riparian states to the Euphrates-Tigris 
river basin. As Stephen D. Krasner defined, an international regime is a set of 
principles and norms, as well as rules and decision-making procedures around 
which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Thus, 
the definition of those principles and norms which give a regime its identity is of 
utm ost importance. Hopefully, in the area of water resources, general principles and 
norms are provided as a result of experts' and scholars' efforts. During a series of 
international conferences that are convened under the auspices of the United 
Nations, issues pertaining to the water resources are discussed and even debated. 
Hence, the next chapter will present a detailed discussion as to how general 
principles and norms relating to the effective and equitable management and 
utilization of w ater resources in the world have come about.
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CHAPTER 2. WATER IN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES: 
STEPS TO REGIME BUILDING
This chapter focuses on the emergence and evolution of the principles and 
norm s of the international regimes on water, through the efforts of international 
organizations, such as the UN and its specialized agencies like the UNDP, FAO 
and the W orld Bank. As w ater has become a high-priority item in international 
politics, increasing tension over water resources has m otivated concerned parties 
in reaching (informal) consensus during a series of international conferences on 
the major provisions of international regimes for equitable and efficient 
m anagem ent and utilization of water resources.
In the 1970s, international conferences and meetings, as well as the 
preparation of num erous reports in various sectors of the water field, were very 
influential in attracting world-wide attention to the water issue. They initiated 
the 'key' concepts and m easures for an efficient and sustainable m anagem ent of 
w ater resources. In the same period, "protection of the environm ent from the 
harm ful effects of w ater development projects", and "providing the world 
population w ith adequate and safe water supply" were the major concerns of 
these international efforts. To illustrate, the UN Stockholm Conference on 
H um an Environm ent in 1972 incorporated few, but im portant clauses on the use 
of international watercourses in an equitable and efficient manner. Moreover, the 
United Nations W ater Conference in Mar del Plata in 1977 (Mar del Plata Action 
Plan) was unique in the sense that it brought about the first set of "guidelines and 
principles" on a global scale which significantly influenced water development in 
the 1980s. Further, it comprised a series of recommendations on the demand
management which has become one of the most fashionable topics of the 1980s in 
the water field.
One can observe increased world attention geared towards the water issue 
in the 1990s as a response to the growing water scarcity in various regions of the 
globe. Thus, the prom otion of comprehensive water resources policy measures, 
and the initiation of some key concepts of the water dem and m anagem ent like 
"capacity building" and "enabling environment" constituted the main themes of 
the UNDP Sym posium  in 1991 (The Delft Declaration). Many of these measures 
and concepts were endorsed by the participants of conferences such as the 
International Conference on W ater and Environment in 1992 (The Dublin 
Statement) and United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 
1992 (Agenda 21, Chapter 18).^ Furthermore, the publication of the Guide to the 
Formulation o f Water Resources in 1994 wlrich is a synthesis of combined efforts by 
the FAO, the World Bank and the UNDP, definitely moved beyond the Delft,
 ^ Between the 1972 Stockholm Conference on Human Environment and the 1992 Rio 
Conference on Environment and Development there were a series of conferences and 
meetings and the preparation of numerous reports in the various sectors of the water field. 
Highly important initiatives have been undertaken by many of the UN agencies involved 
in the water issue. These initiatives are very wide-ranging, including the assessment and 
management of water resources; development of resources for agriculture, industry and 
commerce; protection of resources for water supply and sanitation as well as protection of 
the natural environment; and development of human potential to make the best use of 
resources. The UNESCO International Hydrological Decade 1965-1974 (IHD), succeeded 
by the International Hydrological Programme (IHP); the Operational Hydrology 
Programme (OHP) of WMO, the WHO Initiatives in environmental health; the FAO 
initiatives in food and agriculture such as vhe World Food Conference (Rome, 1974) 
which discussed the importance of water for both irrigated and rain-fed agriculture; and 
the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Vancouver, 1975). These firmly 
put the issue of domestic water supply and sanitation on the international agenda. 
Numerous technical assistance initiatives of the UNDP and the World Bank exemplify 
the great efforts made in the water sector within the UN agencies. These and other 
programmes in water, led to the 1977 UN Water Conference in Mar Del Plata.
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Dublin, and the Rio conferences. Hence, it covers almost all aspects of a 
comprehensive w ater resources strategy, and recommends num erous issue- 
specific actions. The Guide develops a systematic framework that incorporates all 
the facets of rational and sustainable water resources management, and provides 
the necessary insights into the principles and norms of the suggested regime in 
the Euphrates-Tigris river basin for better management and use of the waters by 
the three riparians, namely Turkey, Syria, and Iraq.
International attention that focused on water, and on the M iddle East in 
particular, has been timely and unprecedented in terms of the emphasis given to 
the economic issues pertaining to water allocation and management.^ Especially 
since the beginning of the 1990s those experts and scholars who participated in 
the aforem entioned conferences have been suggesting implementation of new 
policies based on economic principles. They recognize that the steady increase in 
the dem and for w ater as a result of rapid population growth, wasteful economic 
developm ent projects, and inefficient utilization and m anagem ent of existing 
water resources, have all placed too much pressure on the resources. These 
developments thus called for new approaches to water planning and 
m anagem ent if escalation of conflicts had to be avoided and environmental 
degradation reversed. Issues pertaining to effective water m anagem ent are 
complex and often politically sensitive, especially in transboundary river basins. 
So long as the w ater resources are treated as a strategic asset (i.e., using water as 
a means for reaching other objectives, such as maximizing power) by the 
leaderships of the riparian states, then the efforts spent w ith a view to prom oting 
effective and equitable utilization of water resources will be impaired, and
2 Jeremy Berkoff, A Strategy for Managing Water in the Middle East snd North Africa, 
Series: Directions in Development, Washington D. C.; World Bank, 1994.
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conflict will prevail. Therefore, as the staff of the international agencies maintain, 
water should be viewed as a limited resource that should be m anaged in an 
integrated m anner to meet national objectives -economic, social, security, and 
environmental. Economic optimality, both on the national level and basin-wide 
scale, should have priority in water resources policy-making in water-scarce 
regions such as the Middle East.
Below, the reader will find more about the works of these international 
agencies. That is, several significant conferences such as the UN Conference on 
the H um an Environment; UN W ater Conference; International Conference on 
W ater and the Environment; UN Conference on Environment and Development; 
and the UNDP Symposium -A Strategy for W ater Sector Capacity-Building- are 
elaborated upon, w ith much emphasis given to the outcome of the conferences 
pertaining to the efficient and equitable water use and m anagem ent practices 
both at national and basin-wide levels. There were obviously more international 
gatherings other than the ones examined here. However, w ith regards to the 
water issue, m ost of them  are concentrated on subjects like 'water quality', 
'protection of transboundary watercourses', 'environmental impact assessment' 
and the like.^ In this chapter, the major concern is about the m anagem ent and 
utilization of the scarce water resources. Thus, the recommendations and 
statements of these conferences are examined through that perspective with 
special references to provisions pertaining to the better use and m anagem ent of 
the available water resources .
3 UN Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes, signed March 17, 1992. UN Convention on Environmental Impact 
Assessment in a Transboundary Context, signed February 25, 1991.
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A. Conferences Under the Auspices of the United Nations
i) United Nations Conferei»ce on the Human Environment 
(1972): Stockholm Action Plan for the Environment^
The United Nations Conference on the H um an Environment, held in 
Stockholm in 1972, issued a num ber of recommendations bearing on water 
w ithin the broader context of protection of the hum an environment. 
Recommendations 51 through 55 of the Stockholm Action Plan handled the 
water issue w ith m uch emphasis on the environmental effects of the water 
management. One of the promising institutions of the UN, namely the United 
Nations Environm ent Programme (UNEP) was initiated at that Conference. 
Hence, as the m ain concern was protection of the environment from the harmful 
effects of hum an intervention, water development projects are severely criticised 
for their devastating effects on the natural system. It has been suggested, in the 
first place, to the concerned riparian governments to create river basin 
commissions to exchange policies concerning the development and management of the 
international river system (Recommendation 51). Moreover, the Action Plan 
comprised an im portant clause in its sub-section which states that: In accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations and principles of international laio, full 
consideration must be given to the right of the permanent sovereignty of each country 
concerned to develop its resources (Recormnendation 51a). That is to say, the Action 
Plan m ade its position clear straight from the beginning by its full commitment 
to the state sovereignty doctrine. However, it has been also recommended that: 
Nations agree that when major water resource activities are contemplated that may have 
a significant environmental effect in another country, the other country should be 
notified well in advance of the activity envisaged. The net benefits of hydrologic regions
4 Report o f the UN Conference on the Human Environment held at Stockholm, UN Doc. 
A/CONF./48/14/Rev. 1, 1972.
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common to more than one national jurisdiction are to be shared equitably by the nations 
affected (Recommendation 51b). It is clear from the above recommendations that 
the Action Plan tried to keep the balance between equitable utilization and no­
harm  rule. The necessity o f collection, analysis, and exchange of hydrologic data in 
international river basins is equally stressed in the Action Plan. Further, the 
assessment of environmental effects of existing water uses; rational use, including a 
programme of quality control, of the water '■esource as an environmental asset is also 
studied in the Action Plan (Recommendation 51c).
Recommendations of the Stockholm Action Plan on the significant role of 
international organizations and their administrative bodies such as the 
Secretariat of the UN give support to the developing countries for better 
m anagem ent and use of their existing water systems. Thus, with 
Recommendation 52, the Secretary General is assigned the task of taking steps to 
ensure that appropriate United Nations bodies support government action with regard to 
water resources where required. References are m ade to the FAO, WHO, WMO, 
UNESCO (Hydrological Decade), the Departm ent of Economic and Social Affairs 
of the United Nations Secretariat, the United Nations Economic and Social Office 
in Beirut, and the regional economic commissions. Indeed, these affiliated 
organizations of the United Nations contributed in many ways to the co­
riparians in the equitable and reasonable management of water resources. For 
instance, the FAO has established a Commission on Land and Water Use for the 
Middle East which prom otes regional cooperation in research, training and 
information, inter alia, on water management problems. Likewise, WMO has a 
Commission on Hydrology which provides guidance on data collection and on the 
establishment of hydrological networks. Such centres are beneficial in providing
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the necessary, reliable and accurate data, that are hardly available in the Middle 
Eastern countries.
The Secretary General is assigned to ensure, w ith Recommendation 53 of 
the Stockholm Action Plan, that the United Nations system is prepared to provide 
technical and financial assistance to governments when requested in the different 
functions of water resources management such as in the making of surveys and 
inventories; in the establishment of institutional frameworks; in the formulation 
of water resources law and legislation. It has been also recommended that the 
Secretary-General takes steps to establish a roster of experts who would he available to 
assist governments, upon request, to anticipate and evaluate the environmental effects of 
major water development projects (Recommendation 54). Further, the Secretary- 
General is assigned to take steps to conduct an explanatory programme to assess the 
actual and potential environmental effects of water management upon the oceans zohich 
are the ultimate recipient for the natural and man-made zoastes discharged into the river 
systems o f the continents (Recommendation 55).
The Stockholm Action Plan evidently encompassed im portant clauses 
concerning the sustainable m anagem ent of water resources, .yet it has had very 
limited achievements w hen compared to the Mar Del Plata Action Plan. 
However, few recom mendations which are devoted to the w ater issue in the 
Stockholm Action Plan are instrumental in designing certain norms of the 
suggested regime in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin. Hence, this study often 
refers to the Recommendation 51 of the Action Plan in form ulating norms like 
"the righ t to use the w aters of the international watercourses in  their respective 
territories of the riparians"; "obligation not to cause significant harm"; 
"establishm ent of jo in t m echanism s to attain optim al u tilization of the
83
Euphrates and Tigris rivers"; "control of the pollution". The classical principle 
that each riparian state has complete authority to regulate the uses of the river 
w ithin its own territory still stands in the Action Plan (which is also included in 
the main features of the suggested regime in the Euphrates and Tigris river basin 
as the foremost norm). However, in contemporary practice this principle has 
been modified by the general principle that a state should not alter the natural 
conditions (environment) of its own territory to the disadvantage of the natural 
conditions of the territory of a neighbouring state. This principle is endorsed by 
the Action Plan in recom mendation 51, and incorporated to the suggested regime 
as a fundam ental norm  such as "the right to use the waters of the international 
water courses in their respective territories of the riparians."
ii) U nited Nations W ater Conference (1977):
The M ar Del Plata Action Plan
In the freshwater management area, the foremost development 
during the past two decades was undoubtedly convening the United Nations 
W ater Conference in Mar Del Plata, Argentina, in March 1977. It was attended by 
116 governments, and the various United Nations agencies and organizations.^ 
The Conference produced the Mar Del Plata Action Plan, which not only 
significantly influenced water development in developing countries during the 
1980s, but continued to affect such practices in the 1990s through renewed and 
intensified efforts of the concerned international organizations.^
 ^ Margaret R. Biswas, "United Nations Water Conference: A Perspective," in Biswas 
(ed.). United Nations Water Conference, op. cit, pp. 7-23.
^ Asit K. Biswas, "Sustainable Water Development: A Global Perspective," Water 
International, Vol. 17, 1992, pp. 68-69.
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The Mar Del Plata Action Plan stimulated a num ber of activities including, 
the UN Conference on Desertification (Nairobi, 1977), W orld Conference on 
Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (Rome, 1979), UN Conference on New 
and Renewable Sources of Energy (Nairobi, 1981), and the International Drinking 
W ater Supply and Sanitation Decade (IDWSSD) 1981-1990. The UN Inter- 
Secretariat Group for W ater Resources was formally constituted as a result of the 
UN W ater Conference.^ The Conference had taken place in an atmosphere where 
nations pledged themselves to work towards a New International Economic 
O rder -an order which in those days hoped would usher in a new set of more 
rational and equitable international political and economic relations.^ At the 
beginning of the gathering, the Conference organizers had four major concerns 
such as the following:
(i) Providing the world community with adequate and safe water supply: Two- 
thirds of the world's population did not have no access to adequate and safe 
water supply by then, and that figure will double by the year 2000 unless 
remedial actions are taken.
(ii) Supporting developing countries to achieve self-sufficiency in food production: 
At that time, about a tenth of the land of the world was cultivated and only one- 
sixth of this cultivated land was under irrigation, producing 40-50% of all
^ As Asit Biswas indicated in his prominent book, it would be a serious error if the Water 
Conference is considered in isolation, without any reference to the world conferences that 
were held earlier such as the Stockholm Conference which recommended farsighted 
actions to preservation of water quality and protection of the environment from large 
scale water development projects; the World Population Conference (1974), the World 
Food Conference (1974), and similarly the Vancouver Conference on the Human 
Settlement (1976)which had direct references to water usage and management and had 
impacts on the evolution of the World Water Conference, later in 1977. Asit K. Biswas 
(ed.). United Nations Water Conference, Pergamon Press, 1978, pp. ix.
 ^ Y. A. Mageed, "Opening Statement," in Biswas (ed.). United Nations Water 
Conference, op.cit.,pp. 1-6.
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agricultural output. To avoid future famines, more land would have to be 
irrigated.
(iii) Pollution: satisfactory remedies for pollution from untreated effluents 
had yet to be formulated.
(iv) Shared Water Resources: It was advised that a more effective system had 
to be built w ithin which the differing national interests and approaches 
regarding shared resources could be harmonized. And, it was added that a 
general agreem ent on the need of 'code of conduct,' had to evolve. The 
achievements of the ILC, were a significant advance, in that respect.
It had been recognized during the Conference that, while some aspects of 
water problems have general dimensions, many aspects are, by and large, unique 
to specific river basins. Bearing in m ind this im portant aspect of water, the 
Conference had issued specific regional recommendations along with the Action 
Plan that comprises general ones. Moreover, the question of implementation had 
to be considered at different levels (i.e., national, regional, and international). It 
had been stressed that the real actioji lay at the national level, international 
assistance being essentially catalytic and effective only when there was dynamic 
national action. The international issue that received a great deal of attention at 
the Conference was the problem of shared water resources. Most representatives 
felt that the question of shared resources should be solved through negotiation 
between states concerned on the basis of equal rights and m utual agreement. 
Several representatives underlined the inadequacy of international law for 
shared w ater resources, and advocated defining codes of conduct based on 
experience gained in successful international litigation. Such codes should be 
flexible, allowing for evaluation, free exchange of information and facilitate the 
evolution of information am ong co-riparian states.
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The Mar del Plata Action Plan, which is said to be the first set of guidelines 
and principles on a global scale, comprises a series of recommendations in a 
broad context. Water resources assessment was explicitly recognized in the Mar del 
Plata Action Plan as one of the essential components of scientific water 
management. The Plan specifically stressed the need for intensifying proper 
assessment practices in developing countries:^ To improve the management of water 
resources, greater knowledge about their quantity and quality is needed. Regular and 
systematic collection of hydrometeorological, hydrological and hydrogeological data needs 
to be promoted; thus, countries should review, strengthen and co-ordinate arrangements 
for the collection of basic dataV^
Water use and efficiency is exclusively stressed in the Action Plan. In this
context, key areas such as the instruments to improve the efficiency of water use
is mentioned. Thus, effective legislation should be framed to promote the efficient and
equitable use and protection of water and water related ecosystems. Pricing and other
economic incentives should be used to promote the efficient and equitable use of water. A
significant place is attributed to the means of dem and m anagem ent -a prevalent
and fashionable topic nowadays. It states that in order to project future water needs
it is desirable to have data on use and consumption and quality by type of user and also
the information necessary to the effect of the application of different policy instruments
0
(tariffs, taxes, etc.,) in influencing the various areas of demandX^
^ An analysis of the progress of implementation of the Mar del Plata Action Plan after 
one decade, carried out for the UN, clearly indicated the unsatisfactory nature of progress 
in developing countries. See Asit K. Biswas, "United Nations Water Conference: A 
Review of Progress During the Past Decade," International Journal o f  Water Resources 
Development, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 148-159, 1987.
Asit K. Biswas (ed.). United Nations Water Conference, op. cit., pp. 147-148 
Ibid.,pp. 150-151.
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Different areas of water use were separately handled in the Mar Del Plata 
Action Plan. For instance, for community water supply and waste disposal- 
domestic use, in order to implement recommendation of HABITAT I (United Nations 
Conference on Human Settlements), the decade 1980-1990 should be designated the 
international drinking water supply and sanitation decade and should be devoted to 
implementing the national plans for drinking water supply and sanitation in accordance 
with the plan of action. Moreover, it has been suggested that the increase of 
agricultural production and productivity should be aimed at achieving optimum yield in 
food production and measures to attain these objectives should receive the appropriate 
high priority. It is necessary to expand the use of water for agriculture together loith an 
improvement efficiency in use. Countries should give early attention to improvement of 
existing irrigation and drainage projects. It was also aimed at draw ing attention to 
the necessity to shift the use of water resources from agriculture to domestic and 
industrial use, in order to attain more productive and less consumptive usages.^2
The Action Plan comprises illuminating clauses which describe the 
necessary steps for the formulation of national water resources strategy w ith 
special emphasis on 'dem and management.' That is, each country should formulate 
and keep under review a general statement of policy in relation to the use, management 
and conservation of water. National development plans and policies should specify the 
main objectives of water-use policy, which should be translated into guidelines and 
strategies. Similarly, consideration should be given to the establishment of efficient water 
authorities to provide proper coordination. Further, each country should examine and 
keep under review existing legislative and administrative structure concerning water 
management, and, in the light of shared experience should enact, where appropriate.
^2 As the third major recommendation, under the main topic of environment, health and 
pollution control are handled. Ibid., p. 158.
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comprehensive legislation, for a co-ordinated approach to water planning. The 
importance of public participation on the effective and efficient m anagem ent of 
water resources is stressed as well: Countries should make necessary efforts to adopt 
measures for obtaining effective participation in the planning and decision-making 
process involving users and public authorities.^^
The Mar del Plata Action Plan includes certain principles which are later 
defined as capacity-building a n d /o r  enabling environment.^^ it has been stated 
that countries should accord priority to conducting surveys to determine national needs 
for administrative, scientific and technical manpower in the water resources area. The 
Action Plan devoted a considerable place to the critical issue of regional 
cooperation and international cooperation for better use and m anagem ent of 
international water resources. In relation to the issue of regional cooperation on 
the development of shared water resources. Mar Del Plata Action Plan suggests 
that countries sharing ivater resources, with appropriate assistance from international 
agencies and other supporting bodies, on the request of the countries concerned, should 
review existing and available techniques for managing shared water resources and 
cooperate in the establishment of programmes... With regard to the international 
cooperation on the developm ent of shared water resources: national policies should 
take into consideration the right of each state sharing the resources to equitably utilize 
such resources as the means to promote cooperation. A concerted and sustained effort is
The fifth recommendation comprises the issues of natural hazards such as flood loss 
management and drought loss management. Ibid., p. 164.
"Capacity-building" and "enabling environment" were the main themes of the Delft 
Declaration. See G. J. Alaerts, T. L. Blair and F. J. A. Hartvelt (eds.), A Strategy for 
Water Sector Capacity-Building, Proceedings of the UNDP Symposium, Delft: 
International Institute for Hydraulic and Environmental Engineering and UNDP, 1991.
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required to strengthen international water law as a means o f placing cooperation among 
states on a firmer basis.^^
In the form ulation of the major principles and norms for the suggested 
international regime for better management and allocation of the waters of the 
Euphrates-Tigris river basin, the guiding recommendations of the Mar Del Plata 
Action Plan are exploited to the most. As a m atter of fact, the aforementioned 
recommendations of the Action Plan to managing water resources are 
particularly relevant to the formulation of national water resources strategy in 
the basin country. However, reviewing and strengthening existing and available 
techniques for m anaging international water resources is equally stressed by the 
Mar del Plata Conference. Moreover, it has been advised that the riparians 
should cooperate in the establishment of joint programmes and institutions for 
the coordinated developm ent of such resources. The Action Plan stated that 
"Such cooperation... m ust be exercised on the basis of the equality, sovereignty 
and territorial equality of all states." It equally stressed the importance of the 
establishment of necessary organizations as a basis for cooperation. The 
principle of "the right of each state sharing the resources to equitably utilize such 
resources as the means to prom ote cooperation" was form ulated in the Action 
Plan. Accordingly, this statement is incorporated to the suggested regime in the 
Euphrates and Tigris as a fundam ental principle.
UN Doc. E/Conf. 70/29, Report o f the UN Conference, Mar del Plata, 14-25, March 
1977, New York, 1977, p. 23.
The Conference adopted a special resolution on "river commissions," recommending 
that the Secretary General of the UN prospect, "the possibility of organising meetings 
between representatives of existing international river commissions involved that have 
competence in the management and the development of the international waters, with a 
view to developing a dialogue between the different river basin organisations on potential 
ways of promoting the exchange of their experiences." See UN Doc. E/Conf 70/29, op. 
cit., p. 77.
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The dem and m anagem ent techniques which are often stressed in this study 
were first initiated by the Mar Del Plata Action Plan in which 'efficiency' in the 
m anagem ent and use of the existing water resources is deem ed as the essential 
criterion. That is, certain dem and management measures such as pricing and 
other economic incentives, building effective legislative and administrative 
structure for the w ater sector, establishment of efficient water authorities to 
provide proper coordination, prom oting public participation, are all 
incorporated to the m ain structure of the suggested regime as one of the essential 
'norms' of the Euphrates-Tigris river system. Further, it has been anticipated in 
the Action Plan that, "water resources assessments" both at national and 
international levels should be prom oted through reviewing, strengthening and 
coordinating arrangem ents for the collection of basic data. This recommendation 
has certainly been included into the norms of the regime setting in the 
Euphrates-Tigris river basin. Since one of the essential argum ents of this study is 
that it has been hardly possible to set a regional cooperation framework for 
effective and equitable usage of the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris due to the 
contradictory, inaccurate and unreliable nature of data pertaining to the water 
and land resources of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin. The Mar Del Plata Action 
Plan is evidently a major landm ark in drawing water policy guidelines. 
However, the events that succeeded this stimulating Conference are much more 
influential in form ulating general principles and policy guidelines which provide 
responses to the current global water stress .
iii) The International Cortference on Water and the Environment 
(1992): The Dublin Statement
The International Conference on W ater and the Environment 
(ICWE), held in Dublin, Ireland, during 26-31 January, 1992, was the most all­
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embracing Conference dealing w ith global water m anagem ent issues since the 
United Nations W ater Conference held ir; Mar del Plata.^^ in  the years before the 
decision to convene the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED), there were discussions between the UN bodies and 
agencies on the need to convene, at some time in the future, a follow-up to Mar 
del Plata. Several more specialized conferences were planned and convened, 
such as the New Delhi Consultation at the end of the International Drinking 
W ater Supply and Sanitation Decade.^^ However, when the decision was m ade 
to m ark the 20th anniversary of the Stockholm Conference (UNGA Resolution 
43/196, 1988) and w hen "protection of quality and supply of freshwater 
resources" featured second in the list of nine priority issues identified in para. 126 
of UNGA Resolution 44/228 a year later, the need for a specialized water 
conference became very evident. The idea was that this would be a conference 
where experts and professionals well versed in different fields of w ater would 
prepare the major input on freshwater to the UNCED process. As a consequence, 
the plans for ICWE were conditioned to reflect the views of govermnents taking 
part in the preparations for UNCED. They also had to take inputs from a series of 
smaller meetings on various aspects ,of water resources, which were held in 
advance of the Dublin Conference.^^
Gordon J. Young, James C. I. Dooge, John C. Rodda, Global Water Resource Issues, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p.l.
The New Delhi Statement, UNDP Global Consultation on Safe Water and Sanitation 
for the 1990s, 10-14 September 1990.
Gordon J. Young, James C. I. Dooge, John C. Rodda, Global Water Resource Issues, 
op. cit., p.33.
20 ICWE was to follow a pattern different from the standard international scientific 
conference and even from the many of the intergovernmental conferences convened under 
the UN umbrella. The agenda had to satisfy the needs expressed by the government 
delegates to the PrepCom, recognizing that the agenda had also to accommodate the 
water-oriented non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations. Delegates in the 
PrepCom wanted it to be a conference of government-appointed experts, rather than of
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The main objectives of the Conference were stated as follows: (a) To assess 
the current status of the world's freshwater resources in relation to present and 
future water dem ands and to identify priority issues for the 1990s; (b) To develop 
coordinated inter-sectoral approaches towards managing these resources by 
strengthening the linkages between the various water programmes; (c) To 
formulate environmentally sustainable strategies and action program m es for the 
1990s and beyond, to be presented to the UNCED Earth Summit; (d) To bring the 
above issues, strategies and actions to the attention of governments as a basis for 
national program m es and to increase awareness of the environmental 
consequences and developmental opportunities in improving the management 
of water resources.21 The Dublin Conference produced a short Dublin Statement 
in addition to the Report of the Conference of which many recommendations were 
incorporated into the Chapter 18 of UNCED Agenda 21.22 ICWE was designed 
as the major lead in freshwater issues into the UNCED process. Many of the 
principles and recommendations for action put forward at ICWE are in the 
process of being adopted in countries in all regions of the world.23
government delegations, so that the position of governments would not be pre-empted 
and that governments represented at PrepCom meetings and UNCED would have the 
final say. This procedure avoided the danger that one government conference (ICWE) 
could have had its findings overturned at another government conference (UNCED). This 
also meant that the recommendations from ICWE did not have to be directly incorporated 
into the UNCED Agenda 21. Yet, during the meetings at Rio de Janeiro, some 
delegations argued against including the findings of ICWE and using them in Agenda 21 
because ICWE was not a governmental conference. Nevertheless, the Report o f the 
Conference, with some additions, was embedded directly into the seven programme areas 
in Chapter 18 of UNCED Agenda 21.
21 Ibid., p. 33.
22 Recommendations as the leading programme areas of the Chapter 18 of Agenda 
21 (UNCED) are discussed extensively in the following sub-section of the thesis.
23 Gordon J. Young, James C. I. Dooge, John C. Rodda, op. cit., p. 39.
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A closer look into the Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development 
reveals some opinions such as the following: the Conference participants24 
called for fundam ental new approaches to the assessment, development and 
m anagem ent of freshwater resources, which can only be brought about through 
political commitment and involvement from the highest levels of governm ent to 
the smallest communities. Commitment will need to be backed by substantial 
and immediate investments, public awareness campaigns, legislative and 
institutional changes, technology development, and capacity-building 
programmes. Underlying all these m ust be a greater recognition of the 
interdependence of all peoples, and of their place in the natural world. Besides, 
the Conference participants urged all governments to study carefully the specific 
activities and means of implementation recommended in the Conference Report, 
and to translate those recommendations into urgent action program m es for 
water and sustainable development. Indeed, this task was accomplished truly 
with the seven program m e areas of the Chapter 18 of UNCED Agenda 21.
The Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development set out 
recommendations for action at local, national and international levels, based on 
four guiding principles. The first principle advocated the idea that effective 
management ofzvater resources demands a holistic approach, linking social and economic 
development with protection of natural ecosystems. Effective m anagem ent links land 
and water uses across the whole of a catchment area or groundw ater acquifer. 
The second principle read as follows: zvater development and management should be 
based on a participatory approach, involving users, planners and policy-makers at all
24The International Conference on Water and the Environment (ICWE) were attended by 
five hundred participants, including government-designated experts from a hundred 
countries and representatives of eighty international, intergovernmental and non­
governmental organizations.
94
levels. This principle constituted indeed one of the significant elements of water 
policy guidelines which were issued mostly for developing countries by WB, 
FAO and UNDP later in the 1990s. The third principle indicated the central part 
played by women in the provision, management and safeguarding o f water.
The fourth principle which gained enormous support both in the scientific 
community and at the governm ent decision-making level asserted that ivater has 
an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic 
good. Within this principle, it is vital to recognize first the basic right of all human 
beings to have access to clean water and sanitation at an affordable price. Past failure to 
recognize the economic value of water has led to wasteful and environmentally damaging 
uses of the resource. Managing umter as an economic good is an important way of 
achieving efficient and equitable use, and of encouraging conservation and protection of 
water resources.^^ A lthough many countries have long recognized the importance 
of securing a reliable w ater supply, only recently have they recognized water as 
an im portant economic good that m ust be carefully m anaged in terms of both 
quantity and quality.
W ater is characterized by several features that affect the way it is handled 
by m arkets and governments, and that limits the ability of countries to rely on 
the automatic reaction of m arket forces to determine prices. Some of the major 
features relate to w hether water should be treated as a public or a private good 
for pricing and regulatory purposes, and whether existing m arket prices can 
fully reflect all aspects of using water. In some of its uses, water is a public good, 
where one person's use does not decrease nor subtract from its value to others
25 Gordon J. Young, James C. I. Dooge, John C. Rodda, Global Water Resource Issues, 
op. cit., pp. 161-162.
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who use the same good, for example water used for navigation.26 At the other 
extreme, "a pure private good", such as food purchased from a market, can be 
and usually is the exclusive property of the owning individual; his or her 
consum ption of the food absolutely prevents anyone else from consuming it. 
Water, like m any other goods, falls somewhere between these two extremes. It 
has "pure public good" aspects w hen it is left in a scenic river, however, it has 
exclusive economic good features w hen it is used by farmers irrigating their 
crops for profit in a m arket setting.
Unlike sunlight and air, we know that rivers, lakes and coastal waters can 
all be appropriated into the ownership of public and private bodies. For this 
reason alone, water is not merely a natural resource but also an economic 
resource. This is true even though in many countries no price is set on water use, 
no sum  of money charged per unit consumed. This is the case whenever users 
enjoy unrestricted physical access to fresh water, and also where water is 
supplied to users by public or private companies but its volume is not measured. 
In the latter case, water charges are widely collected by means of a fixed charges 
levied on w ater consumers.27 Thus, water is and has always been an economic 
resource because of water scarcity and associated competition between users, 
and also because of the economic and financial costs imposed by laws to protect 
water quality. And, if water is S(> fundamental a biological and social 
requirement, and if it is now widely recognized to be an economic good, then
76 Adam Smith was one of the first to define a "pure public good": once the good is 
provided, it is not possible to exclude anyone who wants to take a advantage of a public 
good from using it, and the consumption of the public good by any one consumer does 
not impede the consumption by any other potential consumer.
77 Stephen Merrett, Introduction to the economics o f water resources, An International 
Perspective, London: University College London Press, 1997, pp. 1-3.
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there is a need for hydroeconomics -the economics of water resources. And, 
among the substantive concerns of hydroeconomics, to reduce and eliminate 
water-driven international conflict has a formidable place.28
Drafters of the Dublin Statement put forward that the "public good" nature 
of w ater is one of the principal causes of the water crisis. That is, even if the 
society w anted to recover the costs of supply, and charge polluters, the "public 
good" nature of the resource often makes this difficult. However, they equally 
claim that water is not bound to remain a public good. It is capable of being 
brought under greater control, for the public benefit. This requires the 
development of public opinion and legislation, as well as the installation of 
administrative and charging structures well beyond those now present in most 
countries. Indeed, in most countries water has an economic value that varies over 
time and am ong uses. In general, competition for water among various uses has 
increased and its value has risen. Economic concerns have become increasingly 
im portant in water resources management.^9
The Delft Declaration (which will be discussed later in this chapter), 
obviously influenced the structure of the Dublin statement in the sense that 
dem and m anagem ent policies are strongly expressed in the Statement rather 
than giving sole importance to the development of new supplies of water. By
28 Other major concerns of hydroeconomics are as follows: to supply water of sufficient 
quantity and appropriate quality to users in domestic, agriculture, industry and other 
sectors; to protect water's hydrocyclical capacity to renew its ground -and surface- water 
flows; to ensure that, when government expenditure takes place for these purposes, it is 
spent wisely.
29 Guy Le Moigne, Ashok Subramanian, Mei Xie, and Sandra Giltner (eds.), A Guide to 
the Formulation o f Water Resources Strategy World Bank Technical Paper Number 263, 
Washington D. C., World Bank, 1994, pp. 59-61.
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analogy, the riparians of the Euphrates and Tigris river basin should formulate 
comprehensive national water resources strategies for better use and 
m anagem ent of the system's waters. In this respect, there are certainly many 
lessons to be draw n from the works of the international organizations studied in 
this chapter. That is, the dem and management techniques described in the 
documents of Stockholm, Mar Del Plata, Delft, and Dublin conferences are 
designed to be implemented at the national level in the first place, which are then 
to be harm onized and coordinated at the international level through the rules 
and decision-making procedures of the regime.
iv) The UN Conference on Environment and Development (1992): 
Agenda 21, Chapter 18
Over the past two decades there have been three events which, 
above all others, have focused and guided world attention in the environmental 
arena. The first was the UN Conference on the H um an Environment (1972), held 
in Stockholm; the second was the publication of Our Common Future, in 1987, the 
report of the W orld Commission on Environment and Development; and the 
third event, arising directly from the others was the United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development (1992), held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The 
recommendations of the Dublin Conference (1992) were initially taken to the 
fourth Preparatory Committee for the UNCED (New York) in March 1992. From 
there they w ent to the Earth Summit (UNCED) in Rio in June 1992 where many 
of the recommendations were incorporated into the document called Agenda 21, 
in Chapter 18 of this document.^^
Ibid., p. XIV.
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Agenda 21, Chapter 18 starts with emphasizing the importance of water in 
all aspects of life. It then stresses the necessity of integrated w ater resources 
development and management. Moreover, it states that transboundary water 
resources and their use are of great importance to riparian States. In this connection, 
cooperation among those States may be desirable in conformity with existing agreements 
and/or other relevant arrangements, taking into account the interests of all riparian 
States concemed.^^ The following program m e areas are dealt w ith in Agenda 21, 
Chapter 18:
(1) Integrated w ater resources development and management;
(2) W ater resources assessment;
(3) Protection of w ater resources, water quality and aquatic ecosystems;
(4) Drinking-water supply and sanitation;
(5) W ater and sustainable urban development;
(6) W ater for sustainable food production and rural development;
(7) Impacts of climate change on water resources.
It has been suggested to all states to prepare designed and initiated targeted 
national action program m es (the first program m e a r e a ) . All states should 
improve integrated w ater resources m anagem ent by putting special emphasis on 
the form ulation of national action plans.^^ Towards this end, interactive
3 ^  In the text, seven programme areas were proposed for the freshwater sector embracing 
the same topics that were handled in Dublin Conference (ICWE) with the modification 
that the "Drinking-water supply and sanitation" and "Impacts of climate change on water 
resources" were not treated as separate topics in the working groups of the Dublin 
Conference. See Agenda 21, Chapter 18: Protection of the Quality and Supply of 
Freshwater Resources: Application of Integrated Approaches to the Development, 
Management and Use of Water Resources, Report o f the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development, UN iVCONF. 151/26, Vol. II, 13 August 1992.
32 Ibid., Paragraph 11.
33 Ibid., Paragraph 12.
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databases, forecasting m ethods and economic planning models should be 
developed appropriate to the task of managing water resources in an efficient 
and sustainable manner. This will require the application of new techniques 
such as geographical information systems (GIS).^^
On the other hand various available options for charging water users 
should be figured out. That is to say, further development is required for 
economic instrum ents that take into account 'opportunity costs' and 
'environmental e x te rn a l i t ie s '.P r ic e  is an integral part of the definition of 
'scarcity.' The fact that pricing has not been rigorously applied in the past, and 
that the current prices of water are still generally quite low, is an indication that 
scarcity is a relatively new phenomenon. It also gives confidence that, at least for 
the next decade, m oderate price increases will solve the water scarcity problem. 
Pricing is the major tool by which economists attem pt to bring about efficient 
resource use. It also aims at leading the society to correct allocation decisions. 
There are im portant concepts which tend to get confused in the discussion of 
water pricing. These are, 1) opportunity cost of water, 2) marginal cost pricing, 
and 3) cost recovery. Marginal cost pricing is pricing of water at the cost of 
supplying an additional unit of water. In a perfectly functioning market 
economy, the most efficient solution occurs when commodities are priced at their 
marginal cost. The m arket is said to clear when the marginal cost is equal to the 
marginal benefit. The marginal cost m ust include the opportunity cost of water. 
Cost recovery refers to pricing of water to recover the costs of providing it. 
Typically, cost recovery is based upon historical costs. However, a fundamental 
piece of information missing in most water plans is the opportunity cost of
34 Ibid., Paragraph 14.
35 Ibid., Paragraph 15.
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water. A dding the opportunity cost of water to its marginal cost of supply and 
comparing this w ith its current price indicates how efficient it could be. In order 
to estimate these numbers, it is necessary to have some form of intersectoral 
comparison of value or willingness-to-pay. Establishing the willingness-to-pay 
for various consumers of water is a fairly well-developed field in economics and 
can be easily adapted in many water conflict situations to establish estimates of 
the opportunity cost of water. If there were well-established markets for water, 
then the m arket price would itself reflect the opportunity cost of water. 
However, in most countries such markets do not exist; thus other valuation 
techniques m ust be used. Near many major urban areas, the opportunity cost of 
water used for irrigation is its value for domestic or industrial consumption. 
W ater users should be required to pay the opportunity cost of water, especially 
where water is scarce and water use is critical. This provides them with a clear 
economic incentive to use water efficiently. The opportunity cost of water could 
be used as an economic signal to improve water allocation decisions and 
encourage water conservation.
Externalities are defined as the environmental and economic impact of a 
project on individuals or institutions tha·· neither work in the project nor use its 
outputs. Because w ater activities have many physical interactions within the 
ecosystem and with other economic activities, they are often characterized by 
externalities; the benefits and costs of production and consum ption affect 
individuals or entities other than those involved in a transaction. Related to the 
issue of externalities is the limited am ount of information available to consumers 
of water and to consumers or producers of water-related services. It is often 
more straightforward for national economies, through the enforcement measures 
of the governments in terms of charges or legal actions, to internalize the
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externalities. However, in most river basins, it seems nearly impossible to 
engage, w ith any reasonable prospect of success, in a law-suit against the 
producer of an externality in another country.
Further, institutional capacity for implementing integrated water 
m anagem ent should be reviewed and developed by governments w hen there is a 
clear demand. Moreover, in creating the enabling environm ent for lowest- 
appropriate-level management, the role of government includes mobilization of 
financial and hum an resources, legislation, standard-setting and other regulatory 
functions, monitoring and assessment of the use of water and land resources, and 
creating opportunities for public participation.^^ Based upon the Mar del Plata 
Action Plan, water resources assessment, as a separate program m e area, has been 
extended into the 1990s and beyond, w ith the overall objective of ensuring the 
assessment and forecasting of the quantity and quality of water resources, in 
order to estimate the total quantity of water resources available and their future 
supply potential, to determine their current quality status, to predict possible 
conflicts between supply and demand, and to provide a scientific database for 
rational w ater resources utilization (second re c o m m e n d a tio n ).H e n c e , the 
conduct of water resources assessment on the basis of operational national 
hydrometric networks requires an enabling environment at all levels.^^
The complex interconnectedness of freshwater systems demands that 
freshwater m anagem ent be holistic (taking a catchment management approach) 
and be based on a balanced consideration of the needs of people and
Ibid., Paragraphs, 21-22.
37 Ibid., Paragraph, 24.
38 Ibid., Paragraph, 34.
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environm ent (third program m e area). The Mar del Plata Action Plan had already 
recognized the intrinsic linkage between water resource development projects 
and their significant physical, chemical, biological, health and socio-economic 
repercussions.^^ Hence, all states, according to their capacity and available 
resources, through bilateral or multilateral cooperation, including the United 
Nations and other relevant organizations as appropriate, could set a series of 
targets to protect water resources, water quality and aquatic ecosystems.^O
Concerted efforts during the 1980s brought water and sanitation services to 
hundreds of millions of the world's poorest people. The most outstanding of 
these efforts was the launching in 198i of the International Drinking Water 
Supply and Sanitation Decade, which resulted from the Mar del Plata Action 
Plan adopted by the United Nations W ater Conference in 1977. The target of the 
Decade was to provide safe drinking water and sanitation to underserved urban 
and rural areas by 1990, but even the unprecedented progress achieved during 
the Decade was not enough. Thus, governments should ensure that adequate 
and safe w ater supply and sanitation is provided to the community as a whole.'^^
Ibid., Paragraph, 36.
40 Ibid., Paragraph, 39.
41 The fifth programme area is on the issue of "water and sustainable urban 
development." The development objective of this programme is to support local and 
central government's efforts and capacities to sustain national development and 
productivity through environmentally sound management of water resources for urban 
use. Activities include in their main headings: "protection of water resources from 
depletion, pollution and degradation"; "efficient and equitable allocation of water 
resources"; "institutional, legal, management reforms"; "promotion of public 
participation"; "support to local capacity-building"; "provision of enhanced access to 
sanitary services." Ibid., Paragraph, 48.
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On the other hand, it has been emphasized that sustainability of food 
production increasingly depends on sound and efficient water use and 
conservation practices consisting primarily of irrigation development and 
management, including water m anagem ent with respect to rain-fed areas (sixth 
program m e area). However, the challenge is to develop and apply water-saving 
technology and m anagem ent m ethods and, through capacity-building, enable 
communities to introduce institutions and incentives for the rural population to 
adopt new approaches, for both rain-fed and irrigated agriculture.^^ Towards 
this end, w ater should be regarded as a finite resource having an economic value 
with significant social and economic implications reflecting the importance of 
meeting basic needs; and local communities m ust participate in all phases of
water management.43
Even though UNCED, Agenda 21, has a separate chapter on the water 
issue, some experts claimed that water did not have higher priority in Rio. 
Hence, in their criticism, the failure of the Dublin Conference, the absence of any 
fall back strategy in the event of a failure, and the very poor timing of ICWE 
which left only four m onths between the two events in Dublin and Rio, were all 
im portant contributions which did not strengthen the cause of water at Rio. They 
further argued that the benign neglect of the water issues by the West, and non­
realization of the importance of the UNCED by the water ministries of the South,
42 Ibid., Paragraph, 65.
43 Besides, there is uncertainty with respect to the prediction of climate change at the 
global level. Although the uncertainties increase greatly at the regional, national and local 
levels, it is at the national level that the most important decisions would need to be made. 
Objectives include; (a) to understand and quantify the threat of the impact of climate 
change on freshwater resources; (b) to facilitate the implementation of effective national 
countermeasures, as and when the threatening impact is seen as sufficiently confirmed to 
justify such action; (c) to study the potential impacts of climate change on areas prone to 
droughts and floods. Ibid., Paragraph, 68.
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ensured that water rem ained a minor item on the international political 
agenda.44 Such criticisms are instructive in the sense that the water issue actually 
dem ands higher priority on the international agenda, thus global water 
assessment is an essential step in quantifying the crisis and seeking 
commensurate remedies. However, one should equally adm it that these 
conferences are limited in their achievements because they basically aim to 
introduce key concepts and cover a wide range of issues in the water field. As a 
m atter of fact, the subsequent studies of the World Bank, UNDP and FAO cover 
almost all aspects of a comprehensive water resources strategy and reconunend 
num erous issue-specific actions.
Agenda 21, Chapter 18 played an essential role in determ ining the major 
principles and more importantly the norms of the institutional setting for better 
m anagem ent and use of the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin discussed 
in the final chapter. Almost all program m e areas that are pu t forward in this
^^During the preparation of a report on how the global water environment has changed 
between the UN Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in June 1972, 
and the UNCED in 1992, it became clear very soon that there was indeed very little 
knowledge of the current global water situation, both in terms of quantity and quality 
issues of the North, let alone of the South and the East. Yet, the scale of the impending 
crisis makes it urgent to get water firmly onto the international agenda. To this aim, the 
UN Commission for Sustainable Development in May 1994, took steps towards a 
comprehensive freshwater assessment in order to bring out the basic facts and made it 
possible to assess the severity of the pending crisis. Water problems have traditionally 
been seen as local or possibly regional issue. In order to find out whether a global 
approach is really called for, it is necessary to find ways of quantifying the crisis. The 
information available for this purpose is surprisingly poor, because of large data gaps, 
especially in the developing world. The importance of assessing water resources as a 
prerequisite for rational and sustainable management of the resource is self-evident. The 
widespread lack of reliable data on this is a fundamental pitfall for sound development 
planning under rapid population growth. See Asit K. Biswas, "Further Momentum to 
Water Issues: Comprehensive Water Problem Assessment," Ambio, Vol. 24, No. 6, 1995, 
pp. 380-82.
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universal document, except the ones on the "drinking-water supply sanitation" 
and "impact of climate-change on water resources" constitute essential sources of 
norms of the suggested institutional framework. They are largely incorporated 
into the first principle of the suggested regime defined as "effective and equitable 
m anagem ent and allocation of transboundary rivers is a key determ inant in 
prom oting cooperation in the region," and em bedded into the demand 
m anagem ent techniques that are mentioned in the context of this principle. 
Besides, certain program m e areas of the Agenda 21, Chapter 18, namely 
protection of water resources, water quality and aquatic ecosystems played a 
direct role in the form ulation of the relevant norms of the suggested regime in 
the Euphrates-Tigris river basin.
B. Efforts of the U nited Nations Specialized Agencies
i) UNDP Sym posium  - A Strategy for W ater Sector Capacity 
Building (1991): The Delft Declaration
The Delft Declaration was a product of a UNDP Symposium which was 
held at the headquarters of the International Institute for Hydraulic and 
Environmental Engineering, Delft, The Netherlands, on 3-5 June 1991.^ 5 The 
main theme of the Symposium was to emphasize the special importance of 
"capacity building" in integrated water sector management.46 The Symposium
G. J. Alaerts, T. L. Blair and F. J. A. Hartvelt (eds.), A Strategy for Water Sector 
Capacity-Building, Proceedings of the UND? Symposium, Delft: International Institute 
for Hydraulic and Environmental Engineering (IHE) and UNDP, 1991.
46 The general principles and policy guidelines suggested in the Declaration addressed 
not only national governments, but also External Supporting Agencies (ESAs). The 
Symposium has brought together technical experts in the relevant field to reach an 
agreement on key issues, and to rally a substantial proportion of the ESA community and 
countries around the strategies that need to be developed for capacity-building. The 
Symposium brought forward recommendations as to what those Agencies and the 
countries should do in order to be supportive of these strategies. Since these issues differ
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thus had a pivotal function towards implementation of the new concepts that 
emerged from the eighties and are considered necessary for improving the 
efficiency and the effectiveness of the water sector. This initiative was intended 
to formulate responses to two major challenges that have emerged from several 
decades of working with water related activities. First, a growing need arises to 
treat these activities, namely the supply-augmentation including subsectors such 
as irrigation and w ater sanitation, and supply and demand-management, 
comprehensively and in an integrated way. Second, it appeared that one of the 
main causes of poor efficiency and effectiveness, in many water sector projects, 
resides in the institutional weaknesses of the organizations and the restrictions 
on their activities (enabling environment). For many years, the term  water 
resources referred specifically to the supply side. It was thought that developing 
this resource would be the key to adequate satisfaction of needs. Later, it 
emerged that the dem and side of the resource is equally im portant and complex. 
It is assured in the Declaration that w ithout effective dem and management, 
national developm ent goals cannot be achieved.
greatly from country to country, the Symposium put much effort into describing clearly 
the conceptual framework, and identifying the elements and actions that can become part 
of country specific strategies.
47 A prerequisite to integrated development in the water resources sector is an accurate 
assessment of the demands in several subsectors and the existing potentially available 
sources for meeting these demands. The focus on the demand side leads to a better 
linkage of the strategic activity of integrated water resources planning and management 
with water handling operations in the two large and relatively fragmented subsectors of 
water supply and sanitation, and irrigated agriculture. These subsectors are of prime 
concern in the context of sustainable water resources utilization, in contrast to other large 
scale water users like hydropower, inland navigation and river engineering which 
generally are centralized, clearly organized, and with financial and technical leverage. In 
WSS and Irrigation (IRR) consumption takes place by the individual household or farmer; 
the wide scale sustainable provision of these services still hits on numerous difficulties 
and the field level which can only be solved when the sector as a whole operates well. 
Many of these constraints appear to be common for the WSS and IRR. Ibid., pp. 14-16.
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Two novel concepts were introduced by the Symposium; "capacity­
building" and "enabling environment". The set of rules governing water use, and 
specific organizational arrangem ents involved in the form ulation and 
implementation of water resources laws, policies, strategies and programs 
together form the enabling environment. Capacity-building consists of three 
basic elements: creating an enabling environment with appropriate policy and 
legal frameworks; institutional development, including community participation; 
and hum an resources development and strengthening of managerial systems. In 
practice, capacity building pertains to a lack of supportive policy and regulatory 
framework in national governments, failure to mobilize public participation, 
limited managerial capabilities to make institutions operate effectively, limited 
financial and technical capabilities, poor personnel management, and a general 
lack of communication ability between users and planners as well as horizontally 
or between subsectors.
In the main text of the Delft Declaration it is stated that, "experience shows 
that institutional weaknesses and malfunctions are a major cause of ineffective 
and unsustainable w ater services; this requires urgent attention to building 
institutional capacity at all levels. Secondly, the Declaration recommends that 
developing countries, which are the leading ones mostly engaged with 
strengthening their institutional setup, could act in partnership with External 
Support Agencies. In that respect, UNDP is invited to take a leading role. In the 
Annex to the Delft Declaration, capacity building is defined at three 
complementary levels. 1) Sectoral level: provision of an enabling environment for 
effective sector and sub-sector management; 2) Institutional level: development of
48 Ibid.,p. 17.
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planning and m anagem ent processes so that the collective skills of the staff can 
be effectively used in the achievement of the institution's objectives . 3) Individual 
level: comprehensive hum an resources development strategies and programmes 
to enhance the skills of individuals in accordance with institutional needs.49
The experience of the past two decades, as formulated in the Mar Del Plata 
Action Plan (1977), the New Delhi Statement (1990), and the policy of the UN 
Administrative Committee on Coordination Inter-Secretariat Group for Water 
Resources (ACCISGW) (1990), emphasized the urgent need for integrated, 
sustainable water resources management. It called for a comprehensive vision of 
the water sector. Yet, a few years prior to these efforts, water supply, sanitation 
and irrigation were often approached as if they were separate subsectors. In 
addition to that, water has, far too long, been regarded as an isolated sector from 
the other sectors of a national economy. The aims are to achieve a more efficient 
and sustainable supply m anagem ent of water as a prime environmental 
resource, and to arrive simultaneously at more effective and sustainable delivery 
to its users (demand management).^® During the eighties a new dimension was 
added to the problem, by recognizing that water was in fact only one of the 
natural resources to be m anaged in an environmentally sustainable fashion. The 
eighties also showed that progress in development is not lasting, or does not take 
root, if the implementers view their task primarily as supplying physical 
infrastucture. The New Delhi Statement is clear in concluding that future long 
term and sustainable development in the subsectors m ust rely more on adequate 
assistance to and development of the local capacity. The whole water sector m ust 
change its infrastructure from supply-orientation to demand-orientation.
Ibid., p. 19.
50 Ibid., p. 13.
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becoming more responsive to the stated priorities and wishes of the 
communities. That era also m arked the importance of water pricing as the major 
item for discussion in many national and international fora. It was felt that if the 
proper water prices could be charged, farmers and other consumers would 
become rational optimizers, which would substantially contribute to efficient 
water use.
Yet by the early 1990s, it was increasingly being realized that two 
fundam ental issues have to be considered before water pricing becomes an 
attractive policy instrument. First, water pricing has thus far been viewed 
primarily as an economic instrument: its sociopolitical implications in 
developing countries have generally not been understood. Second, water has 
been traditionally subsidized to achieve the very specific sociopolitical objectives 
of food security, provision of clean drinking water, and increasing the health and 
income of the rural poor.^l If economic water pricing is to be introduced, other 
policy instruments have to be developed to achieve the same objectives. As the 
dem and for w ater increases, and exclusively national sources of water are fully 
developed, the only major sources of water that would be available in many 
countries in the future are likely to be international in nature. Therefore the need 
for the development of international water bodies have been emphasized 
extensively during the last decade, though it has seldom been realized so far. 
Another major constraint to efficient water m anagement during the past two 
decades has been the weaknesses of the institutions concerned. Since the 
beginning of the 1990s, international bodies put much emphasis on rationalizing 
and strengthening of water management institutions.^^ 7^0  growing economic
51 Ibid., p. 17.
52 Ibid., p. 79.
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relevance of water and the looming spectra of increasing water resource 
strategies, led the UN Committee on Natural Resources to request ACCISGW to 
develop a strategy for a renewed commitment to the Mar Del Plata Action Plan.
The Delft Declaration certainly played a leading role in promoting 
comprehensive water resources policy measures with its clear descriptions of the 
key concepts like capacity building and enabling environment. The Delft 
Declaration served the goal of identifying and implementing the new concepts 
that have emerged from the 1980s in the water sector. It has been stressed that, 
comprehensive and integrated national development plans and policies should 
specify the m ain objective of water use policy. That is, the water sector is part of 
the national economy and decisions should be taken at the w ater sector with 
consultation of the national economic structure. Moreover, the institutional, 
administrative and legal structure of water sector capacity-building should be 
rationalized and strengthened. The strengthening a n d /o r  building effective 
institutions for better use and m anagement of water resources are reinforced not 
only at the national level but at the international level, as well. These concepts 
are largely utilized in the making of principles and norms of the suggested 
regime in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin. That is, an im portant norm  of the 
suggested regime in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin includes a list of demand 
m anagem ent options which are basically derived from the outcomes of the Delft 
Symposium. Many of these were endorsed by the participants of the following 
Conferences such as the International Conference on W ater and Environment 
and United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. These 
measures are also reflected in the joint study of World Bank, FAO and UNDP, 
entitled A Guide to the Management of Water Resources.
I l l
ii) A Joint Study by W orld Bank, FAO and UNDP (1994);
A G uide to the M anagem ent of W ater Resources
This guide is a synthesis of combined efforts by the FAO, the World 
Bank and the UNDP in moving beyond the Delft Declaration, the Dublin 
Declaration (1992), UNCED (1992), and the World Bank's own policy paper Water 
Resources Management of 1993. This latter paper committed the Bank and the 
UNDP to developing a systematic framework to incorporate all the facets of 
rational and sustainable water resources management, and identified two major 
requirements such as capacity-building in countries' abilities to plan and manage 
natural resources, and implementation of policy reviews requiring a national 
water resources strategy. The major goal of the guide is to outline approaches to 
policy review and strategy development and not make overly specific 
prescriptions.^^ Moreover, the purpose of the guide is to identify the issues 
involved in water management, setting out principles and criteria for such 
management, introducing some useful methods and key processes, and 
indicating some of the results obtained from actual cases. The major problems in 
the water sector are defined by giving a detailed checklist of critical issues facing 
governments in this sector, and by providing the basic principles for water 
m anagem ent and allocation in a comprehensive manner.^'^ This checklist of
The guide consists of eleven sections. Following an introduction, section 2 presents 
the "problems and principles" of water resources management and its reform. Sections 3 
and 4 deal with the process of "formulating a strategy" and provides further discussion of 
the elements that make up the detail involved in policy-review, assessment and 
development of options in management. Key issues such as stakeholder participation; 
information systems; and international aspects are presented in more detail in the 
successive sections 5 through 9. And, sections 10 and 11 lead to a short summary of 
recent international experience in water resources management reforms in selected 
countries.
54 In the checklist of critical issues, ten critical issues are classified; 1) Supply-demand 
balance, 2) Standard of service, 3) Economic importance of water sector, 4) Water quality 
indicators, 5) Future supply options, 6) Efficiency of use, 7) Financial performance of
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critical issues may be used by the concerned authorities of the water scarce 
countries to find out shortcomings in the water sector.^^
a) Formulation of national water resources strategy
W ater's vital role in economic and social development makes it 
essential to have a strategy to develop and manage this resource. The 
form ulation and implementation of a strategy for the water sector can help 
sustain economic and social development and can help build a country's capacity 
to m anage its resources. Formulating a water resources m anagem ent strategy 
begins by examining a country's development goals and its existing water- 
related policies. Formulating a water resources m anagement strategy will also 
test the feasibility of existing development objectives and policies. The WB, 
UNDP, and FAO prepared jointly a guide to assist countries in preparing 
national water resources management strategies by outlining for policy-makers 
a general process of formulating such strategies and suggesting ways for 
countries to build m anagem ent capacity through the process of formulating 
these strategies. Thus, Chapter 4 of this study analyzes the current water policy 
and m anagem ent of the three riparians of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin to 
display that particularly the two downstream  riparians, namely Syria and Iraq 
are in an urgent need to formulate a comprehensive national water resources 
strategy to overcome the difficulties of their fragmented and ineffective 
bureaucracies in their water sectors. In che same manner, it would be wise for
sector, 8) International sensitivity and commitments, 9) Symptoms of conflict, 10) 
Stmctural and institutional change. Ibid., pp. 13-15.
To illustrate, during Özden Bilen's (who is a very experienced and knowledgeable ex­
bureaucrat in the water sector) lectures. Spring 1996, the class under his guidance made 
use of that checklist to overview the Turkish water sector, in general. See Ö. Bilen, 
Lecture Notes, Hacettepe University Hydropolitics and Strategical Research and 
Development Centre, Spring 1996.
113
Turkey to review its national water resources strategy with the idea of the best or 
most efficient use of existing or emerging resources to achieve development 
goals in the water sector. Such guides provide a perfect beginning for the 
developing countries to determine a set of medium-to-long term  action 
program s to support the achievement of development goals, and to implement 
efficient and equitable water-related policies. A water resources management 
strategy should emphasize such aspects of water development as the necessary 
institutional and hum an resources framework. Such a strategy should 
incorporate the views of water resources stakeholders by including them  in the 
formulation process. Moreover, a strategy should be developed principally by 
national experts. Foreign technical assistance might be offered as appropriate, 
but it should be kept to a minimum.^^
Certain steps should be followed in the process of form ulating water 
resources s t r a t e g y . "po begin with, countries should determine the importance 
of water in national, social and economic life. Thus in order to demonstrate the 
importance of w ater issues to policy-makers, the general public and key 
interested parties, certain broad indicators should be made of the relative 
importance of the water sector. Useful general indicators include: the size and 
value of water-intensive sectors in the national economy, significance of irrigated 
agriculture to national food security, GNP and exports, cost to the budget and 
public investment program m e of providing and subsidizing water services, 
relative importance of water-related diseases in national health status, and
56 Ibid., pp. 28-29.
57 These steps are not exhaustive. Each country can formulate a national water resources 
strategy regarding its own needs. However the guide could be useful for the beginners to 
find out the way of designing the best strategy suitable to country's needs. See Guide to 
the Management o f Water Resources, op. cit., pp. 25-26.
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estimates of their economic and financial costs, balance of payments implication 
of water sector, e.g. debt servicing on water projects, etc., and estimates of 
national economic costs of water pollution.
The objective of formulating a national water resources management 
strategy is to provide measures to manage this vital resource in accordance w ith 
adopted goals and policies. A national strategy need not identify specific 
investment projects like "master plans" or "rapid assessments", although it may 
outline or provide broad directions for an investment program. A water 
resources m anagem ent strategy should emphasize such aspects of water 
development as the necessary institutional and hum an resources framework, and 
should address the m edium  to long term  issue of building or enhancing a 
country's water m anagem ent capacity. In the past, supply-side approaches 
dom inated water resource management practices. W ater itself was physically 
managed through technical and engineering means that captured, stored, 
delivered and treated water. However, the era of meeting growing dem and by 
developing new supplies is ending. In c>ur day, water resource management is 
shifting away from the goal of capturing more water towards that of designing 
dem and and user-focused approaches that influence behavior.
In the formulation of a comprehensive national water resources strategy, 
countries should review options available for addressing the most im portant of 
them. It involves four m ain categories: (i) Planning and analysis at the technical 
level entails the creation of data systems and analytical frameworks which may 
include strategy documents, water resource assessments, data banks, modelling 
and research; (ii) Legal and institutional reforms include the formation of 
m anagem ent structure regulations. These actions may include the reform of
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water and land legislation, water quality standards and passing supporting 
legislation, the creation of new authority, systems of coordination, corporatizing 
or privatizing water utilities, empowering groups, setting up a regulatory 
framework for the private sector, etc.; (iii) Economic policies, w ith the aim of 
providing a suitable "enabling environment" for general economic policies 
should be examined to adjust their effects on food self-sufficiency and industrial 
promotion. Special incentives such as economic pricing, the creation of 
opportunities for m arkets and trading, introducing pollution charges should be 
created to persuade users to treat water as a scarce resource; (iv) Projects and 
programmes, such as public investment, information and education campaigns, 
and program m es to encourage water efficiency
In the form ulation of water resources strategy, it is really useful to adopt 
guides like the one which came through the efforts of the WB, FAO, and UNDP. 
However, each country has a set of unique legal, institutional, economic, social, 
physical and environmental conditions that influence its water management 
policies and strategies.^^ While experience worldwide is useful to generate 
options for action, solutions to a country's problems m ust be tailored to its 
specific needs.^^The formulation of national strategies for integrated water 
m anagem ent can be complex, depending on many factors such as the size and 
political organization of the country, its hydrological conditions and the 
diversity of stakeholders. There is m ounting evidence that in the near future, the
58 Ibid., pp. 29-30.
59 Ibid., pp. 30-39.
The current water policies of the three riparians, namely Turkey, Syria, Iraq display 
that an urgent review of national water resources strategy should be undertaken to achieve 
efficient and equitable use and management of existing resources (see Chapter IV of this 
study).
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major constraint to water resources development and protection will be the 
limited capacity of the institutions in many countries to absorb financial 
resources and convert them into worthwhile and sustainable actions and 
projects. Capacity-building is a major aspect of formulating a water resources 
management strategy. Real long-term success in water resources management 
depends on the ability of nationals to identify problems and formulate and 
implement policies and strategies. Countries constantly need to adapt their 
policies and associated strategies to new circumstances and challenges. 
Stakeholder participation should involve those who are concerned with, or have 
an interest in, water resources and who will be affected by outcomes of policy 
and its implementation. Decisions regarding water resources can affect nearly 
every sector of the economy and the public as a whole and stakeholder 
participation should be established in a form that will elicit responses from those 
concerned at appropriate levels. A holistic approach should be adopted by the 
governments of the developing countries because only that approach recognizes 
the far-reaching and intersectoral character of decisions about water. Hence, the 
ICWE and UNCED called for a new approach to the assessment, development 
and m anagem ent of freshwater resources. A more integrated and broader 
approach to the water sector policies and issues is im portant because of water's 
special nature as a unitary resource. Rainwater, rivers, lakes, groundw ater and 
polluted water are all part of the same resource, which means global, national, 
regional and local actions are highly interdependent. W ater use in one part of the 
system alters the resource base and affects water users in other parts. 
Fragmented bureaucracies make uncoordinated decisions, reflecting individual 
agency responsibilities^that are independent of each other. Often, government 
planners develop the same water source within an interdependent system for 
different and competing uses. This project-by-project, department-by-
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departm ent and region-by-region approach is no longer adequate for addressing
water issues.61
b) Key Issues in the formulation of a national water 
resources strategy
In this part, a conscious effort has been m ade to bring 
together disciplines that all too often are addressed separately. Thus, 
"institutional and hum an resources issues", "stakeholder participation", 
"information system issues", "the role of economics", "environmental and health 
considerations", and "international issues" are all addressed as the key issues in 
the formulation of national water resources strategy. The following sections 
describe approaches to the key issues and relate them to the formulation of water 
resources strategy. The process outlined below incorporates the elements of 
comprehensive or "holistic" water resources management that have been 
endorsed by num erous international conferences described above. These key 
elements discussed below are very instrumental in designing an effective water 
resources strategy both national and basinwide. They demonstrate that water is 
really a multi-disciplinary issue which should be handled with all its peculiar 
aspects to achieve sound and equitable policies in the management and 
allocation of the existing resources.
b.l) Institutional and human resources issues
The institutional and hum an resources issues have a 
considerable place in the formulation of a national water resources strategy. The 
term  "institutions" refers to both the set of rules governing water use and specific
Ibid., pp. 43-45.
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organizational arrangem ents involved in the formulation and implementation of 
water resources laws, policies, strategies and programmes. Together, these rules 
form the "enabling environment" for water resources management. Changes in 
the rules, organizational arrangemeri^s and means of hum an resources 
development may be required to effectively translate water resources 
management policies into an action program. Sound institutions along with 
high-quality hum an resources are the best assurance of achieving water sector 
objectives. Two objectives are served by analyzing institutions and human 
resources: the first objective is to assess existing rules and organizational 
arrangem ents and match them to the demands of program  implementation, and 
the second objective is to identify means of strengthening capacity to undertake 
strategy form ulation on a continuing basis. The strategy formulation process is 
an opportunity to evaluate whether institutions and hum an resources programs 
in a country effectively serve the country's water resources management goals. 
An evaluation of the set of rules is another opportunity to consider both the 
social norms that govern water supply and use as well as w hether explicit 
policies, laws and regulations are sufficient. A review of organizational 
arrangements can reveal whether existing and recommended rules can be 
enforced; it is also a chance to consider ways of involving community 
organizations, water users or professional associations in the planning and 
management of water resources. Finally, hum an resources development 
considerations involve a look at supply and demand for key personnel, as well as 
education, training, employment, career structures and incentives. Water 
resources m anagem ent strategy is country-specific. Analysis of institutional and 
hum an resources should pay special attention to a country's culture in terms of 
its legal framework, the mix of public and private sectors, educational and 
manpower development policies and traditional modes of organization.
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Therefore, in the analysis of institutions, particular care should be paid to social 
and cultural practices governing the use of the resource.^2
b.2) Stakeholder participation
Stakeholder participation is the process of involving 
those who are affected by and who have an interest in water resources and in the 
formulation of a water strategy. Stakeholders can be individuals, organizations 
or groups. Stakeholders include: (a) public sector agencies involved in water 
resources (for example, departments or ministries of agriculture, industry, 
transportation, and recreation); (b) various levels of public sector agencies in the 
water sector (state, regional, local); (c) private sector organizations and 
companies w ith water interests (water users association in the irrigation sector); 
(d) environmental and other professional non-governmental organizations. It is a 
two-way communication process that explicitly seeks to identify and to clarify 
interests at stake with the ultimate aim of producing a well-informed water 
m anagement strategy that has a good chance of being implemented. Stakeholder 
involvement is an integral part of the process of developing a strategy, mainly 
because it can (a) assure that alternatives serving a broad range of interests are 
considered, help to gather data or information, identify gaps in data or 
information, and identify those who m ight provide data or information in the 
future (b) provide transparency and accountability regarding both decisions 
taken and the process by which those decisions were taken (c) accustom 
stakeholders to the fact that some difficult choices may have to be made in order 
to manage water resources effectively (d) build a broad base of commitment to 
options by creating an environment that rewards the realistic discussion of
^2 Ibid., pp. 61-66.
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benefits, risks and costs of options and that provides a meaningful basis for 
informed consent to recommendations.^^
b.3) Information systems
A water resources information system plays an 
im portant role in estimating the quantity and quality of water available as well 
as the current and prospective water use and demand patterns. Each country or 
drainage basin has its own hydrological and economic characteristics. The 
developing countries should prepare an assessment of their information system 
in order both to develop a water resources m anagement strategy and to design 
or improve a system. W ater strategy formulation should include an examination 
not only of which data are available, but how they are collected, analyzed and 
shared. Information is an issue in many aspects of integrated water resources 
management, particularly the institutional, international and economic areas. 
When the efficient allocation of water depends on the analysis of more 
information than the government has, there is an acute need to evaluate and 
improve the water resources information systems. Uninformed or inadequate 
decision-making will eventually paralyse both the public and private sectors as 
different economic sectors or different countries compete fiercely for water. In 
addition to helping form a strategy to manage water, information technology 
with its "decision-aiding systems" can assist the efficient management and 
allocation of water in rapidly changing supply and dem and conditions (see 
Appendix VI for further discussion on information systems). Decision-makers 
will be able to form better sustainable water resources management strategies if 
they are provided with credible historical information on water resources.
Ibid., pp. 67-70.
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Implementing strategies will depend on timely information for day-to-day 
m anagem ent decisions.^'^
b.4) The role of economics
Countries are increasingly recognizing that water not 
only has a social and environmental value, but an economic one as well that 
m ust be m anaged in terms of both quantity and quality. Economic efficiency -the 
ability to produce the same or more goods with fewer resources- is a key policy 
in most countries, one that is directly linked to the conservation of water. Price 
and other economic incentives are required to conserve water and increase the 
efficiency of its use. Also, since the last-cost options in water development have 
largely been exploited in most countries, further major investment in water will 
in most cases be in the area of water conservation and demand-management. 
Economic analysis is an essential tool in helping select strategy options.^^
b.5) International considerations
The makers of the Guide recognize that in case a 
country is sharing an international watercourse w ith others, international 
considerations should be included in the process of formulating a national water 
resources strategy and present some ot the main considerations that arise in 
setting up of collaborative arrangem ents between basin states. Experiences from 
international law concerning the uses of trans-national water resources should be 
drawn. Moreover, in the later stages, the formation of joint commissions and the 
establishment of river basin organizations for managing international water 
resources effectively and equitably should be seriously considered. It should be
64 Ibid.,pp. 71-74.
65 Ibid., pp. 75-79.
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immediately obvious to the group charged with formulating a national water 
resources m anagem ent strategy whether the international aspects of the resource 
deserve significant attention. In general, the process of assessing water resources 
should be similar in m ost countries. For some, dependence on international 
sources will be a major issue and the chief question in developing and choosing 
options is how to most efficiently and equitably manage such resources. It may 
be that form ulating a national water resources strategy w ithout directly 
involving neighboring riparian countries would be fruitless and thus some 
countries m ust engage in joint strategy formulation from the outset. At the 
minimum, the strategy team may wish to review existing international treaties 
and suggest realistic options if change in such arrangements is required. The 
strategic plan might suggest areas of further collaboration by riparian states.^^
This Guide has been reviewed extensively to display its instrumentality in 
draw ing lessons for form ulating national water resources strategy in riparian 
countries like Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. It will be illustrated in the following 
chapters that the w ater problem concerning the Euphrates and Tigris rivers 
basically lies on the mismanagem ent and misallocation of the waters of the basin 
both at national and international levels. Thus, the Guide provides a starting 
point for the three riparians of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin to reconsider and 
reassess their national water resources strategy w ith a view to achieve better 
m anagem ent and utilization practices. To illustrate, the three riparians can first 
make use of the "checklist of the critical issues" to determine shortcomings in 
their water sectors. Afterwards, they can formulate a water resources strategy or 
review the existing one by following the steps that the Guide put forward. A
66 Ibid., pp. 89-92.
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holistic approach should be adopted in which the water sector should be 
organized as a significant part of nalional economic decision-making. Special 
emphasis should be given to the strengthening of institutions in the water sector. 
Only w ith the functioning of effective institutions, can these countries reach 
sound policies in the water sector. Further, "key issues" such as stakeholder 
participation, improving information systems, and the role of economics should 
be scrutinized by policy-makers of three riparians of the Euphrates-Tigris.
The conferences examined in this Chapter, outlined the water problems in 
a broad perspective encompassing water in all its im portant uses, and indicated 
areas that should be emphasized in the national economies of the water scarce 
countries. They put forward some simple concepts and methodological 
approaches that could, if understood and adopted, significantly influence the 
successful development of water resources around the world. And, the basic 
argum ent of the experts of these agencies is that, major problems w ith successful 
development of water resources lie in the refinement of economic analysis. The 
proposed new approach introduced by the international agencies to managing 
water resources builds on the lessons of experience. At its core is the adoption of 
a comprehensive policy framework and the treatm ent of water as an economic 
good, combined with decentralized management, greater reliance on pricing, 
and fuller participation by stakeholders. The adoption of a comprehensive 
framework for analyzing policies and options would help guide decisions about 
managing water resources in countries where significant problems exist, or are 
emerging, concerning the scarcity and the allocation of water. Decentralizing the 
delivery of water services and adopting pricing that induces efficient use of 
water are key elements of sound water resource management. But, for 
decentralized m anagem ent to be effective, a supportive legal framework and an
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adequate regulatory capacity are required. Hence, differences am ong countries 
notwithstanding, water resource m anagement that follows the principles of 
comprehensive analysis, opportunity cost of pricing, decentralization, 
stakeholder participation, and environmental protection delineated in these 
documents will yield more coherent policies and investments across sectors, 
promote conservation, and improve the efficiency of water allocation. The 
comprehensive approach to water resources management challenges countries to 
find new ways of providing environmentally sound social and economic 
development and of m anaging these resources to achieve this. Circumstances in 
countries vary so widely that it would not be fruitful to prescribe one method for 
strategy formulation. It is clear, however, that throughout the world water is a 
limited and a critical resource, that strategies to manage and conserve it are 
necessary, and that countries need and w ant to build their capacities to manage it 
successfully. Moreover, international conferences cover certain principles 
regarding to international water resources, as well. To illustrate, "the right to use 
the waters of the international water resources in their respective territories of 
the riparians," "obligation not to cause significant harm," "establishment of joint 
mechanisms and river basin organizations to attain optimal utilization of the 
transboundary rivers," and "protection of water resources, water quality and 
aquatic ecosystems" are the foremost norms that are presented through the 
works of the international agencies. Thus, these guidelines which are to be 
implemented concomitantly both at the national and international levels 
represent vigorous steps to international regime-building for better use and 
m anagem ent of water resources.
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CHAPTER 3. CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL
WATER LAW: PRINCIPLES AND NORMS
This chapter rests on the basic assum ption that the principles and norms of 
international water law provide a foundation for negotiating regional regimes on 
the use and m anagem ent of transboundary rivers. An international regime is by 
definition "a set of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures 
around which actors expectations converge in a given issu e -a rea .D ete rm in in g  
the principles and norms of a regime help to distinguish it from any regular 
patterns of action in world politics that create common expectations about the 
behavior of states. And, this is the task of this chapter. Drawing on the basic 
assum ptions and propositions of the theory of international regimes, and 
analyzing significant developments and contributions of international water law 
may prom ote efforts to establish an international regime for achieving effective 
allocation and m anagem ent of the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin.
Through the evolution of substantive principles and explanation of 
processes of coordination, international law can influence the development of a 
regime within a given issue area.^ On the other hand, the theory of international 
regimes, in interaction with international law, provides insights into the 
elaboration of "guides to action" which can be built upon the premises of 
international law seeking to identify or generate binding legal norms.^ In fact.
1 Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as 
intervening variables", in Krasner (ed.) International Regimes, Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1983, p.l.
2 J. Brunnee and S. J. Toppe, "Environmental Security and Freshwater Resources: 
Ecosystem Regime Building", American Journal o f International Law, Vol. 91, No. 1, 
1997, p. 28.
3 Ibid., p. 33. Indeed the foremost principles of international water law: "equitable 
utilization" and "no harm" rule which had been dealt by the international law institutions
regimes are seen as a fertile ground for the elaboration of explicit treaty norms.4 
Likewise, regimes are understood, in international relations theory, as necessary 
institutional frameworks or building blocks for the construction of more specific 
treaties.^ In international relations literature -as quite a num ber of scholars of 
institutionalism argued- recognizing essential institutional features such as the 
rules and rights of resource regimes is the primary stage for the emergence and 
effectiveness of that regime.^ Hence, international water law is proved to be the 
most productive field in issuing legal framework rules which constitute a crucial 
part of an effective resource regime.
Therefore, discussion in this chapter starts with an elaboration of legal 
framework doctrines that have arisen through competing claims of the riparians 
along a transboundary river basin. These doctrines are useful in providing a 
necessary fram ework to evaluate the riparian states' assertions regarding the 
rights to use transboundary water resources. Next, a brief historical review of the 
notable works of the NGOs, such as the Institut de Droit International, The Inter- 
American Bar Association, and the International Law Association (ILA), over the 
use and m anagem ent of transboundary rivers will follow. The works of the ILA, 
Helsinki Rules in particular, are examined more extensively because it is the first 
attem pt by an NGO to prepare a complete codification of the law of the 
international watercourses. Moreover, ILA's rules on the uses of the waters of 
international rivers were adopted by a num ber of states in different parts of the
such as the ILA and the ILC, had deterministic impact on the negotiation and formation 
of bilateral and multilateral treaties on international watercourses.
4 R. O. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes", in S. Krasner (ed.), 
International Regimes, Ithaea; Cornell University Press, 1983, pp. 141-163.
 ^J. Brunnee and S. J. Toppe, op. cit., p.31.
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world. Finally, the works of the UN International Law Commission (ILC) which 
have culminated in the adoption of the Convention on the Law of Non- 
navigational Uses of International Watercourses in the UN General Assembly 
will be analyzed in detail. It is assum ed that parties to a disputed water resource 
may derive from the rich text of the Convention appropriate principles that can 
be applicable to specific circumstances of their regions. Such legal principles 
which determine basically the rights and obligations of the riparians with regard 
to the use of the transboundary water resources facilitate negotiation process of 
concluding an agreement.
A. Legal Fram ework Doctrines
W ith the development of international water uses for other than 
navigational purposes, and in particular for consumptive uses such as irrigation 
and domestic purposes, a num ber of potential or actual conflicts emerged among 
riparian states. Thus, in the evolution of customary law, the theoretical 
foundation of the law of international water resources relates to the state 
practice. That is, the legal framework doctrines have emerged through the 
controversies between states; their claims and counter-claims over the right to 
use of transboundary rivers. Historically, international riparian law has been 
underdeveloped, eluding efforts of jurists to sort out its complexities and 
persuade nations to subject their competing claims to a standardized code of 
legal principles. Those complexities have sometimes m ade the process appear 
m uddled. W hatever consensus now exists has only been achieved during the 
past fifty years.7 Yet, the progress has been also slow and the achievement so
^ J. M. Wenig, "Water and Peace: the Past, the Present, and the Future of the Jordan 
River Watercourse; An International Law Analysis," New York University Journal o f  
International Law and Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2, 1995.
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meager that some observers have concluded that no universal code of 
international river law is possible. Nevertheless, experience, scholarship and 
jurisprudence have produced three basic legal principles, namely absolute 
territorial sovereignty, absolute territorial integrity, and limited territorial sovereignty. 
By means of categorizing the legal framework doctrines, one could comprehend 
the approaches of the riparians to the allocation and management of 
transboundary water resources. Initially, upper riparian states claimed absolute 
territorial sovereignty entitling themselves to use the transboundary water 
resources w ithin their boundaries as they pleased and w ithout regard to the 
dem ands or wishes of the lower riparians. In response, lower riparians claimed 
absolute territorial integrity, a doctrine which justified the dem and of an 
undisturbed flow from upstream. These mutually exclusive claims raged back 
and forth across diplomatic exchanges and international disputes until the 
international community moved gradually towards the more reasonable middle- 
ground doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty which is expressed in terms of 
the principle of equitable utilization. Five basic theories or legal framework 
doctrines have been developed to address the allocation of transboundary water 
resources. Peter Rogers defines them as the following: absolute sovereignty (a 
state has absolute rights to water flowing through its borders), riparian rights 
(any territory along a riverway has rights to a relatively unchanged river), prior 
appropriation ("first in time, first in right"), optim um  development of the river 
basin (the basin is considered as a single hydrologic unit, and the most efficient 
way to develop the river is considering it as a whole), and reasonable share or 
equitable use.^ However, as it is most commonly defined in literature, for the 
sake of clarity, three significant doctrines will be elaborated in detail.
 ^ Peter Rogers, "International River Basins: Pervasive Unidirectional Externalities," 
Presented at a conference on The Economics o f Transnational Commons, Universita di
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i... The Theory of Absolute Territorial Sovereignty
Clyde Eagleton points out that the earlier writers like Grotius, or 
positivists like Fiore and Bluntschli, were inclined to think of rivers as God-given 
highways which m ust be open for the use of all; or that they were merely 
extensions of the sea and m ust therefore, like the sea, be free to all. They felt that 
rivers were not subject to sovereignty or to ownership by states. This generous 
viewpoint of course did not prevail in practice, and states have in fact claimed 
sovereignty over the portions of water resources within their territories. The U.S. 
Attorney General Judson Harm on found no basis for this contention in 
international law and went on to observe that: "The fundam ental principle of 
international law is the absolute sovereignty of every nation, as against all others, 
within its ow n territory." According to this theory, the state as "master of its own 
territory" may use the watercourse as necessary w ithout regard to any other 
riparian state. Thus, a state may freely dispense of the waters w ithin its territory 
but has no right to dem and water from an upper riparian.^ The theory of 
absolute territorial sovereignty is mostly asserted by upper riparian states.^^ 
Judson Harm on stated this theory in 1895 during a dispute w ith the lower 
riparian Mexico over the Rio Grande, thus giving the absolute territorial theory 
its colloquial name, the Harm on Doctrine. The absolute sovereignty principle 
was first extended to non-navigational uses of rivers by the United States in a 
controversy w ith Mexico concerning the Rio Grande river. Mexico argued that: 
"... international law would form a sufficient basis for the rights of the Mexican 
inhabitants." Their claim to the use of the water of that river was incontestable in 
their view, they being the prior users of the river for hundreds of years before the
Siena, Italy, 25-27 April, 30, 1991, pp. 5-7.
^ Thomas Naff and Ruth C. Matson (eds.). Water in the Middle East: Conflict or 
Cooperation, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985, p. 83.
10 J. E. Cohen, op. cit., p. 522-525.
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inhabitants of the US. Yet, the great majority of writers reject the doctrine on the 
principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your own property so as not to 
cause an injury to an o th e rj.^  State practice has also repudiated the doctrine. In 
the 1950s, the United States finally rejected the doctrine during its dispute with 
Canada over the Columbia River where the US was in a downstream  position. 
An international tribunal also rejected the absolute territorial sovereignty theory 
in the Lake Lanoux case.^^ today's international law, states refrain from, at 
least explicitly, adopting the doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty 
concerning the transboundary watercourses along which they are in a riparian 
position. The Harm on doctrine has been described as "essentially anarchic." 
Jerome Lipper maintains; "In conclusion, the Harmon Doctrine was not an 
expression of international river law, rather it was an assertion that, there being 
no rules of international law which governed, states were free to do as they 
wished. No subsequent development of the principle supports its inclusion as a 
part of the law of international rivers.
ii... The Theory of Absolute Integrity of the River
Diametrically opposed to the Harm on doctrine is the theory 
asserted by some writers according to which the lower riparian is entitled to 
dem and the continuation of the natural flow of water from the territory of the 
upper riparians. There is very little support for this doctrine. The initial point of 
departure for the lower riparians is the insistence that they have an absolute
11 William L. Griffin, "The Use of Waters of International Drainage Basins Under 
Customary International Law," American Journal o f International Law, Vol. 53, 1959.
12 John G. Laylin and Rinaldo L. Bianchi, "The Role of Adjudication in International 
River Disputes, The Lake Lanoux Case," American Journal International Law, Vol. 53, 
1959, pp. 45-6.
12 Jerome Lipper, "Equitable Utilization," in (eds.) Garretson, Hayton, Olmsted, The Law 
o f International Drainage Basin,1961, pp.22-23.
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right to have the uninterrupted (or natural) flow of the river from the territory of 
the upper riparian. Under this doctrine, also called the theory of absolute 
territorial integrity, a riparian state may not control a section of an international 
river if it will harm  another riparian s t a t e .L i k e  its opposite (i.e., the Harmon 
Doctrine), this theory has received little support among legal writers, or in state 
practice. Theory of absolute territorial integrity is inequitable in its award of 
rights w ithout corresponding duties and is only invoked in situations where the 
continued flow of water is crucial to the lower riparian.!^
iii... The Theory of Limited (Restricted) Territorial Sovereignty
This theory strikes a golden means between the two preceding 
theories, by recognizing a state's sovereignty over the waters of a transboundary 
river under its jurisdiction, but limiting the exercise thereof in such a manner as 
would ensure other riparians a reasonable share of the waters. International as 
well as municipal adjudications lend some support to this doctrine.^^ Under this 
theory, all states are equally sovereign, hence, the sovereignty of one state is 
limited by the sovereignty of the others. In other words, every state is free to use 
its territorial water, provided that in no way prejudices the rights and the uses of 
the other states. This doctrine is supported by the principles of reasonable and
Griffin, Ibid., p. 70.
15 Naff and Matson, op. cit., p. 165.
16 In the Lake Lanoux Case, Spain challenged a proposed French development scheme 
where under the waters of Lake Lanoux which naturally flowed towards Spain would not 
have followed such course regularly. The dispute between France and Spain was referred 
to arbitration. The tribunal held: "The unity of a basin is supported at the legal level only 
to the extent that it conforms to the realities of life. Water, which is by nature a fungible 
thing, may be restored without alteration of its qualities from the viewpoint of human 
needs. A withdrawal with return, as contemplated in the French project, does not alter a 
state of affairs established in response to the demands of life in society," John G. Laylin 
and Rinaldo L. Bianchi, op. cit., p. 46.
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equitable use and the obligation to avoid significant harm .l^  Because it contains 
reciprocal rights and responsibilities, this doctrine is widely favored by both 
experts and state practice. Article IV of the Helsinki Rules supports this doctrine: 
"Each basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable 
share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an international drainage basin." 
Also, Article 5 (on equitable utilization of the international watercourses) of the 
Draft articles of the International Law Commission has this doctrine behind it. 
Besides, this doctrine is fully embraced in the suggested regime for better 
m anagem ent and utilization of waters of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin 
discussed in Chapter V.
B. Historical Evolution of International Water Law in its Early Stages
For centuries, national interests in the use and the management of 
transboundary water resources had been accommodated by means of 
agreements with references to specific and well-defined watercourses and uses. 
In the last fifty years, however, water consumption for multiple uses and the 
need for global responses to water demands have dramatically increased and 
actual or potential conflicts have arisen. Interested states, moreover, have often 
been unwilling or unable to stipulate adequate treaties on the subject. As a result, 
jurists have turned to general principles, and started looking into state practices 
and legal thoughts for suitable definitions and rules. The work accomplished on 
the subject by such distinguished bodies such as the Institut de Droit 
International (IDI), the International Law Association (ILA), and the 
International Law Commission (ILC) of the United Nations indicates that the
Naff and Matson, op. cit., p. 166.
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intended objective has been only partially a c h ie v e d .T h is  chapter includes a 
brief survey on the evolution of the law of transboundary water resources. The 
works of ILA and ILC concerning the legal status of international water courses 
will also be elaborated in an extensive manner.
The problems of international rivers have been a topic of interest among 
international jurists since the beginning of this century. According to Guillermo 
Cano, international water law did not substantially begin to be formulated until 
after World W ar I. Before that time, hum an consumption, industrial waste, and 
diversion for irrigation, were not deemed major issues. Rivers were used 
primarily for navigation and log floatation, both of which were covered for 
Europe in the Congress of Vienna of 1815.1^ The historical importance of the use 
of rivers for navigation is well known. It is therefore not surprising that such 
landm ark agreements as the Final Act of Congress of Vienna of 1815 and the 
Treaty of Versailles of 1919 specifically addressed the rights of navigation. The 
economic and sometimes social importance of navigation (and since many rivers 
had been used for that purpose for a number of years) led to a belief in some 
quarters as recently as the first part of this century that navigation enjoyed an 
inherent priority over other uses of an international watercourse. In 1910, the 
Institut de Droit International proposed a framework for regulating international 
waterways. In the following year, the Institut passed the M adrid Resolution on 
the uses of international rivers.^O The Resolution had put the bulk of emphasis
Dante A. Caponera, "Patterns of Cooperation in International Water Law: Principles 
and Institutions," Natural Resources Journal, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 563-588.
Guillermo J. Cano, "The Development of the Law of International Water Resources 
and the Work of the International Law Commission," Water International, Vol. 14, 1989, 
pp.167-171.
20 j. E. Cohen, "International Law and the Water Politics of the Euphrates," New York 
University Journal o f International Law and Politics, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1991, pp. 503-556.
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on the right of navigation, stating that "The right of navigation by virtue of a title 
recognized in international law may not be violated in any way w hatever..."21 
Moreover, in the 1920s, the League of Nations adopted the two general 
multilateral conventions which are still in existence, on the use of international 
waterways: the Barcelona Convention and Statute on the Regime of Navigable 
W aterways of International Concern, and the Convention Relating to the 
Development of Hydraulic Power Affecting More Than One State. The latter was 
discussed in Geneva, but it was signed only by seventeen states and later ratified 
by eleven. Similarly, the Declaration of Montevideo approved by the Seventh 
International Conference of American States in 1933, had given priority to 
navigation vis-à-vis industrial or agricultural uses of the rivers.22 As other uses 
increasingly rivaled navigation in social and economic importance, it came to be 
recognized that absolute priority to navigation thwarted the attainm ent of 
optimal utilization of the watercourse. Even in 1931, H. A. Smith in his classic 
work entitled The Economic Uses of International Rivers already observed that "one 
of the most notew orthy features of the last hundred years has been the immense 
increase in the use of water." He attributed this increase to a combination of 
changes in personal habits and scientific progress. Thus, S. C. McCaffrey 
comments on this classic masterpiece by adding that some contemporary 
developments such as accelerated urbanization, rapid economic development 
and burgeoning population, increased demand on the fresh water resources. It is
21 International Regulation of the Use of International Streams, Apr. 20, 1911, reprinted 
in Resolutions o f the Institute o f International Law, James Brown Scott trans., 1916, 
pp. 168-170,.
22 S. C. McCaffrey, "The Evolution of the Law of Transboundary Rivers," conference on 
Transboundary Waters in the Middle East: Prospects for Regional Cooperation, Bilkent 
University, Ankara, Turkey, 2-3 September 1991.
135
these changes in the nature of hum an society that have prom pted corresponding 
changes in the law governing transboundary water resources.
Professor Clyde Eagleton (who can rightly be called the father of m odern 
international water law because of his vision and pioneering endeavor in this 
field) m entioned in 1954 the lack of legal research.^3 Eagleton raised the 
following question: "What can international law contribute to the solution of 
these problems of diversion and use of the waters of international rivers?" This is 
not to suggest that international law experts had completely ignored the 
subject.^'^ Some of the views of earlier publicists were, however, far from 
encouraging any attem pt to regulate the use of international rivers by general 
principles of international law. Professor Brierly considered this to be impossible, 
and stated that:
"...there are many rivers, especially so-called international rivers, which 
flow through or between the territories of more than one state, which it is 
desirable in the general interest that the law should regulate so that 
maximum advantage may be extracted from them, but this cannot be done 
by rules applying generally to all rivers; the political factors which have to 
be taken into account differ, and so do the uses to which rivers may be put: 
navigation; electric power generation; irrigation; water supply to cities; 
some rivers are more important for one purpose and some for. another, so 
that they carmot all be dealt with in the same way; each requires a regime 
adapted to its own special circumstances."25
Among the international non-governmental organizations, the Institut de 
Droit International proposed a series of principles in M adrid (1911), Salzburg
23 Clyde Eagleton, "International Rivers," American Journal o f International Law, Vol. 
48, 1954, p. 287.
24 The Institut de Droit International considered the subject of the use of international 
rivers in its Madrid session in 1911. See H. A. Smith, The Economic Uses o f 
International Rivers, 1931.
25 J. L. Brierly, The Outlook for International Law, 1944, pp. 42-43.
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(1961), and Athens (1979) on non-navigational uses of water and on pollution. 
The M adrid Resolution is quite categorical regarding the obligations of the 
riparian states with respect to transbounciary rivers. For successive rivers (the 
rivers which flow from one state to another state or states) the Resolution 
provided: "No establishment (especially factories using hydraulic power) may 
take so much water that the constitution, otherwise called the utilizable or 
essential character, of the stream shall, when it reaches the territory downstream 
be seriously modified." Fifty years later, the Institute adopted another Resolution 
on the subject in its meeting at Salzburg on September 1 1 , 1961. The Salzburg 
Resolution declared that "a state's right to make use of shared waters is limited 
by the right of use by the other States concerned with the same river". It then 
provided that any dispute as to the extent of the respective states' rights "shall be 
settled on the basis of equity, taking into consideration the respective needs of 
the states." This provision, in McCaffrey's view, affirms the principle of ecjuitable 
utilization. Flence the Resolution is noteworthy for the following reasons: It 
rejects the absolute sovereignty theory, and it recognizes the right of the non­
riparian States in the hydrological basin, and in so doing leans towards the 
theory often referred to as "community in the waters" theory, or the "basin" 
approach which appear to be essentially similar. In addition to that, the Athens 
Resolution of 1979 declared that states must "ensure" that activities within tlie:r 
borders "cause no pollution in the waters of international rivers and lakes 
beyond their b o u n d a r i e s . T h i s  obligation was m oderated in a subsequent 
article, yet it is still very close to the "no harm" rule. The Institut's work has bee a 
relied upon on a num ber of occasions by international tribunals and by stales la
26 D. A. Caponera, The Law o f Iniernational Water Resources, Legislative Study Nij, y g 
Rome: FAO, 1981, p. 313.
22 S. M. McCaffrey, in P. Gleick, Water in Crisis, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993, p. 98.
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diplomatic exchanges. On the other hand, the Inter-American Bar Association 
produced the Declaration of Principles of Law Governing the Uses of 
International Rivers and Lakes (Buenos Aires, 1957). Two more Declarations 
followed: the Declaration of Caracas (1959), and the Declaration of San Jose de 
Costa Rica (1976). The International Association for W ater Law, as the co­
organizer of the session in Caracas, issued a declaration on the uses of 
international rivers as well.28 in 1992, the UN Economic Commission for Europe 
adopted three instrum ents with regards to international water management: The 
Declaration of Policy on Prevention and Control of W ater Pollution, Including 
Transboundary Pollution, merely indicates that "rational utilization of water 
resources" is a basic element of long-term water management, whereas the 
Declaration of Policy on the Rational Use of W ater recommended a "unified 
strategy" and "coordinated utilization." Yet, the Commission's Recommendations 
to ECE Governments on Long-Term Planning of W ater Management endorse 
basin-wide, cooperative management of international water resources.29
C. The Work Of The International Law Association (ILA):
The Helsinki Rules
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice enumerates the 
sources of international law which the court shall apply:
1. International conventions (treaties), whether general or particular, 
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
2. International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
28 Cano, op. cit., p. 168.
29 J. W. Dellapenna, "Building International Water Management Institutions: The Role 
Of Treaties And Other Legal Arrangements," in J. A. Allan and C. Mallat (eds.). Water in 
the Middle East: Legal and Commercial Implications, Taims: British Academic Press, 
1994, p. 63.
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3. General principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
4. Judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations.
A striking aspect of treaties concerning international watercourses is their 
sheer number. A systematic index prepared by the FAO contains more than 2000 
instruments relating to international watercourses.^^ Most agreements 
concerning international watercourses are bilateral and relate to specific rivers. 
The num ber of multilateral agreements, while small in comparison to that of 
bilateral treaties, is growing steadily. Treaties between states respecting 
successive rivers are not so num erous as those in the case of transboundary 
rivers. Moreover, treaties m ust be evaluated w ith caution; their significance rests 
not in the specific provisions of a particular treaty, but in the underlying factors 
found in common among such treaties. It is of great importance that all of the 
num erous treaties dealing with successive rivers have one common element- the 
recognition of the shared rights of the signatory states to utilize the waters of an 
international river.^l Yet, the fact that most water treaties relate to specific 
watercourses does not mean that these agreements are of no use in the search for 
general principles of law in this field. As S. C. McCaffrey points out, international 
law experts derived fundam ental principles of the law of international 
watercourses, precisely the recognized principle of "equitable utilization" and its
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Systematic Index o f 
International Water Resources Treaties, Declarations, Acts and Cases by Basin, 
Legislative Study No. 15, Rome, FAO, 1978.
Jerome Lipper, op. cit., p. 23.
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subordinate principle "obligation not to cause significant harm", from treaties
and state practice.^^
There also exists w hat is called the international soft law, which consists of 
principles adopted or recommended by organs of international organizations, 
whether governmental such as the International Law Commission of the UN, or 
not. Non-governmental international organizations with high academic prestige, 
such as the International Law Association, founded in 1873, can produce 
international soft law, but the degree of its acceptance depends on the prestige of 
these organizations. In that manner, the Helsinki rules have been adopted or 
recommended by the OAU (Organization of African Unity) and other regional 
organizations and by some governments.^^ In addition to Cano's standpoint in 
evaluating the work of ILA as international soft law, Dellapena, in his analysis, 
evaluated the Helsinki Rules of ILA in the customary international law of 
transboundary water resources.^^ In the absence of a binding international 
agreement, determ ination of the rights of the various riparians relies on the 
varied concepts embodied in customary international law.
In 1966, the International Law Association (ILA) adopted the Helsinki Rules 
on the Uses of the W aters of International Rivers. This set of articles was the first 
attem pt by an international organization to prepare a complete codification of 
the law of the international watercourses. The three Treaties concluded one after
^2 S. C. McCaffrey, "Water, politics, and international law," in P. Gleick, Water in 
Conflict, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 97-98.
33 The Helsinki Rules are adopted by Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee of 
OAU in 1973, Yearbook o f International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/ CN.4/274, 1974. 
Besides, Argentinean government approved them in 1970, ILA, Report o f the 54th 
Conference, The Hague, 1970.
34 Dellapena, op., cit., p. 63.
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the other on three major rivers, namely the Nile (1959), the Indus (1960), and the 
Columbia (1961) rivers m ust have influenced the Helsinki Rules in no small 
way.35 In these cases, the international legal rights of the concerned states to use 
the waters of the rivers was the issue; the upstream  states held views of the law 
that were the opposite of those held by the downstream  states. This divergence 
of views clearly indicated the urgent need of an authoritative statem ent of the 
international law applicable to the uses of international rivers.36 The Helsinki 
Rules were Drafted by the ILA's Committee on the Uses of the Waters of 
International Rivers, whose objective was "to clarify and restate existing 
international law as it applies to the rights of states to utilize the waters of an 
international drainage basin." Indeed, the Committee recommended that the ILA 
adopt the completed Draft as "a statement of existing rules of international
law. "37
The Helsinki Rules center on the concept of "international drainage basin" 
as an indivisible hydrologic unit on the basis of which planning m ust occur to 
assure the "maximum utilization and development of any portion of its waters." 
The emphasis on maximum "utilization" and "development" as the principal 
objectives of states w ith regard to their watercourses is perhaps indicative of the 
chief concerns of states during the first half of this century. Subsequent work of 
ILA displays more sensitivity to environmental concerns. The Helsinki Rules 
explicitly include w ithin this concept all tributaries, and not simply the primary
35 Sadık Toksöz, "International Water Disputes," Lecture Notes for MA course on 
Economics and Politics o f  Water Resources, Department of Economics, Boğaziçi 
University, 1996, p. 7.
36 Charles B. Bourne, "The International Law Association's Contribution to International 
Water Resources Law," Natural Resources Journal, Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring 1996, p. 156. 
37s. C. McCaffrey, "International Organizations and the Holistic Approach to Water 
Problems," Natural Resources Journal, Vol., 31, 1991, pp. 139-165.
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international watercourse itself. The adoption of the drainage basin approach to 
the codification of the law of international watercourses represented a significant 
step forward. There is substantial support for use of the international drainage 
basin as the physical unit to which legal rules are applied. From a scientific point 
of view, "the river basin, bounded w ith its drainage divide and subject to surface 
and sub-surface drainage under gravity to the ocean or to interior lakes, forms 
the logical areal unit for hydrological studies. It functions physically as a self- 
contained unit".^^ Also stated in the eminent work of Ludwik Teclaff "the waters 
which the river basin receives form an interconnected system which is capable of 
transm itting w ithin itself any disturbance caused by changes affecting water in 
any part of the basin." The fact that the waters within a drainage basin are 
interconnected makes the basin the ideal unit to which to apply a legal regime. 
Since the drainage basin is a natural functional unit, it is also an appropriate 
factual basis for rules concerning environmental protection.39
Some writers have expressed dissatisfaction with the concept of 
international drainage basin as defined by the Association by saying that in order 
to constitute an international drainage basin, there should be, inter alia, a system 
of waters, including surface and underground waters, which flow into a 
"common terminus". The Association's comment on Article 1 states that "the 
underground waters constituting a part of the drainage basin are those that 
contribute to its principal river, a stream or lake or other common terminus."
McCaffrey, op., cit., p. 143
ILA has continued to draft rules relating to water-centered activities, namely 
environmental issues, not addressed directly by Helsinki Rules, including flood control 
(1972), pollution (1972 and 1982), navigability (1974), the protection of water 
installations during armed conflicts (1976), joint administration (1976 and 1986), flowage 
regulation (1980), general environmental management concerns (1980), and groundwater 
(1986).
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Perhaps a similar statem ent with respect to surface waters also should have been 
made. Another problem  presented by the definition is that there are in some 
states small lakes, ponds or swamps and the like which are not connected to a 
principal river of the basin, and the exploitation of the waters thereof may make 
it necessary to connect them  to the principal river. Under the Helsinki Rules such 
waters will also fall w ithin the regime established thereunder.
On the other hand, use of the expression "geographical area" in defining 
drainage basin may have been unfortunate since, while technically accurate, it 
implies that not only water but land areas might fall within the scope of the 
Helsinki Rules. This has caused some States to reject the entire concept of the 
drainage basin as the proper basis for a set of rules on international watercourses 
as S. C. McCaffrey explained in detail in his illuminating article.^O W hen the 
International Law Commission started its work on modeling of Draft Articles on 
International W atercourses for Purposes Other Than Navigation, it first issued a 
questionnaire which was submitted to member states of the UN. The replies of 
states revealed sharp differences of views concerning the proper basis for the 
ILC's work. As noted in 1979 by the second special rapporteur S. Schw ebel, the 
questions that gave rise to substantial differences were the first three, which 
concerned the m eaning and scope of the term "international watercourses. "41 
Although Schwebel himself was in favor of the use of the drainage basin concept, 
he recognized that there was decided opposition to its use. In McCaffrey's 
analysis, those opposing the drainage basin concept are, for the most part, in an 
upstream  or predom inantly upstream  position.
40 McCaffrey, op. cit., pp. 150-156.
41 S. Schwebel, First Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, Yearbook o f International Law Commission, 143, UN Doc. A/CN.9/ 
SER.B/1981.
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In 1980, the International Law Commission accepted a provisional working 
hypothesis as to the m eaning of the term  "international watercourse system." The 
Commission's commentary to Article 1 provided explanation of the expression 
"international watercourse system".42 The Commission did not define the 
expression "international watercourse system" in the text of an article, rather it 
worked on a tentative definition which attem pted to strike a balance between 
diverging positions of the member states. On the one hand, it incorporated all of 
the components of a hydrographic system, but on the other hand, it introduced 
the concept of 'relative international character' of a watercourse, a legal fiction 
designed to keep the scope of the Draft manageable and realistic. As so defined, 
the concept of an "international watercourse system" comes very close to that of 
an "international drainage basin" under the Helsinki Rules.^^ The most obvious 
difference is w hat is described as the 'relative international character' of an 
international watercourse under the Commission's hypothesis. S. C. McCaffrey 
argues that the utility of this concept, which was probably added to provide 
reassurance to those concerned about the 'system' approach, seems doubtful. 
Thus, for that particular period of time the Commission left the question to be 
dealt w ith later and turned to its work on the remaining provisions of the Draft. 
Though there is not a direct reference to the term "international watercourse
42 McCaffrey, op. cit., p. 154.
43 The hypothesis, on the basis of which the ILC worked in the early 1980s reads as 
follows: "To the extent that parts of the waters in one state are not affected by or do not 
affect uses of waters in another state, they shall not be treated as being included in the 
international watercourse system. Thus, to the extent that the uses of the waters of the 
system have an impact on one another, to that extent the system is international, but only 
to that extent; accordingly, there is not an absolute, but a relative, international character 
of the watercourse," Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of 
its 32nd session. Yearbook o f  International Law Commission, Vol. 2, Part 2, p.l08, 1980.
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system" in the latest Draft44 of Articles with which the ILC has come up, in the 
second subparagraph of Article 2 it is stated that ivatercourse means a system of 
surface waters and groundwaters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a 
unitary whole and normally floiving into a common terminus. In addition to that, in 
the commentary of the same article, it is asserted that "the concept of a 
watercourse or river system is not a novel one, and the expression has long been 
used in international agreements to refer to a river, its tributaries and related 
canals." The commentary continued with plenty of examples of international 
agreements, treaties, and conventions (Treaty of Versailles, the 1950 Convention 
between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Hungary, the Indus Waters 
Treaty of 1960 between India and Pakistan, Zambezi River System Agreement), 
and concluded that "international organizations and experts have reached 
similar conclusions", giving some prom inent examples such as the works of the 
Economic Commission for Europe and the Helsinki Rules of the ILA.
W ithin a drainage basin, the Helsinki Rules embraced the concept of 
restricted sovereignty through the adoption of a rule of equitable utilization.^^ The 
position of the ILA is that an accommodation of the multiple and diverse uses of 
various riparian states is the "optimum goal of international drainage basin 
development", and that such an accommodation can be achieved only through 
the implementation of the rule of equitable utilization. It is clear from the above 
argum ent that ILA regards the dom inant principle in the field of international 
watercourses to be that of equitable utilization. As a well-recognized principle in 
the field of international watercourses, equitable utilization principle has been
44 Draft Articles On The Law O f The Non-Navigational Uses O f International 
Watercourses And Commentaries Thereto, Adopted On Second Reading By The 
International Law Commission At Its Forty-sixth Session, A/CN.4/L.493, 12 July 1994.
45 Dellapenna, op. cit., p. 63.
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championed by the International Law Association, initially in its Helsinki Rules 
but also in later resolutions concerning international water resources.^^ Besides, 
ILA made many contributions to the law of the international watercourses. 
Article IV of the Helsinki Rules describes the overriding principle of "reasonable 
and equitable share" of international watercourses: Each basin state is entitled, 
within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters 
of an international drainage basin. As observed from the above statement, one 
im portant shift in legal thinking in the Helsinki Rules is that they address rights 
to beneficial use of water, rather than the water per s e .^  It is pointed out that in 
order to be a beneficial use it is not necessary that the use m ust be the most 
productive one to which the water may be put or is one that avoids waste and 
insures m axim um  utilization of water. The commentary on Article IV states: "to 
be worthy of protection a use m ust be beneficial, that is to say, it m ust be 
economically or socially valuable, as opposed, for example, to a diversion of 
waters by one state merely for the purpose of harassing another."
Article V of the Helsinki Rules cites all of the factors that m ust be taken into 
account for reasonable and equitable use.^^ And the commentary to the Helsinki 
Rules makes clear that an existing use may have to give way to a new use in 
order to achieve an equitable apportionm ent of shared water resources; 
compensation would, however, have to be paid for the impairment or
The commentary to the ILA's Montreal Rules on Water Pollution in an International 
Drainage Basin, adopted in 1982, states that "The principle of equitable utilization is the 
foundation on which the Helsinki Rules are built.," see Article 1, Montreal Rules on 
Water Pollution in an International Drainage Basin, Report o f the Sixtieth Conference, 
ILA, Montreal, 1982, p. 535.
^^Deborah, Housen-Couriel, Aspects o f the Law o f International Water Resources, Draft,
1992.
48see, ILA, "The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers," 
Report of the 52nd Conference, Helsinki, 1966.
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discontinuance of the existing use.49 At that point, one should emphasize the 
fact that the ILA considered the international watercourses as 'shared resources' 
which is in contrast to the approach of the ILC of the UN. The ILA has developed 
w hat some see as a second principle governing the m anagement of international 
watercourses that, "each nation should not cause substantial harm  to the 
environm ent or the natural condition of the waters beyond the limits of the 
nation's jurisdiction. "50 Thus, far from being prohibited, harm  to an existing use 
is treated by the ILA as only one factor to be taken into account in achieving an 
equitable apportionm ent of the waters. S. C. McCaffrey concludes that ILA 
maintained the controlling principle as that of "equitable utilization." Both the 
relationship between the recognized principle of international law "equitable 
utilization" and the rule of "the obligation not to cause significant harm" will be 
discussed in the next section which is on the work of the ILC vis-à-vis the 
codification of international watercourses.
Other significant contributions of the Helsinki Rules are that they reject the 
Harm on Doctrine, and the prevalent view that navigation takes precedence over 
other uses of the rivers. The rules also make clear that a state may not be denied 
the present 'reasonable' use of the waters to reserve for a co-basin state a future 
use of the waters, rejecting at the same time the theory that prior use creates a 
vested right in the use of the waters. The rule stated in Article VIII reflects the 
current international attitude in this matter, a middle ground between the two 
extremes. It gives protection to an existing use but only so long as the factors 
justifying its continued existence are not outweighed by factors showing the
49 Article IV of the Helsinki Rules, Report o f the Fifty-second Conference, ILA, 
Helsinki, 1966.
59 See Rules on the Relationship between Water, Other Natural Resources and the 
Environment, Article I, ILA, adopted at Belgrade, 1980.
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desirability of its modification or termination. There may also be instances where 
an existing use will be "phased out over a period of time in order to give the user 
the opportunity to develop alternative sources of water." Moreover, in 1976, the 
Committee of the ILA on International W ater Resources Law produced a set of 
draft articles on international water resources administration, which was 
opproved by the ILA. The first Article defines the term "international water 
resources administration," and the first paragraph of the second Article states: 
"with a view to implementing the principle of equitable utilization of the waters 
of international drainage basin and consistent with the provisions of Chapter VI 
of the Helsinki Rules, the basin states concerned and interested should negotiate 
in order to reach agreem ent on the establishment of an international water 
resources administration. "51
While not having received general recognition and although they have not 
yet been fully incorporated into international agreement on water resources, it 
may nevertheless be anticipated that the Helsinki Rules were undoubtedly used 
as guidelines in water resources treaty making world wide. They had been used 
in Drafting the basic water resources agreements such as the ones concluded in 
Lake Chad and Lower Mekong basins52^ and had been the subject of a general 
declaration of acceptance by the Government of Argentina in 1967. These are the 
evidences that the Helsinki Rules are scon to be accepted by the international 
community as customary international law. The best evidence of the influence of
51 International Law Association, Report of the 57th Conference, 1976, p. xxxiv
52 In 1975, the governments of the four states composing the Mekong Committee 
adopted a Joint Declaration of Principles for Utilization of the Waters of the Lower 
Mekong Basin; the principles were fashioned on the Helsinki Rules, Article V of the 
Rules being reproduced in the Declaration word for word, Mekong Committee, Doc. 
E/CN.l 1/WRD/MKG/L.405, p. 19.
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the Helsinki Rules and of their status as international law is seen in the work of 
the ILC on international watercourses. Special Rapporteurs Schwebel, Evensen, 
and McCaffrey concluded after intensive studies that the principle of equitable 
utilization was a rule of customary international law. However, some analysts 
claim that the Helsinki Rules are short of the degree of authority run  by the ILC 
of the UN because Helsinki Rules are prom ulgated by the non-official ILA 
whereas the ILC was given the m andate by the UN General Assembly to address 
the non-navigational uses of international rivers. Meanwhile, C. A. Bourne 
pointed out that the law on international water resources as propounded by the 
ILA is not readily available. It is contained in many documents, not only in the 
Helsinki Rules but in ten sets of Articles subsequently adopted by the ILA 
subcommittees. Therefore, there is an urgent need for consolidation of ILA 's 
work . Since the inaccessibility of the ILA's work on this branch of international 
law is bound to affect the extent to which this work is used, and thus its 
influence.^^
D. The Efforts of the United Nations International Law Commission: 
Convention on Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses 
(1997)
The impetus for the International Law Commissions's (ILC) work on the 
international watercourses came from the General Assembly which in 1970 
recommended that the Commission "take up the study of the law of the non- 
navigational uses of international watercourses with a view to its progressive 
development and codification. By 1974, the Commission had begun
Charles B. Bourne, op. cit., p. 216.
54 S. C. McCaffrey, "The International Law Commission Adopts Draft Articles on 
International Watercourses," The American Journal o f International Law, Vol. 89, April 
1995, p. 399.
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preliminary work on the subject. It established a subcommittee whose report 
proposed that the views of the governments be sought on various issues, 
including the following: the scope of the proposed study; the uses of the water to 
be considered and w hether the problem of pollution should be given priority; the 
need to deal w ith flood control and erosion problems; and the interrelationship 
between navigational uses and other uses. A questionnaire accordingly was 
circulated to the member states of the And in the same year the
Commission appointed Ambassador Richard D. Kearney of the United States as 
the first special rapporteur for its work on international watercourses. Kearney 
produced only one report which analyzed the scant response to the 
questionnaire and pointed out the important differences of opinion, which it 
listed, on the adoption of the "drainage basin" concept. The discussion led the 
ILC to agree that it was not necessary to decide upon the scope of the expression 
"international watercourse" at the outset of the work, and that attention should 
be devoted instead to beginning the formulation of general principles.
During the rapporteurship of S. M. Schwebel, hot debates took place mainly 
on the concept of "watercourse system" and on the principle of "equitable 
utilization." Schwebel completed three reports. In his first report he analyzed the 
nature of the subject m atter, the influence of the physical characteristics of water 
on it and proposed a text of ten articles.^^ In his second report, the concept of 
"watercourses system" instead of "basin" was adopted and a text of six articles
Yearbook o f the International Law Commission, Doc. A/9610, rev. 1, United Nations, 
New York, 1974.
S. M. Schwebel, First Report as Special Rapporteur, Yearbook o f International Law 
Commission, UN Doc. AC/N 4, 320, 1979.
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was proposed.^7 In 1980 the Schwebel rapporteurship resulted in the 
codification of the very first articles on the topic and in a remarkable report that 
strongly influenced the shape of the Commission's subsequent work on the 
watercourses.^^ The articles, adopted in 1980, were Article 1: scope of the present 
articles; Article 2: system states; Article 3; system agreements; Article 4: parties 
to the negotiation and conclusion of system agreements; Article 5: use of waters 
which constitute a shared natural resource; and Article X: relationship between 
the present articles and other treaties in force. Four of these six articles have their 
counterparts in the Draft 1994 . The two that do not are Article 5 and Article 
iiXii 59 Article 5 later proved to be controversial.
Jens Evensen, the third rapporteur, concluded that opposition to the 
concept of an international watercourse as a 'shared natural resource' made it 
doubtful whether it will prove conducive to the attainm ent of a generally 
acceptable convention to retain the concept. Instead he proposed an article 
providing that a state is entitled to a reasonable and equitable share of the uses of 
the waters of an international watercourse. The new formulation is nothing more 
than an expression of the doctrine of equitable utilization- a doctrine that the 
previous special rapporteur treated separately from the 'shared natural resource' 
principle. Besides, Evensen abandoned the concept of the "system" and adhered 
solely to the concept of "international watercourse." His first and major 
contribution was a general draft on the contents of the proposed convention.
S. M. Schwebel, Second Report as Special Rapporteur, Yearbook o f International Law 
Commission, UN Doc. AC/N 4, 332, 1980.
S. M. Schwebel, Third Report as Special Rapporteur, Yearbook o f International Law 
Commission, UN Doc. AC/N 4, 348, 1982.
Yearbook o f International Law Commission, Part 2, 1980, pp. 110-136.
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which he developed in thirty-nine articles, complementing those already put 
forward by Schwebel.
Before the Commission had an opportunity to take action on his draft 
convention, Evensen moved to the International Court of Justice and S. C. 
McCaffrey took over. During the first two years of McCaffrey's rapporteurship, 
depending on the ten years experience of Commission's work. Article 2-7, 
namely Article 6 on the equitable utilization of the international watercourses, 
and Article 7, enum erating factors relevant to equitable utilization were adopted 
in 1987. It took five years to complete the provisional adoption of a full set of 
Draft Articles. The Draft adopted on first reading in 1991 consisted of thirty-two 
articles arranged in six parts or chapters.^® In accordance w ith the standard ILC 
procedure, it was sent to governments for comments. The Commission then gave 
the Draft Articles its second reading in which it took into account the comments 
of the member states and proposals of the special rapporteur.^! Finally the 
Commission adopted a final text of thirty-three articles in its forty-sixth session 
in the sum m er of 1994 and submitted them to the General Assembly for 
approval.^2 xhe ILC requested that the General Assembly convene a 
plenipotentiary conference for the elaboration of a convention on the basis of the 
ILC's Draft Articles (1994) on international watercourses. The General Assembly 
formed a working group to revise the Draft in light of comments from member
See Report o f the ILC on the work o f its forty-third session, UNGAOR, 46th Session, 
at 161, UN Doc. A /46/ 10,1991.
See Draft Articles on the Law o f the Non-navigational Uses o f International 
Watercourses and Commentaries thereto. Adopted on the Second Reading by the 
International Law Commission at its Forty-sixth Session, UN Doc. A/ CN. 4/ L. 493, 12 
July 1994.
Courtney G. Flint, "Recent Developments of the International Law Commission 
Regarding International Watercourses and Their Implications for the Nile River," Water 
International, Vol. 20 1995, pp. 197-204.
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states. The working group came together in September 1996 and studied the 
written commentaries of the member states on the Draft.
The Convention is intended to serve as a framework instrument, setting 
forth principles and rules that have general applicability and that may be applied 
and adjusted in agreements between states sharing international watercourses.^^ 
However, whether it was feasible to Draft such an instrument posed the first of 
several fundam ental problems for the work of the Commission on international 
watercourses. Throughout the Commission's work, doubts were raised 
concerning the feasibility of formulating a set of general principles that would 
apply to all international watercourses. Each watercourse is different, it was 
argued, and the needs of the states using them vary considerably as well. The 
uniqueness of each watercourse and its surrounding circumstances means that 
any rules drafted to apply to all international watercourses would have to be 
formulated at a high level of generality. In order for an international legal 
framework to have universal applicability, it m ust be flexible enough to allow for 
a regional context, while m aintaining the principle of equity. Too much 
flexibility, however, will cause the framework to collapse. Therefore, a balance is 
required that allows for regional context while maintaining· a strong set of 
guidelines for determ ining equity. Thus, S. C. McCaffrey asked the critical 
question: "Would rules so general be of any practical value?" As he then clarified, 
the most satisfactory answer may be found in the argum ents m ade by states in 
actual controversies: they tend to rely upon general principles rather than 
specific rules or standards. However, there has not always been agreement on 
w hat these general principles were. Yet, McCaffrey claims that the ILC, being a
McCaffrey, “The International Law Commission Adopts Draft Articles on 
International Watercourses," op. cit., p. 398.
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respected body of experts in international law, deserves the attention of the 
states in issuing general rules governing relations between states w ith regard to 
the non-navigational uses of international w atercourses.^  In this line of 
reasoning. Part II, General Principles (Articles 5-10) of the Convention can be 
evaluated as serving the main goal of being a framework document with its 
broad principles and norms. Yet, as it will be discussed in detail in the following 
section. Part III, Planned Measures (Article 11-19) set forth such rules that simply 
may not have general applicability.
The Sixth (Legal) Committee of the United Nations General Assembly met 
as a "working group of the whole" from October 7 to 25, 1996, at the UN 
headquarters to draft a multilateral framework convention on non-navigational 
uses of international watercourses, which was to be based on draft articles 
developed over more than twenty years by the ILC.^^ The committee last 
discussed the non-navigational uses of international watercourses in 1994, when 
it had before it a set of draft articles on the topic adopted by the ILC on the 
second reading that same year. The committee had then decided to give 
governments some time to consider the m atter and to convene as a "working 
group of the whole" during the fifty-first session of the General Assembly to 
elaborate a framework convention on the basis of the draft articles.^^ The 
convention is intended to establish general principles for the use and
S. C. McCaffrey, "An Assessment of the Work of the International Law Commission," 
Natural Resources Journal, Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring 1996, p. 302.
John R. Crook and Stephen C. McCaffrey, "The United Nations starts work on a 
watercourses convention," American Journal o f International Law, Vol. 91, No. 2, April 
1997, pp. 374-78.
66 Virginia Morris and M.-Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailes, "The work of the Sixth 
Committee at the Fifty-first session of the UN General Assembly, "American Journal oj 
International Law, Vol. 91, No. 3, July 1997, pp. 546-47.
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m anagem ent of international watercourses and to assist in the resolution of 
disputes. It encourages states to enter into specific agreements concerning the 
watercourses they share. Such agreements may alter or adjust the principles 
contained in the convention to suit particular conditions. The working group 
reached provisional agreem ent on many articles, but was not able in time 
available to reach agreem ent on key provisions defining and balancing the rights 
of upstream  and dow nstream  riparian states. A second session was therefore 
convened from March 24 to April 7, 1997, which resulted in the adoption of a 
Draft Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses.
At the first round of the negotiations (from October 7 to 25, 1996), as 
McCaffrey and Crook indicated, the national delegations' positions were 
som ewhat unusual in that they were largely shaped by perceptions of their 
country's geographic circumstances as upstream  states (e.g., Ethiopia, Turkey), as 
downstream  states (e.g., Egypt and Portugal) or as states having both interests 
(e.g., the United States, Canada, Mexico). Considerations of ideology and of 
relative economic development had little effect on most national positions. The 
result was that unusual combinations of states formed to support or oppose 
particular elements of the text.^^ This happened also in the Law of Sea 
Conference (1974-1982). In addition to that point, the general trend of the 
discussions dem onstrated growing awareness in delegations of the crucial 
importance of the subject, despite their caution in molding the general legal 
principles that should apply in the absence of more specific agreements and 
provide a frame of reference for future negotiations. It also emerged that on great
Crook and McCaffrey, op. cit., p. 375.
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many points where the positions of delegations were most divergent, the ILC 
text, which had been indicated in the m andate of the General Assembly as the 
basis for discussion, was close to the center. A core of delegations including the 
United States w orked to develop a new convention largely based on the ILCs 
texts and to avoid am endm ents fundamentally altering the ILC approach. These 
efforts were generally successful. Thus, the text adopted by the working group, 
in that fall session tended to look very much like the ILC's Draft. However, it was 
not clear then how the working group would reconcile the opposing interests of 
upper and lower riparian states. This explains why additional time was needed 
for the completion of the text. Among the most difficult issues that were handled 
in that session were; (i) balancing of the right to equitable and reasonable 
utilization of an international watercourse with the obligation not to cause 
significant harm  to other watercourse states; (ii) the relationship between this 
Convention and existing and future agreements relating to a specific 
watercourse; (iii) and the mechanism to be used for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes.^^
In the first session of the working group, as expected, the most difficult 
issue that the group faced was the fundamental rights and obligations of 
upstream  and dow nstream  riparians. After years of debate, the ILCs 1994 Draft 
adopted an approach, influenced by the ILA's Helsinki Rules, that attem pted a 
balancing of the rights and interests of upstream  and downstream  states.^^ There
Attila Tanzi, "Codifying the minimum standards of the law of international 
watercourses; remarks on part one and a half," Natural Resources Forum, Vol. 21, No. 2, 
1997, p.llO.
Morris and Vrailes, op. cit., p. 547.
The set of three articles; Article 5, Article 6, and Article 7 in ILC's 1994 Draft were 
extensively dealt with at some other sub-sections of this part.
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was a general agreem ent in the working group on the elements in Article 6, 
about the factors to be weighed in assessing equitable utilization. Nevertheless, 
there was division on Article 5 with regards to the right of equitable use and 
development, and deeper division on Article 7 dealing with situations where 
harm  may occur. Many upstream  states argued generally that the Draft articles 
unjustifiably limited their rights to use and to develop international 
watercourses. Several downstream  states argued that the articles insufficiently 
protected their interests; some criticized the ILC formula in some cases for 
allowing upstream  uses that inflict significant harm  downstream. Thus, the 
key provisions defining the basic rights and obligations of upstream  and 
downstream  states remained unresolved. A second gathering was convened 
from March 24 to April 7,1997 to resolve the disagreements on some significant 
issues and resulted in the adoption of a Draft Convention on the Law of the Non- 
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. There the working group 
adopted the Draft Convention by a vote of 42 to 3, with 18 abstentions.^^ 
negative votes were cast by China, Burundi and Turkey. Later in May, 21,1997, 
in the General Assembly, the Convention was approved by 103 states whereas 27 
states abstained and 3 states issued negative votes. Separate votes were held on 
some controversial provisions.
The Convention consists of thirty-seven articles and an annex on 
arbitration. The Convention consists of the following parts: Part I, Introduction 
(Articles 1-4); Part II, General Principles (Article 5-10); Part III, Planned Measures 
(Articles 11-19); Part IV, Protection, Preservation and Management (Articles 20- 
26); Part V, Harmful Conditions and Emergency Situations (Articles 27-28); Part
Crook and McCaffrey, op. cit., p. 376.
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VI, Miscellaneous Provisions (Articles 29-33); Part VII, Final Clauses (Articles 34- 
37); and Annex on Arbitration. The Commission also adopted a companion 
resolution on confined transboundary groundwater. The effort to draft a 
convention began in the Fall of 1996. The scope of the articles mainly emphasizes 
the fact that "the present articles apply to uses of international watercourses and 
of their waters for purposes other than navigation" (Article 1). In order to remove 
doubts, the Commission found it necessary to add the phrase "and of their 
waters" to the expression "international watercourse", since from time to time 
questions have been raised as to whether the expression "international 
watercourse" refers only to the channel itself, or includes also the water 
contained in that channel.
Article 2 resolved the question of how to define the term "international 
watercourse" as well as the related question concerning the "system" approach: 
the Commission defines "watercourse" broadly to mean "a system of surface 
waters and groundw aters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a 
unitary whole and normally flowing into a common terminus." Besides an 
"international watercourse" is defined as "a watercourse, parts of which are 
situated in different states." Thus, the Convention would apply not only to the 
main stem of a river or stream  forming or crossing an international frontier but 
also to tributaries of such watercourses, and groundwater that is connected with 
other parts of an international watercourse, whether or not the groundwater is 
intersected by a boundary.
The Convention would not, however, apply to aquifers intersected by a 
boundary but not connected to surface water. These aquifers are the subject of 
the resolution on "Confined Transboundary Groundwater." The Convention
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makes no distinction between watercourses that are "contiguous" (those forming 
a boundary) and "successive" (those crossing an international boundary). While 
most international controversies over the use of freshwater have arisen with 
regard to successive watercourses, commentators are in general agreement that 
the same rules apply to both kinds of watercourses. Thus, McCaffrey agrees that 
the same rules should apply to both forms of international watercourses, he 
adds, however, that a close examination of a state practice will reveal that the 
practice of states is som ewhat different with regard to each of the forms. This is 
no criticism of ILC's approach, however, since the Commission engages not only 
in codification of existing principles of customary international law, but also in 
its progressive development.
Moreover, the "common terminus" requirement in Article 2 proved to be 
controversial since the codification of the Draft 1994. To illustrate, the 
commentary to the articles adopted on first reading explained that the 
requirement "was included in order to introduce a certain limitation upon the 
geographic scope of the articles. Thus, for example, the fact that two different 
drainage basins were connected by a canal would not make them part of a single 
"watercourse" for the purpose of the present articles.^^ To illustrate, w ithout the 
"common terminus" requirem ent the Rhine and Danube systems, connected by 
the Rhine-Main Canal, could conceivably be viewed, functionally, as a single 
international watercourse. The common-terminus requirement would 
presumably result in their being viewed as two independent watercourses, even 
though activities in one could be felt in the other.^^ xh0 word "normally" was
Ibid. p. 305.
Report o f  the ILC , op. cit., 1991, p. 175.
S. C. McCaffrey, "An Assessment of the Work of the International Law Commission," 
op. cit., p.306.
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introduced at the second reading stage as a compromise aimed not enlarging the 
geographic scope of the Draft articles but at bridging the gap between, on the 
one hand, those who urged simple deletion of the phrase "common terminus" on 
the grounds, inter alia, that is hydrologically wrong and misleading and would 
exclude certain im portant waters and, on the other hand, those who urged 
retention of the notion of common terminus in order to suggest some limit to the 
geographic scope of the articles 7^
Especially concerning the three significant unresolved issues the 
Convention reached the following compromises: Article 3, dealing with the 
relationship between the Convention and other agreements, provides, inter alia, 
that the former does not affect the rights or obligations of a watercourse state 
arising from agreements in force, unless the parties otherwise agree, and that 
states may conclude agreements in the future which "apply and adjust the 
provisions of the Convention to the characteristics and uses of a particular 
international watercourse or part thereof. Yhe Convention was intended to 
have a supplem entary character, in the sense that it would apply to states parties 
in the absence of specific watercourse agreements. And, it was designed to serve 
as a guideline for negotiations of future agreements. This is truly reflected in the 
language of the Convention Article 3.^^ For one thing, the Convention achieved
The Euphrates and the Tigris rivers have to be considered as forming one single 
transboundary watercourse system, and managed accordingly. These rivers are linked not 
only by their natural course when merging at the Shatt-al-Arab, but also because of a 
man-made Thartar Canal connection between the two rivers in Iraq. Consequently, all 
existing and future agricultural water uses need not necessarily be derived from 
Euphrates. Irrigation water for areas fed by Euphrates, may also be supplied from the 
Tigris {Personal correspondence with a member o f International Law Commission, 
November 1997).
Morris and Vrailes, op. cit., p. 547.
During the negotiations, a group of delegations (Ethiopia, Finland, Germany, Iraq, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Syria, Tanzania, Uganda and Vietnam) requested the insertion of
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codification of customary international law which has been already in existence 
for years, but the Draft did not have as much effect as the Convention would 
have since it was not written and accepted by more than hundred states. 
Furthermore, by means of the Convention, the ILC managed to create new rules 
where it deemed necessary and in case customary law did not cover the ground. 
This practice is called "progressive development." A member of the International 
Law Commission commented that with these significant features the Convention 
will have a binding effect on future engagements of the states even if they did 
not give their consent, since it was born out of state practice and customary 
international law.^9
The cornerstone of the Convention is Part II, namely the General 
Principles.®^ This part (Articles 5-10), is the most im portant element within this 
framework as it provides the foundation for the resolution of conflicts.®^ 
Contained in this part are two articles that define the most fundamental rights 
and the obligations of the states in a watershed and that have been the focus of 
much debate: "the principle of equitable utilization" on the one hand, and "no 
harm" rule on the other. That is. Article 5 embodies the fundamental principle of 
equitable and reasonable utilization and stipulates, in particular, that a
language that would forbid states parties to conclude future watercourse agreements at 
variance with the basic principles of the Convention. Yet, that position was opposed by 
other delegations (Argentina, the Czech Republic, Egypt, France, Israel, South Africa, 
Switzerland, Turkey and the USA). The latter group insisted on maintaining an explicit 
reference to the possibility for future ^vatercourse agreements to depart from the 
Convention. Consequently a compromise solution was reached more or less as it stands in 
the ILC Draft 1994.
^9 Mehmet Güney, Ambassador, Member of International Law Commission, from his 
speech in Turkish Association of the UN, October 24, 1997.
S. C. McCaffrey, "The International Law Commission Adopts Draft Articles on 
International Watercourses," op. cit, pp. 399-401.
81 C. G. Flint, op. cit., pp. 197-199.
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watercourse state shall use and develop an international watercourse "with a 
view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits 
therefrom, taking into account of the interests of the watercourse states 
concerned, consistent w ith adequate protection of the watercourse." Apart from 
num erous general statements of principle on Article 5, what gave rise to most of 
the controversy over this provision was the concept of "optimal utilization" to the 
effect that "an international watercourse shall be used and developed by 
watercourse States w ith a view to attaining optimal utilization thereof and 
benefits therefrom consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse." 
Accordingly Article 5 has been rearranged in the Convention by inserting the 
term "sustainable" between "optimal" and "utilization."
The doctrine of equitable utilization was a move away from doctrines such 
as absolute territorial sovereignty and absolute territorial integrity which gave 
either the upstream  state or the downstream state a superior claim to the waters 
of a river.^2 Equitable utilization was the principle which leveled the playing 
field and concentrated on factors which were more crucial and less arbitrary, 
such as the needs of the states; and it is not simply a formula or system of 
computing the most equitable allocation to which each watercourse state is 
entitled.^^ The Convention does not seek to produce a clear and concise formula 
which, w hen all the data are inserted, produces a definitive division of the 
waters. In other words, the result of the application of international law would 
not be an immediate comprehensive reallocation of all the waters in the 
watercourse. Rather, equitable utilization would enable and prescribe regional 
initiatives prom oting efficiency, conservation, and economy of use. Instead of
^2 J. M. Wenig, "Water and Peace...," op. cit., p. 345. 
Ibid., p. 351.
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presenting a formula for determining how much water each state is required to 
provide or entitled to demand, the principle of equitable utilization requires each 
watercourse state to examine the structure of its economy, and the direction of its 
agriculture and water m anagem ent policy with the aim of putting the water it 
presently appropriates to the best and most efficient possible use.^^
It appears that, in international law, equity is m easured in terms of existing 
circumstances. To the extent that existing allocations satisfy existing demands, 
they are judged as equitable. Hence, Jonathan Wenig argues that the ILC tended 
to support the view that progress is to be achieved in water terms, not by 
estimating future needs, but by optimizing present utilization. Thus, Wenig 
emphasizes that equity and reasonableness m ust be shored up in three senses: 
there m ust be equity in terms of internal efficiency and economy, in terms of 
regional efficiency and cooperation, cmd finally, in terms of comparative 
considerations. Sovereignty over the water resources remains where it is but is 
subjected to international duties. Therefore, in addressing inequities, before 
redistribution and reallocation are contemplated, international law turns to 
greater efficiency, improved watercourse management, and economic 
structuring to satisfy water needs.^^
Each principle has its adherents. Perhaps the best known and most 
influential instrum ent supporting the preeminence of equitable utilization is the 
Helsinki Rules, which consider harm  as only one factor to be taken into account 
in determ ining w hether a particular utilization is equitable. However, critics of 
equitable utilization as the prevailing doctrine are concerned principally, and
84 Ibid., p. 352.
85 Ibid., p. 354.
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justifiably, w ith its use in the field of pollution (water quality), rather than that of 
allocation (water quantity).*^ It is indeed difficult, and perhaps impossible, to 
apply the same rule to all kinds of problems relating to the non-navigational uses 
of international watercourses. The Commission may, in fact, have recognized this 
difficulty in modifying Article 7 at the second reading stage to make the "no­
harm" rule more flexible and process-oriented.
The core of the Convention: Articles 5 to 7 are molded again to reach as 
much support as possible by reconciling the conflicting interests of upstream  and 
downstream  states. The relationship between the principle of "equitable and 
reasonable utilization" (Article 5), and the principle of "obligation not to cause 
significant harm  to other riparian states" (Article 7), has changed over time, and 
these changes m eant fundam ental shifts in the applicability of the ILC's rules. 
Discussion had focused not on whether these principles should have a place in 
the Draft, but on which of them should prevail in the event that they come into 
conflict. In many cases the principles of equitable utilization and no-harm do not 
come into conflict, because there is water of sufficient quantity or quality to 
satisfy the reasonable needs of the states concerned. When the quantity or quality 
of water becomes insufficient, however, a potential conflict between the 
principles is presented: the no-harm rule would require the water to be used in 
such a way as to avoid harm  to other states sharing the watercourse system, 
while the principle of equitable utilization would apportion the water equitably 
in such a m anner as to minimize the harm  to all states concerned, while 
maximizing available benefits to those states.^^ Thus, the equitable utilization
^^Andre Nollkaemper, The Legal Regime for Transboundary Water Pollution: Between 
Discretion and Constraint, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993, p. 68.
See S. C. McCaffrey, "The Evolution of the Law of Transboundary Rivers," op. cit., p. 
14.
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principle would require states concerned to accept some measure of harm, while 
that of no-harm, in theory, prohibits cause of any legally significant harm.
Debate over the issue led to considerable revision in the general principles 
section of the Draft in the last few years. The Draft adopted on first reading in 
1991 accorded primacy to the no-harm rule.^^ The most significant problem 
regarding the general principles in this 1991 Draft was that the rights of the 
downstream  states were strongly favored and thus, the right to equitable 
utilization by the upstream  states was severely reduced. At that time, S. C. 
McCaffrey pu t forward a num ber of reasons to explain the Commission's 
rationale for this position. First of all he claimed that the Commission was not 
alone in taking this approach: an Operational Directive of the W orld Bank 
concerning Projects on International Waterways embodied a set of guidelines 
that were strikingly similar to the Commission's articles in its 1991 Draft. 
Secondly, he argued that the no-harm rule has the virtue of being 
straightforward and relatively simple to apply. It would presumably be less 
difficult for a state to establish a breach of Article 7 than of Article 5, since a 
determination of whether a given utilization is equitable requires the balancing 
of a num ber of factors. A breach of Article 7, on the other hand, is established 
simply by making the factual showing that one state's use of an international 
watercourse has resulted in significant harm  to another state. A final point that 
McCaffrey pu t forward, in favor of the Commission's approach is that the 
equitable utilization doctrine does not seem particularly well-suited to problems 
of pollution and environmental protection.^^
Yearbook o f ILC, Part II, 1988, p. 36.
S. C. McCaffrey, "The International Law Commission and its Efforts to Codify the 
International Law of Waterways," Text o f a speech held at the Annual Meeting o f the 
Swiss Society o f  International Law, Bern May 5, 1990, pp. 51-52.
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Yet, in spite of the fact that several chief rapporteurs of the ILC during 1981 
and 1982 acknowledged the virtually unanimous recognition of the rule of 
equitable utilization as a general rule of international law, S. C. McCaffrey, the 
former special rapporteur, advocated the primacy of the no-harm rule by stating 
the importance of protecting the "weaker state that has suffered harm" from the 
actions of a "stronger state" that would otherwise be able to justify a harmful use 
due to the principle of equitable use.^^ This statement reflects the assumption 
that upstream  states are 'stronger' and in an advantageous position and that 
downstream  states are 'weaker' and in a disadvantageous position, which in C.
G. Flint's view is fundamentally flawed. Flint argues that when this statement is 
applied to the case of downstream  dominance (e.g., the Nile river case), the 
relationship between the general principles in this first Draft would protect the 
'stronger', downstream  state by potentially prohibiting any upstream  water 
development. Thus, even McCaffrey, in his later work, criticized the position 
adopted by the ILC in the Draft 1991 by arguing that the ILC's solution is at least 
questionable. It would appear to encourage a 'race to the river', and to reward 
the winner. That is, the state that develops first would thereby establish an 
entitlement to the am ount of water used or to the particular use made of the 
watercourse, and other riparian states would not be perm itted to trench upon 
that am ount or adversely affect that use w ithout the agreement of the former 
state. If that state refused to agree, the only legal avenues open to the other states 
would appear to be (i) to attem pt to interpret the term  'harm' in a relative rather 
than an absolute sense, or (ii) to attem pt to convince the first state to reach a 
practical resolution of the conflict, probably according to equitable principles. He
C. McCaffrey, "The Law of International Watercourses; Some Recent Developments 
and Unanswered Questions," Denver Journal o f International Law and Policy, Vol. 17, 
No. 3, 1989, pp. 505-526.
C. G. Flint, op. cit., p. 198.
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then elaborates on w hat m ight be the results in case states follow the first and
second avenue, respectively.^2
Similarly, J. Dellapenna pointed that the asserted absolute primacy of the 
rule of no significant harm  ignores the reality of water usage. In his opinion, 
logically, the no-harm principle prohibits any meaningful use by an upstream  
state, turning the principle into merely a variant form of the absolute integrity 
claim. He states that, "as the state seeking to initiate a new use would generally 
be cast in the posture of the one creating the injury, absolute integrity favors the 
downstream  states at the expense of their upstream  neighbors, particularly as the 
lower basin states tend to develop earlier and faster than the upstream  states". 
According to Dellapenna, such a posture is hardly useful in achieving the 
developmental equity proclaimed under various banners at the United 
Nations.^^
The parallel fundam ental principle, i.e., the obligation not to cause 
significant harm  to other watercourse states, is the subject of Article 7. This 
provision also stipulates that, where the use of a watercourse by a state 
nevertheless causes such harm, that state shall, "in the absence of agreement to 
such use, take all appropriate measures, having due regard for the provisions of 
Articles 5 and 6, in consultation with the affected state, to eliminate and mitigate 
such harm  and, where appropriate, to discuss the question of compensation.
In light of substantial comments from the international law community, the final 
version of the Draft 1994 softened the regime by making two im portant changes
s. C. McCaffrey, "Water, politics, and international law," op. cit., p. 99. 
Dellapenna, op. cit., pp. 17-18.
Morris and Vrailes, op. cit., p. 547.
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in Article 7. The first change was the introduction of a due diligence standard. The 
article in the Draft 1994 read in the relevant part: "watercourse States shall 
exercise due diligence to utilize an international watercourse in such a way as 
not to cause significant harm  to other watercourse states. That due diligence 
clause loosened the prohibition of harm  and allowed the possibility that some 
significant harm  may have to be tolerated if standards of due diligence had been 
m et and the use of the international watercourse was equitable and reasonable. 
The graver or the more im portant the interests involved, the more rigorous the 
requirements of the due diligence standard, and the exertion of due diligence 
should be a measure of the best practicable means within the capabilities of the 
responsible state. A watercourse state can be judged to have violated its 
obligation of due diligence if it negligently or intentionally causes significant 
harm  or if it knew or ought to have known that a particular use of an 
international watercourse would cause significant harm  to other watercourse 
states.^^ The due diligence clause in Article 7 provided a mechanism by which 
cooperation, equity and reason are encouraged in resolving international 
watercourse conflicts.^^One may clearly observe that the due diligence clause is 
lifted in the Convention. Yet, the wording of the Convention maintains the 
preventive approach of the final version of the ILC Draft text (1994), without 
reference to the controversial concept of due diligence, but rather specifying its 
content. During the working group, there were two opposing groups of 
delegations on that issue. The upstream  countries, such as the Czech Republic,
The Draft 1994 replaced "appreciable" with "significant" wherever the former term 
appeared in the Draft 1991. And, the "significant" clause remained in the Convention, as 
well.
International law Commission, Report o f the International Law Commission on the 
work o f its Forty-sixth Session, 2 May-22 July 1994, A/49/10, United Nations General 
Assembly Official Records, New York, U.S.A., 1993.
97 C. G. Flint, op. cit., p. 200.
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Ethiopia, Switzerland and Turkey, expressed the view that Article 7 introduced 
an unjustifiable restriction on state sovereignty, and advocated the deletion of 
this article. On the other hand, downstream  delegations held that causing harm  
is absolutely incompatible with equitable and reasonable utilization; therefore 
they also objected to the addition of the concept "due diligence" and the word 
"significant". Moreover, the delegations that called for the deletion of Article 7, 
indicated that its deletion would not, nevertheless, eliminate the no-harm rule 
altogether, but subordinate it to the principle of equitable utilization. 
Consequently, after heated debate the accepted provisions of Article 7 in the 
Convention represented slightly more stringent clauses for the State causing 
damage. The obligation of consultation with the affected State over (a) the extent 
to which a particular use is equitable and reasonable, (b) having due regard for 
the provisions of Articles 5 and 6, and (c) the question of compensation are all 
prominently mentioned in the second paragraph of Article 7 of the Convention. 
Indeed, this major change in Article 7 was made during the formulation of the 
Draft 1994, by adding of a new paragraph, which directly addressed the 
relationship between the equitable utilization and no-harm principles. It 
provided that, i f  significant harm is caused with due diligence standards being met, the 
obligation o f the state causing harm is limited to the duty to enter into consultations with 
the state experiencing harm with the goal of reduction or mitigation of the harm or the 
payment o f compensation. This paragraph remained in the Convention, with the 
exception of "due diligence." While it is clear that this paragraph does not 
entirely solve the problem, it at least strongly suggests that a state's use that 
causes significant harm  is not per se breach of the state's international obligations. 
This is confirmed in the commentary, which states that "the fact that an activity 
involves significant harm, would not itself necessarily constitute a basis for 
barring it." Instead, the paragraph recognizes the possibility, well-grounded in
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state practice, that the states concerned will already have agreed to the use.^^ By 
requiring consultations, the article enhances the possibility that the concerned 
states will resolve the problem by agreement. And if consultations do not resolve 
the problem, the Draft's new article on dispute resolution would apply.
According to McCaffrey, the requirement that the states concerned resort to 
third-party dispute settlement is an im portant and useful addition to the 
Convention. And he expressed that, according to the commentary of Article 7, at 
least some kinds of serious harm  could never qualify as being equitable and 
reasonable. Thus "a use which causes significant harm  to hum an health and 
safety is understood to be inherently inequitable and unreasonable." McCaffrey 
went on to argue that the approach adopted by the Commission to the 
relationship between Articles 5 and 7, while not perfect, seems preferable to the 
more inflexible rule of the earlier Draft for two reasons. First, it mitigates the 
absolute priority given to the no-harm rule under the 1991 articles, a priority that 
does not accord with state practice and could well give rise to more problems 
than it resolves. Second, the revised text is more likely to lead to a satisfactory 
resolution of any conflict in uses because of its requirement that the states 
concerned enter into consultations and ultimately have recourse to the dispute 
resolution procedures. The adjustment of conflicting uses of ah international 
watercourse, especially where the watercourse is 'successive' in character, is a 
highly complex affair that is unlikely to be accomplished satisfactorily through 
the simple expedient of the no-harm rule.^^
S. C. McCaffrey, “The International Law Commission Adopts Draft Articles on 
International Watercourses," op. cit., pp. 400-401.
99 Ibid.,p. 401.
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On the other hand, Patricia K. Wouters argued that Article 7 is not relevant 
to state practice.^00 W outers focused on recent international agreements 
involving watercourses to demonstrate that the due-diligence-not-to-cause- 
significant-harm rule governing the watercourse law in the ILC Draft, is 
inconsistent with state practice.^^l In her stance, these agreements are indicative 
of w hat may be acceptable in the field of the law of the non-navigational uses of 
the international watercourses. It is unlikely that states will embrace a no 
significant harm  approach to watercourse development, except in special cases 
where existing uses are to be protected. Through the survey of the state practice, 
Wouters reached the conclusion that states recognize that most uses of 
international watercourses result in some harm, perhaps even in significant harm  
being caused to other watercourse states. And this is perm itted by states where; 
(i) the use is an equitable and reasonable one and (ii) the harming state 
undertakes its 'best efforts' to limit the transboundary harm. In her opinion.
100 Patricia K. Wouters, “An Assessment of Recent Developments in International 
Watercourse Law through the Prism of the Substantive Rules Governing Use Allocation," 
Natural Resources Journal, Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring 1996, p. 419.
Her first example was a multilateral agreement of global scope: UN Helsinki 
Convention on the Protection and Use o f Transboundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes, March 1992. Then she gave plenty of examples fi’om multilateral 
and bilateral treaties of limited scope: Agreements on the Protection o f the River Meuse 
and River Scheldt, signed by France, the Netherlands and Belgium, April 26, 1994; 
Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use o f the Danube 
River, December 5, 1995; Agreement on the Protection and Utilization o f 
Transboundary Waters o f  the Halaha River, Kerulen River, Bor Nor Lake and Bulgan 
River, April 29, 1994; Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development 
o f the Mekong River Basin, April 5, 1995; the Treaty o f Peace Between Israel and 
Jordan, October 26, 1994; An Agreement Between Israel and Palestinian Authority on 
Waters o f West Bank, September 24, 1995. With the above examples, she covered more 
or less all the recent agreements on the use-allocation of international water resources 
except the developments in Africa, the Americas and India. Wouters analyzed that most 
of the watercourses in these regions are covered by accords reached during the heyday 
of international river contests some three decades ago: such as the Nile Treaty of 1955, 
the Indus Treaty of 1965, and the Columbia River Treaty of 1961.
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Article 7 not only fails to implement this practice, but subverts it. Besides, 
W outers suggested to the states and to the Committee of the Whole to reconsider 
the substantive rules contained in Part 11 of the ILC's Draft Articles, before that 
part takes its last shape as a Convention to be opened to the signatures of the 
states, since the successful elaboration of a framework convention relating to 
non-navigational uses of international watercourses mainly rely on the approval 
of the states. In the same manner, the ILC's Special Rapporteurs Rosenstock, 
McCaffrey and Schwebel have all recommended that the principle of equitable 
utilization should govern the substantive rules of the Articles on watercourse 
law. Recent state practice supports this view. Rules for watercourse use based 
upon equity and reason promote a balanced approach to watercourse 
development which has been endorsed by state practice.
The factors considered to ensure equitable and reasonable utilization are 
spelled out in Article 6 w ith its original standing in ILC Draft 1994. The list of 
factors or circumstances to be considered is intended to be 'indicative', not 
'exhaustive' and no priority is assigned to any of the factors.102  Notably, the 
provision does not include 'harm' or 'injury' as factors to be applied in this 
context.103 Meanwhile some delegations aimed to add a 'hum an rights' 
dimension connected w ith the utilization of freshwater to Article 6. Indeed this
^^2 (a) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of 
a natural character; (b) The social and economic needs of the watercourse States 
concerned; (c) The population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse State;
(d) The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse State on other 
watercourse States; (e) Existing and potential uses of the watercourse; (f) Conservation, 
protection, development and economy of use of the water resources of the watercourse 
and the costs of measures taken to that effect; (g) The availability of alternatives, of 
comparable value, to a particular planned or existing use (International Law Commission, 
Report o f  the International Law Commission on the Work o f its Forty-sixth Session, op. 
cit., p. 236).
Both of these clauses were included in the Helsinki Rules.
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article makes no mention of hum an rights, except for a general reference to "the 
social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned." Nevertheless, 
the last rapporteur of the ILC Draft, Rosenstock rem inded the delegations that 
Article 6 should be interpreted in conjunction with Article 10, Para. 2, according 
to which a conflict between different uses will be resolved "...with special regard 
being given to the requirem ent of vital hum an needs." Therefore, Article 6, para. 
2 which provides for the obligation to consult, "when the need arises" to 
determine in concrete terms whether a certain watercourse use is equitable and 
reasonable under Article 5 of the Convention remained unchanged. This 
confirms the impression that delegations have accepted an integrated approach 
to solving problems concerning the management of international watercourses 
through cooperation among the States concerned. In determining w hat is a 
reasonable and equitable use of a particular international watercourse, this 
provision prevents the legitimizing of unilateral assessments.^^'^
W eighing of all relevant factors in determining equitable and reasonable 
use may be problematic as different states will undoubtedly argue for the 
priority of different factors. For example, one state may argue that hydrological 
factors should tilt the allocation of water to the state contributing the largest 
volume of water to the watercourse. Another state may argue that population 
factors should determine allocation based upon the greater population 
dependent upon the watercourse; and yet another state may argue that existing 
uses should be the most im portant factor in determining allocation. Determining 
the needs and levels of dependence upon an international watercourse is a potentially
^^^Attila Tanzi, "Codifying the minimum standards of the law of international 
watercourses: remarks on part one and a half," Natural Resources Forum, Vol. 21, No. 2, 
1997, p. 114.
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problematic undertaking. Therefore, according to C. G. Flint, there is need for more 
direction in the ILC Rules for the determination of equitable and reasonable use 
based upon these or other criteria. A clear outlining of how relevant factors are 
to be assessed and weighed in a manner acceptable to all parties is needed in this 
portion of the ILC Rules. Hence, the W orking Group added a new paragraph 3 to 
Article 6 of the ILC which explicitly states w hat was already implicit in the 
Draft's language, i.e. that no factor has objective priority over the others and that, 
in determining whether a particular use is equitable and reasonable, all relevant 
factors should be considered jointly.
Part III of the Draft addresses a subject that has been problematic in the 
practice of states: the obligations of a state planning a change in its use of an 
international watercourse.^^^ While initially somewhat controversial w ithin the 
Commission itself, the question was resolved in 1988 in a detailed set of 
provisions regulating the rights and obligations of both the state contemplating 
the change and the state or states likely to be affected by it. This regime 
essentially requires the state planning to undertake a change "which may have a 
significant adverse impact" upon other states to notify such states in a timely 
fashion of its plans. If w ithin six months of the notification it has received no 
reply from the notified states,^^^ it may implement its plans (subject always to 
its obligations of equitable utilization and harmless use). If the notifying state
105 7 he first reference to the subject-matter of Part III was given in the UN General 
Assembly Resolution 3129 of December 13, 1973 which stated: "...considers further that 
co-operation between countries sharing such natural resources and interested in their 
exploitation must be developed on the basis of a system of information and prior 
consultation within the framework of the normal relations existing between them". The 
Principle referred to above in the General Aisembly resolution was also reconfirmed by 
Article 3 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States of the UN.
1 International Law Commission, Report o f the International Law Commission on the 
Work o f its Forty-sixth Session, op. cit., p. 272.
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does receive a response in which the notified states object to the planned change, 
the states concerned are to "enter into consultations and, if necessary, 
negotiations w ith a view to arriving at an equitable resolution of the 
situation. "107 If so requested by the notified state when making its reply, the 
notifying state m ust suspend implementation of its plans for six months to 
perm it serious consultations and negotiations. Thus, the entire process could take 
twelve months, or longer if the states concerned have not completed good faith 
consultations and negotiations within the second six-month period. If the matter 
is not resolved to the satisfaction of any of the states concerned, the dispute 
settlement procedures of Article 33 would be applicable.108 After some 
controversial debate, a slight change wa? made in Part III, Article 12, by adding 
the words "including the results of any environmental impact assessment" after 
"technical data and information." This addition brought the ILC version of 
general obligation up-to-date and into conformity with recent and authoritative 
international instruments, e.g. the Rio Declaration (in Principle 19) and the UN 
ECE Helsinki Convention of 1992 (in Article 3).10^
Part IV of the Draft deals not only with water pollution but, more widely, 
with protection and preservation of the ecosystems of international 
watercourses. Besides, it also contains provisions on the crucial subject of 
cooperative management of international watercourses, on measures to regulate 
watercourses and on water installations.^^® Harmful conditions, including
on
107 Ibid., p. 279.
108 s. C. McCaffrey, "The International Law Commission Adopts Draft Articles 
International Watercourses," op., cit., pp. 402-403.
109 Attila Tanzi, op. cit., p. 116.
110 International Law Commission, Report o f the International Law Commission on the 
Work o f its Forty-sixth Session, op. cit., p. 280.
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floods, are dealt w ith in Part V, which also contains a provision on emergency 
situations. Part VI consists of articles on armed conflict, indirect procedures, data 
vital to national security, and nondiscrimination, as well as a new article on the 
settlement of disputes. The new article on dispute settlement provides for a 
series of stages of dispute settlement, beginning with consultations and 
negotiations through any existing watercourse institutions. And if after six 
m onths the states concerned have been unable to resolve the dispute, they m ust 
submit it, at the request of any of them, to impartial fact-finding or, if mutually 
agreed, to m ediation or conciliation. The states concerned may by agreement 
submit their dispute to arbitration or judicial settlement if the dispute has not 
been resolved through the other procedures mentioned within the specified time 
limits.ll^
Despite the strong recommendations of the current special rapporteur Prof. 
Rosenstock, who proposed that confined groundw ater be included in the 
Convention, the ILC declined to bring confined groundw ater within the scope of 
the articles. In an apparent compromise, however, the ILC adopted a resolution 
expressing its view that the principles contained in its Draft articles may be 
applied to transboundary confined groundwater.^^^
According to S. C. McCaffrey, the reaction of states suggests that the 
Convention strikes a good balance between the interests of upper and lower 
riparian states. But as Prof. Rosenstock noted in his first report, the utility of a 
framework convention will depend on the strength and the depth of its 
acceptance. Even though the Helsinki Rules were an influential attem pt to codify
111 Ibid.,p. 322.
112 Ibid., p. 326.
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international law in the field, the ILA did not have the benefit of government 
comment during the elaboration of those rules. Moreover, in his view, states will 
undoubtedly look to the articles and commentaries in the Convention, as a 
m odern document prepared by a UN expert body, for guidance regarding their 
rights and obligations. In addition, they may well use the Convention as a model 
for agreements w ith other riparian states.^^^ On the other hand, C.G. Flint 
argues that the ILC should be more progressive in its development of the 
Convention by acknowledging the need for a more balanced approach that 
regards dem and for water as a manageable variable and that recognizes 
conservation, efficient use and protection of sustainability and quality as primary 
goals of rational water resource management. The problem of water resources 
has far too long been regarded as a shortage of supply. In solving problems of 
water allocation, especially in arid or semi-arid areas, dem and management m ust 
be a d d r e s s e d . Flint put it, the ILC has progressed significantly in its 
development of rules regarding international watercourses that represent 
accepted principles of international water law. Yet, the ultimate test of this 
potential new legal regime will come in its implementation, when the framework 
is applied to many diverse watercourses and to different relationships among 
watercourse states.
The articles discussed above take the form of a framework convention 
which may be applied and adjusted through specific agreements to suit the 
conditions of individual watercourses and the needs of the states concerned. As 
such, the provisions of the convention are confined, for the most part, to setting
113 s. C. McCaffrey, "The International Law Commission Adopts Draft Articles on 
International Watercourses," op. cit., pp. 404.
114 c . G. Flint, op. cit.,p. 203.
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forth general principles and rules, as well as to encouraging states to consult with 
regard to such im portant measures as joint management of international water 
resources. Any conflict between the sectors of utilization (e.g., irrigation, 
industry, domestic) of an international watercourse is to be resolved in the light 
of the principles and factors contained in Articles 5 to 7 of the Convention. These 
may regard equitable utilization, and the rule against causing significant harm  to 
other riparian states, w ith special regard to the requirements of vital human 
needs. Moreover, the complementary articles of Part III (i.e.. Articles 6, 8, 9,10) 
can equally be m ade use of in the management and allocation of international 
watercourses. Further, Article 24 of the Convention specifies that an international 
watercourse management may include the establishment of a "joint management 
mechanism." Meanwhile, Article 21 states that "watercourse states shall, 
individually, and where appropriate, jointly, prevent, reduce and control the 
pollution of an international watercourse that may cause significant harm to 
other watercourse states and to their environment..."
These provisions of the Convention have evolved through the works of the 
International Law Commission (ILC). That is why the work of the ILC (as of the 
1994 Draft) has been scrutinized at length. Yet, even the previous works of other 
NGOs like the International Law Association (ILA) and the Institut de Droit 
International had an impact on the evolution of the articles of the Convention. 
With this in mind, the earlier works have been also reviewed at the beginning of 
this chapter. Thus, these earlier efforts altogether constitute the legal aspects of 
the international regime for equitable and effective management of international 
water resources. And, they are, indeed, very instrumental in designing the 
region-specific norms of the suggested regime in the Euphrates-Tigris river 
basin.
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PART II
WATER USE AND 
MANAGEMENT IN THE 
EUPHRATES-TIGRIS 
RIVER BASIN
CHAPTER 4. THE HYDROPOLITICAL SETTING OF 
THE EUPHRATES-TIGRIS RIVER BASIN
This chapter consists of two sections: in the first section (physical setting) 
the geography, climate and hydrology of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin is 
reviewed briefly. The next section considers the general problem of the riparian 
dispute by highlighting various episodes in the hydropolitical^ history of the 
Euphrates-Tigris river basin. This chapter is thought to be necessary because it 
provides the ecological and historical bases from which all options for the future 
m ust begin. Thus, it is believed, a reader who will be acquainted with the 
information on the physical and hydropolitical setting of the issue will better 
interpret the proposed regime framework for the better m anagement and use of 
the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin. This chapter rests on the argument 
that the water stress in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin is not the result of an 
absolute shortage. Rather, it is the consequence of increasing pressure on 
dem and due to the thirsty development projects, and more importantly, due to 
inefficient water use and m anagement practices of the three riparians.
A. Physical Setting
In their illuminating article from the 1950s, Harold and M argaret Sprout 
presented the importance played by the environment in international politics.^
^The term "hydropolitics" is extensively used in the literature on the politics of the 
international water resources. As a brand-new multidisciplanary branch of science it is 
defined as "a branch of science that deals with the politics over international water 
resources together with their engineering and legal aspects." See M. Liitfu Beliil, 
Hydropolitics o f the Euphrates-Tigris Basin, M.Sc. Thesis Submitted to the Graduate 
School of Natural and Applied Sciences of the Middle East Technical University, June 
1996.
2 Harold and Margaret Sprout, "Environment Factors in the Study of International 
Politics," Journal o f Conflict Resolution, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1957, pp. 309 -28.
They argued that, to make sense of the political behavior of states and 
individuals requires understanding the envirorunent or the context in which 
actors operate, and the variety of constraints and possibilities it poses. Hence, in 
this section, the environment of the dispute in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin is 
described w ith a view to underscore those aspects of the physical and political 
environments that elucidate the significance of the water issue for the riparian 
states. In addition, the reader should bear in m ind that data relating to 
hydrology, climate, and soils of the river basin exhibit anomalies. This is 
certainly due to the strategic characteristics of the relevant data which cover for 
instance, monthly and yearly discharges of the river basin, the irrigable land in 
each riparian country, and the present and future water demands of each 
riparian. Nevertheless, certain technical studies and expert opinions of some 
distinguished scholars in this field that are utilized in this study are believed to 
be instructive enough to reach a meaningful outcome upon which a regime 
setting can be built.
i... Geography
In this study, in conformity with the expert judgments of 
geographers, the Euphrates and the Tigr is rivers are considered as forming one 
single transboundary watercourse system.^ They are linked not only by their 
natural course w hen merging at the Shatt-el-Arab, but also because of a man-
3 Nurit Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East, London and New York: 
Routledge, 1994, p.lO; Ewan W. Anderson, "Water Geopolitics in the Middle East: Key 
Countries," Conference on U.S. Foreign Policy on Water Resources in the Middle East: 
Instrument for Peace and Development, CSIS, Washington, D.C., 24 November 1986, pp. 
18-19; Peter Beaumont, "Water- A Resource under Pressure:, Gerd Nonneman (ed.). The 
Middle East and Europe: An Integrated Communities Approach, Federal Tmst for 
Education and Research, London, 1992, p. 183.
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made Thartar canal connection between the two rivers in Iraq.^ The two greatest 
rivers of the Eurasian landscape, namely the Euphrates and Tigris originate in a 
particular climatic and topographic zone and end up in quite a different one. The 
basin is characterized by high mountains to the north and west and extensive 
lowlands in the south and the east. They begin, scarcely 30 kilometers from each 
other, in a relatively cool and hum id zone with rugged 3,000 meter-high 
mountains, visited by autum n and spring rains, and winter snows. From there, 
the two rivers run separately onto a wide, flat, hot, and poorly drained plain. In 
their middle courses, they diverge hundreds of kilometers apart, only to meet 
again near the end of their journey and discharge together into the Persian Gulf. 
Both rivers wend their ways circuitously over two-thirds of their courses 
through the highlands of eastern Anatolia and the valleys of the Syrian and Iraqi 
plateaus before descending into the arid plain of Mesopotamia.^ Along their 
upper courses, at elevations ranging from 2,000 to 3,000 meters above sea level, 
the rivers flow through the narrow openings between mountains. They continue 
more tranquilly through the plateaus of north Syria and Iraq, where they cut 
deep beds in rocks so that their course have remained stable over the millennia. 
Here the two rivers are separated by a triangle of limestone desert known as the 
Jazirah. In that section they descend from elevations of about 400 meters to little 
over 50 meters above sea level where they enter the alluvial plain. The great 
alluvium-filled depression, Shatt al-Arab, the combined area of the lakes and
^ The canal which links the Tigris to the Euphrates through the Thartar Valley has already 
been realized and became operative since 1988. See A. Dhanoun, "Thartar Canal to be 
Opened," Baghdad Observer, 4 January 1988.
5 Daniel Hillel, Rivers o f Eden: The Struggle for Water and Quest for Peace in the 
Middle East, Oxford: OUP, 1995, pp. 92-93.
182
swamps has a length of 180 kilometers and constitutes the combined delta of the 
Euphrates-Tigris river basin.^
ii... Climate
The Euphrates-Tigris basin experiences a sub-tropical 
M editerranean climate regime with wet winters and dry summers.^ In the 
m ountainous headwater districts, freezing temperatures prevail in winter, and 
much of the precipitation falls in the form of snow. As the snow melts in spring, 
the rivers are in spate, augmented by seasonal rainfall, which reaches its 
maximum between March and May.^ The Euphrates and Tigris also pass 
through a M editerranean sub-tropical climate characterized by rainy winters and 
dry warm  summers. This climate prevails in southeastern Turkey, as well as 
northern Syria and Iraq. The two-river system enjoys a m ilder climate and 
considerably more rainfall than the Mezopotamian Plain. In those districts, 
winter grains are grown by rainfed farming, though supplementary irrigation - 
where applied- raises yields and allows multiple cropping. Winter precipitation 
ranges between 400 and 600 millimeters which is enough for rain-fed agriculture. 
In the M esopotamian Plain itself, however, the annual rainfall is very scanty, 
rarely above 200 millimeters. The sumruer season is exceedingly hot and dry, 
with m idday tem peratures approaching 50 degrees Celsius and with daytime 
relative hum idity as low as 15 percent. Consequently, the evaporative demand is 
very high, and crops require very intensive irrigation.^ These climatic conditions
^ John Kolars and William A. Mitchell, The Euphrates River and Southeast Anatolia 
Development Project, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991, pp. 3-8.
^ Nurit Kliot Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East, London and New York: 
Routledge, 1994, pp. 104-108.
8 Daniel Hillel, Rivers o f Eden..., op. cit., p. 97.
9 Ibid., p. 98.
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point to the fact that both the Euphrates and Tigris flow through semi-arid and 
arid regions w ithin Syria and Iraq, since 60 percent of the Syrian territory 
receives less than 250 millimeters of precipitation while 70 percent of Iraq is 
subject to 400 millimeters per year. Another extremely im portant climatic feature 
in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin is the high tem perature resultant in high 
evaporation. Heavy evaporation also reinforces water salination and water loss 
in major reservoirs like Keban and Atatürk in Turkey, Assad in Syria, and Lake 
Habbaniya and Thartar in Iraq.l^
iii... Hydrology
This section will exhibit the hydrology of the Euphrates-Tigris river 
basin as the key indicator of the physical setting of the water dispute in the 
region. Information relating to the major characteristics of the river basin such as 
the length and discharges of the rivers, main sources and tributaries, and the 
distribution of the basin area among the riparians will be provided in this 
section. Finally the discussion will end up with the demonstration of striking 
figures of the consum ption projections of the riparian states from the water 
potential of the Euphrates and Tigris. The figures indicate that the total demand 
of three riparians of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin well exceeds the water 
potential of two rivers.
a) Area of drainage basin and river lengths
The Euphrates and its tributaries drain an enormous basin 
covering an area of 444,000 square kilometers of which 33 percent lies in Turkey, 
19 percent in Syria, and 46 percent in Iraq. On the other hand, the Tigris and its
Nurit Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East, op. cit., p. 108.
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tributaries drain an area of 387,600 sqirare kilometers of which 15 percent lies in 
Turkey, 0,3 percent lies in Syria, 75 percent lies in Iraq, and 9,5 percent lies in 
Iran.1^1 The Euphrates is the longest river, 3,000 kilometers, in southwest Asia to 
the west of the Indus. 41 percent of the Euphrates lies in Turkey, while 23 percent 
lies in Syria, and 36 percent in Iraq. The Tigris is only 1,850 kilometers long and 
most of it (77 percent) is in Iraq followed by Turkey (22 percent) and Syria which 
has 44 kilometers in the main river channel, constituting its border with Turkey 
(about 36 kilometers) and with Iraq (about 8 kilometers).!^
b) M ain sources and tributaries
The headwaters of the Euphrates (Firat) comprise two main 
sources, the M urat and Karasu, which drain the high plateau to the northwest of 
Lake Van. Where those streams meet, in Kharput (Harput), the rock-filled Keban 
Dam was built in the early 1970s. After Keban, the main canal joins with 
num erous springs of various discharges.!^ From the Keban Dam to Karakaya 
Dam, the river joins with the Tohma tributary and many other small springs. 
From the Karakaya to Atatürk Dam, the river flow is increased almost only by 
the Kahta river contributing a very small increment to the Euphrates. From 
Birecik to KarkamJ^^J?, the only significant increment is performed by the Nizip 
tributary. The united Euphrates first flows southeast, then southwest and breaks 
through the m ountains in a gorge near Hilván, and eventually crosses the Syrian 
border at Karkam^J?. Soon after crossing the Turkish-Syrian border the main 
canal joins with the Sacir (Sacur) branch.!^ In Syria, the Euphrates is joined by
 ^  ^ M. Lütfü Belül, Hydropolitics o f the Euphrates-Tigris Basin, op. cit., p. 67.
12 Peter Beaumont, "The Euphrates River: An International Problem of Water Resources 
Development," Environmental Conservation, Vol. 5, No.l, 1978, pp. 35-43.
1! M. Lütfü Belül, Hydropolitics o f the Euphrates-Tigris Basin, op. cit., p. 37.
14 Ibid., p. 42.
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two tributaries: Balikh (Cullap in Turkish) and Khabur. The Khabur (Habur) sub 
basin together with its transboundary tributaries and springs, is the most 
complicated element of the system. There are various branches of Khabour 
originating either from Turkey or from Syria.^^ No doubt that, Sacir, Balikh and 
Khabur together w ith springs and other unrecorded streams which are estimated 
to have a potential of 200 million m 3 /} ear contribute a significant volume to the 
discharge of the Euphrates. Henceforth, over the remaining 1,000 kilometers of 
its course in Iraq, it obtains no further increment of water. In Iraq, at 360 km from 
the border, the Euphrates reaches its 100,000 square kilometers giant alluvial 
delta at Ramadi, where the elevation reduces down to 53 meters above sea level. 
Further downstream, near Nasiriye, the river becomes a tangle of channels some 
of which drain into the shallow lake of Hammar as the rem ainder joins the Tigris 
at Qurna (Kurna).
The upper Tigris (Dicle) originates from a small m ountain lake, Hazar, 
south of Elaz^d in eastern Turkey -scarcely 30 kilometers from the headwaters of 
the Euphrates-and flows through the basaltic district of DiyarbakJ^r. The first 
source is a branch nam ed Tigris which rises at DiyarbakJ^r, and the second source 
of the Tigris is Batman-Su. The Tigris is a less circuitous river than the Euphrates, 
and it flows more directly toward Mesopotamia. It forms the boundary between 
Turkey and Syria and Iraq and Syria, but the border is such that Syria might 
dem and riparian status to the Tigris with rights to utilize waters. The two 
tributaries of the Tigris are the Great Zab and Little Zab, which join the river 
downstream  from Mosul. The third tributary of the Tigris is the Adhaim (or 
Uzaim), a very small contributor to the Tigris, and a few kilometers further
Ibid., p. 47.
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downstream  from Baghdad the Diyalah also joins the Tigris. Contribution of the 
Tigris tributaries to the river potential is very significant and amounts roughly to 
50 percent of the Tigris flow at Baghdad.l^ Downstream from Baghdad the 
river's slope is flat and the river becomes exceedingly tortuous w ith the Tigris 
joining the Euphrates to form the Shatt al-Arab north of Basrah. The Shaft al- 
Arab receives the last tributary of the river: the Kharun which drains mountain 
ranges as high as 5,000 meters making a snow a major source of precipitation.^^ 
Most of the water in the lower part of both the Euphrates and Tigris is lost in the 
wide area of the salinated swamps and marshland. The combined area of lakes 
and swam ps at the head of the Persian Gulf varies from 8,288 square kilometers 
at the end of the dry season to 28,490 square kilometers during the spring flood.
c) River discharge
The discharge (flow) of the Euphrates and Tigris is still a 
m atter of dispute among the students of the basin. This is not only because the 
flow patterns had shown great deviations which impedes to come up with 
representative average discharge value,!^ but the rapid development on both 
rivers which disrupted the natural flow had also created difficulties for the 
hydrologists to determine the discharge values.!^ On the other hand, the lack of
Peter Beaumont, "Transboundary water disputes in the Middle East," International 
Conference on Transboundary Waters in the Middle East, Prospects for Regional 
Cooperation, Ankara, Bilkent University, 2-3 September 1991, p. 11.
Nurit Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East, op. cit, pp. 103-4.
The major rivers of the Middle East have extremely high seasonal and multi-annual 
variance in their flow. The Euphrates' annual flow in Turkey at Birecik near the Syrian 
border ranged from 42.7 billion m3 in 1963 to 15.3 billion m3 in 1961. The peak flows 
recorded at Hit, Iraq, during the period 1924-73 were as high as 7,390 m3/sec in 1969 and 
as low as 850 m3/sec in 1930. See John Kolars and William Mitchell, The Euphrates 
River and Southeast Anatolia Development Project, Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1991, pp. 90-97.
M. Liitfu Beliil, Hydropolitics o f the Euphrates-Tigris Basin, op. cit., pp. 35-36.
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m utual trust and confidence surely deprives the riparians of the basin from 
releasing the necessary data and information relevant to rainfall and runoff.20 
This study presents data that are accepted by the majority of professionals 
working in the field, or at least provided detailed citations for the sources of data 
that may be of questionable quality. One other reason of this irregularity in flow 
data is the long term  drought and flood periods which affects the flow on 
average.21 It is possible to divide the flow season into three distinct periods:
... the period of high discharge (March to June)
... the period of low discharge (July to October)
... the period of average discharge (November to July)22
This section deals with the natural (average discharge) flow of the two 
rivers. Thus, the repercussions of the present or future projects such as the 
amounts that irrigation practices withdraw  from the natural flow and the 
am ount of storage evaporation from the dams along with municipal and 
industrial consum ption amounts are not taken into account in these figures. This 
will be dem onstrated in the next section by means of two tables. In sum, the
20 In their book on the Jordan watershed, Stephen Lonergan and David Brooks assert that 
water is deemed a strategic resource, vital for state security, for human well-being, and 
for economic development. As such, many countries in the region keep most data on 
water availability and use confidential. In other cases, data may be released but may be 
purposely misleading or too aggregate to permit independent analysis. See S. C. Lonergan 
and D. B. Brooks, Watershed: The Role o f Fresh Water in the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict, Ottawa: International Development and Research Centre, 1995, p. 8.
21 According to Ozden Bilen two distinct dry cycles were recorded over the 1937-90 
period at Birecik gauging station. The first was in 1958-62, in which the annual flow was 
14.9 billion m3 in 1961. The second dry cycle started in 1970 and ended in 1975 with the 
lowest flow recorded as 18.8 billion m3 in 1973. Besides, the recorded peaks were 56.4 
and 57.7 billion m3/year in 1969 and 1988, respectively. See O. Bilen, "Propects for 
Technical Cooperation in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin," in Asit Biswas (ed.). International 
Waters o f the Middle East: From Euphrates-Tigris to Nile, Water Resources Management 
Series, Oxford: OUP, 1994, p. 96.
22 Nurit Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East, op. cit, p. 109.
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annual mean flow of the Euphrates is 32 billion m 3 /year as a valid value on 
which the most of the distinguished analysts have had a consensus.23 
Approximately 98 percent of the mean flow of the Euphrates is drained from 
Turkey, whereas the remaining tiny amount of 2 percent originates from Syria.24 
As for the Tigris and its tributaries, the average total discharge is determined as 
50 billion m 3/ year.25 Turkey contributes approximately 40 percent of the total 
annual flow, whereas Iraq and Iran contribute 51 percent, and 9 percent,
respectively .26
Estimates for the total flow of the Tigris-Euphrates and their tributaries 
vary between 68 billion m3 and 84.5 billion m3. This represents great variance in 
data for the combined flow, and does not help in assessing how to allocate the
23 Kolars gives the Euphrates flow as 32.7 billion m3/y. See J. Kolars, "Water Resources 
of the Middle East," Canadian Journal o f Development Studies, Special Issue, 1992, p. 
106. While Beaumont, and Naff and Matson assert that the annual discharge varies from 
16.8 billion m3 to 43.4 billion m3. See Peter Beaumont, "The Euphrates River: An 
International Problem of Water Resources Development," Environmental Conservation, 
op. cit., p. 36; Thomas Naff and Ruth Matson, Water in the Middle East: Conflict or 
Cooperation, Boulder, Colorado:Westview Press, 1984, p. 86. Yet, in this study we 
adopt the mean annual flow rate of the Euphrates as 32 billion m3/y as Kliot, Hillel and 
Belul have accepted as a reliable and valid figure in their studies. See Nurit Kliot, Water 
Resources and Conflict in the Middle East, op. cit, p. 109; Daniel Hillel, Rivers o f Eden: 
The Struggle for Water and Quest for Peace in the Middle East, op. cit., p. 95; M. Lütfü 
Belül, Hydropolitics o f the Euphrates-Tigrh Basin, op. cit., p. 68.
24 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, "Profile: Tigris-Euphrates River," Water in the Sand, 
U.S. Army, 1991, Section 4, p. 2.
23 j. Kolars, "Water Resources of the Middle East," Canadian Journal o f Development 
Studies, op. cit., p. 107; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,"Profile: Tigris-Euphrates River," 
op. cit., p. 2; T. Naff and R. Matson, Water in the Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation, 
op. cit., p. 87. The total for Tigris and tributaries is between 48.7 - 52.6 billion m3, or 
between 43.0 and 49.2 billion m3 according to K. Ubell, "Iraq's Water Resources," 
Nature and Resources, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1971, pp. 3-9; C. Gischler, Water Resources in the 
Arab Middle East and North Africa, 1979, Wisbech, Cambridge: Menas Resources 
Studies; M. Shahin, "Review and Assessment of Water Resources in the Arab World," 
Water International, Vol. 14, 1989, pp. 206-219.
26 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, "Profile: Tigris-Euphrates River," op. cit., p. 2.
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water resources of the Euphrates-Tigris among the riparian states. This study 
adopts the value of 84.5 billion m3 for the combined flow of the Euphrates and 
Tigris just like Kliot, Kolars, and Beaumont, Blake and Wagstaff adopted in their 
analyses.27 It should be noted that, in their mean annual discharge, both rivers 
reveal w ide fluctuations discharge.28 As Kliot comments, the main feature which 
emerges from a study of the various data sources is that less is known about 
Euphrates-Tigris (e.g., adequate records are not kept on the stream flow of these 
rivers), but its is clear that the utilization of both basins can be increased. The 
difficulties in evaluating often contradictory data is a major obstacle to providing 
accurate guidelines for equitable and reasonable water allocation within the 
Euphrates-Tigris river basin.
d) W ater balance: supply and dem and ratios
Discussions on the physical setting of the Euphrates-Tigris 
river basin will be closed by presenting the consumption projections of the three 
riparians from the water potential of the Euphrates and Tigris. Measuring supply 
and dem and is at the very heart of cooperative solutions to problems of water 
utilization in international river basins. Riparians tend not to agree on how much 
water there is, on when it is available, and how much each riparian needs or is 
likely to need. Objective measures of supply are, of course, quite possible, 
although they tend to be based on past behavior of the river and may say little 
about the future. Demand estimates are far more problematic because they m ust
77 John Kolars and William Mitchell, The Euphrates River and Southeast Anatolia 
Development Project, op. cit., p. 96; Nurit Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict in the 
Middle East, op. cit, p. 110; Peter Beaumont, Gerald H. Blake and Malcolm Wagstaff, 
The Middle East: A Geographical Study, London: David Fulton, 1988, p. 364.
78 Beaumont, Blake and Wagstaff, op.cit., p. 357.
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include choices among uses (industry vs. agriculture, etc.), and relative 
efficiencies w ith which the water is used.
As indicated in the above section, the annual mean discharge (natural flow) 
of the Euphrates is accepted in this study as 32 billion m 3 /year and the annual 
mean discharge of the Tigris is regarded as 50 billion m 3 /year which are equal to 
the supply row in the following tables. Respective consumption dem ands from 
the Euphrates are targeted for the year 2040 which is theoretically the projected 
time that full development schemes shall be implemented by the three riparians 
on their proportion of the river.29 The most im portant result which is draw n 
from the tables is that the total dem and of the three riparians far exceeds the 
supply of each river especially in the case of the Euphrates-Tigris.
Table 1. The W ater Potential of the Euphrates Basin and the Consumption 
Projections of the Riparian States (in billion m 3 /y)
Turkey Syria Iraq Total
Supply 31.163 0.973 0.000 32.136
D em and 18.500 11.500 23.000 53.000
M. Liitfu Belul, Hydropolitics o f the Euphrates-Tigris Basin, op. cit., pp. 102-103.
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Table 2. The Water Potential of the Tigris Basin and the C onsum ption
Projections of the Riparian States (in billion m 3 /y)
Turkey Syria Iraq Total
Supply 20.700 0.000 27.150 47.850
D em and 6.500 3.000 41.800 51.300
These tables exhibit mismatches between supply (average discharge) and 
dem and in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin. Besides, the consumption targets for 
the year 2040 which are indicated in both tables are calculated by each riparian, 
thus they stand to be very subjective and exaggerated. Nevertheless, some 
experts consider these figures of demand as inputs in their painstaking analyses 
of the water budget of the Euphrates-Tigris basin.^^ It should be noted that the 
Euphrates Tigris rivers have extremely Hgh seasonal and multi-annual variance 
in their flow. Besides, natural flows of both rivers (supply) passing from Turkey 
to Syria, and from Syria to Iraq do change due to irrigation and energy projects 
that the riparians have already initiated. The rapidly increasing populations of 
these countries and the importance given to agricultural development and to 
food production necessitate further utilization of these rivers. The major 
problem, however, arises from the fact that the projected water dem ands of the 
riparians for the future surpasses the actual am ount of water, which can be 
supplied by the Tigris and the Euphrates.
Ibid., p. 139.
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Table 3. D istribution of the Basin Area (km2)
River Turkey Syria Iraq Total
Euphrates 127,300 28.7% 73,700 16.6% 177,000 39.9% 444,000
Tigris 57,600 14.9% 1,000 0.3% 292,000 75.3% 387,600
Basin Totals 184,900 22 .2 % 74,700 9.0% 469,000 56,4% 831,600
Table 4. Length Parameters of the Basin (km)
River Turkey Syria Iraq Total
Euphrates 1,230 41.0% 710 32.7% 1,060 35.3% 3,000
ri-i· ·Tigris 400 21.5% 44 2.4% 1,418 76.2 1,862
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Table 5. Contribution of the Riparian States to the W ater Potential (billion m3)
River Turkey Syria Iraq Total
Euphrates
Total
33.163 98.5% 0.498 1.5% 0.000 0.0% 33.661
Tigris Total 27.150 53.4% 0.000 0.0% 20.700 40.7% 50.850
Euphrates-
r · " ! ·  ·Tigris
60.313 71.4% 0.498 0.6% 20.700 24.5% 84.511
Basin Totals 60.313 57.7% 0.498 0.5% 20.700 19.8% 104.511
This chapter aimes at displaying the physical characteristics of the 
Euphrates and Tigris rivers as well as the basin at large that they constitute. 
These characteristics of the rivers pave the way to political disturbances among 
the states that they pass through. Had the flow and discharge of the rivers been 
rather constant over long periods, had the climate in the basin-wide area were 
uniform, had the soils of each of the riparians exhibited similarities, or had the 
lengths of the rivers and the amounts of water in each state been similar, it 
w ouldn't be too difficult to assert that no serious conilictual situation would 
occur, nor would there be an exigency for discussing efficient and equitable 
management techniques for the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin. These 
physical characteristics of the river basin create interdependence among the
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riparian states, which indeed call for a cooperative stance not only to use the 
water in the region more efficiently, but also to avert serious conflicts. The 
demand turns out to be much more than the supply, underlying many of the 
water disputes and signaling that many more will arise in the future. Hence, this 
study asserts that the problem is primarily a 'demand side' problem and can be 
solved through the application of 'effective demand management' and 'equitable 
resource allocation practices' within a regime framework. The previous part of 
the study was deemed essential in providing the necessary instruments of the 
regime in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin by drawing basically from the global 
experiences accumulated through a series of conferences under the auspices of 
international organizations as well as the works of the international water law 
community. And, the final chapter will end the overall discussion with an 
attem pt to apply these universal set of principles to the specific circumstances of 
the region. However, to bring the discussions to this end one still needs to 
comprehend properly water politics of the region starting from the smooth 
preliminary stages to the rise of the conflict.
The water issue has emerged as a regional question when Turkey, Syria, 
and Iraq initiated projects for developing the waters of the Euphrates in the 
1960s. Thus, the following section of this chapter will review water politics in the 
region with special references to major development projects that caused 
imbalances in supply. The discussion will start with a brief survey of water 
politics in the region between the 1920s and the 1950s, the period which is 
characterized by agreeable relations among the riparians that are codified by a 
number of agreements on water use and management.
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B. The Hydropolitical History of the Euphrates-Tigris Basin
i... Harmonious nature of water politics from 1920s to 1950s: 
the development of the rivers at a minimal level
Turkey, Syria and Iraq have all formulated plans and implemented 
projects beginning in the early decades of this century to achieve flood control on 
the Euphrates to use its waters for hydroelectric generation and large scale 
irrigation.^! However, it is not surprising to see that Iraq was the first of the 
three states to build m odern water works on the river, and to begin utilizing the 
waters of the Euphrates in modern times because of its traditional use, especially 
of the ancient Habbaniya and Abu-Dibbis Lakes for thousands of years.^2 jh e  
Hindiya dam, completed in 1913, made it possible to divert the Euphrates into 
reconstructed irrigation canals dating from ancient and medieval times. In the 
1950s, a second dam  built at Ramadi allowed the Euphrates flood waters to be 
diverted to Lake Habbaniyah and the Abu-Dibbis depression, permitting a 
measure of flood control.
Planning has been largely on a country by country basis, though there 
have been technical consultations among the three states since the early 1960s. 
Throughout the period 1920-1974 neither the absence of integrating planning for 
the entire basin nor the failure to reach agreement on water resource sharing led 
to serious international conflict among the riparian states. Projects implemented
It should be noted that water resources management largely for irrigation, in major 
basins like the Euphrates-Tigris, and the Nile had been usually initiated by the 
downstream riparians such as Iraq and Egypt, respectively. Those dovrastream countries 
used the advantage of undisturbed flow from headwaters of the rivers and cultivated 
fertile alluvial deltas of these rivers. See Ludwik A. Teclaff, The River Basin in History 
and Law, 1967, p. 14.
M. G. lonides. The Regime o f the Rivers Euphrates and Tigris, New York Chemical 
Publishing Company, 1937, p. 147.
Nurit Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East, op. cit, p. 117.
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in this period did not result in significant adverse ecological consequences, and 
the dem and for water did not exceed s u p p l y H o w e v e r ,  the use of the waters 
by the three countries has been subject to discussions since the demise of the 
Ottoman Empire. Belül argues that the rise of the water dispute in the Euphrates- 
Tigris river basin goes back for more than 30 years though the legislative history 
of the basin has a 65 year background.^^ The first legal arrangem ent among the 
riparians was the agreement between France and Turkey with a view to 
prom oting peace, signed in Ankara on 20 October 1921. According to Article XII 
of that agreem ent on "Distribution and Removal of Waters" it was agreed that the 
city of Aleppo may organize, at its own expense, a water supply from the 
Euphrates in Turkish territory in order to meet the requirements of the district.^^ 
The 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty contains another component of the legal 
identity to the issue w ith Article 109. The Article briefly states that, unless 
otherwise agreed, if due to tracing of a new border, the river system of a state is 
dependent on the facilities within the borders of another state that were 
established before the war, an agreement m ust be concluded among the parties 
which is capable of safeguarding interests and sovereign rights of each of them 
and in the absence of an agreement the dispute will be settled by arbitration.^^ 
One of the most im portant legal texts between Iraq and Turkey on the water 
resources of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers and tributaries is the Protocol 
annexed to the 1946 Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborly Relations.^^ The
T. Naff and R. Matson, Water in the Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation, op. cit., p. 
92.
35 M. Liitfii Belül, Hydropolitics o f the Euphrates-Tigris Basin, op. cit., p. 11.
36 İsmail Soysal, Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları Cilt 1 (1920-1945), Ankara: Türk 
Tarih Kummu Yayınları, 2. Baskı, 1990.
37 M. Lütfü Belül, Hydropolitics o f the Euphrates-Tigris Basin, op. cit., p. 11.
38 The Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourly Relations between Iraq and Turkey, 
Protocol on Flow Regulation of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and of their tributaries, 
United Nations, Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisions Concerning the Utilization o f
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Protocol provides a framework for the two parties to deal with their respective 
interests in the above water resources. The main features of this agreement read 
as follows:
... "In order to ensure the maintenance of a regular water supply, to 
regulate the water flow and to avoid the danger of floods during the annual 
periods of high water, it had been found necessary to construct dams and 
perm anent observation stations in Turkish territory" (Preamble),
... "Authorization to undertake studies with a view to controlling the 
rivers: Iraq may send to Turkey groups of technical experts to make 
investigations and surveys, collect hydraulic and geological information needed 
for the selection sites for the construction of the dams and observation stations to 
be constructed on the Tigris, Euphrates and their tributaries" (Article 1),
... "Collaboration in carrying out the projected studies. Right of access. 
Provision of facilities: The technical experts from Iraq shall collaborate with 
Turkish technical experts; Turkey shall authorize them to proceed to the places to 
be visited and shall provide them with the information, assistance and facilities 
necessary for the accomplishment of their task" (Article 2),
... "Turkey shall install and operate perm anent flow measurement 
facilities, and transmit periodically the readings and the recorded data to Iraq" 
(Article 3),
International Rivers for Other Purposes than Navigation, UN/Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/12, 
1963, p. 376.
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... "Turkey in principle accepts to construct flow regulation works needed 
in the interest of Iraq in Turkish territory" (Article 4),
... "Turkey shall inform Iraq of projects for waterworks on any of the 
Protocol watercourses, and shall consult with Iraq with a view to 
accommodating the interests of both countries" (Article 5),
To implement the arrangements stated in the above Protocol, a Committee 
for the Regulation of the Flows of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers was provided 
for within the framework of the Mixed Economic Commission. Such a 
Commission was envisaged by a separate Protocol annexed to the 1946 
Friendship Treaty. It would appear that the provisions of that Protocol have not 
been followed up, nor have the above Commission and Committee been set 
up.3^ However, nearly three decades later in 1980, a Joint Technical Committee 
was established between Iraq and Turkey by an agreement reached at the end of 
the first meeting of the Mixed Economic Commission between Turkey and Iraq. 
This Conunittee was not a product of the 1946 Treaty, but served similar 
objectives envisaged in the former. In addition, hydrometeorological data 
concerning river discharges, in particular have often been exchanged, though 
irregularly, between Iraqi and Turkish technical experts since the 1940s and 
1950s. Although the three riparians had not reached any further formal 
agreement between 1921-1946, there were not any notable crises relating to the 
water issue because the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers were used at a 
minimal level in that period.
39 Dante A. Caponera, "Legal and Institutional Concepts of Cooperation", International 
Conference on Transboundary Waters in the Middle East, Prospects for Regional 
Cooperation, Ankara, Bilkent University, 2-3 September 1991, p. 26.
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ii... The controversial nature of water politics from the 1950s to 
the present: the initiation of major development projects and 
current water policy and management
The water question emerged on the regional agenda w hen the three 
riparians of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin initiated major development projects 
in the 1950s. These projects were carried out during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, 
and some are still under construction. In this section the analysis focuses on the 
exploration of the implications of the major development projects of co-riparians, 
such as the construction of Keban, Karakaya and Atatürk dams, namely the 
Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) of Turkey, the Euphrates Valley Project 
(Tabqa dam) of Syria, and the Thartar Canal Project of Iraq on the water politics 
in the region. Moreover, current water policies (politics, regulation, 
implementation) of each of the riparians of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin will 
be discussed. This analysis will reveal that the uncoordinated nature of these 
supply-led developments as well as the inefficient and ineffective demand 
m anagement practices within the framework of national water policy and 
m anagement of the co-riparians are the principal causes of water imbalance in 
the Euphrates-Tigris river basin. The discussion on water development projects 
will start with a brief account of economic factors that have an impact on the 
current water policies and management of the three riparians. Since the main 
argum ent is that water allocation and development policies of the three countries 
are mere products of their macroeconomic policies.
a) Turkey
a.l) Economic Factors
Turkey's socioeconomic structure is characterized by 
a transition from an agriculture to an industry-oriented economy. The share of
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agriculture in total output declined from 27.6 percent in 1977 to 16.6 percent in 
1996; conversely, the share of the industrial sector increased from 19.8 to 29.2 
percent during that period.^O Turkey is also experiencing a rapid increase in 
urban population. The overall population growth rate is 2.4 percent, whereas the 
rate of urbanization is 3.6 percent and is expected to continue at that level.^^ In 
response to poor economic growth in the late 1970s, the government 
implemented several reforms, including shifting the orientation of the economy 
outw ard and changing the role of the public sector from leading economic 
growth to supporting private sector development, a policy that currently 
encourages private investment and decentralization to regional authorities.42 
Turkey has a well-developed manufacturing industry accounting for 40 percent 
of its exports and contributing 22 percent of the GDP which, itself, grew by an 
average of 5.0 percent per annum  between 1980-9143. Turkey has adopted a 
policy of self-sufficiency in most basic and technical commodities and has 
established a well-developed steel industry and consumer goods industries, such 
as textiles and clothing. But the country is still dependent on oil importation and 
oil used to constitute the most im portant commodity in its trade with Iraq.44
40 World Resources 1994-95, World Resources Institute, New York: Oxford University 
Press, p. 256.
41 Overall population is 63.9 million in 1996. EIU: Country reports, 4th Quarter, 1997.
42 Özden Bilen and Savaş Uşkay, "Comprehensive Water Resources Management: An 
Analysis of Turkish Experience," in Guy Le Moigne, Shawki Barghouti, Gershon Feder, 
Lisa Garbus and Mei Xie (eds.). Country Experiences with Water Resources 
Management, Economic, Institutional, Technological and Environmental Issues, World 
Bank Technical Paper, No. 175, 1992, p. 143.
43 World Resources 1994-95, op. cit., p. 256. See also "Special Report, Turkey," Middle 
East Economic Digest, November 1983.
44 Nurit Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East, op. cit, p. 151.
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Further, Turkey has a very high long-term debt and its general level of per capita 
income level is low.^^
The average annual growth in agriculture is favorable in Turkey which 
has an agriculture growth rate of 3.0 percent. However, food imports have 
grown significantly in Turkey, a country which, unlike the other co-riparians to 
the Euphrates-Tigris river basin, is classified as self-sufficient in food production. 
The drought of 1988-9 and the failure of crops led to a reduction in agricultural 
exports. In the event, Turkey is the largest producer of cereals in the Middle East, 
producing over 20 million tons per annum  in recent years. Turkey is a large 
producer of wheat and cotton, tobacco, and hazelnuts, but the contribution of 
agriculture to the GNP is not significant. In the 1970s agriculture contributed to 
about one-third of the Turkish GNP but this has dropped to less than 17 percent 
at the present.46 The productivity of Turkish farming has increased in recent 
years. For instance, although the cultivated area increased by 7 percent between 
1960 and 1980, production doubled in some cases.^^ The physical constraints 
affecting the expansion of agriculture are mainly relief, altitude and climate with 
some regions having favorable climates but being characterized by steep slopes 
and high altitudes- the interior of the Anatolian plateau, for example, which is 
dependent on rain-fed farming is susceptible to rainfall fluctuations.'^^ A major 
thrust of Turkish agricultural policy has been to extend the irrigable area, mainly
45 Total external debt (million US$) in 1989-1991 for Turkey is estimated as 46,936. 
While, GDP estimates based on Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs) per capita is 4,840$ in 
1991. See World Resources 1994-95, op. cit., p. 258.
46 ElU, Country Profile: Turkey, 1997-98, p. 34..
47 Brian W. Beeley, "Progress in Turkish Agriculture", in P. Beaumont and K. 
McLachlan (eds.) Agricultural Development in the Middle East, New York: John Wiley 
& Sons, 1985, pp. 289-301.
48 j. c. Dewdney, "Agricultural development in Turkey", in J. I. Clarke and H. Bowen- 
Jones (eds.). Change and Development in the Middle East, London, pp. 213-223.
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in southeastern Turkey where there is not enough precipitation but the 
topography is favorable. More im portant is Turkey's irrigable land potential of 
8.5 million ha. (of which 1.7 million ha. are in southeastern Anatolia). 
Government policies aim  to tackle the first problem by extending the area of 
irrigation, currently around 4.5 million ha. compared w ith 2.7 million ha. in 
1980.'^^ Hence, the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) is envisaged to expand 
the irrigated area of Turkey by adding 1.6 million ha. to the current 4.5 million 
ha. irrigated at the present. The first stage in the irrigation network of the GAP 
began in November 1994. Irrigation works are currently incomplete, but early in 
the next century GAP is expected to contribute 19 percent of Turkey's total 
irrigated land. GAP is planned as an agro-business project which will attract 
foreign and domestic investment, and the most m odern farming technologies are 
going to be adopted for the region in order to increase the production. The above 
described general economic outlook of the country could provide some clues for 
further discussion on the major development projects that Turkey have already 
engaged with in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin as well as its current water 
policy and management practices in this region.
a.2)The Southeastern Developm ent Project (GAP)
Turkey established the State Hydraulic Works (DSİ) 
in 1953 and had been planning to develop the Euphrates waters since the mid- 
1950s.^0 The construction of the Keban dam  started in 1965. The Keban Project 
was solely a hydropower project, thus it caused no loss of water potential to the 
downstream  riparians. The Project was financed by the United States Agency for
49 EIU, Country Profile: Turkey, 1997-98, p. 35.
Gün Kut, "Burning Waters: The Hydropolitics of The Euphrates and Tigris," New 
Perspectives on Turkey, Vol. 9, Fall 1993, p. 4.
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International Development (USAID). Turkey signed an agreement with USAID 
mainly by stating that it would try to make the necessary arrangements with 
Syria and Iraq w ith regard to the initial filling of the reservoir; if such 
arrangem ents were not possible by the time of impounding, Turkey would 
guarantee the release of an agreed upon amount of water downstream.^^ Soon 
after the Keban dam  was completed in 1973, the Tabqa dam  was also at the initial 
im pounding stage (1974). This caused rapid diplomacy among the riparians.52
During the second season that the Turkish and Syrian dams impounded 
part of the Euphrates' spring flood, a major crisis developed between Syria and 
Iraq that brought the two countries to the brink of an armed conf l i c t . ¡ j - ^q  
accused Syria of reducing the river's flow to intolerable levels. Syria, in turn, 
blamed Turkey for not releasing the promised amounts to downstream 
countries. Nonetheless, Iraq was not satisfied with the Syrian attitude and sent its 
troops to the Syrian border. Consequently, an imminent water w ar was averted 
through the frantic efforts of Saudi Arabia, which m ediated for extra amounts of 
water to be released by Syria. In 1976, Turkey started negotiations with the 
World Bank about a second dam, Karakaya, further downstream  from Keban. A 
series of negotiations were held among the riparians. These included trilateral 
talks of the technical experts which took place in Ankara and Baghdad, between 
November 1972 to May 1973. At last, by a m em orandum  in 1976 stating that 
during the construction, im pounding and operation of the Karakaya Dam, the
This unilateral guarantee, initially involved a minimum of 350 cubic meters per 
second (m3/s) which later amended as 400 m3/s and later in August 1966 as 450m3/s 
according the agreement reached between Turkey, Syria and Iraq. See Kamuran Gürün, 
Akıntıya Kürek: Bir Büyükelçinin Anıları, Milliyet Yayınları, İstanbul, 1994, pp. 240-272. 
^2 M. Lütfü Belül, Hydropolitics o f the Euphrates-Tigris Basin, op. cit., p. 18.
T. Naff and R. Matson, Water in the Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation, op. cit., p. 
94.
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flow of the Euphrates river, as it leaves Turkey, would average not less than 
500m3/s. The averaging period would not be greater than one m onth and any 
shortfall in one period would be made up immediately in the following period.54 
Karakaya entered service in 1987, while work on the Atatürk Dam had been 
under way since 1980. Around the same time, Syria was involved in studying the 
feasibility of another major work upstream  from the Tabqa, the Tishrin Dam.^^ 
Consequently, the construction of these three major dams which were originally 
planned to be a part of a Lower Euphrates Project,^^ initiated the most ambitious 
development scheme in Turkey, namely the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) 
in 1980.
GAP is basically designed to harness the waters of the Euphrates and 
Tigris rivers for hydroelectric power generation (HEP) and irrigation. However, 
as it is introduced as a m ultipurpose development project, GAP covers all 
development-related sectors such as agriculture, industry, transportation, urban 
and rural infrastructure, health care and education.57 However, this study will 
only briefly review the water resources development aspect of GAP. A report 
was prepared in 1980 by the State Hydraulic Works in connection with the 
development of water resources in the GAP region.^^
^4 M. Lütfü Belül, Hydropolitics o f the Euphrates-Tigris Basin, op. cit., p. 19.
Gün Kut, "Burning Waters: The Hydropolitics of The Euphrates and Tigris," op. cit., 
p. 5.
Aşağı Fırat Projesi istihsal Raporu, T.C. Enerji ve Tabii Kaynaklar Bakanlığı, 
Ankara: DSİ, 1966.
Olcay 1. Ünver, "Innovations in Water Resources Development in the Southeastern 
Anatolia Project (GAP) of Turkey," Speech delivered in the Conference on Water as an 
Element o f Cooperation and Development in the Middle East, Hacettepe University, 
Ankara, 1993.
Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, DSİ, Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi, 
Ankara: DSİ, 1980.
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The GAP project area lies in southeastern Turkey, covering eight 
provinces, corresponding to approximately 10 percent of Turkey's total 
population and a surface area of 73,000 square kilometers. The project area 
includes the watersheds of the lower Euphrates and Tigris rivers and the upper 
Mesopotamian plains. For organizational convenience, GAP is divided into the 
Euphrates and the Tigris development plans of which the Euphrates portion is 
well under way and the Tigris portion is in the beginning stages.^^ There are 13 
large sub-projects altogether, 7 of which are on the Euphrates river (Lower 
Euphrates -which is the largest and most comprehensive project including the 
Atatürk Dam and PanlJ^urfa Tunnels together with five more subprojects within 
this framework-Karakaya, Euphrates Border, Suruç-Baziki, Kahta-Adiyaman, 
Gaziantep, Gaziantep-Araban) and 6 on the Tigris (Dicle, Kralkizi -under 
construction- Batman, Batman-Silvan, Garzan, Ilisu, C i z r e ) . GAP involves a 
total of 21 major dams and 19 HEP generating stations. The centerpiece is the 
Atatürk Dam, which was completed at the beginning of the 1990s, with a total 
storage capacity of 48.7 billion m3, an installed electricity-generating capacity of 
2,400 Megawatts (MW). Other major works in GAP are considered to be the 
Şanlıurfa Tunnels, Birecik and Karkamış Dams on the Euphrates (both are under 
construction), and llisu on the Tigris. Şanlıurfa Tunnels are the major units of 
GAP, consisting of two tunnels which will discharge water from the reservoir of 
Atatürk Dam at a rate of 328m3/s. The discharged water will run  for 4 km. on 
the north of the Şanlıurfa -Harran plains and will be able to be converted into 
electric power at the Şanlıurfa Hydroelectric Power Plant. The water will be 
divided into two at the power plant: the Şanlıurfa main irrigation canal will
John Kolars and William Mitchell, The Euphrates River and Southeast Anatolia 
Development Project, op. cit., p. 19.
Ali İhsan Bağış, GAP, Southeastern Anatolia Project, The Cradle o f Civilization 
Regenerated, Istanbul: interbank, pp. 50-60.
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irrigate 48,000 ha. and the Harran canal will irrigate 99,866 ha. The Şanlıurfa 
system will be the longest irrigation system in the world.^^ Over 1.6 million ha. 
(1.08 million on the Euphrates and 600,000 ha. on the Tigris) are scheduled for 
irrigation. To achieve this goal would require putting 100,000 ha into production 
in the Euphrates basin each year beginning in 1993, and another 60,000 ha per 
year in the basin of Tigris. The annual ability of the General Directorate of Rural 
Affairs to develop farmland at present is thought to be between 1000 and 3000 
ha. Only 80,000 ha are currently irrigated in the GAP area (30,000 ha in Harran 
Plain which would likely to be increased to 50,000 ha in the first m onths of the 
1998).^2 7he slow pace of land redistribution is largely responsible for this delay. 
At the same time, the Ministry of Agriculture, responsible for the introduction of 
hands-on aspects of irrigated agriculture, is facing a difficult task. Its facilities are 
limited and the inertia of the traditional farming systems is great. Moreover, 
since the most advanced techniques and technologies are attem pted to be used so 
far in irrigation areas (e.g. drip irrigation), the process has been too slow an 
costly. GAP is considered to be a very expensive project: 32 billion dollars is the 
estimated cost, and 9 billion dollars have been spent so far.^^ Due to the 
"transboundary flows" involved, except for the German and Swiss credits 
obtained for equipm ent purchases, it has not been possible to secure 
international finance.^4 However, it is highly unlikely that Turkey will give up 
its plans to harness the Euphrates-Tigris rivers.
Nurit Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East, op. cit, p. 129.
Personal communication with Mr. Barbaros Özdemir, Consultant, Prime Ministry 
Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration, Ankara, 1996.
Personal communication with bureaucrats in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Ankara, December 1997.
International funding agencies, namely the World Bank requires the 'consent' of all the 
parties (riparian to a transboundary watercourse) on the project to issue financial support 
to the riparian who envisages to develop a certain portion of the river.
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GAP is very critical for the I'urkish economy with its 7,526 MW of 
hydroelectric power-generating capacity and 27,470 G W h/ y energy production 
which will significantly increase the country's existing energy output. There is a 
huge dem and for hydropower in Turkey due to its population growth (2,2 % per 
annum) along with urbanization (3,6% for 1985-90) and impetus for 
industrialization. Moreover, with the irrigation systems envisaged, Turkey is 
determined to develop agriculture and agro-industrial production for export and 
to raise the standard of living of the people of the region. According to Kliot, the 
importance of GAP for Turkey can be summed up by these two sentences: GAP 
will add 70 per cent to Turkey's existing hydroelectrical output. Moreover GAP 
will add 1.7 million ha. to the current 4.5 million ha. of irrigated land in 
Turkey.^5 Furthermore, importance of GAP to Turkey beyond hydropower 
a n d /o r  foreign exchange is obvious, given the underdevelopm ent of the 
southeast and the government's desire to stabilize the area politically through 
significantly raising the population's standard of living. Thus, among the 
development objectives of the GAP there lies "to raise the income levels in the 
GAP region by improving the economic structure in order to narrow  the income 
disparity between the region and the other regions"; "to increase the productivity 
and employment opportunities in rural areas"; "to enhance the assimilative 
capacity of larger cities in the region"; "to contribute to the national objective 
sustained economic growth, export promotion, and social stability by efficient 
utilization of the region's sources."^^
Nurit Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East, op. cit, p. 131.
Nipón Koei Co. Ltd. and Yüksel Proje A. S. Joint Venture, Vols. I-IV, Southeastern 
Anatolia Project Master Plan Study, Tokyo and Ankara, April 1989, pp. 2-3.
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About the implications of the GAP on the downstream  states, many 
analysts had pu t forward diverging opinions.^^ As a leading analyst, John 
Kolars argues that, the construction of huge dams in the headwaters of the rivers 
offers advantages to Syria and Iraq in flood control and it provides regular water 
supply. Indeed, a clearly recognized principle in the m anagement of rivers with 
extreme seasonal a n d /o r  annual variance in their flow (such as the Tigris and 
Euphrates) is that flood control as well as storing of water for seasonal lows and 
periods of drought is best accomplished at the headwaters. W ater loss from 
evaporation is also minimized in this way. Moreover, this service has cost 
downstream  neighbors nothing. However, Kolars also argues that GAP would 
have three significant negative impacts downstream: the depletion of 
downstream  flow, the detouring of downstream flow, the pollution of 
downstream  flow. However, his arguments are rather flawed in the sense that 
irrigation targets (irrigation sector consumes the greatest amounts from the 
existing water resources; and irrigation use pollutes the water resources to a 
considerable degree) in GAP have not been fully realized yet. Thus, J. A. Allan 
argues that Turkey's use of water for agriculture is unlikely to go ahead at the 
optimistic rate proposed by its planners, and it is unlikely that more than one 
million new hectares will be irrigated by 2010.^^ The impact of such demands on
John Kolars and William Mitchell, The Euphrates River and Southeast Anatolia 
Development Project, op. cit., p. 265; Natasha Beschomer, "Water and Instability in the 
Middle East" London: IISS, Adelphi Paper, No. 273, 1992, p. 31; Daniel Hillel, Rivers o f 
Eden: The Struggle for Water and Quest for Peace in the Middle East, op. cit., p. 106; 
Nurit Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East, op. cit, p. 131; Peter 
Beaumont, "Water- A Resource under Pressure," Gerd Nonneman (ed.). The Middle and 
Europe, An Integrated Communities Approach, Federal Tmst for Education and 
Research, London, 1992, p. 184.
John Kolars, "Problems of International River Management: The Case of the 
Euphrates," op. cit., pp. 69-70.
J. A. Allan, Water Resources in the Middle East, SOAS, University of London, 
October 1989, p. 3.
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the flow of water to Syria depends on the depth of irrigation water applied per 
year in Turkey as well as on the effectiveness of the engineering. On the basis of 
the results in irrigation schemes elsewhere the reduction in flow is likely to be 
between five and ten billion cubic meters per year, and it is argued by Turkish 
engineers that the greater control enabled by the new dams will halve the impact 
of the reduction in flow on the downstream states. Because the lead times are 
long for both dam  building and for land development, the international relations 
aspects of the developments will evolve gradually. Moreover, even in the case of 
full implementation, as the Turkish authorities argue, Turkey will do its utmost 
to introduce and enforce irrigation water quality control measurements in the 
GAP irrigation fields. Accordingly water used in irrigation (return flows) will be 
properly treated in Turkey before it enters Syria.
The GAP Master Plan foresees three options based on different 
combinations of irrigation and electricity production alternatives.^^ In the first 
option, priority is given to irrigation: 1.6 million ha. of land will be irrigated, and 
the electricity production will be 25 billion kWh. To attain this level, 10 billion 
m3 will be w ithdraw n from the waters of the Euphrates (one third of the total 
discharge of 32 billion m 3/ y) and 5,195 billion m3 from the Tigris (ten percent of 
the total discharge of 50 billion m 3 /y)7'^ Yet, Kolars and Mitchell estimate an 
absolute river depletion of 16 billion m3 (around the year 2040). Kut argues that, 
in either case, Turkey will be able to provide the minimum of 500 m 3 /s to its
Interview with Ö. Bilen (retired Director General of the State Hydraulic Works, 
Turkey), April 1996.
Nipón Koei Co. Ltd. and Yüksel Proje A. Ş. Joint Venture, op. cit., p. 9.
Ali İhsan Bağış, GAP, Southeastern Anatolia Project, The Cradle o f Civilization 
Regenerated, op. cit., pp. 123-124.
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downstream  neighbors7^ The second option gives priority to electricity 
production, aiming at a yearly output of 29.8 billion kWh, but reduces the 
irrigated area 894,459 ha. The water consumption drops accordingly to half of the 
am ount estimated in the first option. Whereas in the third option, the area to be 
irrigated remains the same as in the second option, but electricity production 
drops drastically.74
a.3) Current water policy and management:
Though generally Turkey has an abundance of water, 
it is not always in the right place, at the right time to meet present and 
anticipated needs. Hydrographically Turkey is divided into 26 drainage river 
basins. It is estimated that 95 km3^^ of surface runoff and 9 km3 of ground water 
could be technically developed for consumptive purposes. Currently, the total 
armual consumption of ground water is 5.4 km3; actual consumption of surface 
water is 25.2 km3, about 30 percent of the potential.^^
The total surface of Turkey is about 78 million ha. Of this total, almost one 
third of, or 27.7 million ha can be classified as cultivable land according to the 
recent available comprehensive studies and an estimated 8.5 million ha could be 
irrigable. Besides, about 2.5 million ha of irrigation infrastructure has developed
Gün Kut, "Burning Waters: The Hydropolitics of The Euphrates and Tigris," op. cit., 
p. 7.
^4 Ibid.
1 km3 -  1 billion m3
Özden Bilen and Savaş Uşkay, "Comprehensive Water Resources Management: An 
Analysis of Turkish Experience," in Guy Le Moigne, Shawki Barghouti, Gershon Feder, 
Lisa Garbus and Mei Xie (eds.). Country Experiences with Water Resources 
Management, Economic, Institutional, Technological and Environmental Issues, World 
Bank Technical Paper, No. 175, 1992, p. 143.
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by the public sector and about 1.3 million ha are provided supplementary water 
by small scale privately owned irrigation schemes.
In their article, Bilen and UJ?kay stress the necessity of introducing 
'comprehensive water resources management policies' in Turkey. In their 
contention, comprehensive water resources management concept in general, is a 
much wider assignment than water resources planning of a basin. It is a plan 
designed for a basin or a water use which should fit into national plans and 
policies. This is a step forward from the "project oriented" water resources 
planning for specific needs towards broader perspectives of national 
development. Moreover, these leading experts of the Turkish water sector define 
the major tasks of comprehensive water resources planning as the establishment 
of development objectives and the identification of constraints.^^ In their 
analysis, comprehensive water resources planning should first examine national 
development objectives. The main objectives of the sixth five-year development 
plan (1990-94) are to improve income distribution under sustainable 
development policies, to reduce unemployment, and to eliminate interregional 
differences in the level of development. In addition, strategies for the water 
sector include developing backward areas; avoiding water pollution; and 
preserving historical, cultural areas. Moreover, Bilen and Uf)kay emphasize that 
there are three basic obstacles in water resources planning and development: 
population growth, financial constraints, and environmental concerns.
Population Growth and Urbanization: The growth of urban areas and the 
creation of an urban middle class have changed household structures and social
Ibid., p. 148.
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preferences, resulting in a rapid rise in per capita water consumption. In rural 
areas, water consumption for domestic purposes is less than 50 liters/day, 
whereas it has reached 200 liters/day  in urban areas. This rapid growth in 
dem and resulted in increased water pollution from sewage. One of the most 
im portant concerns regarding population growth is meeting present and future 
needs for food. The options are an increase in the cropped area, an increase in 
yields, or a combination of both. The response in Turkey has been an expansion 
in irrigated agriculture.
Financial Constraints: Financial management of the water sector is 
fundam ental to the integrated management structure, with financial policies 
playing an im portant role in achieving social and resource allocation objectives. 
Investment in the water sector ranks third, after transportation and energy, and 
from 1980 to 1991 accounted on average for 11.7 percent of the total public 
i n v e s t m e n t . T h e  expansion of water sector investment could be achieved by 
introducing private sector participation and by selling revenue-sharing bonds to 
the public. In the hydropower sector, for instance, the government now 
encourages private sector participation in electricity generation through the 
removal of all legal constraints. The most extensive privatization model of this 
kind is the recent "Build, Operate and Turnover" scheme, under which private 
investors are encouraged to finance, build, and operate a given facility for a 
certain period, and then transfer it to the government. Revenue-sharing bonds to 
finance other projects with revenue potential have been successfully 
implemented in the hydropower sector :-ince 1984. However, there is a growing 
need to develop a rational financial plan to support development programs. The
78 State Planning Organization, Basic Targets and Strategy o f the Sixth Five-year 
Development Plan, Ankara, 1989.
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plan should address priority investaents in the water subsectors; multiyear- 
based investment strategies; improvement of the investment data base; and 
improvement of investment-planning skills.^^
Environmental Concerns: Recently, serious water pollution problems have 
arisen in certain areas of Turkey. Major factors contributing to pollution are the 
lack of adequate sewage treatment and industrial waste treatm ent facilities, and 
agricultural intensification. The reuse of polluted water resources will require 
high expenditure and advanced technical facilities.^0
In order to achieve a successful integration of the water sector and other 
sectoral policies, changes in legislation and organization may be a necessary 
precondition. According to Bilen and UJ?kay, legislation and organization are 
two components of institutional framework and these two components are very 
much interrelated.^^ Development of water resources is considered within the 
responsibilities and authority of the state in Turkey. This is not only an economic 
necessity but also an obligation required by constitution. In Turkey, all ground 
water and surface waters except some privately owned small springs and waters 
are vested in the government by the Constitution of 1982. Although the Turkish 
Constitution provides for natural wealth and resources to vest in the State, the 
ownership regime of water resources is rather complex. The basic principle 
governing surface water use rights provides that water is a public good the use 
of which everyone is entitled, subject to the rights of prior uses. It follows that 
surface water use rights are normally free of any prior authorization. If any
Özden Bilen and Savaş Uşkay, "Comprehensive Water Resources Management: An 
Analysis of Turkish Experience," op. cit., p. 149.
80 Ibid., p. 149.
81 Ibid.,pp. 144-145.
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conflict arises among users in this respect, the various customary rules and 
regulations developed locally apply. If these do not help in resolving the matter, 
rights are settled by court decision. W hen a prospective user intends to divert 
water, however, court adjudication can be rendered almost impossible because of 
the difficulty in identifying prior existing rights within provincial and district 
jurisdictions. New laws on water rights are therefore required. W ith water use 
for hydropower and thermal energy production, special legislation has been 
enacted requiring prior authorization for water use. Legislation regarding 
ground water use is more comprehensive than that for surface water. Generally, 
the State Hydraulic Works needs to approve both the use and extraction rate of 
water for different activities. Moreover, water rights can be neither sold nor 
transferred. As regards to underground water resources, a prior authorization is 
required for their use from the General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works. 
Private permits are issued annually for ground water use. There are only water 
use rights, and conditions are imposed regarding extraction rates and purpose of 
utilization.
In relation to water resources management, there are several codes in the 
Turkish Legislation. Establishment law Code 6200 of the General Directorate of 
the State Hydraulic Works determines its organization. W ater resources 
m anagement and nation-wide responsibility for the water-sector planning is 
centralized within the General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works under the 
Ministry of Public Works and Settlement. According to its specific law, this 
organization acts as the water sector's integration to some extent, although this is 
not systematically established in the legislation.
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Ground water law code 167 came into force in 1968, and according to this 
law ground water is the sole property of the state and the State Hydraulic Works 
is the only legal authority responsible for investigation, use and allocation of 
ground waters. There are more laws concerning drinking water supply, rural 
area water supply, and the environment. However, no general legislation to 
regulate the right to use public waters has been promulgated in accordance with 
the corresponding provision of the Turkish Civil Code which states that use all 
surface waters are public goods. However, it adds that a special law will be 
prom ulgated concerning the use of the surface waters. Although the State of 
Hydraulic Works prepared and proposed a bill on this issue in 1977, to date this 
draft did not pass as a law. Thus, experts like Ô. Bilen assert that with the 
passing of this bill on the use of surface waters, it will be possible to issue 
permits by the goverrunent to the users which can be sold and transferred as an 
exchange of water. And, this will, in turn, create a system in which water will be 
treated as an economic good. Moreover, existing water-sector laws do not 
include provisions to meet specific problems. New legal codification on water- 
use is considered necessary with special reference being given to water 
ownership, water rights, registration of the right of use, permit system, penalty 
against misuse of water resources, etc. Further, legislation does not lay special 
emphasis on public participation. Public participation rather occurs in a 
conventional way in the democratic political process, but not in clearly stated 
certain procedures. Wishes and complaints are directed to the authorities 
individually, or on politicians initiatives. There is no regulated process such as 
public inquiry, based upon legislation.^^
82 Ibid., p. 145.
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The organizational structure of the water sector in Turkey is not complex 
because of the limited number of authorities involved. The responsibility for 
water resources management and nation-wide water planning is centralized 
within the State Hydraulic Works, which was established under the Ministry of 
Public Works in 1954. The responsibility for drinking water supplies in rural 
areas was originally given to the State Hydraulic Works, but was later 
transferred to the General Directorate of Rural Services. The State Hydraulic 
Works is the only legal authority responsible for the exploitation, use, and 
allocation of ground water.^^ At the national level, the State Hydraulic Works 
coordinates water use in cooperation with other agencies, which m ust obtain 
prior approval from this Directorate for each project they undertake. These 
agencies include (a) the General Directorate of Rural Services, responsible for 
carrying out on-farm works for state irrigation schemes, developing small 
irrigation schemes, and supplying drinking water to rural areas; (b) the General 
Directorate of the Bank of Provinces, under the Ministry of Public Works, 
providing credit to finance and implement urban infrastructure; (c) the General 
Directorate of Electrical Power Resources Survey, responsible for carrying out 
hydrological studies, geotechnical investigations, and m apping activities to 
evaluate national hydroelectric potential; and (d) the Turkish Electrical 
Authority, responsible for generation, transmission, and distribution of 
electricity. H ydropow er schemes constructed by the State Hydraulic Works are 
transferred to this Authority for operation.^4
Intersectoral water allocation involves allocation and reallocation of 
water among different users, such as irrigation, hydropower and domestic
Ibid.
84 Ibid., pp. 145-146.
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(intersectoral and municipal) use. As Bilen and UJ?kay stress the intersectoral 
water allocation' issue should be seriously handled in the Turkish water sector. 
W ater resources allocation cannot be separated from economic considerations. 
For example, while the transfer of water from hydropower to irrigation will 
increase income in the agricultural sector, hydropower generation, however, 
contributes to the entire economy The general approach to dealing with 
alternative uses of water requires the identification of the objectives of all 
interested parties and exploration of viable alternatives. Actions can then be 
determined on the basis of an evaluation of gains and losses, both economic and 
non economic, for each p a r t y M o r e o v e r ,  changes in water allocation can also 
be brought about by new demands arising during the operation of a project. For 
instance, in the Gediz and Menderes river basins, water was over allocated to 
irrigation uses at the expense of its use elsewhere such as urban water supply. 
Therefore the problem of growing municipal areas, faced with a need to increase 
their water supply, can be viewed as one of choosing between two alternatives 
such as irrigation and municipal use. In Turkey, however, there is no transfer of 
water rights from agriculture to municipal use or to higher economic uses. 
Moreover, water rights are acquired simply by putting water to beneficial use
Water use by sector in Turkey, 1990-2000:
Use 1990 1995 2000 (estimated)
Drinking and Utility 5.9 7.4 9.0
Irrigation 32.3 37.0 41.8
Industrial 5.1 6.2 7.3
TOTAL 43.3 50.6 58.1
Source: General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSİ), Statistical Bulletin of 
DSi-1989.
86 Ibid., p. 147.
87 For example, in the Southeastern Anatolia Project three alternatives were presented by 
Bilen and Uşkay representing different development schemes in different sectors. Criteria 
such as incremental capital output ratio, gross regional production, foreign currency 
requirements, and total public investment were selected as macro indexes for comparison. 
Ibid.,
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and are still not defined in any official or reliable way such as a perm it which 
does define the right to some extent. At present, almost 95 percent or more of the 
water rights are not adjudicated. Besides, inter basin water transfer (transfer of 
water from surplus areas to areas of water deficiency) is being planned on a large 
scale in Turkey. Transfer of water can have large equalizing effects on the value 
of water and the social and economic benefits of transfers may exceed total costs. 
The technological means for large scale transfers have increased and improved 
considerably in Turkey. However, the implementation of these projects may also 
change the social and economic conditions of the population in regions that 
supply water as well as in those that receive it. It is, therefore, of vital importance 
to study and assess all the economic, social and ecological consequences of such 
diversions.^®
In the past, water resources development policy was almost totally 
dom inated by supply management and demand management was given low 
priority. The regulation of consumption through dem and m anagement tools, 
such as appropriate pricing policies, has recently received greater attention. The 
pricing approaches selected affect the distribution of income, resource allocation, 
and level of investment. Higher prices for water would induce consumers to use 
less water, since price will influence total usage and will affect the appropriate 
level of investment.
Irrigation capital costs and O&M expenditures incurred by the State 
Hydraulic Works are subject to repayment in accordance with its establishment
For example, 1.2 billion m3 of water will be transferred annually from the Great 
Melen River to Istanbul to meet the growing water demand in the metropol, at a cost of 
$2.8 billion.
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law. According to this law, a repayment schedule is prepared by the State 
Hydraulic Works and presented for parliamentary approval, and it is to be 
announced before the end of April every year. Water charges include the actual 
cost of operating and maintaining irrigation facilities and the am ount required 
for recovery of capital costs of such facilities, amortized over a period not 
exceeding fifty years. Although, certain amount of interest rate (subject to 
governmental approval) could be applied, and in practice, no interest is charged. 
Furthermore, amortization charges, once they have been established, are not 
adopted to inflation. Only when the charges become very low, some adjustments 
are made. Since 1989, O&M charges have been set to recover 100 percent of the 
actual costs incurred in the previous year. Over the past seven years, however, 
collections have only amounted to about 37 percent of total assessments, due to 
inadequate penalties for late payment. Recent legislation has proposed an 
increase in the penalty from a flat rate of 10 percent to a monthly charge of 7 
percent for delays. Bilen and U§kay emphasize privatization in the irrigation 
sector by the establishment of irrigation (water user) groups and assigning them 
the O&M of irrigation canals. This policy, in their reasoning, will enable these 
irrigation water user groups to collect O&M charges in their local area. These 
irrigation groups have indeed proven to be very successful and effective in the 
collection of O&M charges, as well as in the repair of tertiary and secondary 
canals and on-farm works. These are mainly village based irrigation groups with 
the village head acting as chairman. First individual farmers as stakeholders 
form small irrigation groups for the operation and maintenance and the repair of 
tertiary canals. Then, these small groups can form bigger unions by coming 
together for the operation and maintenance of larger scale secondary canals. 
Finally, these secondary canals are integrated to main canals carrying water 
directly from storage facilities. Hence, the management of the network of
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irrigation canals are privatized with the establishment of such a system. Nearly 
half of the area irrigated by the State Hydraulic Works has been successfully 
transferred to those groups.^^ Turkey is regarded by the World Bank as an 
exemplary case in public participation (stakeholder participation) with its 
achievements in privatization of the irrigation sector.^^ Hence, the establishment 
of water user associations like that of Turkey is made a condition by the World 
Bank for giving financial support to developing countries. In the past, the criteria 
for W orld Bank's assistance was the application of volumetric charging system in 
irrigation sectors of these developing countries.
In Turkey tariffs related to the O&M costs are calculated and charged on 
the basis of area irrigated, adjusted for the crop grown for reflecting the 
differences in water requirement. Cropped area-base charges do not lead to more 
efficient use of water because farmers are not charged in proportion to actual 
consumption. No motivation for conservative use can be achieved by this 
system. Agricultural water use is heavily subsidized, with government irrigation 
schemes financed by the national budget. This represents a redistribution of 
income from urban taxpayers to farmers. This method of transferring income 
from the "richer" (urban population) to the "poorer" (farmers) regions contributes 
little to equitable income distribution, because at the scheme level flat rates apply 
to all farmers regardless of farm size. This system does not lead to more efficient
1, 629 572 ha. of irrigated land out of total irrigated land of 3,734 000 has been 
transferred to the water user groups as of 1997 (Interview with Faruk Cenap Erdoğan, 
Agricultural Engineer, Operation and Mainienance Department of State Hydraulic Works, 
July 1996).
An International Seminar was organized by the World Bank, in Antalya, Turkey on the 
issue of Participatory Irrigation Management in April 1996 to present Turkey's 
achievements in transferring the management (including operation, maintenance and 
repair) of the irrigated areas from the state control to the water user (irrigation) 
associations.
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water use. Volumetric charging system should be introduced to motivate the 
conservation of water, and the infrastructure for this purpose is to be provided. 
Further, the participation of farmers in investment decisions regarding irrigation 
projects should be introduced to motivate water conservation. On the other hand 
municipal water supply charges are determined by municipal assemblies, taking 
into account O&M and amortization of capital costs over 30 years, and constitute 
part of municipal budgetary incomes. Drinking water is charged in two ways: a 
fixed am ount regardless of consumption and a variable amount depending on 
consumption. Additional water charges are also made in some large cities.^!
A series of technological development activities has been initiated, 
including development of a flood forecasting and warning system for all 
watershed areas; a research project (on 3000 ha of land in GAP) on introducing 
new irrigation techniques, and a study program on increasing irrigation system 
efficiency. There is a need for modernization of the hydrometric network 
introducing remote controlled gauging stations. Establishment of remote sensing 
facilities could provide an important input to the management of water 
resources. In Turkey, utilization of this technology in the water sector is rather 
limited and needs to be developed. The State Hydraulic Works controls all files 
and archives for hydrometric and meteorological information. It recently 
inaugurated a modern, computerized data base system for meteorological and 
stream flow measurement. Coordination with other organizations on water 
resources inventory data is encouraged by the State Hydraulic Works to establish 
compatible data banks. An autonomous institute could be set up to collect, store, 
and process these data. Besides, reallocations among uses and places seem to be
Özden Bilen and Savaş Uşkay, "Comprehensive Water Resources Management: An 
Analysis of Turkish Experience," op. cit., p. 148.
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unavoidable in the future due to increasing water demand in the whole economy 
stemming from rapid urbanization and high rates of economic development. 
Thus, legislative measures in this respect should be taken beforehand. In the 
event, water use for agriculture is quite high in Turkey, either reducing the 
amount of water used in irrigation or through withdrawing little land from 
irrigation, will provide adequate water amounts for urban usage in the future. 
Moreover, measures to increase efficiency in the water sector in different fields 
are as im portant as finding additional sources of water. For example, in 
irrigation water use per hectare could be decreased by almost a third by 
improving water m anagement on farm level. In Turkey, sprinkler irrigation at 
the farm level has recently been extensively used by farmers and this trend is 
expected to grow in the future and to be promoted by financial incentives.
Turkey's achievements are remarkable in regard to the organization of the 
water sector. In the same manner, the privatization of the Turkish irrigation 
sector through the activities of water user associations are indeed notable within 
the context of dem and management activities. However, as a critical component 
of the institutional framework, water legislation, with all its aspects (e.g. water 
use rights, ownership, permits) need to be strengthened through the 
implementation of certain norms discussed above. Moreover, as urbanization is 
quite high (3.6 percent per annum) in Turkey, the necessity for reallocating 
available water resources from agriculture to municipal use will prevail. 
Furthermore, 'water pricing' and pricing water at its 'opportunity cost' in all 
sectors, should be seriously considered in the Turkish water sector. Pricing will 
induce the consumers to conserve water, and to use water efficiently and 
reasonably.
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b) Syria
b.l) Economic factors:
The Syrian economy has been traditionally an 
agricultural economy. Some analysts argue that the expansion of irrigation and 
domestic food production will continue to be an economic priority and the 
Euphrates region is the main development target area in Syria.^2 the same 
manner, some others assert that even more than Turkey, and more than Iraq 
(which has independent control of tributaries to the Tigris, as well as alternative 
economic resources e.g., petroleum), Syria depends crucially on the Euphrates to 
develop its agricultural economy. H ow e/er, Tony Allan claims that Syria should 
in due course re-examine its water allocation policy and management of water, 
and conclude that allocating water to agriculture is neither economically nor 
ecologically sustainable.^^ As is also true in many Middle Eastern countries, 
agriculture is by far the most significant consumer of water in Syria. Despite the 
fact that irrigated farming produces only 10 percent of Syria's annual harvest, 
nearly 90 percent of water used in Syria in 1981-1982 was applied to irrigation, 
and there is no reason to believe the proportion is any less t o d a y n  is, 
therefore, im portant to examine the position of this most thirsty of economic 
sectors, which provides 20 percent of Syria's GDP, 13 percent of its exports, and 
employs 28 percent of its workers.^^ Syria still being largely a rural-based 
society, the government has placed a strong emphasis on agriculture, and Syria 
achieved self-sufficiency in wheat in 1992.
Natasha Beschomer, "Water and Instability in the Middle East," op. cit., p. 33.
J. A. Allan, Fortunately there are substitutes for water: otherwise our hydropolitical 
futures would be impossible. School of Oriental and African Studies, University of 
London, 1993, p. 9.
Associates for Middle East Research (AMER), Syria: Political, Economic and 
Strategic, University of Pennsylvania, 1989, pp. 54-55.
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Country Profile: Syria, 1997-98, p. 15.
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Syria has introduced many irrigation projects since the early 1960s. The 
reason behind this policy was to increase the share of agricultural output in the 
GNP so as to meet the challenge of rapidly rising food demand in its economy. 
Indeed, in the Middle East, food-security has been a great concern for the 
political authorities, because imports are rising rapidly and the domestic 
agricultural sector would seemingly never be able to produce sufficient food to 
fulfill the increasing food gap without substantial government subsidies.^^ A 
few states in the region have adopted an export-based food-security strategy, 
while nearly all, including Syria, have implemented import-substituting 
agricultural policies. By spending huge amounts of money especially on 
irrigation projects, Syrian authorities hoped to reduce risks in food supply 
caused by fluctuating rainfall. But, the irrigation projects, namely the Euphrates 
Valley Project were unsuccessful due to many social, economic and ecological 
reasons.
Although Syria has not realized its full potential in agriculture, it has, during 
recent decades, achieved remarkable ii'creases in growth rates in per capita 
agricultural productivity for the region.^^ However, it should be noted that.
Alan Richards and John Waterbury, A Political Economy o f the Middle East, Boulder, 
Co: Westview Press, 1990, pp. 139-184.
As of 1980, Syria's growth in agricultural value-added per capita compared to its 
neighbors as follows:
Value-added in Agriculture ($ per capita per year)
1961 1980
Iraq: 142 480
Syria: 50 311
Turkey: 300 886
Source: World Bank, Resources for Agriculture, Syrian Arab Republic-Development 
Prospects and Policies Report, Vol. 1-4, 2/22/1980, New York, pp. 248-49, and I. R. 
Marmers and T. S. Nejad, "Agricultural Development in Syria," in P. Beaumont and K. 
McLachlan (eds.). Agricultural Development in the Middle East, New York: John Wiley 
& Sons, 1985, pp. 255-279. After the politically turbulent years of the 1940s and 1950s in
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Syrian agriculture was and still is predominantly rainfed. Of a total cultivable 
area of around 6 million ha only some 20 percent is irrigated. Nevertheless, the 
area of irrigated land rose from 690,000 ha in 1990 to 1.09 million ha in 1995. That 
is, Syrian advances have been registered primarily in dryland crop production 
during years of adequate rainfall. Although the records of the 1980-1984 five- 
year development plan gave agricultural products top priority and agriculture 
seemed to capture the highest proportion in GNP and was used to compensate 
for foreign trade imbalances, that success was achieved by the leverage of 
government subsidies during good harvest years in rain-fed areas rather than 
achievements in irrigated agriculture.^^ Likewise, the cotton crop has been a 
significant earner of foreign exchange in the past, given the right rainfall at the 
right seasons.^^ For instance, throughout the 1980s, the rains have come either 
too little or too late. Whereas, in 1988 the rains have been plentiful and at the 
right times. This, plus the introduction of improved strains of wheat, have 
produced a record grain harvest, with a significant reduction in the need for food 
imports. Cotton also yielded a bum per crop in 1988.10^
Syria, the starting point in 1961 was perhaps understandably low. Data used here display 
rather old figures, however one should note the fact that these are the only available 
figures that the researcher can make use of just like some highly regarded periodically 
updated research publications such as the Economist Intelligence Unit did for its Country 
Reports and/or Country Profiles, and the World Resources Institute {World Resources 
guide) used in its publications concerning Syria.
A. R. Milnes, "Why Syrian agriculture is a top priority?". The Middle East, July 1984.
S. Heydemann, "The political logic of economic rationality: selective stabilization in 
Syria," in H. J. Barkey (ed.). The Politics o f Economic Reform in the Middle East, New 
York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 11-41.
Middle East Economic Digest Ltd. (MEED), 19 June 1986, London; Middle East 
Economic Digest Ltd. (MEED), 21 March 1987, London.
Middle East Economic Digest Ltd. (MEED), 9 September 1988, London.
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Official investment in agricultural development remains high. In recent 
years, agriculture has received on the order of 20 percent of Syria's government 
investment budget. Food self-sufficiency is a high priority for the 1986-1990 Five 
Year Plan. For these economic reasons, agriculture will continue to be 
im portant productive sector in the Syrian economy. These considerations are 
reinforced by political goals which, under the ruling Baath Party, have 
emphasized the development of the country-side and the organization of 
peasants as a political power base.102 However, as the gap between water 
supplies and water usage narrows, it is likely that Syria will have to alter its 
priorities away from the prestige irrigation projects and concentrate instead on 
increasing productivity and efficiency of rainfed agriculture. In spite of the fact 
that agricultural production (mostly rain-fed) accounted for 28 per cent GDP in 
1990, Syrian agriculture is becoming more marginal to the economy, and cotton, 
once Syria's main export earner, is being superseded by oil. In 1989, oil 
accounted for 27 percent of export earnings by value.^®^
There are more difficulties in Syrian economy: officials realize that land 
reclamation targets are very ambitious and that total food security can never be 
achieved, but they insist that relative food security in staple crops is essential, 
regardless of economic viability.^04 Food shortages will continue to be a 
problem for Syria because it has difficulties in generating foreign exchange to
AMER, Syria: Political, Economic and Strategic, op. cit., p. 56.
102 Raymond Hinnebusch, Peasant and Bureaucracy in Ba'thist Syria, Boulder, Co: 
Westview Press, 1989, p. 220.
Middle East Economic Digest (MEED), 26 August 1994, p. 11; Economist 
Intelligence Unit (ElU), Country Report: Syria, 4th Quarter, 1997.
Natasha Beschomer, "Water and Instability in the Middle East," op. cit., p. 34.
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pay for imports of food from the world m arkets.l^^ Moreover, since the 
beginning of the 1990s, world oil prices have declined further. Accordingly, those 
managing the Syrian economy have returned to the option of policies supporting 
the agricultural sector in an attem pt to put the economy on a healthy footing. In 
short, Syrian economic well-being remains subject to seasonal fluctuations in 
rainfall and world oil prices (because the actual irrigation has always fallen 
behind the declared targets that were supposed to meet the demands of the 
agricultural sector). J. A. Allan argues that both Syria and Iraq have policies that 
reflect their agricultural expectations based on the further supply management of 
water.106 However, evidence of the past three decades suggests that the 
utilization of additional water in irrigated farming will advance slowly, 
especially in the enduring constrained economic circumstances of Syria, as well 
as in Iraq, which has moved from the position of not needing to develop an 
economically viable irrigated sector when oil revenues were plentiful up until 
1990, to the current position where it too has limited options with respect to 
development spending. Moreover, Allan argues that to overcome a likely deficit 
in the water sector, Syria should reallocate its water resources at the national 
level by shifting the major emphasis from irrigation to domestic and industrial
use.107
Syria has a weak trading capacity: its exports amount to $3,253 million where its 
imports are recorded as $4,150 million in 1993; further the country is burdened with 
external debt of about $16,000 million, roughly equivalent to total gross domestic product 
See David Butter, "Syria: Special Report," MEED, 18 November 1994.
J. A. Allan, "Overall Perspectives on Countries and Region," in Peter Rogers and P. 
Lydon (eds.) Water in the Arab World, Mass., Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1994, 
p. 97.
J. A. Allan, Fortunately there are substitutes for water..., op. cit., p. 9.
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b.2) The Euphrates Valley Project:
Syria has given priority to using its scarce surface 
water especially during the past three decades. In the event, it has been much 
less successful in developing this surface water than its ground water.^^^ There 
have been a number of environmental as well as institutional reasons for the 
absence of success in irrigation targets in Syria. Syria initiated the Euphrates 
Valley Project in the early 1960s when the Baath Party came to rule. As a matter 
of fact, a major dam  on the Euphrates had been envisaged as early as 1927 by the 
French, but was not realized. Shortly after independence in 1946, Sir Alexander 
Gibbs and Co. conducted a preliminary study for a dam near Yusuf Pasha which 
would have irrigated 100,000 ha. Nothing came of it, however, and this effort 
was followed by a twelve-volume study by the Soviets published in 1960 which 
suggested the Tabqa site. Next came a study by the West German Government in 
1961 and another by the Dutch consulting firm, NEDECO, in 1963-64.109 
breakdown of the relations with the Germans in 1965 left the way open for Soviet 
participation in building the Tabqa dam. Thus, in 1963, the Government of Syria 
in the first five-year development plan, decided to build a large dam  on the 
Euphrates river as a response to the country's increasing energy and food need. 
The Euphrates-Tabqa (renamed Al-Thawra meaning 'revolution' in Arabic), 
became operational in 1973.
^08 j  A. Allan argues that the ground water option is not an uncomplicated one and 
ground water cannot be relied upon to sustain the increase in food production achieved in 
the past decades because in Syria ground water, has already been pushed to its limit. By 
1984, ground water was commanding an area just a little less than the total fed from 
surface flows. Yet, ground water resources are not infinite and there are signs in many 
parts of the country that the decline in water levels will prevent further extensions of use 
See J. A. Allan, Developing Euphrates Water in Syria: The Plans and Their Realizations 
1946-86, SOAS, University of London, 1986.
H. Meliczek, "Land Settlement in the Euphrates basin of Syria," in FAO, Land 
Reform: Land Settlement and Cooperatives, Rome: FAO Publications, 1987, p. 111.
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The government set a number of objectives to be followed in the context of 
the Euphrates Valley Project: irrigating an area as wide as 640,000 ha; generation 
of electric energy needed for urban use and industrial development; and 
regulating the flow of Euphrates in order to prevent seasonal flooding.^O After 
more than 30 years, none of the objectives have been totally realized in the 
Euphrates basin. The Project consisted of some six irrigation districts, the work 
for which was unified and undertaken by the General Authority for the 
Development of the Euphrates Basin (GADEB). Syria also created a Ministry for 
the Euphrates Dam. A pioneer, or pilot project was initiated in May 1973 on the 
left bank of the Euphrates. It was sometime after this pilot project had been 
implemented that serious problems began to develop with regard to the 
application of water to the land.^^^ As summarized in a 1980 USAID report and 
intimated by various press releases from Syria, the Euphrates basin soils are in 
large part gypsiferous, crusty, prone to erosion, and suitable for careful 
applications of irrigation water.1^2 xhe government has now realized that its 
initial plans were over-ambitious and reduced the targeted am ount to 370,000 ha 
of which currently 160,000 ha. is being irrigated in the Euphrates basin. For one, 
the schemes in the Euphrates valley were adversely affected by high gypsum 
(minerals containing calcium sulfates) levels in the soil and by salinization 
caused by over pum ping and by collapse of canals due to seepage. Some sources 
indicate that in Syria, critical levels of gypsum cover 21 percent of the total area 
and 50 percent of the fertile Euphrates basin. The middle and lower Euphrates
1^0 Ibid., pp. 112-113.
 ^  ^  ^ John Kolars, "The Future of the Euphrates River," Paper prepared for the World 
Bank Conference, International Workshop on Comprehensive Water Resources 
Management Policy, Washington D. C., June 24-29,1991, p. 4.
USAID, Syria: Agricultural Sector Assessment, 5 Volumes, Washington, D. C., 
1980.
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terraces and adjoining areas are composed of soils with more than 50 percent 
gypsum. Besides, in large part the delay in implementing proposed irrigation 
projects appears to be due to inadequate planning. Particularly disturbing is the 
evidence that the area of land suitable for irrigated crop production may be 
substantially less than originally anticipated. Land classification data are 
presently available for only about 400,000 ha, but the examination of these data 
suggests that less than half of the 640,000 ha is reasonably good land for 
irrigation purposes.
There were more technical problems. The Soviet design of the Tabqa dam, 
which produces 60 percent of the country's electricity, is not appropriate for the 
local topography. Hence low flows in the summer substantially reduce power 
generation. Damascus and Aleppo faced continuous and long-lasting power cuts. 
On the other hand, the local population in the area had expected to benefit from 
the irrigation schemes, yet, after 30 years this was still not the case. They got less 
revenue, increased soil salinity and had to endure more government control over 
agricultural activities. The Syrian Baathist regime promoted the irrigation 
schemes because these enabled them to extend their authority and to recast the 
social class structure. They tried to create a structure where small farmers 
gathered around state cooperatives and were totally dependent on the state.^^3 
The policy did not contribute at all to productivity and efficiency of the land and 
water resources. The government of Syria has spent more than 10,000 dollars/ha 
for land reclamation and irrigation in the Euphrates basin.^^^ Irrigation
John Waterbury and Alan Richards, A Political Economy o f the Middle East, 
Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1990.
Ian Manners and Tagi Sagafi-Nejad, "Agricultural Development in Syria," in Peter 
Beaumont and K. McLachlan (eds.). Agricultural Development in the Middle East, New 
York : Wiley, pp. 255-78.
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investment is often the most expensive portion of public investment, and 83 
percent of Syrian public investment was spent on irrigation schemes during the 
implementation of the Euphrates Project.^^^ In short, performance in the 
development of the country's water resources has not matched expectations.^!^ 
A careful re-evaluation of government priorities with respect to the future 
direction of water resource development appeared essential. Further, it stood 
that consideration m ust have been given to assigning higher priority to strategies 
that emphasize better management rather than large-scale development. Some 
experts claim that the limits of viable rain-fed cultivation have been exceeded 
and that the expansion of Syria's irrigated area is likely to be slower and more 
costly than originally envisaged.!!^ In these circumstances, increases in 
agricultural output will be dependent upon raising productivity through 
improved cropping practices.
Three dams have already been built on the Euphrates: the Tabqa dam 
(with 14.2 km3 storage capacity and 860 MW installed HEP capacity), the Al- 
Baath regulatory dam  and the Tishreen HEP dam (completed in 1995 with 630 
MW installed capacity).!!^ According to the Syrian Ministry of Electricity, the 
total installed electrical capacity in 1990 was 2,999 MW, 50 percent of which was 
produced by thermal generating stations. And, by the year 2010, Syria will be 
exploiting 95 percent of its suitable hydroelectric potential. Thus, starting from
 ^ FAO Production Yearbook, Rome: FAO,1984.
 ^ German Development Institute, The Euphrates Development Scheme in Syria: social 
impact, production organization and linkages, Berlin: German Development Institute,
1990.
 ^ Ian Manners and Tagi Sagafi-Nejad, "Agricultural Development in Syria," op. cit., p. 
268.
Mikhail Wakil, "Analysis of Future Water Needs for Different Sectors in Syria," 
Water International, Vo\. 18, 1993, p. 19.
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the next century, the country will be forced to rely on steam and gas stations to 
ensure its growing needs of electrical energy.l^^ On the other hand, the total 
irrigated area in Syria is officially reported to be 863,300 ha. The government still 
intends to expand irrigated areas on the Euphrates, Tigris, Khabur and Balikh, to 
attain a total irrigated area of 1.4 million hectares. Moreover, irrigated 
agriculture accounts for the bulk of water consumption (20.68 billion m 3 /yr for 
the year 2020), whilst the estimated total water needs for industrial and domestic 
uses will am ount to around 500 million m3, and 3,159 million m3, respectively 
for the twenty-first century. Syria, with a 1996 population of 14 million people, 
growing at 3.8 percent per year, faces acute and immediate shortages of water for 
domestic use in its large cities.^^O Indeed, urban water had become a problem in 
the second half of the 1980s, and by the mid-1990s the management problem had 
not been successfully addressed. Given the supply of potable water is not 
increasing as fast as demand, serious action will be needed in the next decade.
b.3) Current water policy and management:
The administration of water in Syria is best 
characterized as fragmented. 121 Historically, different aspects of water 
regulation and development have been the responsibility of the bureaucracies of 
various ministries and the executive branch of the government. These are 
traditionally the weakest of the three pillars of the executive (presidency, 
military, ministries). However, the importance of water as a national 
development priority and as an instrument of Baath Party rural development 
ideologies has given this issue prominence in both the legislative and Party
119 Ibid.
120 The World Bank Report of 1977 estimated that approximately 30 percent of the 
domestic water used in Syria's nine largest cities is unaccounted for.
121 AMER, Syria: Political, Economic and Strategic, op. cit., p. 72.
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policy making circles. This situation has changed over time, with agencies 
created, separated out, converted into ministries, and then re-emerged into other 
configurations. In identifying the locus of authority for a water project, it is 
always necessary to ask what dates are involved; the answer changes from 
decade to decade and even from year to year. Indeed, Syria has found some 
difficulty in devising a rational form of administration for its most vital natural 
resource. The trend in the 1980s has beer: toward consolidation. In the mid 1980s 
a major reorganization took place relating to the way water decisions are made 
and how water resources are administered. The new organization is based on the 
natural division of Syria into seven hydrologic basins. It also attempts to 
streamline the bureaucracy, making the new Ministry of Irrigation responsible 
for agricultural water use and development while a directorate in the Ministry of 
Housing and Public Utilities is in charge of all domestic water use and treatment.
Before 1982, Syria had no central coordinating agency for water 
management. The responsibility for the water sector was shouldered by several 
ministries, including the Ministry of Public Works, the Ministry for the 
Euphrates Dam and the Institute of the Euphrates (the ministry and the institute 
prepared studies and supervised the execution of projects related to the 
Euphrates and the reclamation of land in the Euphrates basin), the Ministry of 
Municipalities and Village Affairs, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian 
Reform. Under a 1982 law, the Ministry of Irrigation was established to take 
charge of the activities related to the water sector.122 xhig ministry has, among 
other things, total responsibility of water resources development and
Yahia Bakour, "Planning and Management of Water Resources in Syria," in Guy Le 
Moigne, Shawki Barghouti, Gershon Feder, Lisa Garbus and Mei Xie (eds.), Country 
Experiences with Water Resources Management, Economic, Institutional, Technological 
and Environmental Issues, World Bank Technical Paper, No. 175, 1992, p. 151.
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hydrological survey. It was made responsible for managing water resources 
according to development plans approved by the Supreme Council for Planning 
and the Supreme Council for Agriculture. One of the main elements of the 
Ministry of Irrigation's responsibilities was to propose an institutional 
framework to identify the functions and roles of different institutions working in 
the water sector. These functions and institutional responsibilities may be 
categorized as:
...planning and monitoring, carried out by the Supreme Council for 
Planning and Supreme Council for Agriculture. The former approves water 
resources utilization plans and monitors their implementation; the latter 
approves the allocation of water to the agricultural sector.
...surveys and research, performed by (a) the W ater Studies General 
Company, for examining ground water and its utilization; and (b) the Ministry of 
Irrigation, for establishing hydrometeorological networks for surface and ground 
water, evaluating water availability, and appraising irrigation projects.
Responsibility for domestic water supply, sanitation, and drainage is 
assumed by a corporation in each province representing the Ministry of Housing 
and Public Utilities. Separate water administrations were established for each of 
the country's fourteen provinces under the aegis of the Ministry of Housing and 
Public Utilities, and all pre-existing organizations dealing with domestic water 
and sewerage were gathered under its roof. While these are steps toward 
simplification and rationalization, the system is still rife with duplicated effort. 
The Euphrates Dam and development of the Euphrates Basin, for instance, are 
responsibilities shared among the Ministry of Irrigation and the Ministry of 
Agriculture and a Supreme Authority for the Euphrates Project, chaired by the
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Prime Minister, stands ready to step in as needed. Thus, the main problem with 
this institutional arrangement is substantial duplication of activities.^23 
However, one of the major accomplishments of the Ministry of Irrigation has 
been the reorganization of Syria's water sector according to physical hydrological 
basins rather than administrative districts. Law of 1986 defines the basins as 
Damascus, Aleppo, the Coastal Plain, Euphrates, Orontes, Yarmuk, and the 
Steppe. These natural divisions facilitate the analysis of water resources.
The ministries, whose administration and plarming are crucial, are by no 
means the only actors. Local government plays a significant role, non­
governmental organizations (Party and affiliated mass organizations) are 
im portant alternative structures in the process, and companies offer both badly 
needed advice and essential services. In sum, the water decision-making in Syria 
is a complex and multiply ramified system. In the absence of direct presidential 
involvement -and this seems to be the case most of the time- the major decisions 
seem to be made in the supreme councils and by authorities, especially the 
planning bodies.
Legislative policies for the water sector follow basic legal principles 
established for the entire country. The detailed implementing regulations are 
generated by ministers. The first water law was prepared in 1925, stating 
explicitly that all water resources were publicly owned and that legal ownership 
could not be sold. The water law (No. 165) of 1958 defined the utilization of 
water resources for agricultural production. The law covered the procedures for 
utilization of surface water and extraction of ground water and for legal drilling
Ibid., p. 152.
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of wells and pum ping facilities. The law limited the pum ping of public water to 
those with official approval. This law contains several im portant provisions. For 
instance. Article 3 states that the Ministry of Public Works and Water Resources 
determines, in accordance with the water in each basin, the maximum amount of 
water that can be licensed for use, the area that can be irrigated, the restrictions 
that m ust be imposed on the method of extracting water, the conditions of 
protecting this water, and the limits of its use. Article 5 states that the authorities 
can refuse the grant a license if it would conflict with the rights of others or with 
public good. Article 8 states that a license should be w ithdraw n if that would 
serve the public good or if it can be shown by the courts that the license causes 
severe damage to the rights of others. The administration faced some difficulties 
in implementing this law, derived principally from the inadequacy of 
information. The regulation of exploitation was to be premised on the available 
water potential, but many of the hydrologic basins had not been properly 
studied. Further, "the principle of common right", which the administration 
sought to impose in place of the "principle of previously acquired right", also 
required an assessment of quality and quantity of annual water inflow according 
to basins and land areas so as to allocate it in ways that would provide equal 
benefit for all users.
An overall review of water legislation was instituted with the goal of 
unifying it into a practical framework. Thus, law number 14 of 1984 deals with 
the establishment, as part of the Ministry of Housing and Public Utilities, of a 
public institute in each of the fourteen administrative governorates, charged with 
the planning and execution of projects providing drinking water and sanitation. 
This law has been put into effect, but it is facing problems for the following 
reasons: the lack of detailed studies for some water basins, the lack of specialized
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staff to be put in charge of projects, the slow pace of mechanization has 
maximized project costs, the need to import materials and parts creates financial 
problems, which offset expected enhancement of economic growth; the absence 
of drinking water and sanitation statistics for many towns and villages in the 
countryside delays plarming and slows down the execution of projects.
Another notable development in the current state of water legislation is 
that upon the recommendation of the Ministry of Irrigation and by a decree of 
the Prime Minister, the Government established a specialized committee to 
oversee the following:
*A review of previous legislation which would lead to recommendations of new 
laws necessary for the facilitation of the responsibilities of the Ministry of 
Irrigation.
*The introduction of legislation to enhance the modernization and development 
of agencies working with water resources.
*The identification and explanation of concepts pertaining to m odern water 
resources legislation (such as, for example, "hydrological unit" and 'hydraulic 
basin") and the clarification of their relation to surface and ground water 
resources.
*The recommendation of legislation to protect sources of surface and ground 
water from overuse and from pollution.
*The working out of a long-range water policy that will provide the nation with 
water for both irrigation and drinking, especially in consideration of the 
tremendous demographic changes and shifting economic needs of the present 
time.
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*The introduction of legislation which considers water resources as part of the 
national wealth and penalizes heavily any violation that jeopardizes the safety 
and security of water resources.
*The review of policies related to the costs of water, mainly drinking water, to 
the right to use certain springs for irrigation purposes.^24
On the other hand, as with many Middle Eastern states, the fundamental 
principles on which Syrian water practice is based derive from the legal precepts 
of Islam.125 Islamic principles predetermine certain underlying attitudes on 
the part of the populace. Since water is seen as the gift of the God to all mankind, 
the extension of this principle to say that water belongs to the state and not to 
any individual meets little resistance. On the other hand, the state's imposition of 
fees for delivering water meets with incredulity. The result seems to be a low 
level of compliance with fee collection, and widespread approval of illegal 
extractions from government canals. Even in cities, where the almost universal 
presence of "artificial channels" could be held to justify fees, the imposition of 
anything beyond what could be seen as maintenance charges meets with low 
compliance. The situation today, with water ownership in the hands of the 
people as represented by the state, differs dramatically from the situation that 
obtained during the period before and after independence. Under the situation 
that developed in the fifties, water belonged not to the people, but to the pum p 
owner (particularly to the "cotton sheiks", landlords and tribal leaders).
AMER, Syria: Political, Economic and Strategic, op. cit., pp. 114-115.
Among these principles are the following: l)Water is the common property of all 
mankind. 2)Water for survival must never be denied. 3) Reasonable agricultural uses, i.e., 
sufficient for cultivation, are to be allocated on a first come, first served basis. 4)Prior 
uses in time and geography take precedence over later or downstream uses. 5)Primary 
water supplies must be protected against contamination.
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However, w ith the Agrarian Reform of the 1960s, this situation has been 
reversed again which was accompanied by a change in the pattern of water 
rights as well. That is, the Baathist state controlled all of the water and most of 
the land but considered that it belonged to the public domain. Thus, the Baathist 
state seemed to be returning to the tradition of Islamic Law under a slightly 
more refined formula.126
There is no useful system of permits or fees for water use in Syria, and the 
small fees that are charged do not reflect the scarcity of water or the real costs of 
investment in irrigation structures. A 1972 law was the first to reflect new 
policies on water charges in which irrigation water users were charged. These 
charges are based on the area irrigated and not on the quantity of water used. 
Thus, these charges cover only a small portion of the actual costs of water supply 
and are insufficient to motivate water consumption economies or to apply 
m odern water-saving irrigation techniques. Accordingly, there is a need to revise 
the charges to cover, at a minimum, costs involved in supply. Such charges 
should be based on the quantity of water used as well as the area irrigated.^27 n  
has been customary in Syria to charge users only for the operating costs of water 
supplies, not for capital investment in infrastructure development. The 
government also assumes the costs of constructing dams and irrigation 
networks. The beneficiaries of government irrigation schemes pay nominal 
charges to cover O&M costs and fuel used in supplying water. The charges do 
not include the capital costs of water supply. Domestic water charges have been 
regulated since 1990 by the Ministry of Housing and Public Utilities. A fixed
126 a MER, Syria: Political, Economic and Strategic, op. cit., p. 102.
Yahia Bakour, "Planning and Management of Water Resources in Syria," op. cit., p. 
153.
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monthly charge of LS 36128 jg also assessed, regardless of the consumption level, 
as a contribution to the maintenance of the public water supply network. While 
nearly all of the urban connections are metered, many meters are either broken 
or malfunctioning. It is estimated that in 1980 only about 54% of urban water 
production was paid for. Indeed, the revenues collected from metered water 
supplies in Syria cover only half the costs of production. Syria's water tariff 
structure is graduated, depending on amount of use and category of user. Part of 
the fees are collected as connection costs (i.e., purchase of water rights), part of 
them are collected against measured usage. The urban water Syria had been 
using until the mid of 1980s had been relatively low cost. However, with the 
pollution of surface waters, Syrian cities have come to rely on ground water or 
long-distance pum ping where the costs are quite high. In spite of this fact, the 
fees that have been collected do not match actual production costs, not to 
mention capital development.129 Besides, agricultural water is almost wholly 
subsidized in Syria. The Syria Times reported in 1984 that it is normal practice to 
subsidize peasant families while implementing agricultural development 
projects. This was elaborated two years later by Melizcek who stipulated that to 
date no fees had been collected for irrigation water in Euphrates project areas.^^^
There is an urgent need for every type of institutional and engineering 
instrument to be deployed to encourage conservation by consumers and system 
improvements by responsible authorities in Syria. Syria's urban water 
distribution systems lose far more through leaking joints and other disrepair 
than is acceptable even in lands far richer in water resources. In arid land like
^28 xhe official rate as of 1997 was 11.22 LS (Syrian Pounds) = USD 1.00 
^29 AMER, Syria: Political, Economic and Strategic, op. cit., p. 61.
H. Meliczek, "Land Settlement in the Euphrates basin of Syria," op. cit., p. 114.
241
Syria, a 30-50 percent loss ratio is simply not admissible. Much water is wasted 
through low water-use efficiency and unrestricted demand.^^^ Mikhail Wakil 
argues that Syria will experience within the next two decades an ever-increasing 
water deficit that will have serious effects on its social and economic 
development.132 ^  response to this situation requires several important 
initiatives that he proposes to be undertaken internally and internationally. To 
illustrate, he stresses that a master plan for the whole country should urgently be 
concluded, better management of the irrigation water, the introduction of water 
conservation techniques and water harvesting systems, and the reduction of 
losses in water supply networks in towns.^^^ Similarly, Syria's irrigation systems 
experience considerable losses. According to Bakour, the efficiency of irrigation 
networks is 60 percent, and water loss in agriculture is 50 percent.^^^ He 
recognizes the importance of modern irrigation techniques (which are used on 
only 1 percent of the country's total irrigated area), and estimates that the 
application of drip irrigation could reduce water consumption by 45 percent ,and 
use of sprinkler irrigation techniques can effect a 20 percent reduction. In 
addition, as much as 20 percent of irrigation water can be saved by increasing the 
network efficiency to 75 percent, which would require overcoming many 
difficulties and m odernizing the existing irrigation system. Moreover, Bakour 
indicates that m odern techniques (drip and sprinkler) have been introduced in 
water-deficient areas, with landowners encouraged to adopt them and to
A. Rodriguez, "Challenges for the Agricultural Sector in Developing Mediterranean 
Countries," International Center for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas (İCARDA), 
Aleppo, Syria, 1996.
Mikhail Wakil, "Analysis of Future Water Needs for Different Sectors in Syria," op. 
cit., p. 21.
Î33 Ibid., p.21.
Yahia Bakour, "Planning and Management of Water Resources in Syria," op. cit., p. 
154.
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abandon old (basin irrigation) systems. Such modern irrigation techniques, 
however, are practiced only by the private sector on farms irrigated by ground 
water. However, he adds that despite the importance of adopting modern 
methods of irrigation, the possibilities for large-scale adoption are limited by the 
availability of the necessary facilities needed to convert the old systems. Towards 
this end, an agreement was signed with FAO to improve the means of irrigation, 
with the objective of providing farmers with new irrigation systems, such as drip 
and sprinkler networks.^^^ The systems will be purchased by farmers through 
subsidized, medium-term loans, to be paid back in three to five years. Syria's 
agricultural bank is involved in providing the necessary funds. The project 
includes elements for farming training in system installation and operation. 
Experts will supervise the daily operation of the new system until the farmers 
can operate it efficiently.
A critical analysis of the water sector in Syria reveals that Syria has still a 
long way to go in order to achieve necessary levels of efficiency in the sector. For 
one thing, Syria needs to strengthen the institutional capacity through serious 
reforms in the fields of water administration and legislation. Hence, the 
measures that have been already taken towards this end, such as the 
reorganization of the water sector through the establishment of Ministry of 
Irrigation, and a num ber of legislative measures that have been formulated by 
that Ministry constitute remarkable achievements. Yet, there is no useful system 
of permits or fees for water use in Syria, and the inadequate fees that are charged 
do not reflect the scarcity of water. Therefore, the costs of investment and O&M 
have never been made up for in the sector. Moreover, Syrian authorities should
i 35 Ibid., 154.
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pay utmost attention to reducing the losses in water supply networks. Even 
though many experts advise that major reallocations should take place in the 
Syrian water sector due to rapid urbanization and industrialization, the Syrian 
government has not considered such policies, so far. In Syria, water used for 
agriculture accounts for 83 percent, thus even a minimal reduction in water used 
for irrigation, transferring this amount to the domestic a n d /o r  industrial sector 
would result in significant levels of conservation in the Syrian water sector.
c) Iraq
c.l) Economic factors:
In the recent history of Iraq, the years 1954 to 1956 
brought a period of intensive planning for the Euphrates and Tigris region when 
the Kingdom of Iraq established the Board of Development, and the Ministry of 
Development. The Board invited well-known international companies from 
Europe and the United States to assist. Plans, surveys, designs, and construction 
of dam  and canals were effectively carried on. During the 1950s, more than one 
million people were working in agriculture, and Iraq became an exporter of 
wheat and rice. Since 1958, Iraq has changed from being mainly an agricultural 
country that exported wheat, rice, and other crops to being an oil-producing, 
semi-industrial nation forced to import most of its own food. Moreover, because 
of unstable conditions created by the July 1958 revolution, there began a steady 
rural-to-urban migration as farmers sought to work in small businesses, trade, 
and industry. It estimated that about one million farmers migrated to Baghdad 
and other cities between 1958 and 1988, resulting in drastic reductions in 
agricultural products. Public investment in the water sector was about 15 percent 
of the agricultural budget from 1974 to 1980. This investment dropped to 5 
percent between 1980 and 1990, when 85 percent of the agricultural budget was
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transferred to military industry. These conditions, combined with poor 
distribution of water and electricity in the countryside, added to instability.
Agricultural lands in some parts of the country are deteriorated because 
of increasing salinity and shortages of seeds, fertilizers, and agricultural 
machinery. At the same time, there were frequent changes in agrarian reform 
laws which allowed absentee landlords v/ho were close to the regime to control 
most of the ownership of land.^^^ Until July 14th, 1958 (during the Kingdom of 
Iraq) agricultural improvement was often inhibited by the need for adequate 
land reform, and the Royalists and through their close links with the landowners 
maintained the system without much change.^37 However, in October 1958 the 
Republican Government announced a radical land reform project bringing an 
end to feudalism in Iraq and starting a new era. The Agrarian Reform Law meant 
the breaking-up of large estates whose owners were to be compelled to forfeit 
their 'excess' land to the Government, which redistributed the land to new 
peasant owners. This reform expropriated some 75 percent of the privately 
owned land affecting the landowners' rights to the irrigation waters. When the 
present government returned to power in 1968, it issued a New Agrarian Reform 
Law where it reduced the land ceiling further and confiscated an additional 1.5 
million ha of land, but, even so, by the end of 1975 only one-third of the 
sequestered land had been distributed. From 1967, the government promoted the 
growth of co-operatives and collective farms. In 1983 the Government 
introduced a law enabling local and other Arab companies or individuals to lease 
land at nominal rates.
136 iVater issues in Iraq, Special Report, p. 2 (the author wished to remain anonymous).
137 Personal correspondence with Ara Kassabian, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of 
Politics, University of Southampton, Southampton: UK, February 1998.
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On the other hand, after the Iraqi government nationalized the oil 
companies in 1972 and began to receive more income from oil, agricultural 
production was emphasized once again. The Iraqi government emphasized 
agricultural and irrigation projects in order to provide food security for the Iraqi 
people. Toward that end the so-called "Revolutionary Plan" was developed. The 
Higher Agriculture Council, attached to the Presidency, the Soil and Land 
Reclamation Organization, the Ministry of Irrigation, and many new 
departments were established to carry out studies, create designs, and provide 
maintenance and construction for water projects. The goverrunent resumed its 
plans and projects begun by the Development Board between 1952 and 1958. 
However, the resurgence of support for agricultural development was short­
lived. Despite these projects, agricultural production remained deficient, due to 
an insufficient num ber of farm workers and a lack a good management and 
operational procedures. Land is very expensive to reclaim. There are millions of 
hectares of technically reclaimable land but the cost-effectiveness of most of such 
reclamation would not be sound in the light of current world commodity prices. 
Further, the performance of the agricultural sector in both crop and livestock 
production has been poor since the mid-1970s. Moreover, the difficulties of the 
agricultural sector were exacerbated by war. Beginning in 1979, Saddam Hussein 
charmeled the bulk of the nation's economic and hum an resources into a massive 
military build-up. In July 1987 the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform 
was re-organized, and in September the ministry was merged with the Ministry 
of Irrigation to become the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation. In addition to 
the devastating effects of wars (war with Iran and the 1991 Gulf War), the effect 
of long-term natural changes in river flow channels, soil erosion, and salinization 
of irrigated land has caused a reduction in per capita agricultural production in 
Iraq, particularly in the production of wheat and rice.
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It can be argued that Iraq's water management program  was unrealistic. 
According to Beaumont and McLachlan, "Although Iraq produced 2.22 million 
tons of cereals in 1980, which is quite remarkable, it still had to import 2.48 
million tons to meet its internal consumption needs. Further, in 1989 and 
1990, due to the poor condition of the Iraqi economy and failure of governmental 
organizations and the farmer union to improve agricultural production. 
President Hussein ordered the sale of most government land, farms, and 
factories to the private sector with no limits placed on the cultivated areas.
Some analysts argue that if stability returns to Iraq during the next 10 or 
20 years, there is certainly a good potential for increased agricultural production. 
This could be achieved primarily by improving yield, improving irrigation and 
agricultural practice, and by adopting new modern technology. Agricultural 
production could also be increased by expansion of the crop area, seed 
improvement, fertilizer use, adoption of water-saving technologies, better use of 
ground water, reclamation of saline land, and improved management and 
agricultural policies. However, 10 to 15 years of this kind of activity would be 
required to achieve a level of agricultural production sufficient to keep pace with 
population growth, postwar reconstruction, and subsequent economic 
development. Yet, as many analysts argue, the medium and long term effects of 
the future deficits will probably be unremarkable due to the very fact that Iraq is 
an oil-rich country. The oil industry dominated the Iraqi economy, accounting 
for more than 60 percent of the country's GDP and 95 percent of foreign currency 
before 1990.1^^ Likewise, economic ties between Turkey and Iraq have
P. Beaumont and K. McLachlan (eds.), Agricultural Development in the Middle 
East, New York: John Wiley, 1985, p. 315.
139 EIU, Country Profile: Iraq, 1997-98, p. 22.
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historically been strong, and during the 1980s the revenue from Iraq's oil pipeline 
through Turkey was more than $1 bn per year. Water problems based on 
construction of GAP project have beer, serious, but not sufficient to disrupt the 
economic dependency between the two countries. The potential for increased oil 
revenue, once the UN sanctions are lifted, places Iraq in a better position than 
Syria. Indeed, dependence on oil revenues in Iraq resulted in major changes in 
the economy. In the past three decades, Iraq's agriculture has declined. Between 
1960 and 1989 agriculture slipped from 17 percent to 15 percent of the Gross 
Domestic Product. This neglect has been reversed with the imposition of 
sanctions, with the government making a concerted but unsuccessful attempt to 
increase agricultural output. That is, while the government has made the 
development of agriculture a priority, the sector's performance has been 
disappointing. There is persistent cereals deficit, estimated at 5.4 million tons in 
1993, and this will have risen in subsequent years. Owing to the unstable political 
situation in Iraq and other parts of the region together with the attendant 
economic deterioration, which is expected to continue or get worse, further 
agricultural development beyond the current level is very unlikely in Iraq in the 
near future. The Gulf War had many devastating effects on the Iraqi agricultural 
sector (e.g., significantly reduced power for water and chemicals for fertilizers, 
no spare parts or replacement equipment, damage to canals, watercourses, 
bridges and roads, closure of markets, and the continued embargo on trade and 
imports). Apparently, under these conditions on-farm efficiency and production 
suffer seriously as well. Apart from problems with water quantity from the 
Euphrates and Tigris, reviving agriculture will be difficult and expensive due to 
overuse of the land and extensive salination. Thus, on the basis of existing 
systems the best Iraq can hope for is modest food security; with properly
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managed irrigation systems, in addition to a large area of rain-fed cultivation in 
the north of the country.
C.2) Thartar Canal Project and water developm ent schemes
Iraq was consuming around 13.0-15.0 billion m3 of the 
Euphrates waters as of 1990. Some experts claim that in order to irrigate all its 
irrigable land within the Euphrates drainage basin (1.29 million ha), Iraq will 
need about 24-27 billion m3 of water either from the Euphrates or, more 
probably, from the Tigris.^^O However, some others argue that the same water 
use dem and will continue until stability is restored -at all events, until at least the 
year 2000. And, these experts continue by asserting that if new technology and 
effective m anagement are applied to agriculture and irrigation, this water 
requirement will be reduced, as well.^'^^ Meanwhile, Turkey has committed to 
release only 16 billion m3 of water to the Euphrates flow, then the Euphrates 
flow to Iraq is going to be no more than 6.5 billion m3 after Syrian 
withdrawals.l'^^ However, even in these circumstances Iraq has the advantage of 
utilizing almost all waters of the Tigris and its tributaries, owing to the fact that 
they are not going to be heavily used by the upper riparians.
Natasha Beschorner, "Water and Instability in the Middle East," op. cit., p. 35.
141 These experts also add the fact that if improvements are made in the existing 
irrigation and agricultural system and if crop yield and irrigation efficiency are also 
increased, then irrigation water required for agriculture within the Euphrates basin in Iraq 
could drop to 11 billion m3. However, these experts emphasize that an additional amount 
of 5 billion m3 water is also required to increase the water level in the river channel so 
that gravity will move water into the irrigation canals. In most irrigation areas in Iraq 
irrigation water is carried from a river or main canal by gravity rather than by pumpingç 
See Water Issues in Iraq, op. cit., pp. 21-22.
142 With the Protocol of 1987, Turkey has undertaken to supply a monthly average flow 
of 500 m3/s at the Syrian border until the "filling up" of Atatürk Dam is completed, and 
until the final allocation realized in the Euphrates-Tigris basin.
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With the majority of upstream development being situated on the 
Euphrates, Baghdad is looking predominantly to the Tigris to meet any 
shortfalls. Many experts assert that in the Tigris river basin there is indeed, a 
surplus water of 11.9 billion m3. Although Turkey has already started the 
construction of storage facilities on the Tigris within the framework of GAP, 
these are all designed for hydropower generation, and thus they are not intended 
for consumptive usage. On the other hand Syria does not make any use of the 
Tigris since it has only 44 km in the main river channel, constituting its border 
with Turkey and Iraq. In connection with this, several authorities on Middle East 
water issues pointed out the importance of initiating water transfer canals 
between the two rivers.^^^ That is, the keystone of Iraq's water development 
scheme is that of the vast Thartar Canal (Depression) between the Tigris and the 
Euphrates northwest of Baghdad with a surface area of 2,710 sq. km. Its vast total 
capacity is twice that of Atatürk dam  and as much as the live capacity of Aswan 
dam. It is filled by diverting water from the Tigris at Samara dam to protect 
Baghdad against the dangers of flooding. Moreover, with the Thartar Canal, Iraq 
has already been able to alleviate water shortages within the Euphrates basin by 
diverting the Tigris water (where Iraq has a surplus) into the Lake Thartar and 
then into the Euphrates when there is not enough water to feed the dependent 
irrigation projects.144 Lake Thartar has a storage capacity of 30 billion m3. 
Taking into consideration the constraints of water salinity in the Thartar Canal 
and the am ount of water that can be saved and transferred from the Tigris to the
Ewan Anderson," Water geopolitics in the Middle East: the Key Countries," 
Conference on US Foreign Policy on Water Resources in the Middle East: Instrument for 
Peace and Development, CSIS, Washington D.C., 24 November 1986, pp. 18-19.
Peter Beaumont, "The Euphrates River-An International Problem of Water Resources 
Development," Environmental Conservation, Vol. 5, No. I, 1978, p. 42.
Keith McLachlan, The South-East Anatolia Project (GAP) and Its Effect on Water 
Supply and Management in Iraq, SO AS, University of London, 1991.
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Thartar Lake reservoir, it may be assumed that about 6 billion m3 of water could 
be transferred annually from the Thartar reservoir to the Euphrates гіѵегД^З 
More than 300 million dollars have been invested in the Project which involved 
turning Wadi Thartar, a natural depression north of Baghdad, into an artificial 
lake linked to both the Tigris and Euphrates by canals. The project has already 
been realized and operative since 1988.
Iraq, on the other hand, pioneered and built its first dam  (the Euphrates 
dam) in 1955-56 to divert the water to the Al-Habbaniya lake. In addition to the 
Euphrates, the Tigris, because of its greater volume (65 percent more than 
Euphrates), is the river which is mostly used for controlling the floods. The 
Samarra dam  on the Tigris (also built in 1955-56), together with the Euphrates 
dam  protected Iraq from catastrophic floods. Moreover, Iraq's Kirkuk Irrigation 
Project, now renamed Saddam Irrigation Project, involves irrigation of more than 
300,000 ha. The North Jezirah Irrigation Project which will be fed with water 
stored by the Saddam dam  with its 30,000 million m3 capacity beside the East 
Jezirah Irrigation Project, will irrigate more than 75,000 ha of rain-fed land near 
Mosul. These are parts of a large schem.e to irrigate 250,000 ha of the Jezirah 
plain. In addition, Iraq has embarked on various projects of its own. In the 
summer of 1984 the government was able to release stored water from the Lake 
Habbaniya reservoir to local farmers to offset the low levels of the Euphrates,
It is argued that salinity in the Thartar depression precludes the transfer of water 
except in extreme cases. However, as Özden Bilen argues, a bypass canal to be built north 
of the Thartar depression could transfer the fresh Tigris water directly into the Euphrates, 
by making use of the existing canal between the Thartar depression and the Euphrates, 
avoiding the rather saline earth formation in the Lake Thartar bed. See Ö. Bilen, 
"Prospects for Technical Cooperation in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin," in Asit Biswas 
(ed.). International Waters o f the Middle East: From Euphrates-Tigris to Nile, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 104-105.
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brought about, in part, by unusually low levels of winter rain. In 1986, the 
formerly named Mosul Dam, now called the Saddam Dam, was completed on 
the Tigris. The Qadisiya Dam and its associated 600 MW hydroelectric plant 
were opened in the same year. In September 1986 Iraq launched the 1.5 billion 
dollar contract to build the 33,000 million m3, 230m high Bekme Dam, on the 
Greater Zab, in the northeast, 40 km. from the Iranian border. Work on the dam 
commenced in 1987, and the first phase of the diversion of the Great Zab was 
completed by June 1990. When fully completed, the Bekme dam  will be one of 
the highest and largest dams. Further dams are designed at Badush (Tigris), at 
M andawa (Great Zab), Taqtaq (Little Zab) south of Dokan dam, at Dujala, at 
Farha and at Upper Adhaim south of Kirkuk. However, most of these projects 
were interrupted by the Gulf War. Bombing by coalition forces caused extensive 
damage to Iraq's infrastructure. Only one main water project, the Darbandikhan 
dam, emerged relatively unscathed, suffering some 50 percent damage. The 
Dokan and Haditha dams were 75 percent destroyed and Ramadi dam, Saddam 
and Samara dams put out of action altogether. Those had serious consequences 
for energy and food production.
The largest potential source of new water development is ground water, 
which would make up almost 50 percent of the total potential loss from Turkey's 
GAP project. Ground water has been exploited very little in Iraq. However, the 
largest aquifers are situated far from the population centers, and the quality of 
this water varies widely.
C.3) Current water policy and m anagem ent
The main water consumer of the Euphrates river in 
Iraq is the agricultural sector. Agriculture consumes about 95 percent of the total
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water of the Euphrates, domestic and municipal use about 3.5 percent, and 
industrial use 1 percent at the present time. By the year 2000 domestic use is 
expected to increase due to an increase in population and improvements in 
living standards related to health care and improvements in the water supply 
system. Domestic use may reach 8 percent and industrial use will increase slowly 
up to 2 percent. In peacetime, the general policy is to give water priority to 
agriculture, domestic use, and industry, in that order. This ranking of priority 
changes in response to war or natural disasters, such as floods or drought. In 
time of war military needs come before all others. This covers even allocations 
for drinking water.
All regulations and statutes come ultimately from the Presidency but are 
issued by the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation. There is no over-arching 
national water statute that regulates the ownership and use of water -no law that 
says, for example, that water resources belong to the state. Most regulations and 
laws are ad hoc. All water other than for domestic use is unmetered. The 
Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation does not enforce regulations and statutes; 
that is the responsibility of the provinces. The governor of each province is 
responsible for seeing that the departments enforce the regulations. The 
governor, in turn, is responsible to the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation for 
water-related issues.
One expert claims that on an efficiency scale of 1 to 10, the water sector 
administration would rate 5-6 in Iraq.^^^ It is fairly effective in terms of studies 
and planning, but not implementation. The policy and decision-making process
146 Water Issues in Iraq, Ibid. p. 44.
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is initiated by the Minister and Deputy Minister at the end of each year when the 
Ministry prepares a government 'blueprint' and asks for input from its 
departments. The general blueprint goes first to the Presidency but often, 
beforehand, a set of guidelines or specific projects come from the President to the 
Ministry. If the President approves, then the planning process proceeds within 
the appropriate departments and organu-ations of the Ministry. At the same time 
the plan is sent to the Presidency, it is sent to the Ministry of Planning, the 
Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Defense. They too, make comments and 
recommendations. This ministerial review can take from 1-3 months, except 
when the Saddam Hussein sets a deadline, which is always met. The Ministry of 
Agriculture and Irrigation can and does negotiate and discuss plans with these 
ministries. Very important issues that have international implications are 
considered by the Revolutionary Command Council and the National Baath 
leadership, but it is Saddam Hussein who decides.1^7 a  National Council 
sometimes considers issues that affect the provinces. Sometimes Saddam Hussein 
will ask the National Council to discuss his decisions or recommendations, which 
are always approved. By using these various bodies, the President can claim to 
have consulted broadly among groups supposedly representing the Iraqi people. 
When all the above groups have acted, usually within 1-3 months because they 
know that the President is looking at the plans, then the plan is distributed to 
water planning and implementation agencies within the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Irrigation. The ultimate authority rests with the President on the water 
issues decision-making procedure. Hence, this practically results in inefficient 
allocation and poor management practices in the water sector. Most of the 
resources allocated to the public investments have been diverted to the military
147 Ibid. p. 46.
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expenditures instead of implementing new technologies in irrigation water use 
as well as industrial and domestic usage.
Despite the absolute dominance of the President in water-related issues, 
there are still some significant organizations in the water sector which review the 
Ministry plan and provide inputs to the planning and policy-making process:
*The Planning and Follow-Up Directorate. It was created in 1981. It links 
the Ministry with the other directorates. It looks at the plan but in fact changes or 
contributes little.
*The Euphrates Center for Studies and Design. This center undertakes 
studies and designs and consults for all water and irrigation projects from the 
largest to the smallest using its own staff or foreign consultants. Because it is 
located in Baghdad near both the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation and the 
Presidency, most urgent projects are given to this center.
*The Tigris Center for Studies and Design. This center is located in Mosul. 
Originally, the Mosul center was a department within the Euphrates Center, but 
it became an independent center in 1988. It performs the same tasks, both large 
and small, as the Euphrates center. Both centers analyze the Ministry's annual 
plan and make recommendations.
*The General Commission for Dams. It is responsible for planning, design, 
and supervision of dam  projects only. On the other hand. Organization for Dam 
Construction is responsible for building dams and reservoirs. Each of these two 
organizations reviews only that part of the Ministry plan having to do with 
dams.
*The General Directorate for Operations and Management Projects. This 
directorate keeps records of all surface water resources in Iraq. It records flows.
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gauges height and discharge, makes records of flood operations, and operations 
of dams and other installations.
*The General Commission for Horticulture. This commission is 
responsible for planning crop patterns.
*Local organizations. Each province has an agricultural departm ent which 
is responsible for both agriculture and irrigation. Each town also has its own 
agricultural department, but it is now planned to reduce or delete almost all such 
urban departments. These departments supervise and advise on local projects 
and settle local agricultural disputes.
*The General Organization for Ground water. This organization deals 
with digging and maintenance of wells. It surveys ground water resources, keeps 
data records, and advises the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation concerning 
ground water resources-availability, utilization, quality, and costs.
A comprehensive master plan was developed for the Iraqi Ministry of 
Irrigation by a team from the former So/iet Union. This plan, entitled "General 
Scheme for Planning of Water and Land Resources in Iraq," was developed over 
a fifteen-year-period, 1970 to 1984. The 16-volume plan contains a survey of 
every hydrological and agricultural project in Iraq and makes recommendations 
for dealing with water and agricultural issues. Technical, economic, and social 
aspects are covered. A complete survey of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers and 
their tributaries in Iraq is also included in the plan, as are cultivated lands, crop 
production, a geological survey, a soil survey, water quality, and other topics. 
The plan describes the water system at the time the report was completed and 
suggests developments and projects until the year 2000. The plan is considered 
confidential, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation is responsible for 
keeping it up-to-date. Economic and political changes in Iraq as well as new
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projects in Turkey and Syria must have had considerable impacts on the plan. 
Moreover, recently departments within the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Irrigation have been required to focus their efforts on projects that either are of 
military significance or satisfy urgent immediate needs.^^^
It should be noted that Iraq's main problem is water quality rather than 
quantity: it has relatively abundant water resources (particularly in the Tigris), 
but serious problems with water management and soil salinity due to the very 
poor irrigation and drainage practices have already dogged previous irrigation 
projects. Moving farmers from the rural areas to the cities, especially after the 
revolution of 1958, and leaving the farms with no maintenance or cultivation also 
caused sharp increases in soil salinity. Salinity affects 50-65 percent of all 
irrigable land in Iraq. Between 1937 and 1957, 20 percent of the land under 
irrigation was abandoned because of salinity and water logging caused partly by 
soil type, partly by over-irrigation. To combat these problems the government of 
Iraq started a large-scale soil and water salinity control project in 1973. A State 
Organization of Drainage and River Dredging was also established at that time. 
Work was started on the design and construction of field drains, main drains, 
and leveling and leaching of salinity from agricultural lands. However, the 
projects were abruptly canceled in 1986. On the other hand, in order to control 
salinization of river water and to minimize the salinity increase of the Tigris and 
Euphrates, particularly south of Baghdad, the Main Drain was constructed to 
collect drainage water from cultivated areas along the Tigris and Euphrates and 
to empty it into the Arabian Gulf.
Ibid., p. 5.
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Rainfed tracts in the north have been driven very hard by unsustainable 
pressures of cultivation and grazing. There are no significant unused rainfed 
land resources. Lowland tracts in the river valleys are naturally saline -alkali and 
are very difficult to reclaim. Iraq's difficulties in this regard are greater than 
those of any country in the region.^^^^Most of the nation's irrigation system is in 
unsatisfactory condition, water withdrawal is uncontrolled, the distribution 
system, structures, and canals are insufficient, field drainage facilities are lacking, 
and field irrigation is improper. As a result, a higher volume of water required 
for irrigation and soil salinization is increasing. Irrigation projects constructed 
since 1975 have created better irrigation system facilities and structures, but their 
operation, maintenance, and management is poor. Agricultural water use 
methods in Iraq have remained almost unchanged over the centuries, following 
ancient irrigation methods. In most areas irrigation water is carried from a river 
or main canal by gravity and the flow is channeled into canals. The older canals 
are earthen and unlined, resulting in high levels of water loss. Recent irrigation 
projects have used canals lined with concrete and pum ps with enough capacity 
for routing water to individual farms. Most of the main, concrete-lined irrigation 
canals suffer from cracks in their linings, sediment deposits, and weeds. This 
leads to additional water loss and decrease in irrigation efficiency. Some of the 
large pum ps are partially clogged due to sedimentation. Maintenance of 
irrigation systems is very low if exists at all. In a few places modern irrigation 
technology is used, such as sprinkler or drip irrigation. Drip and sprinkler 
irrigation were first used in Iraq in the Desert Development project of 1974.1^0 
Similar problems exist within the drainage system. Most are ineffective in 
preventing or reducing salinization due to blockage of field drains and the
J. A. Allan, Agricultural Sector in Iraq, SOAS, University of London, 1990, pp 1-2. 
150 Water Issues in Iraq, op. cit., pp. 12-13.
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growth of weeds in the main open earth drains. Maintenance is also very poor. 
The efficiency of current irrigation practice varies 40-60 percent depending upon 
the irrigation system condition and irrigation practice. For old, earthen irrigation 
canals and gypsum  soil, irrigation efficiency is about 30-40 percent. For new, 
concrete-lined canals w ith gate-controlled flow to farms, irrigation efficiency is 
approximately 60 percent. Proposals have been made for increasing irrigation 
efficiency and reducing water losses by lining the canals and maintaining them 
in good condition, for reducing water consumption through widespread use of 
more m odern irrigation methods -such as drip and sprinkler irrigation, and for 
using green houses for agriculture. Concomitantly, irrigation efficiency would be 
increased by improving governmental policies and management techniques for 
irrigation and water use. Water at present is delivered free of cost to the farmer - 
that is, it is subsidized 100 percent. There are plans to charge for water use, 
which would lead to reduction of excess water use and, presumably, promote 
increased efficiency. The government's goal is to attain an average irrigation 
efficiency of 60 percent by the year 2000.^^^
As to conservation, prior to war, an extensive effort was made to line 
canals in order to reduce seepage; all new canals are lined, but there are 
problems with maintaining them. Drip irrigation is only just being introduced 
experimentally, especially on land owned by Saddam Hussein. There is no 
conservation policy or effort regarding industrial and domestic uses. Other 
efforts in agriculture include increased use of pumping rather than gravity flow, 
which is the most widespread method, to carry water from canals to farms 
through open ditches. There are also plans to charge farmers for water and
Ibid., p. 14.
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pum ping services to reduce consumption. Even if there continued to be no 
charge for agricultural water use, the assumption is that farmers will use less in 
order to reduce the cost of pumping.152
The chief water technologies employed in Iraq are for domestic and 
industrial use. W ater is treated and purified, disinfected by means of modern 
water treatment plants and water supply systems with a distribution pipe 
network in Baghdad and all the cities and towns of Iraq. Irrigation projects that 
have been constructed recently are equipped with controlled intakes, concrete 
canals; a network of drainage pipes and canals has been established as 
preventive measures against salinization of soil, Although these are all limited 
efforts, there have been no plans for the use of additional technologies due to the 
satisfactory nature of the quantity and quality of water at the present time; the 
government's priority on military projects, and to the weakness of the economy.
The above discussion of the current water policy and management of Iraq 
exhibits that Iraq's water sector is very poorly administered and managed. This is 
partly because of 'abnormal' economic and political conditions that the country 
has been experiencing since the 1980s. However, the main constraint on the 
water sector reform has been that the necessary departm ent and tools to 
implement the law were either inefficient or non-existent. The traditional values 
of farmers are an impediment, for example, they believe they have a right to take 
water in any am ount w ithout cost. Other constraints are the political structure of 
the government (everything goes up to the President for his decision) and the 
special privileges of the Baath Party, the security police, and the military.
Ibid., pp. 17-18.
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Sufficient managerial and technical skills to implement policies and strategies are 
also lacking. Moreover, Iraq faces serious problems with regards to water 
quality. In the event, poor irrigation and drainage practices in Iraq cause 
devastating effects on the natural system of the rivers; and they are wasteful in 
the sense that they pu t exceeding pressure on the limited am ount of supply of 
the Euphrates and Tigris.
This chapter was an attem pt to display the physical and hydropolitical 
characteristics of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin. The region possesses unique 
physical conditions which make the development, use, and management of the 
river system indeed a highly difficult task. That is, the geography, climate and 
the hydrology of these two rivers exhibit sharp variations from their source to 
the point of their discharge to the Gulf. Hence, these conditions must be seriously 
considered in the utilization of the waters of the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers. 
In addition to that, the major development projects which had been initiated in 
the river system since the 1950s, and the current water policy and management 
of the three riparians had increased the pressure on the demand for water 
tremendously. These project are, however, uncoordinated and they have 
competing demands from the river system. The current water allocation and 
management policies of the three riparians are rather complex and most of the 
times inefficient, particularly in the Syrian and the Iraqi cases. That is, the 
hydropolitical setting of the water issue which was described in the latter part of 
this chapter provides a significant input for the formulation of the efficient and 
equitable utilization patterns of the Euphrates-Tigris river system. A basic 
assumption of this study is that the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris as a single 
river system are poorly allocated and managed by the riparians. Moreover, there 
does not exist any form of joint management and allocation practices or a
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negotiation forum among the three riparians. These institutional deficiencies 
both at the national and regional levels result not only in ineffective uses, but 
also in the devastation of an extremely vital resource. Hence, the following 
chapter envisages building a regime framework to correct these inefficient and 
inequitable water management practices of the riparians by making use of the 
universal principles and norms which are the invaluable outcomes of the works 
of the international organizations and the international law authorities.
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CHAPTER 5. MAIN FEATURES OF AN INTERNATIONAL 
REGIME SUGGESTED FOR THE EUPHRATES- 
TIGRIS RIVER BASIN
Riparian relations during the period between the 1920s and the 1960s were 
characterized as harmonious since none of the countries had been engaged in 
major development projects that could have resulted in excessive consumptive 
utilization of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin waters. There was, therefore, no 
exigency during that period in devising a regime framework for better 
management and utilization of the waters in the basin. Even the inefficient and 
ineffective development and management practices of the three riparians did not 
have substantial negative impacts on the quantity and quality of the waters. 
Populations were at manageable levels, and the rivers were flowing depending 
only on the natural monthly and yearly variations in discharge. That, however, 
was the only serious concern of the two downstream riparians because of the 
devastating effects of the floods.
The smooth nature of riparian relations began to change as of the end of the 
1960s when both Turkey and Syria began to draw  up plans for large-scale surface 
irrigation schemes. Then, a basin-wide accord was put on the diplomatic agenda 
as a response to the emerging crisis among the riparians over the water issue. 
There were, indeed, three notable crises in the hydropolitical history of the 
Euphrates-Tigris river basin. The first crisis broke out during the impounding of 
the Tabqa and Keban dams, in Syria and Turkey, respectively. The Tabqa and 
Keban dams were completed a year apart between 1973-75, when particularly 
dry seasons had been experienced by coincidence, one after another. The 
impounding of both dams in the following two years escalated into a crisis in the
spring of 1975.1 Iraq accused Syria of reducing the river's flow down to 
intolerable levels, while Syria put the blame on Turkey. The Iraqi government 
was not satisfied with the Syrian attitude, and mounting frustration resulted in 
mutual threats bringing the parties to the brirdc of an armed hostility. A war over 
waters was averted by means of the efforts of Saudi Arabia that mediated for 
extra amounts of water to be released from Syria to Iraq.
The second major crisis among the riparians of the Euphrates-Tigris river 
basin occurred during the impounding of the Atatürk dam in 1990. On 13 
January, 1990 Turkey temporarily tampered with the flow of the Euphrates river 
in order to fill the Atatürk dam. The decision to fill the dam  that would last for 
one month was taken much earlier and Turkey had notified its downstream 
neighbors by November 1989 of the pending event. In its note to the downstream 
countries Turkey explained the technical reasons, and provided a detailed 
program making up for the losses of the two downstream countries. However, 
the Syrian and the Iraqi governments protested officially to Turkey, and 
consequently called for an agreement to share the waters of the Euphrates, as 
well as a reduction in the impounding period. It was this confrontation and the 
words of w ar that raised fears world-wide of a Middle East water war.
The third crisis took place in 1996 when Turkey started the construction of the 
Birecik, an after-bay dam, on the Euphrates river which was designed to be built 
to regularize the waters of the Euphrates as the water level reaches its maximum 
at the Atatürk dam  during the generation of hydroelectricity at peak hours. Both 
Syria and Iraq sent official notes to the Turkish government in December 1995
 ^ Gün Kut, "Burning waters: the hydropolitics of the Euphrates and Tigris," New 
Perspectives on Turkey, No. 9, Fall 1993, p. 5.
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and January 1996 indicating their objection to the construction of the Birecik 
dam. Because, in their contention, the Birecik dam will affect the quantity and the 
quality of the waters flowing to Syria and Iraq.
An overview of the above crises reveals that the initiation of the major 
development projects caused increasing demands on the supply of the river 
system, which, in turn, exacerbated the tensions among the riparians. 
Nevertheless, since 1965 there have been a series of bilateral and trilateral 
negotiations among the parties over the utilization and development of the 
Euphrates river. Amongst them, the functions of the Joint Technical Committee 
has been remarkable because it was established to exchange accurate and 
reliable hydrological information. However, these meetings were infrequent 
and appeared to have made little progress on the question of water allocation.^ 
For instance, beginning in 1966, Syria and Iraq started a series of bilateral
2 High level meetings took place between Syria and Turkey in 1993. The Turkish Prime 
Minister Siileyman Demirel paid a visit to Syria between 19-20 Febmary 1993, and 
during that visit a Joint Communiqué was signed between Turkey and Syria. Among 
other things, paragraph No. 6 of the Communiqué was devoted to the water issue, stating 
that: "Pursuant to the protocol signed in 1987 by Turkish and Syrian governments and in 
view of the proximity of the filling up of Atatürk Dam Reservoir, the two sides agreed to 
reach before the end of the 1993 a final solution determining the allocation to the parties 
from the waters of the Euphrates river. The two Foreign Ministers have been charged to 
follow up the realization of this objective." In accordance with the above mentioned Joint 
Communiqué, a Syrian delegation visited Ankara between 7-20 May 1993 and held talks 
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. During the meeting, the Syrian side, 
referring to the international codification studies, tried to set forth a legal argument on the 
issue. But this attempt was rejected by the Turkish side on the grounds that those set of 
studies have not yet been finalized and they do not attain any binding character. The 
Turkish side, on the other hand, had declared that the Orontes river should also be 
discussed during the meeting but the Syrian side strongly rejected the idea. The meeting 
has ended with a decision to convene a trilateral meeting, including Iraq, to be held on 
21-24 June 1993. Although the Iraqi delegation attended these meetings between 21-23 
June 1993, the Syrian side, at the last instant and stating no reason, did not join the talks. 
During the meeting, the Iraqi side declared that Turkey should increase the amount of 
flow on the Euphrates to 700 m3/sec. The meeting was unsuccessful.
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negotiations. In them, Iraq iterated its claim to acquired rights in a fixed share of 
the Euphrates discharge.^ Syria, by contrast, argued that potential needs must 
be weighed against acquired rights, and in the 1966 talks, rejected the Iraqi 
claim to acquired rights.^ In 1971 and 1972, there were two rounds of fruitless 
talks between Syria and Iraq. Even though, an agreement was reached, Syria 
later declined to sign the agreement. The year 1973 saw another round of 
unproductive negotiations. By this time, the reservoirs of both the Keban and 
the Tabqa dam  sites had begun to fill, threatening to reduce (albeit temporarily) 
Iraq's flow down to unacceptable levels. Iraq issued a formal protest and took 
the m atter to the Arab League. These matters have lain ever since. In 1975, there 
was an angry confrontation between Syria and Iraq. In 1980, all three riparians 
agreed to establish a technical commission for the exchange of information. But, 
the three riparians soon lost their communication and negotiation platform, and 
uncertainty in riparian relations became more pervasive.^
In general, the outcomes of a series of negotiations discussed above were 
fruitless. The reason behind this failure was that the parties could not reach any 
consensus on basic principles and norms (rights and obligations) that would 
sustain the negotiation process. Hence, this chapter endeavors to prepare an 
agenda consisting of necessary institutions (i.e., principles, norms, rules, and
3 This notion is at the heart of what any downstream state will try to establish as a 
binding commitment.
^ In 1967, however, Syria accepted that Iraq was entitled to 59 percent of the flow of the 
river at the Syrian-Iraqi border. A variant of this apportionment was discussed in 1967 
and 1968, whereby Iraq would receive two-thirds of the flow in normal years, but that the 
proportions would be reversed in favor of Syria in apportioning excess flow. However, by 
1968, no accord had been formalized.
 ^ John Waterbury, "Dynamics of Basin-Wide Cooperation in the Utilization of the 
Euphrates," Prepared for the Conference: The Economic Development o f Syria; 
Problems, Progress, and Prospects, Damascus, 6-7, 1990.
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decision-making procedures) that would attain such a goal. Throughout a 
transboundary river basin we observe an interdependent set of relations among 
the riparians where the impact of physical effects generated in one state is 
delivered to the other via the river system. The Euphrates-Tigris river basin 
constitutes such a medium. Since the end of the 1960s when all three riparians 
initiated major development projects on the rivers, they indeed began to function 
under the conditions of growing interdependence.^ Interdependence, in the case 
being examined here specifies the degree of connectedness. It does not predict, 
however, w hat action shall be taken by either of the parties. That is, the position 
of the riparians could be cooperative or conflict-prone. When Ernst Haas singled 
out the uncertainty and lack of clarity resulting from growing interdependence, 
he assumed that interdependence was not a sufficient condition for cooperation, 
and may even result in conflict. ^  Thus, if interdependence is not a sufficient 
condition for cooperation and may even result in conflict, regimes may provide 
the necessary linkage between interdependence and cooperation. An international 
water regime through its institutions creates a clear legal framework in which the 
parties to the dispute can identify their joint gains in the utilization of a 
transboundary watercourse in an equitable manner.
Another major function of international regimes is to facilitate the making 
of specific agreements by preparing the necessary ground for them. In the final 
analysis, a basin-wide accord is needed to settle the necessary conditions for 
effective and equitable allocation and management of the waters of the
^R. O. Keohane and J. S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 
2nd Edition, Mass: MIT Press, 1989.
^Emst Haas, "Words can hurt you; or, who said what to whom about regimes," in 
Stephen Krasner (ed.). International Regimes, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983, pp. 
23-61.
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Euphrates-Tigris river basin. However, the current physical and political setting 
of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin is not ripe for concluding a sharing agreement 
as the two downstream  riparians insist on. In the Euphrates-Tigris river basin, 
the three riparians could not conclude a basin-wide accord for efficient and 
equitable utilization of the waters of the system mainly due to the uncertain 
political setting, pursuing short-term national interests, lack of regularized 
institutions, and incomplete information. Data regarding the stream flow, 
precipitation, evapo-transpiration, water removals, return flow, salinity, and a 
host of other variables in relation to land resources are notoriously scarce, 
incomplete, and open to question in the basin. Information relating to water and 
land resources of the region are poor and are not exchanged on a regular basis 
among the riparians. Negotiations between parties contending for limited 
amounts of water can only succeed in the long-term if agreements are based on 
an accurate picture of w hat amount of water is available. Hence, the quantity and 
quality of the information pertaining to the Euphrates-Tigris need to be 
improved before the parties engage in agreements which can be beneficial for all. 
Further, an authoritative legal framework, (i.e., principles and norms) is lacking 
in the region. International regimes, and the institutions and procedures that 
develop in conjunction with them, perform the function of reducing uncertainty 
and the risk by linking discrete issues to one another, and by improving the 
quantity and the quality of information available to participants. The institutions 
and procedures that develop around international regimes acquire value as 
arrangements permit communication, and therefore facilitate the exchange of 
information. Effective international regimes are often associated with a great deal 
of informal contact and communication among officials. Transgovernmental 
relationships increase opportunities for cooperation in world politics by
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providing policy-makers with high-quality information about what their 
counterparts are likely to do.
As discussed in the first chapter, regimes come into being either 
spontaneously, or by imposition of a hegemon, or through a negotiation process 
(institutional bargaining). Neither spontaneous orders nor imposed ones as 
conceptual frameworks have as much explanatory power as negotiated regimes 
as regards to the specific circumstances of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin.^ For 
instance, although ideal for long standing low impact problems facing the 
international system, the time dimensions involved in scarce natural resources 
do not allow the present social institutions the luxury of forming spontaneous 
orders.^ Likewise the situation in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin demands 
immediate attention. The increasing demands of the three riparians put 
exceeding pressure on the limited amounts of the supply of the two rivers which 
may, in the long run, exacerbate tension in the region. Besides, it would be 
indeed a too simplistic scenario to argue that one of the riparians in the 
Euphrates-Tigris river basin, most probably Turkey which has the most 
advantageous position as the uppermost riparian, would engage in unilateral 
diversion or appropriation of a transboundary watercourse without consultation 
with other riparian. Such an argument does not take into account the complex 
political and economic interrelationships among the riparian states. Moreover, 
even though Turkey is the most powerful of the three riparians militarily and 
economically, it would not be in Turkey's interest to act as a hegemon, that is, to 
use its power to threaten its downstream neighbors to reach a cooperative
*Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources 
and the Environment, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989, pp. 84-87.
9 Ibid., p. 85.
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solution. On the one hand, this will exacerbate the precarious political situation 
among the three riparians.^^ On the other hand, it would be in Turkey's interest 
to evaluate water-related issues as an element of cooperation to promote its 
relations with two of its immediate neighbors in the Middle East.
It is emphasized, however, in this study that in case the three riparians 
agree in principle to form a regime, this should be a negotiated regime through 
institutional bargaining. Principles, norms, rules, and decision-making structures 
discussed in this chapter are all designed to constitute the agenda of the 
bargaining process. These principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
structures can only become operational if all parties give their consent. In 
addition, they do not altogether form an exhaustive list. They are just designed 
to embody essential institutions to use and manage the Euphrates-Tigris river 
system efficiently and equitably among the riparians. Indeed, the institutional 
bargaining process may alter them in no less way.
Institutional bargaining is a useful concept that deserves elaboration for 
the formation of a regime in the Euphrates-Tigris basin. Among the distinctive 
features of the "institutional bargaining model" which is developed through the 
analysis of Oran R. Young, this study focuses on the role of "leadership."^  ^
Hence, there are certain areas of concern that would be critical in the formation
Bilateral relations between Turkey and Syria have long been uneasy. Two principal 
sources of friction between the states are: Syria's backing of opponents of the Turkish 
regime; and Syrian irridentist claims to the province of Hatay.
Turkish and Iraqi policies have often coincided on the issue of Kurdish separatism. This 
has extended to tacit military cooperation during the 1980s. However, the situation has 
drastically changed after the Gulf War. Turkey joined the Allied embargo against Iraq, 
and Iraq became less cooperative.
' ' Oran R. Young, "The Politics of International Regime Formation; Managing Natural 
Resources and the Environment," op. cit., pp. 360-366.
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of an international regime in the basin where Turkey has inherent advantages. 
Turkey could combine the peculiarities of the three different categories of 
leadership (structural, entrepreneurial and intellectual) with a view to initiate 
negotiations for building a regime in the region. 12 There were some incidents in 
the hydropolitical history of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin when Turkey 
displayed keen interest to reach cooperative outcomes. Turkey formulated the 
Three-Staged Plan which presented a regime for optimum, equitable and 
reasonable utilization of the transboundary watercourses of the Euphrates-Tigris 
river basin. Turkey also proposed the Peace Pipeline based on the idea of 
supplying the Arabian peninsula with freshwater from the Seyhan and Ceyhan 
rivers in southern Anatolia. Furthermore, Turkey was eager to host a Global 
Water Summit in Istanbul in 1991 to discuss regional water issues, and was 
equally very willing to convene multilateral talks on water issues within the 
framework of the Middle East Peace Process. Although all of these initiatives 
have failed mainly due to a lack of trust among the riparians, there are still more 
imaginative institutional options for Turkey to perform in the region. To 
illustrate, Turkey has shown its goodwill in sharing data with others. Indeed, the 
acquisition, verification and analysis of data pertaining to water and land 
resources is extremely problematic in the region. Even if reliable data can be 
obtained, the amount would be so enormous that it would have to be 
synthesized with archival records by Geographic Information Systems (GIS) 
technology where Turkey has considerable advantages (see Appendix on GIS 
technology and its applications in Turkey). Besides, Turkey is eager to put 
forward many more cooperative proposals utilizing its experience in water
'2 Oran R. Young, "The Politics of International Regime Formation: Managing Natural 
Resources and the Environment," International Organization: Vol. 43, No. 3, 1989, pp. 
349-375.
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technology and engineering skills in the use and development of the water 
resources of the basin. Proposals for technical cooperation based on the idea of 
basin-wide planning process include innovative options such as storage facilities, 
water transfer between rivers and non-conventional water supply methods and 
demand-management policies, which include making more efficient use of 
existing supplies through structural, operational and economic means. Turkey 
could, as an entrepreneurial (problem-solving) leader, affect the course and the 
outcome of negotiations if resumed under the aegis of DITCH by influencing the 
setting and the substance of negotiations. Hence, under the rubric of the main 
features of a water regime in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin, following sections 
will present the necessary principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures to be discussed among the riparians during the process of regime 
formation. The following institutions that are suggested, either in the form of 
abstract set of principles, norms, and rules, or in the form of specific 
organizational arrangements, are thought to constitute substantial tools that the 
parties to the dispute can make use of as attractive institutional arrangements to 
foster the bargaining process and to persuade others to come on board of 
supporters of such arrangements.
In the case of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin, the primary sources of the 
principles and norms as the basic constituents of the suggested international 
regime can be found in the works of a number of international agencies during a 
series of conferences convened under the auspices of the United Nations. The 
outcomes of the lengthy discussions among distinguished experts and scholars 
during these conferences, as well as the works of the international water law 
community that are equally valuable efforts for the emergence, evolution and the 
codification of universal guidelines, yielded a set of principles and norms for
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effective and equitable management and utilization of transboundary water 
resources. These general principles and norms are considered to be applicable to 
specific watercourses in the world, taking into consideration the physical 
characteristics and the hydropolitical developments. The issue of equitable, 
reasonable, and optimal utilization of transboundary water resources was 
extensively discussed and reviewed during a series of international conferences 
such as the United Nations Conference on the Hum an Environment (Stockholm, 
Sweden, 1972), the United Nations Water Conference (Mar Dell Palter, 
Argentina, 1977), UNDO Symposium: A Strategy for Water Sector Capacity- 
Building, (Delft, the Netherlands, 1991) International Conference on Water and 
the Environment (Dublin, Ireland 1992), United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1992). The combined 
frameworks of these successive conferences culminated in a set of general 
principles and norms that are acknowledged as guidelines for effective and 
equitable management and use of water resources. Besides, the International 
Law Commission (ILC) of the United Nations set forth principles and rules that 
may be applied and adjusted in agreements between states situated alongside 
transboundary watercourses. The Draft Articles of the ILC which are then made 
into the Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International 
watercourses are all incorporated to the discussion below which is on the 
designing of the institutions for better use and management of the Euphrates and 
Tigris.
A. Principles
The principles of an international regime reflect the aims and the premises 
of the regime, and the purposes members are expected to pursue. In other words, 
principles give the regime its identity and reason for existence. It has been
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presumed, in this study, that if Turkey, Syria and Iraq, as the major riparians to 
the water dispute in the Euphrates and Tigris river basin, adhere to the principles 
described below, it will be easier to resume and proceed the negotiations on the 
water issue, and to achieve fruitful outcomes. Two guiding principles are 
suggested in this study with a view to designing negotiated frameworks (i.e., an 
international regime) in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin.
i... Effective and equitable management and utilization of 
transboundary rivers is a key determinant in promoting cooperation
The first principle originates partly from international water law^^, 
and partly from the accumulation of international agencies.^^ Hence, the 
universal guidelines on water which have emerged from the designated efforts
13 Article IV of Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, and 
Article 5 of the Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses are dedicated to the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization and 
participation. In addition, these principles of the Helsinki Rules and the Convention 
enumerate the factors relevant to equitable and reasonable utilization in Article V and 
Article 6 of these documents, respectively.
14 The final recommendation of the Mar Dell Palter Action Plan emphasized "the right of 
each state sharing the resources to equitably utilize such resources as the means to 
promote cooperation." See Asit K. Biswas, United Nations Water Conference, Pergamon 
Press, 1978. Besides, the UN Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, 
Chapter 18 started with the clause that "transboundary water resources and their use are of 
great importance to riparian states; in this cormection cooperation among those states may 
be desirable in conformity with existing agreements and/or other relevant arrangements, 
taking into account the interests of all riparian states concerned." See Agenda 21, Chapter 
18: Protection of the Quality and Supply of Freshwater Resources: Application of 
Integrated Approaches to the Development, Management and Use of Water Resources, 
Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, UN 
A/CONF. 151/26, Vol. II, 13 August 1992. Moreover, in Section 10 of the Guide to the 
Management of Water Resources by the World Bank, FAO and UNDO it was stated that 
"the chief question in developing and choosing options in the management of 
international water resources is how most efficiently and equitably to manage such 
resources." See Guide to the Management o f Water Resources, WB, FAO and UNDO, 
First Draft for Review in the Expert Consultation on Methodology for Water Resources 
Policy Review and Reform, FAO Headquarters, Rome, 1994, pp. 89-92.
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of the international agencies and international law community rests on the basic 
assumption that effective and equitable management and allocation of 
transboundary rivers eases the tensions over the limited supply of water, and 
thus promotes cooperation. The principle of "equitable management and 
allocation of transboundary rivers" is concentrated on factors which were more 
crucial and less arbitrary, such as the needs of the states; and it is not simply a 
formula or system of computing the most equitable allocation to which each 
watercourse state is entitled. Therefore, this principle does not produce a clear 
and concise formula which, when all the data is inserted, produces a definitive 
division of the waters. In other words, the result of the application of this 
principle would not be an immediate comprehensive reallocation of all the 
waters in the watercourse. Rather, equitable utilization would enable and 
prescribe regional initiatives promoting efficiency, conservation, and economy of 
use.
Efficient use and management of water resources would evidently be 
achieved through 'demand management' techniques.!^ Thus, the following
Mar Dell Palter Action Plan incorporated certain recommendations on the 'demand 
management' practices such as the recommendation which is on the "water use and 
efficiency" (discussed in an earlier chapter on the initiatives of international agencies). 
See Asit K. Biswas, United Nations Water Conference, Pergamon Press, 1978, pp. 150- 
151. Later, the Delft Declaration stressed the importance of developing effective demand 
management techniques including institutional development through building appropriate 
legal and administrative frameworks in the water sector together with improving 
efficiency by means of introducing economic water pricing. See G. J. Alaerts, T. L. Blair 
and F. J. A. Hartvelt (eds.), A Strategy for Water Sector Capacity-Building, Proceedings 
of the UNDO Symposium, Delft: International Institute for Hydraulic and Environmental 
Engineering and UNDO, 1991. pp. 17-19. Moreover, the Dublin Statement set forth the 
criteria for effective management of water resources: "a holistic approach, linking social 
and economic development with protection of natural ecosystems should be adopted in 
water demand management." The Statement indicated that water development and 
management should be based on participatory approach, involving users, plaimers and 
policy-makers at all levels. Further, the Statement stressed that managing water as an
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actions are basically determined as the significant components of demand 
management which would, in turn, increase overall efficiency in use, 
management and allocation of transboundary water resources, whilst most 
actions would be taken at the national level:
...effective legislation should be framed to promote the efficient and 
equitable use and protection of water and water related eco-systems;
...pricing and other economic incentives should be used to promote the 
efficient and equitable use of water;
...comprehensive and integrated national development plans and policies
should specify the main objectives of water-use policy, which should in turn to 
be translated into guidelines and strategies;
...institutional arrangem ents adopted by each country should ensure that 
the development and management of the water resources take place in the 
context of national planning;
...consideration should be given to the establishment of efficient water 
authorities to provide proper coordination;
economic good is an important way of achieving efficient and equitable use, and 
encouraging conservation and protection of water resources. See Gordon J. Young, James 
C. I. Dooge, John C. Rodda, Global Water Resources Issue, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994, pp. 161-166. Similarly Agenda 21, Chapter 18 encompassed 
"integrated water resources development and management" as the first program area in 
which it was advised that demand management practices such as changing water uses, 
human resources development, strengthening institutional capacity for implementing 
integrated water management including legislation, standard-setting, regulatory functions, 
monitoring and assessment of the use of water and land resources and creating of 
opportunities for public participation should all be adopted by the developing countries. 
Agenda 21, Chapter 18: Protection of the Quality and Supply of Freshwater Resources: 
Application of Integrated Approaches to the Development, Management and Use of 
Water Resources, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, UN A/CONF. 151/26, Vol. 11, 13 August 1992, Paragraphs 21 & 22.
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...stakeholder participation: countries should make necessary efforts to 
adopt measures for obtaining effective participation in the planning and 
decision-making process involving users and public authorities;
...water conservation is a necessity: appropriate policies and actions are 
needed to promote management of water more as an economic commodity;
...capacity-building a n d /o r enabling environment: countries should 
accord priority to conducting surveys to determine national needs for 
administrative, scientific and technical manpower in the water resources area.
In complying with the above criteria, the three riparians of the Euphrates- 
Tigris river basin can make use of certain guidelines that have been issued by 
international agencies like the World Bank, FAO, and UNDO.^^ These 
publications may be instrumental with their instructive and straightforward 
wording in describing the formulation of national water resources strategy step 
by step.l7
W ater resources management can be conveniently considered under two 
headings: supply management, which covers those activities required to locate, 
develop, and exploit new sources, and demand management, which addresses 
mechanisms to promote more desirable levels and patterns of water use. Water 
development projects include the construction of dams, reservoirs, wells, pumps, 
canals and, so forth. Governments have typically emphasized supply 
management in the water resources management. However, for achieving 
efficient and equitable water resources management, supply and demand
Guide To the Management o f Water Resources, WB, FAO, and UNDO, First Draft for 
Review in the Expert Consultation on Methodology for Water Resources Policy Review 
Reform, FAO Headquarters, Rome, 1994.
Ibid., pp. 25-29.
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management policies should go hand in hand. Thus, in the management of the 
waters of the Euphrates and Tigris, Turkey, Syria and Iraq first engaged in giant 
water development projects. All three riparians have neglected demand 
management policies, albeit in different degrees. For instance, Turkey's current 
water policy and management is more responsive to certain demand 
management policies such as 'stakeholder participation,' establishment of proper 
'water authorities,' 'efficient delivery systems.' Yet, there are many more areas of 
demand m anagement such as 'pricing' and 'issuing effective legislation' that 
should be considered by the Turkish authorities. Notwithstanding, both Syria 
and Iraq have experienced ineffective demand management strategies. They are 
in urgent need to review their national water resources strategies to manage and 
allocate their water resources more efficiently. Thence, the governments of the 
three riparians of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin have a vested interest in re­
evaluating their national water resources strategy to reach effective and equitable 
water management policies and strategies at the national level that would, in 
turn, be harmonized with other riparians' policy through river basin 
management organization.
ii... The National water sector of each riparian is a part of global 
political economy where adjustments can be made through international trade.
This principle originates primarily from major premises of the 
political economist approach. Hence, J. A. Allan comments that the international 
trading system has enabled the economies of the region to escape being trapped 
in the closed hydrological systems to which they have access. Indeed, the past 
forty years of water management in the Middle East since the initiation of major 
development projects cannot be explained without such perspectives since the 
solution to water shortages has lain much more in the capacity of the region's
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economies to import food rather than in agreements to share inadequate indigenous 
resources.^^ Moreover, in line with the same principle, it has been suggested that 
all countries in the region, particularly for those the water scarcity is a genuine 
concern, should reallocate their water resources at the national level by shifting 
the major emphasis from irrigation to domestic and industrial use. Additionally, 
to compensate for the overall deficiencies in agricultural production, they could 
import food stuffs. However the developments are not always that 
straightforward: most of the countries of the region including the ones facing 
serious water shortages like Iraq and Syria did not engage in such reallocations 
at all.l9 One should also mark the fact that for a couple of decades countries like 
Syria and Iraq have already had experienced quite a great deal of trade in terms 
of food staples either through imports or exports depending on the harvests of 
the year in question.20 This principle emphasizes that such economic 
adjustments should continue as a response to the growing water scarcity in the 
Euphrates-Tigris river basin. Apparently, there is a great need in the region for 
urgent reconsiderations of water allocation and management practices primarily
18 Agricultural Trade (Export/Import m illion US dollar) of the Ri
Turkey Syria Iraq
1993: 3,633 / 2,287 586 / 676 6/1,064
2000: 4,180/ 1,820 567 / 970 68/2,710
2040: 8,690 / 4,057 1,082/ 1,992 94 / 5,662
(Source: FAO, The State of Food and Agriculture, Rome, 1995, pp. 190-205)
Water Withdrawal (percentage) by Sector in the Three Riparians of the Euphrates- 
Tigris River Basin. The years indicate last data availability.
Domestic (%) Industry (%> Agriculture ( % )
Iraq (1970) 3 5 92
Syria (1976) 7 10 83
Turkey (1989) 24 19 57
(Source: World Resources Institute, 1994-95, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) 
20 Percent GNP for agriculture: Turkey (17%); Syria (28%); Iraq (18%). Syria, Country 
Profile, 1990-91, Economist Intelligence C/n//(EIU), London, 1991; Iraq, Country Profile, 
1990-91, Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), London, 1991; Turkey, Country Profile, 
1990-91, Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), London, 1991.
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at the national level and subsequently at basin-wide level. The riparians to the 
Euphrates-Tigris river basin are likely to depend on domestic food production to 
a considerable extent, in spite of the fact that the three riparians have practiced 
inefficient and water-wasting irrigation practices for many years. However, the 
second principle upholds the idea that reasonable and efficient water use and 
conservation could be realized by importing food (cereals and wheat) through 
international trade in regions like the Euphrates-Tigris where water stress is 
getting worse. Thus, by this principle, it is suggested that the three riparians 
could im port food instead of consuming too much water in inefficient 
agricultural practices, and reallocate the excess water from irrigation to domestic 
and individual uses where supply can match demand even in the longer term.
B. Norms
The norms of an international regime can be regarded as a mandate for 
the rules and procedures of the regime. They indicate what members of the 
regime m ust or m ust not do, that is, what is legitimate or illegitimate. But they 
are still so general that it is often impossible to determine whether or not specific 
actions violate them. In this study, the norms of an international regime for 
better management and allocation of the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris have 
been principally derived from the General Principles (Part II) of the Convention 
on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (see 
Appendix 1). The norms of an international regime are mostly expressed in terms 
of issue-specific agreements. Hence, the general principles of the regime for 
allocation and management of the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris would be 
translated into specific norms through a water allocation and management 
agreement. To draw  relevant insights for a regime in the Euphrates-Tigris region, 
two international agreements on the allocation and development of the Mekong
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and the Jordan River Basins have been reviewed.21 These agreements can be 
regarded as "successful" cases in achieving water utilization arrangements over 
two significant and disputed rivers in other parts of the globe. Even though, they 
possess unique features depending on the geographic, political and economic 
conditions of the region, these two cases may well provide the necessary format 
for the riparian states in other disputed watercourses to reach a basin-wide 
agreement. The norms that are elaborated in this study are to be incorporated 
into an agreement for the allocation of the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris rivers. 
To begin with, these following statements should be evaluated as the primary 
norms of an international regime:
i... The Euphrates and the Tigris rivers have to be considered as 
forming one single transboundary watercourse system, and managed 
accordingly
These rivers are linked not only by their natural course when 
merging at the Shatt-al-Arab, but also because of a man-made Thartar Canal 
connection between the two rivers in Iraq. Consequently, all existing and future 
agricultural water uses need not necessarily be derived from the Euphrates. 
Irrigation water for areas fed by the Euphrates, may also be supplied from the 
Tigris.
21 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River 
Basin, April 5, 1995; and the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan, October 16, 
1994. See Patricia Wouters, Recent Developments in International Water Law, A Survey 
o f the New Treaties, Working Documents, Center for Energy, Petroleum & Mineral Law 
and Policy, Dundee, Scotland, UK, 1997.
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ii... The inventory of water and land resources should be drawn 
up and evaluated jointly
The methods used in each country for data collection, 
interpretation and evaluation show disparities from country to country and are 
not readily applicable to transboundary watercourses. Thus, the necessary means 
and measures should be determined to attain the most reasonable and optimum 
utilization of resources on the basis of these studies.
Part II (General Principles) of the Convention which embodies key 
provisions defining rights and obligations of the upstream and downstream 
states are appropriate, to a certain extent, for formulating the norms of an 
international regime in the Euphrates and Tigris river basin. To begin with. 
Article 5 and Article 6 delineate the right to utilize the waters of the international 
watercourses in their respective territories in an equitable and reasonable 
manner, and list the factors relevant to equitable and reasonable utilization, 
respectively (see Appendix I). Article 5 states that riparians of an international 
waterway are obliged to use, develop, and protect the watercourse in an 
equitable and reasonable manner, and are duty- bound to do so cooperatively. 
Each riparian has a right of utilization- reasonable and beneficial- equal to that of 
every other co-riparian. However, 'equitability' in this context does not mean an 
equal share of the water. Rather, equitability implies the idea of proportionality, 
a share and usage proportional to a riparian's population and its social and 
economic needs, consistent with the rights of its co-riparians. Reasonable (or 
rational) may be explained as exploitation of water or other natural resources in 
such a way as to conserve the resource for the benefit of the present and future 
generations through careful planning and management. On the other hand. 
Article 6 provides the basis to determine whether the riparians' use of the waters
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of the Euphrates and Tigris is equitable and reasonable. Article 6 requires that 
"all relevant factors and circumstances" be taken into account in determining 
whether a watercourse state's utilization is equitable and reasonable. It sets forth 
a non-exclusive list of seven factors to guide the determination. Each of the seven 
factors are pertinent to the Euphrates and Tigris river system. These factors, as 
well as other relevant factors, must be weighed in applying the general and 
flexible principle of equitable and reasonable utilization.
Similarly, agreements on the Jordan and the Mekong River Basins comprise 
articles on the same subject-matter: Article 6 of the Treaty of Peace Between 
Israel & Jordan states that "[t]he Parties agree mutually to recognize the rightful 
allocations of both of them in Jordan River and Yarmouk River waters...", while 
Article 5 of the Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development 
of the Mekong River Basin states that "[t]o utilize the waters of the Mekong River 
system in a reasonable and equitable manner in their respective territories..."22 
That is, the foremost norm  of the suggested regime in the Euphrates-Tigris river 
basin would comprise:
iii... Each riparian has the right to use the waters of the international
watercourses in  their respective territories in an equitable and reasonable
k23manner"^
22 Ibid.
23 Recommendation 51 of the Stockholm Action Plan stated that "full consideration must 
be given to the right of the permanent sovereignty of each country concerned to develop 
its resources." See Report o f the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
Held at Stockholm, UN A/CONF./48/14/Rev.l, 1972. Mar Dell Palter Action Plan also 
stated that "national policies should take into consideration the right of each state sharing 
the resources to equitably utilize such resources as the means to promote cooperation." 
See Asit K. Biswas (ed.), United Nations Water Conference, op. cit., pp. 1-6.
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This norm  relies basically on the doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty. A 
brief account of the official stance of the two downstream riparians vis-à-vis 'the 
right to use the waters of the international watercourses in their respective 
territories' displays a totally different picture. To begin with, Iraq maintains that 
it has acquired rights relating to its 'ancestral irrigation' from the Euphrates and 
Tigris rivers. Thus, the Iraqi governmen); claims that there exist two dimensions 
of these acquired rights. One outlines the fact that for thousands of years these 
rivers have given life to the inhabitants of Mesopotamia, and thus constitute an 
acquired right for this people. The second dimension of these acquired rights 
stems from the existing irrigation and water installations. Iraq has 1.9 million ha 
of agricultural land in the Euphrates basin, including the ancestral irrigation 
systems left from Sumerian times.
Syrian official arguments are more or less overlapping with the Iraqi ones. 
That is to say, Syrians also claim that Syria possesses acquired rights over the 
rivers that pass through Syrian territory dating from antique periods.24 Iraq's 
and to a lesser extent Syria's claims to acquired rights would probably be ignored 
in line w ith the specialists' opinion that prior rights have no relevance to 
equitable water allocation. Concerning acquired rights, most publicists argued 
that this doctrine should not be applied to international disputes because it is 
often wasteful and is not conducive to the optimum economic development of 
the river basin.25 The historical or acquired rights doctrine claimed by Syria and
24Syrian Proposal for the "Draft Decisioi' on the Work of the International Law 
Commission at its Forty-fifth Session," Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, 
Thirty-third Session, Tokyo, 17-21 January 1994, p. 4.
25Jerome Lipper, "Equitable Utilization," in A. H. Garretson, R. D. Hayton and Olmstead 
(eds.). The Law o f International Drainage Basin, Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 
1967, pp. 50-51.
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more often by Iraq are inadequate in the sense that prior uses of water by 
downstream countries represent only one of many factors that have to be taken 
into account in reaching an equitable utilization of a transboundary river.26
On the other hand, Turkey has been advocating the necessity of common 
criteria in allocating the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris basin, based on the 
principle of equitable utilization which is grounded in the doctrine of limited 
territorial sovereignty. In order to utilize water in an equitable manner Turkey 
proposed a project which is called the Three-Staged Plan (TSP).
The principle of equitable utilization is the most widely acknowledged 
principle in international water law for allocating the waters of a transboundary 
river. In order to reach an equitable and efficient allocation in disputed waters, 
the countries should take certain factors into consideration, such as 
socioeconomic, hydrological and geopolitical conditions. The list of these factors 
are not exhaustive and if other national and natural resources are available to 
meet the needs of the co-riparians, these resources have to be taken into account 
as well.27 Thus, according to both Helsinki Rules and the works of the 
International Law Commission (ILC) which relate to the climate, geography and 
hydrology of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin, Turkey is entitled to a large 
amount of the waters of Euphrates and Tigris. Turkey not only contributes 
almost all the water of the Euphrates and much of the water of the Tigris, but 
also has a large share in the area of the river basin. Besides, Turkey has a 
favorable climate all through the basin which is most suitable for water storage 
constructions.
26 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op. cit., p. 101-103.
27 Ibid., p. 107.
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The discussion on the third norm should be complemented with the 
analysis of another significant article of the Convention about the "no harm rule" 
which has become a fundamental stone of international customary law. Article 7 
denotes the "obligation not to cause significant harm." The Convention sets forth 
that "[wjatercourse States shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in their 
territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant 
harm to other watercourse states." Thu&, the Convention legally prohibits the 
causing of any significant harm. However, this study suggests that, in general, 
no-harm rule should be applied to certain cases of usage (e.g., water quality). 
Even state practices support the same view that in the utilization of the 
international watercourses, priority should be given to the doctrine of equitable 
and reasonable utilization. A series of bilateral and multilateral agreements on 
the use and management of the transboundary rivers are indicative of what may 
be acceptable in the field of the law the non-navigational uses of international 
watercourses.28 That is, it is unlikely that states will embrace a no significant 
harm approach to watercourse development, except in special cases. To 
illustrate, the equitable utilization doctrine does not seem particularly well- 
suited to problems of pollution and environmental protection. Moreover, a use 
which causes significant harm  to hum an health and safety is understood to be 
inherently inequitable and unreasonable. As a result, in designing the 
international regime in the Euphrates and Tigris, application of the no harm rule 
should be limited to issues like water quality, human health, and safety.29 Only
28 The Second Paragraph of Article 6 (Water) of the Treaty o f Peace Between Israel & 
Jordan, October 26, 1994, and Article 7 of the Agreement on the Cooperation for the 
Sustainable Development o f the Mekong River Basin, 5 April, 1995 comprised clauses 
related to the no-harm mle.
29 Article 51 (b) of the Stockholm Action Plan which was perfectly formulated for the 
obligation not to cause significant harm read as follows: "nations agree that when major 
water resources activities are contemplated that may have a significant environmental
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in this way it can be incorporated to the third norm of the suggested 
international regime in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin.
Article 8, Article 9 and Article 10 of the Part II (Principles) of the 
Convention embody a series of obligations which are certainly very useful in 
drawing up the norms of the regime in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin. In line 
with Article 8 of the Convention, a fourth norm can be set for the envisaged 
regime in the Euphrates and Tigris region:
iv... Riparian states shall cooperate through the establishment of 
joint mechanisms on the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, 
mutual benefit, and good faith in order to attain optimal utilization and 
adequate protection of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers.
In determining the manner of such cooperation, riparian states may 
consider the establishment of joint mechanisms or commissions, as they deem 
necessary, to facilitate cooperation on relevant measures and procedures in the 
light of experience gained through cooperation in existing joint mechanisms and
commissions in various regions 30
effect in another country, the other country should be notified well in advance of the 
activity envisaged." See Report o f the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment Held at Stockholm, UN A/CONF./48/14/Rev. 1, 1972.
Article 1 of the Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development o f the 
Mekong River Basin, 5 April, 1995 stated that "To cooperate in all fields of sustainable 
development, utilization, management and conservation of the water and related 
resources of the Mekong River Basin, in a manner to optimize the multiple-use and 
mutual benefits of all riparians and to minimize the harmful effects that might result from 
natural occurrences and man-made activities." Moreover Chapter IV of the same Treaty 
set the institutional framework of Mekong River Commission in a detailed manner. 
Similarly, Article 6 (section VII) of the Treaty o f Peace Between Israel & Jordan, 
October 26, 1994 mentioned the establishment of the Joint Water Committee while the 
previous section (VI) of the same Treaty describes the details of the cooperation between 
the riparians: "Israel and Jordan undertake to exchange relevant data on water resources
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The subject-matter of Article 9 of the Convention would be likely to 
constitute one of the prominent norms of the proposed regime in the Euphrates- 
Tigris river basin:
V ... Regular exchange of data and information.
Similarly, the foremost recommendation of the Mar Dell Palter Action 
Plan put forward that "to improve the management of water resources, greater 
knowledge about their quantity and quality is needed; regular and systematic 
collection of hydrometeorological, hydrological and hydrogeological data needs 
to be promoted; thus countries should review, strengthen and co-ordinate 
arrangements for the collection of basic data." This norm should be incorporated 
to the proposed regime in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin.^^
vi... Riparians should agree that when major water resource activities are 
contemplated that may have possible adverse effects, other countries should 
be notified well in advance of the activity envisaged
This norm  finds direct references in Part III (Planned Measures) of the 
Convention. It constitutes a substantial part of international customary law 
defined as "duty of prior consultation." However, in this case, the Convention
through the Joint Water Committee. Israel and Jordan shall cooperate in developing plans 
for purposes of increasing water supplies and improving water use efficiency, within the 
context of bilateral, regional or international cooperation." Likewise, the works of the 
international agencies, such as the Guide to the Management of Water Resources 
explicitly defined the modalities of joint mechanisms for managing international water 
resources. See Guide To the Management o f Water Resources, WB, FAO, and UNDO, 
First Draft for Review in the Expert Consultation on Methodology for Water Resources 
Policy Review Reform, FAO Headquarters, Rome, 1994, pp. 89-92.
Recommendation 51 (c) of the Stockholm Action Plan stated the necessity of 
collection, analysis, and exchanges of hydrologic data in international river basins. See 
Report o f the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment Held at Stockholm, 
UNA/CONF./48/14/Rev.l, 1972.
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does not serve the end to formulate major clauses of this norm for a regime 
framework in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin. Part III of the Convention 
comprises detailed procedural arrangements such as determining the period for 
reply to notification. In the event, each transboundary watercourse possesses 
different and specific characteristics so such time limits should be determined 
according the specific circumstances of each watershed with the consent of the 
riparians.
vii... Watercourse states shall, individually and, where appropriate, 
jointly, prevent, reduce and control the pollution of an international 
watercourse that may cause significant harm to other watercourse states or to 
their environment, including harm to human health or safety, to the use of the 
waters for any beneficial purpose, or to the living resources of the watercourse.
Part IV (Article 21) of the Convention deals with protection and 
preservation of the ecosystems of the environment. Indeed, the complex 
interconnectedness of freshwater systems demand that freshwater management 
be holistic (taking a catchment approach) and based on a balanced consideration 
of the needs of the people and environment. Watercourse states shall take steps 
to harmonize their policies in this connection.^2 ^  has been observed that almost 
all of bilateral and multilateral agreements on the utilization of the international 
watercourses embody a set of norms concerning the protection of ecosystem of
32 Both Stockholm and Mar Dell Palter Action Plan encompass recommendations on the 
control of the pollution of international watercourses. Further, the third program area of 
the Agenda 21, Chapter 18 stressed the importance of the protection of water resources, 
water quality, and aquatic ecosystems. Moreover, the Guide prepared by the WB, FAO, 
and UNDO includes section on environmental and health issues that should be considered 
in developing a water resources management strategy.
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watershed.^^ An international regime on the allocation and management of the 
waters of the Euphrates and Tigris should apparently include a set of norms 
concerning the environmental aspect of the water resources.
C. Rules
Rules are the most concrete components of the international regimes. They 
are often stated explicitly in the formal agreements on which regimes are 
commonly based, and they facilitate assessment of implementation and 
compliance. The rules of an international regime are prescriptions and guidelines 
for actions the member states are expected to perform on or refrain from 
performing. They define the relevant actors, the expected behavior, and the 
specific circumstances under which the rules are operative. Rules make the 
principles and norms operational, measurable and verifiable, and they 
institutionalize procedures. The origin and functions of the rules as described by 
the above sentences may lead to a judgment that it is for the time being not 
possible to design rules for the Euphrates-Tigris river basin because there does 
not exist any formal agreement or legislative text to comprise such prescriptions 
or guidelines.
UN Helsinki Convention on the Protection and Use o f Transboundary Watercourses 
and International Lakes, March 1992; Agreements on the Protection o f the River Meuse 
and River Scheldt, signed by France, the Netherlands and Belgium, April 26, 1994; 
Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use o f the Danube River, 
December 5, 1995; Agreement on the Protection and Utilization o f Transboundary 
Waters o f the Halaha River, Kerulen River, Bor Nor Lake and Bulgan River, April 29, 
1994; Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development o f the Mekong 
River Basin, April 5, 1995; the Treaty o f Peace Between Israel and Jordan, October 26, 
1994; An Agreement Between Israel and Palestinian Authority on waters o f West Bank, 
September 24, 1995. See Patricia Wouters, Recent Developments in International Law: A 
Survey o f the New Treaties Working Documents, Center for Energy Petroleum & Mineral 
Law & Policy, University of Dundee, Dundee, Scotland, UK, 1997.
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Nevertheless, there are two formal protocols and a plan concerning the 
utilization (use rules) of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin which make the 
following elucidation constructive rather than a merely superficial exercise. Prior 
to the elaboration of the TSP put forward by Turkey, two protocols are identified 
as notable developments which are also likely to determine the rules for the 
allocation of the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin. Though, the wording 
of these agreements are more straightforward than the TSP, they are not as 
constructive as the Plan in facilitating the effective and equitable use of the 
waters of the Euphrates and Tigris.
i... The Protocol of 1987 Between Turkey and Syria
The Turkish-Syrian Mixed Economic Commission meeting on 17 July 1987 
had an im portant outcome about the negotiations on the water issue. Hence the 
first arrangement was the Protocol of Economic Cooperation signed by Turkey 
and Syria in 1987. The Protocol was not solely devoted to the water issue. It is 
important to note that the Protocol was regarded as a temporary arrangement. It 
embodies several articles pertaining to the water issue.^^ The text of Article 6 of 
the Protocol reads as follows: "During the filling up period of the Atatürk Dam 
reservoir and until the final allocation of the waters of Euphrates among the 
three riparian countries the Turkish side undertakes to release a yearly average 
of more than 500 m 3/s at the Turkish-Syrian border and in cases where the 
monthly flow falls below the level of 500 m 3/s, the Turkish side agrees to make 
up the difference during the following month." Article 7, on the other hand, 
states that "the two sides shall work together with the Iraqi side to allocate the
This Protocol covered a wide range of issues from oil and gas exploration, banking 
and customs formalities to livestock transport and customs formalities. The Protocol had 
a positive impact on Turkish-Syrian trade (published in the Resmi Gazete (Official 
Gazette),T\xxV&y, December 10, 1987).
291
waters of the rivers Euphrates and Tigris in the shortest possible time." While, 
Article 8 states that "the two sides agreed to expedite the work of the Joint 
Technical Committee on Regional Waters." Under Article 9, both states agreed in 
principle to construct and jointly operate irrigation and hydroelectric power 
projects.
The repercussions of the Protocol were immediate. Iraq complained to 
Turkey that it had not been included in negotiations on water. Later, Iraq was 
reassured by Turkey that the 1987 Protocol was temporary, and that a real treaty 
would eventually be concluded between the riparian states.^^ In sum, the Iraqi 
reaction to this was that Turkey's commitment was a unilateral one, which is far 
less than the desired tripartite solution. Syria, on the other hand, pointing to the 
fact that the arrangem ent was an interim one, was interpreting the 500 m 3/s 
clause as a prelude to a final partitioning of the waters.^^ Moreover, Syria and 
Iraq asserted that since the annual average flow of the Euphrates River is around 
1000 m 3/s, Turkey should keep for itself only 1 /3  of the flow and let the 
remaining 2 /3 rd  to Syria and Iraq to be shared by those countries.
One of the significant events in-between the 1987 Protocol and the 1990 
accord is the initial impounding of the Atatürk Dam in 1990. When Turkey 
finished the construction of the Atatürk Dam, it interrupted the flow of the 
Euphrates for a month (from 13 January to 12 February 1990) partly to fill the 
reservoir. Immediately blown into crisis by the world media and by the reaction 
of the two downstream  riparians, the filling of the Atatürk Dam thus gave the
Natasha Beschorner, "Water and Instability in the Middle East," op. cit., p. 41.
36 Gün Kut, "Burning Waters: The Hydropolitics of The Euphrates and Tigris," op. cit., 
p. 9.
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opportunity to revive water war scenarios in the Middle East.^^ At the 
November 1989 meeting of the Joint Technical Committee, Turkey explained the 
technical reasons behind the interruption of the flow and gave a detailed 
program for making up for the losses of the two countries. Hence, Turkey 
assured that Syria would receive a minimum flow of 120 m 3/s from tributaries 
below the Atatürk Dam, as well as additional flows at a rate of 750 m 3/s from 
November to 13 January. Thus, the Euphrates discharge into Syria averaged 768 
m 3/s in this period, so during this and the impounding period the average flow 
would be 509 m 3/ s within the terms of the 1987 Protocol. Turkey also stressed 
that the impounding was scheduled for the time when Syrian and Iraqi water 
requirements were lowest.^^ The Syrian and Iraqi governments protested 
officially to Turkey, which consequently called for a just sharing of the Euphrates 
waters and for a reduction of the impounding period (limiting the impounding 
period to two weeks). However, soon the heat was over when it was recorded 
that the total am ount of water released during the make-up and closure periods 
in the average, had not fallen below 500 m3/s.^^
ii... Water Allocation Agreement Between Syria and Iraq:
The Protocol of 1990
Syria and Iraq perceived the interruption to the flow of the 
Euphrates, due to the impounding of the Atatürk dam, as the beginning of many 
such interruptions that would be the consequences of envisaged projects within 
the framework of GAP. Hence, the 13th meeting of the Joint Technical 
Committee held in Baghdad on 16 April 1990, provided the occasion for a
37 Ibid., p.2.
38 Natasha Beschomer, "Water and Instability in the Middle East," op. cit., p. 41.
39 Water Issues Between Turkey, Syria and Iraq, Ankara: Turkish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 1995.
293
bilateral accord between Syria and Iraq (i.e., the second arrangement in mention 
here) according to which 58 per cent of the Euphrates waters coming from 
Turkey would be released to Iraq by Syria. The related article of this agreement 
reads as follows: "Contingent of Iraq passed at the Syrian-Iraqi border is to be 
with a perm anent annual total rate of 58 per cent of the waters of the river passed 
to Syria at the Syrian-Turkish border. The Syrian contingent of the waters of the 
rivers is to be the rest of the waters which is 42 per cent from the waters passed 
at the Syrian-Turkish water."40
In sum, the downstream arguments, mutually shared by Syria and Iraq 
except for minor details, are built around the assertion that the Euphrates waters 
have to be allocated among the riparians according to a mathematical formula 
which would recognize their declared needs. The 1990 Agreement between the 
two downstream riparians stands in conformity with these argument. However, 
as for the issue of needs, Turkey maintains that objective criteria which take into 
consideration optim um  and reasonable use of waters, namely the Three Staged 
Plan, rather than unilateral declarations, should provide the basis for 
determining how much water each user needs. Consequently, this study argues 
that, as a preliminary and necessary step for determining detailed prescriptions 
for allocation of the waters of the Euphrates ai\d Tigris system and to display the 
needs of the riparians in an equitable and objective manner, the Three Staged 
Plan should be implemented. Then, it would be possible to set use, liability and 
procedural rules which would spell out quotas and standards to which riparians 
making use of resources would be expected to conform.
40 The Official Paper of Syria, May 9, 1990.
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iii... The Ideal Form: Three-Staged Plan
In the Euphrates-Tigris river basin, both Syria and Iraq proposed 
similar plans for a 'sharing agreement.' During one of the Joint Technical 
Committee (DITCH) meetings, Iraq formulated the following plan to share the 
waters of the Euphrates: 1) Each of the riparian states will notify its water 
demand for each of its completed project as well as for the projects under 
construction or planned; 2) Hydrologic data will be exchanged on the Euphrates 
and Tigris waters; 3) After gathering all relevant data, the Joint Technical 
Committee will, first of all, calculate the demands of water for the projects under 
operation, then for the projects under construction, and finally for the planned 
projects. The determination of needs for these projects will be made separately. 
Syria, on the other hand, insisted on the point that the Euphrates and Tigris 
rivers were "shared resources", and should be divided among the riparians 
according to a quota to be determined by the following procedure: 1) Each 
riparian state shall declare its demands on each river separately; 2) The capacities 
of both rivers in each state shall be calculated; 3) If total demand does not exceed 
total supply, the water shall be shared according to stated figures; 4) In case total 
demand of water, declared by the three riparians, exceeds the water potential of 
a given river, the exceeding amount should be deduced proportionally from the 
demand of each riparian state.
During the negotiations there emerged the fact that the water potential 
was unable to meet the declared needs of the three riparians. And, more 
importantly, there have been rooted uncertainties and inadequacy relating to 
data on water and land resources. In response to Syrian and Iraqi demands for 
the formulation of urgent 'sharing arrangements' depending on the criteria that 
they put forward, Turkey proposed the "Three Staged Plan for Optimum,
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Equitable and Reasonable Utilization of the Transboundary Watercourses of the 
Tigris-Euphrates Basin." According to this plan, which, in this analysis, 
constitutes the essential rules of the proposed regime, the inventory studies of 
water and land resources of the whole region comprising the territories of 
respective states would be undertaken and evaluated jointly. Based on these 
studies, "necessary means and measures to attain the most reasonable and 
optimum utilization of resources would be defined." Turkey was convinced that 
"the accomplishment of this Plan would save substantial amount of water and 
consequently result in enough water to meet the requirements."
The Three Staged Plan was, in fact, formulated back in the 1960s by the 
engineers in the State Hydraulic Works (DSİ) of Turkey. Its original version was 
more comprehensive with detailed descriptions of the responsibilities of the 
study groups and the work schedule that they were supposed to carry on. Three 
study groups consisting of experts from Turkey, Syria and Iraq were decided to 
work on the three stages of the issue. Those were the 'hydrology', 'land 
resources', and 'engineering' study groups. The first version of the Plan was 
entirely a product of engineers with its wording and content. To illustrate, 
engineers put special emphasis on the economic concept of optimum utilization 
along with criteria of equitable and reasonable use of the waters of the Euphrates 
and Tigris. And, it has been stressed that the agreement on a proper water 
allocation should be based on findings derived from basin-wide planning 
process and all negotiations should emphasize basin-wide planning as a goal. 
Such a plan depends on the collection, interpretation and evaluation of basic data 
relating to hydrology, soils, climate and other physical and socio-economic 
factors. These experts claimed that the presence of evident data anomalies in the 
available records concerning water and irrigable land resources in the Euphrates-
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Tigris river basin were noted several times in various reports and the question of 
data validity was pertinent to the formulation of any firm conclusions. Özden 
Bilen demonstrates the conflicting data on the total irrigation project areas fed by 
the Euphrates in Syria and Iraq."^^ Bilen asserts that a variety of local and foreign 
experts contended different figures concerning availability of irrigable land in 
each riparian country depending on expert observation.42 Since irrigation is a 
major water consumer, lack of consensus on irrigable land potential is an 
important issue. Such inconsistent figures can mislead the analysts. Hence, data 
consistency and reliability, particularly on the land to be irrigated is a major 
concern for all parties and much work needs to be done to clarify existing 
situation. The Three Staged Plan would serve the end of data collection and 
survey of water and land resources of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin. This 
would be jointly performed by the experts from the three riparians so as to 
acquire a basis for water allocation questions. Moreover, engineers have asserted 
that the Euphrates and Tigris have to be considered as forming one single 
transboundary umtercourse system, not only because they are connected by their 
natural course when uniting at the Shatt-el-Arab, but also because Iraq uses the 
waters of both rivers interchangeably through its Thartar Canal Project which 
transfers the Tigris waters to the Euphrates. Consequently, all existing and future 
agricultural uses from the Euphrates, irrigation requirement of the same areas
41 Özden Bilen, "Prospects for Technical Cooperation in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin," 
Asit Biswas (ed.). International Waters o f the Middle East: From Euphrates-Tigris to 
Nile, Water Resources Management Series, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 
96-98.
42 Özden Bilen indicated that while official figures of Syria and Iraq for the total 
irrigation project areas fed by the Euphrates are as 773,000 ha and 1,952,000 ha, 
respectively; experts like John Kolars ( 375,00 ha in Syria and 1,294,000 ha in Iraq), 
Ewan Anderson (200,000 ha in Syria) and Peter Beaumont (400,000 ha in Syria) have all 
noted much less figures for the cultivated areas in Syria and Iraq.
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fed by the Euphrates, could be commanded by waters to be transferred from 
Tigris.
Turkey has proposed the updated and revised versions of this Plan during 
the 4th and 7th meetings of the Joint Technical Committee held in 1984 and 1986, 
respectively. The Plan was also reiterated in the tripartite meeting at a ministerial 
level on 26 June 1990 and during the bilateral talks with both Syria and Iraq in
1993. The Three-Staged Plan, aimed at achieving a solution satisfactory to all 
parties. And, the technicians in Turkey who formulated this plan were confident 
that its implementation would create a positive atmosphere that would be 
conducive to cooperation in the utilization of not only water but also other 
natural resources. Thus, these steps would also promote confidence between the 
states of the region. The stages of the plan are as follows:
Stage 1: Inventory Studies for W ater Resources
These will cover the following activities:
1) To exchange the whole available data (levels and discharges) of the 
selected gauging stations below: Experts of the three countries shall agree upon 
the nomination of the representative meteorological stations in the Euphrates- 
Tigris basin, and exchange data on them as well as the whole available data 
concerning evaporation, temperature, rainfall, snowfall (if available) on monthly 
basis for the representative stations;
2) To check the above mentioned data;
3) To measure jointly the discharges at the above mentioned stations in 
different seasons, if necessary;
4) To evaluate and correct the measurements;
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5) To exchange and check data about the quality of water (if available) or 
(such data after having been initiated);
6) To calculate the natural flows at various stations after the estimation of 
water uses and water losses at various sites.
Stage 2: Inventory Studies for Land Resources
These will cover the following activities;
1) To exchange information concerning soil classification methods and 
drainage criteria used and practiced in each country;
2 To check the soil conditions for projects, planned, under construction 
and in operation;
3) If the studies indicated under item (2) could not be carried for reasons 
acceptable to all sides, soil categories shall then be determined to the extent 
possible;
4) To study and discuss the crop-pattern determined according to soil 
classification and drainage conditions for projects, planned, under construction 
and in operation;
5) To calculate irrigation and leaching (washing away the soil) water 
requirements based on the studies carried out in the above mentioned items for 
the projects planned, under construction and in operation;
Stage 3: Evaluation of W ater and Land Resources
These will cover the following activities:
1) To discuss and determine irrigation type and system for the planned 
projects aiming at minimizing water losses and to investigate the possibility of 
the modernization and rehabilitation of the projects in operation;
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2) Based on the project-wise studies under item (Stage 2. 5) to determine 
the total water consumption of the whole projects in each country including 
municipal and industrial water supply, evaporation losses from reservoirs and 
the conveyance losses in irrigation schemes;
3) To set up a simulation model which present a river system 
schematically to analyze water demand and supply balance, considering water 
transfer opportunity from Tigris to Euphrates;
4) To discuss the methods and criteria for determining economic viability 
of the planned projects.
In order to expedite cooperative efforts, the Three-Staged Plan has to be 
carried out in accordance with a timetable. During the period needed to put the 
plan into action and during the implementation of the projects based on this plan 
such as water transfer from the Tigris, modernization and rehabilitation of 
irrigation schemes, water withdrawals from the Euphrates might be limited. 
Since final allocations will be calculated on the basis of the plan itself, utilization 
of waters will be adjusted according to the outcome of this plan.
Some experts argued that despite the two critical concepts, "utilization of 
the transboundary watercourses," which rejected the co-sovereignty on the 
waters as downstream riparians claim, hence the sharing arrangements, and "the 
Tigris-Euphrates basin" which of course referred to the rivers as a single system, 
the Three Staged Plan incorporated elements for a breakthrough.^^ It 
encompassed guidelines and prescriptions to be followed by the three riparians. 
It was a plan one would rather expect from a supragovernmental body that tries
Gün Kut, "Burning Waters: The Hydropolitics of The Euphrates and Tigris," op. cit., 
p. 13.
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to impose a regime on sovereign states, offering them greater benefits in return 
for limited application of sovereignty. Moreover, the plan was suggesting the 
application of high and appropriate technologies in order to minimize water 
requirements for agriculture, thus injecting the norm of conservation as an 
essential solution to what is basically a problem of a scarce resource. Further, the 
plan proposed to regulate the flow of the Euphrates river according to seasonal 
needs of the downstream countries instead of keeping a steady flow which may 
not match seasonal agricultural demand-within the limits of the average annual 
flow of 500 m 3/ s (the amount that Turkey promised to release at the Turkish- 
Syrian border by the Protocol of 1987). However, Syria and Iraq insisted on 
increasing the minimum quota to 700-750 m 3/s through ad hoc bilateral or 
trilateral sharing agreements.
The Three Staged Plan stems from the basic idea that the cost of concluding 
a water allocation agreement in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin is very high for 
the time being. Therefore, there is a need for a regional regime on waters of the 
Euphrates-Tigris. Preoccupation with amounts and individual shares will not 
help in overcoming water shortage in the region. In other words, dividing up a 
scarce resource among the users does not alleviate scarcity, irrespective of how 
equitable the allocation procedure is. Instead, a comprehensive water 
management regime would provide the necessary framework of principles, 
norms, rules and procedures for negotiations that would facilitate agreements. 
The Three Staged Plan initiates the preliminary stages of this regime. However, 
even the Three Staged Plan was coolly received by the downstream countries. 
Gün Kut explains the reason behind the opposition of Syria and Iraq to the plan 
by the very principle of sovereignty that Turkey was criticized for defending. 
Indeed, joint studies for optimal and rational utilization of water and land
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resources are seen by the downstream states as an infringement on their 
sovereignty, since Turkey expected to prove through this exercise that certain 
agricultural practices in Syria and Iraq are inefficient and that, therefore, the 
water needed for these could not be justified.44 Meanwhile, Turkey, in turn, 
should be expected to act in conformity with what it advises to Syria and Iraq: 
keep rationality in production the top priority, thus apply demand management 
techniques which are already in existence in Turkey, though partially.
The Three-Staged Plan mainly used the terminology developed by the 
International Law Commission of the United Nations entrusted with the 
codification of a law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses. 
Hence, an overview of the Turkish official stance as regards to the Euphrates- 
Tigris river basin can bring any researcher to the point that it is in conformity 
with the essence of the Convention, namely with Part II: General Principles. 
However, Turkish officials issued a number of critiques on the ILC Draft 1994. 
Turkish official circles asserted that the main purpose of the Convention should 
be to achieve an equitable and reasonable arrangement regulating water 
utilization among the watercourse states: "any other approach turns the 
Convention into a document which unilaterally restricts, in terms of both 
quantity and quality the utilization rights of states in which watercourses 
originate; due attention should also be paid to establishing an equitable balance 
of rights and obligations among all watercourse states." Yet, according to Turkish 
Government, while these requirements were taken into account to a certain 
extent in the general principles set forth in Part II of the Convention, the same 
cannot be said of Part III and Part IV of the document. In fact, as regards the Part
44 Gün Kut, "Burning Waters: The Hydropolitics of The Euphrates and Tigris," op. cit., 
p.3.
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Ill (Articles 11-19) of the Convention, Turkish authorities delivered severe 
criticisms mainly on the point that Part III comprises detailed procedural 
arrangements such as determining the period for reply to notification, ignoring 
the basic fact that each international watercourse possess different and specific 
characteristics. Accordingly, the Turkish proposal was to reduce the dispositions 
of Part III to a minimum necessary and to set forth certain general principles 
regarding planned measures. Turkish authorities had a series of criticisms on 
Article 5. They were eager to make it clear that the principle of equitable and 
reasonable utilization should be understood in the light of the fundamental 
principle of the sovereign rights of states over their territory. It should also be 
applied by taking fully into account all the particularities of the watercourses 
including the distinction of whether they are transboundary by nature or 
international (forming a boundary ) between states. In relation to the first 
paragraph of Article 5, Turkish officials suggested that the principle of 'optimal 
utilization' should aim at both protecting the watercourse and at optimizing the 
interests of riparian states in a way which avoids water waste. Yet, in the Turkish 
standpoint, the first paragraph of Article 5 does not clearly state that 'optimal 
utilization' should not be restricted to the protection only but should be seen also 
as comprising the concept of 'efficient use.' The most dramatic change that the 
Turkish Government proposed on the Convention was deleting Article 7 
altogether. The Turkish delegation indicated that this deletion would not 
eliminate the no-harm rule altogether, but subordinate it to the principle of 
equitable utilization. To that end, the delegation of Turkey requested that it 
should be made explicit in the text that the no-harm rule is "without prejudice to 
the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization." Moreover, the Turkish 
Government totally disagreed to include Article 33 in the Convention. The 
rationale is explained as follows: "It would be more appropriate not to foresee
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any compulsory rules as regards the settlement of disputes, and to leave this 
issue to the discretion of the concerned states. A framework agreement should 
not attem pt to set forth detailed rules in this respect, since it is virtually 
impossible to respond to the pressing needs of specific and more often than not 
very complex cases of water disputes.45
Turkey's cautious attitude towards ILC Draft 1994 and later its negative vote 
for the Convention 1997 basically originates from its deep concern about the fact 
that certain articles of the Convention might restrain its official stance in future 
negotiations for the allocation and management of the Euphrates-Tigris river 
basin. Turkish officials are very keen on the point that the Convention should 
keep their original aim of constituting a framework document. Therefore, they 
go on asserting that the Convention clearly comprises provisions which go far 
beyond that scope. In the Turkish contention, the Convention should be confined 
to setting forth the conceptual framework and the principles regarding the 
international watercourses. As to specific watercourses, bilateral and regional 
arrangements between watercourse states have to be concluded by taking into 
account the characteristics of each river svstem.
D. Decision-Making Procedures: From Joint Technical 
Committee to River Basin Organization
Regimes serve a number of purposes in international relations theory, and 
they could be very illuminating, in this context, to apply a theoretical framework 
to an empirical case. Some significant features of international regimes are very
‘*5 See The Turkish Goverment's Observations on the Draft Articles on the Law o f the 
Non-Navigational Uses o f International Watercourses, Report Sent to the United Nations 
General Assembly, Sixth Committee, as Member-States Opinions on the Draft Articles, 
July 1996.
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akin to the arguments in this study. To illustrate, decision-making structures of 
the regimes function as platforms on which participating states meet regularly, 
thence a certain level of institutionalization tends to occur, though its degree may 
be minimal at the beginning. The decision-making procedures of an international 
regime are those mechanisms that deal with situations requiring collective 
choice, which may for example, be necessary to amend or interpret the 
principles, norms, rules or procedures of the regime, and to deal with compliance 
issues, including monitoring, verification and sanctions against violators. 
Concerning the Euphrates-Tigris river basin, we see only the Joint Technical 
Committee (DITCH) that used to be acting as a technical forum meeting 
regularly for general project discussions and exchange of hydrological data. The 
initiation of these meetings was decided by an agreement reached at the end of 
the first meeting of the Mixed Economic Commission Technical Cooperation 
between Turkey and Iraq held in 1980. At the end of the meeting a Joint 
Technical Committee was established to discuss and finalize the water allocation 
problem among the riparians. The relevant part of this protocol which is devoted 
to the regional water issues reads:
"The two Sides further agreed that a Joint Technical Committee be 
convened within two moths to study matters relating to regional waters 
(in particular the Euphrates and Tigris basin) and be requested to 
submit its report to the government of the three countries within two 
years. This period can be extended one more year. Upon receipt of the 
report the three governments will be invited to meet at Ministerial 
level in order to evaluate the findings of the Joint Technical 
Committee and to decide on the methods and procedures to be 
recommended by the Joint Technical Committee to lead to a definition 
of the reasonable and appropriate amount of water that each country 
need from the joint rivers."
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The first meeting of the DITCH was held in May 1982 between Turkey and 
Iraq. In 1983, Syria joined the meetings, and from then on the DITCH convened 
on a trilateral basis. After 16 technical and two ministerial meetings, the DITCH 
could not fulfill its objectives and the DITCH talks came to a deadlock, having 
failed even to produce an outline of its report.^^ However, the role of the Joint 
Technical Committee should not be underestimated. Although its meetings were 
infrequent and appear to have made little substantive progress on the question of 
water allocation, it was a useful channel for communication. The major issues 
that led to the deadlock of the DITCH m.eetings were related to both the subject 
and object of the negotiations: whether the Euphrates and the Tigris be 
considered a single system or if the discussions could be exclusively limited to 
the Euphrates. Whether the final objective of the DITCH was to formulate a 
proposal for "sharing" the "international rivers", or was to come up with a 
trilateral regime for determining the "utilization" of the "transboundary 
w a t e r c o u r s e s . I n  other words, there have not been any consensus among the 
three riparians on the principles and norms of the negotiation process.
Apparently, institutionalized cooperation through a technical body or joint 
commission is more successful in preparing, the necessary data for decision­
makers: collecting and standardizing information, investigating facts, and 
considering special circumstances which are prerequisites of a more equitable 
determination of shared water benefits. Moreover, as most of the watersheds.
The outlines of the Joint Technical Committee meetings were reviewed with the 
permission of the officials in the State Hydraulic Works (DSI) in order to come up with 
the above arguments.
While, the former concepts of "sharing" and "international rivers" were adopted by the 
downstream riparians, "utilization" of "transboundary" rivers were strongly advocated by 
Turkey.
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like Euphrates-Tigris begin to reach the limits of supply due to augmented rates 
of demand, the flexibility of decision-making procedures to respond to the water 
stress becomes crucial. This flexibility is most needed to provide new forums for 
dealing with water allocation problems which cross both time and space. In that 
manner the DITCH meetings were not totally useless. First of all, the issues at 
stake were more complex than they appeared, and the concerns and official 
stance of the parties were openly put on the table at the meetings. Secondly, vital 
information exchange on regional waters has been possible (e.g., hydrological 
data were exchanged regularly by telex).^8 And, more importantly, certain 
proposals were more or less discussed.49 Still, none of the parties were content 
with the outcomes. Moreover, to set up more appropriate decision-making 
procedures, in conformity with the original definitions of the regime theorists, a 
river basin organization with broader tasks need to be established in the 
Euphrates-Tigris river basin along with a technical committee.^8
Creating some kind of river basin organization (RBO) is a practical step 
toward efficient and equitable allocation of the waters of the river basin. An 
international river basin organization can cover all or any of the following 
activities: data collection, planning water allocations, raising funds for studies 
and project implementations, project cost sharing, implementation of projects.
48 Natasha Beschomer, "Water and Instability in the Middle East," op. cit., p. 42.
49 For instance, Turkey's proposal for the Three Staged Plan and the downstream 
arguments, mutually shared by Syria and Iraq except for minor details, that are built 
around the assertion that the Euphrates waters have to be allocated among the riparians 
according to a mathematical formula which would recognize their declared needs, were 
all discussed within the framework of Joint Technical Committee meetings.
This study acknowledges the fact that even the DITCH meetings did not come up with 
any concrete outcome. However, this fact is not regarded as an impediment for further 
elaboration of the best suitable decision-making procedures for the basin, namely a river 
basin organization.
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operation and maintenance of projecrs, monitoring water use, control of 
pollution, and preservation of environmental conditions. River basin 
organizations range from joint commissions concerned with little more than 
water allocations, to organizations that have major executive functions. Examples 
of the former are the India-Pakistan and Sudan-Egypt joint water commissions, 
and of the latter the Senegal basin's Organization for Management of the Senegal 
river (OMVS) which covers almost all of the functions listed above.^^ Joint 
Technical Committee of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin could have been useful 
had the Three Staged Plan been fully implemented. Only with the realization of 
this plan, the DITCH would have the functions of data collection through 
inventory studies of water and land resources of the region, and planning water 
allocations according to data retrieved from those studies and on later stages it 
could monitor water use. Though the experience of the DITCH has been 
somehow disappointing, this should by no means imply that a river basin 
authority structured for the Euphrates-Tigris river basin is not a viable option for
Two commissions dealing with apportionment are the Permanent Joint Technical 
Commission for Nile Waters and the Permanent Indus Commission. The former was 
provided for in the Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, Nov. 8, 1959, 
the latter by the Indus Waters Treaty, Sept. 19, 1960. The major functions of the 
Permanent Indus Commission, established in 1960 between India and Pakistan are not 
only to apply the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation and application of 
the 1960 Agreement, but also the study of problems referred to by the two governments. 
The Indus Commission may also conduct inspections and make recommendations. The 
main purpose of that agency is to prepare specific cooperative arrangements, but it also 
initiates studies, and coordinates the parties' water policies. On the other hand, the 
Senegal River Basin Management Organization (OMVS) was created between Mali, 
Mauritania, Senegal, and Guinea in 1972, with a view to encouraging and coordinating 
water resources development in the Senegal river basin. This is the first international river 
basin entity with executive capacity. It not only has the power to approve a project, but 
may be charged with actual management. The main organs are: (1) a Conference of Heads 
of State upon which rest all final decisions; (2) a Council of Ministers of which make 
decisions or recommendations to the Conference and prepares and controls the activities 
of the Organization (3) a High Commissioner; (4) a Secretary-General; (5) a Permanent 
Water Commission; and (6) an Advisory Board to deal with water resource sharing.
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the better management and allocation of the waters of the region. To illustrate, 
one of the more specific needs, in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin, is for a forum, 
namely a river basin organization which could be established through a water 
allocation agreement, to facilitate trade-offs over time among upstream and 
downstream riparians. That is, given the fluctuations of the river, agreements 
based on flow in Year 1 need to be made with the understanding that those who 
gave up benefits that year would be compensated 2 or 3 years down the line 
when fluctuations changed. That authority would require a level of 
documentation and a guarantee that does not exist along the river at this time.^^
It is advisable to establish river basin organizations in progressive steps so 
that they may evolve to conform as precisely as possible to the needs of each 
situation. As a first step, a provisional commission can draft a treaty and 
constitution for the creation of a permanent joint water commission. This process 
may call for specific studies initiated by the provisional commission. At this stage 
a variety of technical assistance programs, even if carried out on a purely 
bilateral basis, could be useful.^^ For example, projects designed to improve 
short-term projections of river flow are needed. One approach could be to 
combine satellite data with data generated by people along the river basins by 
means of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) technology. Such models would 
greatly enhance the capacity to respond to flow fluctuations and to operate on a 
systems level. At a later stage, the permanent joint water commission can both 
create and regulate any further body that may be required, such as a river basin 
organization charged with the implementation of specific works and studies.^^
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Water in the Sand, U.S. Army, 1991, p. 22.
Ibid., p. 24.
54 Guy Le Moigne, Ashok Subramanian, Mei Xie, and Sandra Giltner (eds.), A Guide to 
the Formulation o f Water Resources Strategy, op. cit., pp. 90-91.
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In sum, a river basin organization for the Euphrates-Tigris basin could be 
established essentially to collect data and monitor hydrologic system 
performance. Such an organization could be composed of representatives of each 
nation, and funded by international funding organizations such as the World 
Bank.55 The organization should also include a professional staff to provide 
support and analysis for the deliberations. Such an authority could be a 
structured forum for debate on water and growth issues. As such, it could 
package implementable and technically feasible projects into policy options that 
would be subject to political debate in the individual countries. Such a forum 
could also be placed to develop consensus approaches among high level 
technical administrative staff. The authority could also respond to requests. It 
would encourage the discovery of shared interests and creation of options by 
building on the shared subculture of water management that crosses individual 
nations. Under such arrangements, the sovereignty of nation-state action will still 
be with the nations, but the national political debate would be supported by 
technical and administrative debate. Although such authorities are conceived 
still as advisory, they would exercise a great deal of moral and technical 
influence in any subsequent debates over equity and fairness of allocation of 
waters.^^
The above listed institutions are designed to support and determine, to a 
certain extent, the agenda of the negotiations for the use and management of the 
waters of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin. These principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures are basically derived from the proceedings of a
Ismail Serageldin, Towards Sustainable Management o f Water Resources, in the 
Series Directions in Developmen/, Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 1995, p. 30.
56 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Water in the Sand, op. cit., p. 22.
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series of international conferences on the water issue, from the works of the 
international law institutions such as the International Law Commission and 
International Law Association, and from the documentation that relates to the 
hydropolitical history of bilateral or multilateral negotiations among the three 
riparians. As a matter of fact, these can only become operational if the three 
riparians agree to commence the negotiation process on the use and management 
of the rivers. For the time being, the two downstream riparians keep insisting on 
concluding an immediate sharing agreement (comprising only the Euphrates 
river) that would entitle one third of the waters to Turkey and the remaining 
amount to the downstream Syria and Iraq to be shared between them according 
to the Protocol of 1990. However, it is generally argued in this paper that the 
present conditions are not ripe for concluding a sharing agreement due to the 
aforementioned reasons. Thus, a water use and management regime which can 
be identified with the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures 
will prepare the necessary ground to reach an agreement for equitable and 
efficient utilization of the Euphrates-Tigris river system.
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CONCLUSION
This study attem pted to draw the framework of a regime for better use 
and management of the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin with a view to 
resuscitating the negotiations among the riparians which have long been stalled 
and entered a deadlock. To avoid the current stalemate situation where none of 
the parties can claim to be better-off, this study thus sought to prepare a ground 
on which the riparians could coordinate their efforts, with a fresh impetus, in 
order to achieve the goal of using the existing water resources effectively and 
equitably. Nevertheless, the high degree of fear of insecurity and instability in 
the region forged with mutual distrust among the states hardly make the current 
political climate conducive to cooperation. Moreover, the irrational claims of the 
downstream riparians for sharing the waters of the rivers according to a simple 
arithmetic formula complicate the situation further.
This study has made it unequivocally clear that, simply sharing the waters 
of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers would by no means provide the riparians with 
an effective and equitable use formula. Because, sharing the already limited 
amounts of water would not constitute a long-term response to water scarcity, 
and would not serve the end of sustainable use and management of available 
water resources. Besides, poor water use and management policies especially 
practiced by the downstream riparians, as well as the lack of crucial data 
relating to the water and land resources, and inappropriate water supply 
networks suggest that the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin should only 
be allocated according to the needs of the parties within a comprehensive 
institutional setting, namely an international regime which will be formed to 
facilitate sustainable use of the rivers. Determining the real needs of the riparian
States will have to rely on the application of scientific methods such as the 
inventory studies of water and land resources, as well as the collection, 
verification and analysis of accurate data on soil quality, salinity, stream flow, 
and precipitation, through the application of geographical information systems 
(GIS). Hence, the Joint Technical Committee meetings that are suspended since 
the early 1990s can again be a useful platform to coordinate proper application of 
these techniques most of which were indeed envisaged in the Three Staged Plan 
once tabled by Turkey in 1984.
There may also be other venues for discussing the methods and techniques 
regarding the effective use and management of water resources. For instance, 
Turkey was once eager to host a global water summit in Istanbul in 1991 in order 
to discuss regional water issues, and was equally very willing to convene 
multilateral talks on water issues within the framework of the Middle East Peace 
Process. These initiatives have failed mainly due to a lack of mutual trust and 
confidence among the riparians. Nevertheless, there should be renewed efforts to 
convene such gatherings which would enable the participation of all concerned 
scholars and experts who would promote various cooperation models on the 
issue of water management.
There are other imaginative institutional options for Turkey to perform in 
the Euphrates-Tigris river basin. To illustrate, Turkey has shown its goodwill in 
sharing data through negotiations with the downstream riparians. Indeed, 
acquisition, verification and analysis of data is extremely problematic in the 
region and underlie all water management. Concerns about data availability, 
validity, reliability are common to all studies on water supply and demand in the 
Middle East. Even if reliable data is obtained regarding stream flow.
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precipitation, évapotranspiration, water removals, return flow, salinity and a 
host of other variables, the amount would be so enormous that it would have to 
be synthesized with archival records by means of GIS technology. Turkey has 
considerable advantages in this field, and ever-increasing volumes of data are 
becoming available.
Moreover, Turkey is eager to put forward many more cooperative 
proposals utilizing its experience in water technology and engineering skills in 
the field of management, use, and development of water resources. Proposals for 
technical cooperation based on the idea of basin-wide planning process include 
innovative options such as storage facilities, water transfer between rivers, non- 
conventional water supply methods, and demand management policies. 
Similarly, Turkey proposed construction of a peace pipeline with a view to 
supplying the downstream riparians as well as the whole Arabian peninsula 
with fresh water from the Seyhan and Ceyhan rivers in southern Anatolia. These 
and other proposals of Turkey, however, await accord of other states concerned.
Although a growing need for water would appear to suggest that adoption 
of ways which enhance more efficient use of water would be an expected rational 
response, it is analyzed, in this study that, particularly the downstream riparians 
of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin are not devoting sufficient attention and 
resources to more efficient use of water. Moreover, they have not shown any 
interest in cooperative solutions that Turkey offered to date. Notwithstanding 
the current unwillingness of its neighbors to cooperate, Turkey should take 
relevant steps to fully implement, at national level, what it suggests to the 
downstream riparians as to how to use water resources effectively. To begin 
with, Turkey should develop a comprehensive national water resources strategy.
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To achieve this, it should carry out a national water sector policy review 
regarding the guidelines that are furnished by international agencies such as the 
World Bank. Such a review will reveal ¿he inadequacies and insufficiencies of the 
water sector in Turkey. Whereas, Turkey has reached advanced stages in the 
field of water supply-management, the demand-side policies and techniques 
need restructuring, supplemented with methods and scientific developments 
that are applied in demand-management in other regions of the world. To 
illustrate, issues like water rights, ownership, registration of right of use, permit 
system, and penalty against misuses of water resources should all be considered 
and properly codified by law. Indeed, the related laws and legislation currently 
in force in Turkey are inadequate. These should be overhauled and adjusted to 
present and future needs. Similarly, Turkey should consider some technical 
measures like volumetric charging, and hence a precise pricing system in the 
farming sector. Farmers should be encouraged to participate in investment 
decisions regarding irrigation projects. Such measures will no doubt motivate 
thinking in terms of water conservation.
In addition to these, Turkey should develop an accurate database regarding 
specifically the per capita amounts of water on a regional basis within the 
country. The existing per capita amount which is estimated on national basis 
does not reflect the huge discrepancies between the per capita amounts in 
different geographical regions of Turkey. The current amount also gives an 
image that Turkey is a very rich country in per capita water available. Such false 
figures mislead authorities in other riparian states and some of the involved 
scholars all over the world to have exaggerated expectations from Turkey. 
Accurate figures at the disposal of Turkish authorities would therefore have a 
positive effect in balancing unfounded expectations from Turkey. In addition to
315
the measures that are suggested to be taken at the national level, Turkey may use 
its relatively advanced position with regards to the water use and management 
to initiate negotiations for building a basin-wide regime.
Hence, in this study, it is suggested that negotiations over the use of the 
disputed waters of the Euphrates and Tigris ivould likely to succeed when Turkey acts as 
an entrepreneurial leader, inventing new options capable of solving major problems and 
to fashion deals that are acceptable to all. I ’be principles, norms, rules, and decision­
making procedures discussed in the final chapter are all designed as useful 
institutional options which may support Turkey's skill in clarifying the 
overlapping interests of the parties to work on those options. Even though, 
Turkey is the most powerful of the three riparians militarily and economically, it 
would not be in Turkey's interest to act as a hegemon, or to use its power to 
induce and threaten its downstream neighbors to reach a cooperative solution. 
This will exacerbate the precarious political situation among the three riparians.^ 
On the one hand, it would be in Turkey's interest to evaluate water-related issues as an 
element of cooperation to promote its relations with its two prominent neighbors in the 
Middle East. Consequently, Turkey should fulfill its responsibility to promote 
cooperation and adopt policies that will conform to the requirements of a would- 
be basin-wide regime in order to set a precedent for other riparians, and even 
implement them unilaterally.
 ^ Bilateral relations between Turkey and Syria have long been uneasy. Two principal 
sources of friction between the states are: Syria's backing of opponents of the Turkish 
regime; to a lesser extent, Syrian irridentist claims to the province of Hatay. On the other 
hand, Turkish and Iraqi policies have often coincided on the issue of Kurdish separatism. 
This has extended to tacit military cooperation during the 1980s. However, the situation 
has drastically changed after the Gulf crisis of 1990. Turkey joined the Allied embargo 
against Iraq, and Iraq became less cooperative.
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As water resources are becoming scarce, access to them may be considered 
as a matter of national security. Hence, uncoordinated behaviors of riparian 
states regarding the uses of limited water resources may eventually strain their 
relations and may result in serious confrontation. Therefore, no country should 
consider itself as having the luxury of manipulating such an extremely vital 
resource, and cooperation should become an agreed-upon principle among the 
riparians. Moreover, a high degree of economic integration among the riparians 
increases the possibilities of cooperation over the use of the Euphrates-Tigris 
rivers. First, pre-existing cooperative frameworks reduce the transaction costs of 
negotiating agreements. Second, incentives to cheat on agreements, and thus 
monitoring costs decline with growing integration because the riparians will 
meet again in many other contexts. Third, with growing integration subordinate 
issues such as recognition of borders are less likely to interfere with river 
management efforts. Hence, Turkish-lraqi economic ties flourished during the 
1980s. Turkey was the principal conduit for Iraqi oil exports (1.5 million 
barrels/day by 1987), especially after the Iraqi closure of the Iraqi-Syrian pipeline 
in 1982. The volume of direct bilateral trade grew tremendously during the Iran- 
Iraq war and by the end of the war Iraq owed Turkey $2 bn. The UN embargo 
against Iraq has had serious economic consequences for Turkish-lraqi economic 
relations. Nevertheless, there are indications that Turkey is keen to resume 
trading relations with Iraq. For instance, during 1997 Turkey negotiated with 
Iraq to build a $2.5 bn worth 1,300 km pipeline to carry 10 bn cubic meters of gas 
per year from the north east of the country.2 On the other hand, Turkish-Syrian 
official economic ties are limited,^ but it is important to note that transit trade.
^ EIU, Country Profile 1997-1998, p. 24.
 ^ Mixed Economic Commission meetings were very infrequent (Personal 
correspondence with Turgay U90Z, Director of the Department of Agreements with 
Middle Eastern Countries, Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade, 1997).
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Turkish livestock exports to, and cereal imports from Syria flourished despite 
political friction. However, despite the geographical proximity of the two 
countries and great potentials in bilateral trade, the volume of trade did not 
reach considerable levels. Thus, each and every opportunity should be used by 
the riparians to exploit the potential of economic relations in the region. This 
would evidently facilitate negotiations over water resources, and may even make 
'water' a part of regional trade which would ease the stress on supply. For 
example, pipelines would convey oil and gas to Turkey. In exchange, Turkey 
would provide food, water, and hydroelectric power to its neighbors. To 
illustrate, Iraq and Syria would almost certainly be consumer of agricultural 
goods produced in the GAP region. This growing interdependence and obvious 
fruits of economic cooperation are the best guarantee against disruption.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A. CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF 
NON-NAVIGATIONAL USES OF 
INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES
The Parties to the present Convention, Conscious of the importance of 
international watercourses and the non-navigational uses thereof in many regions of 
the world, Having in mind Article 13, paragraph 1 (a), of the Charter of the United 
Nations, which provides that the General Assembly shall initiate studies and make 
recommendations for the purpose of encouraging the progressive development of 
international law and its codification. Considering that successful codification and 
progressive development of rules of international law regarding non-navigational uses 
of international watercourses would assist in promoting and implementing the 
purposes and principles set forth in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, Taking into account the problems affecting many international watercourses 
resulting from, among other things, increasing demands and pollution. Expressing the 
conviction that a framework convention will ensure the utilization, development, 
conservation, management and protection of international watercourses and the 
promotion of the optimal and sustainable utilization thereof for present and future 
generations. Affirming the importance of international cooperation and good- 
neighbourliness in this field. Aware of the special situation and needs of developing 
countries. Recalling the principles and recommendations adopted by the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development of 1992 in the Rio Declaration 
and Agenda 21, Recalling also the existii-g bilateral and multilateral agreements 
regarding the non-navigational uses of international watercourses. Mindful of the 
valuable contribution of international organizations, both governmental and non­
governmental, to the codification and progressive development of international law in 
this field. Appreciative of the work carried out by the International Law Commission 
on the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses. Bearing in mind 
United Nations General Assembly resolution 49/52 of 9 December 1994, Have agreed 
as follows:
PARTI. INTRODUCTION
Article 1
Scope of the present Convention
1. The present Convention applies to uses of international watercourses and of 
their waters for purposes other than navigation and to measures of protection.
preservation and management related to the uses of those watercourses and their 
waters.
2. The uses of international watercourses for navigation is not within the scope 
of the present Convention except insofar as other uses affect navigation or are affected 
by navigation.
Article 2
Use of terms For the purposes of the present Convention:
(a) "Watercourse" means a system of surface waters and groundwaters 
constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and normally 
flowing into a common terminus;
(b) "International watercourse" means a watercourse, parts of which are situated 
in different States;
(c) "Watercourse State" means a State Party to the present Convention in whose 
territory part of an international watercourse is situated, or a Party that is a regional 
economic integration organization, in the territory of one or more of whose Member 
States part of an international watercourse is situated;
(d) "Regional economic integration organization" means an organization 
constituted by sovereign States of a given region, to which its member States have 
transferred competence in respect of matters governed by this Convention and which 
has been duly authorized in accordance with its internal procedures, to sign, ratify, 
accept, approve or accede to it.
Article 3
Watercourse agreements
1. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, nothing in the present 
Convention shall affect the rights or obligations of a watercourse State arising from 
agreements in force for it on the date on which it became a party to the present 
Convention.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1, parties to agreements referred 
to in paragraph 1 may, where necessary, consider harmonizing such agreements with 
the basic principles of the present Convention.
3. Watercourse States may enter into one or more agreements, hereinafter 
referred to as "watercourse agreements", which apply and adjust the provisions of the 
present Convention to the characteristics and uses of a particular international 
watercourse or part thereof.
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4. Where a watercourse agreement is concluded between two or more 
watercourse States, it shall define the waters to which it applies. Such an agreement 
may be entered into with respect to an entire international watercourse or any part 
thereof or a particular project, programme or use except insofar as the agreement 
adversely affects, to a significant extent, the use by one or more other watercourse 
States of the waters of the watercourse, without their express consent.
5. Where a watercourse State considers that adjustment and application of the 
provisions of the present Convention is required because of the characteristics and 
uses of a particular international watercourse, watercourse States shall consult with a 
view to negotiating in good faith for the purpose of concluding a watercourse 
agreement or agreements.
6. Where some but not all watercourse States to a particular international 
watercourse are parties to an agreement, nothing in such agreement shall affect the 
rights or obligations under the present Convention of watercourse States that are not 
parties to such an agreement.
Article 4
Parties to watercourse agreements
1. Every watercourse State is entitled to participate in the negotiation of and to 
become a party to any watercourse agreement that applies to the entire international 
watercourse, as well as to participate in any relevant consultations.
2. A watercourse State whose use of an international watercourse may be 
affected to a significant extent by the implementation of a proposed watercourse 
agreement that applies only to a part of the watercourse or to a particular project, 
programme or use is entitled to participate in consultations on such an agreement and, 
where appropriate, in the negotiation thereof in good faith with a view to becoming a 
party thereto, to the extent that its use is thereby affected.
PART 11. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Article 5
Equitable and reasonable utilization and participation
1. Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an international 
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an international 
watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse States with a view to
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attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits therefrom, taking 
into account the interests of the watercourse States concerned, consistent with 
adequate protection of the watercourse.
2. Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and protection of 
an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable maimer. Such 
participation includes both the right to utilize the watercourse and the duty to 
cooperate in the protection and development thereof, as provided in the present 
Convention.
Article 6
Factors relevant to equitable and reasonable utilization
1. Utilization of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable 
manner within the meaning of article 5 requires taking into account all relevant factors 
and circumstances, including:
(a) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other 
factors of a natural character;
(b) The social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned;
(c) The population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse State;
(d) The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse State on 
other watercourse States;
(e) Existing and potential uses of the watercourse;
(f) Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water 
resources of the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that effect;
(g) The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned 
or existing use.
2. In the application of article 5 or paragraph 1 of this article, watercourse States 
concerned shall, when the need arises, enter into consultations in a spirit of 
cooperation.
3. The; weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance in 
comparison with that of other relevant factors. In determining what is a reasonable 
and equitable use, all relevant factors are to be considered together and a conclusion 
reached on the basis of the whole.
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Obligation not to cause significant harm
1. Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in their 
territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to 
other watercourse States.
2. Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another watercourse State, 
the States whose use causes such harm shall, in the absence of agreement to such use, 
take all appropriate measures, having due regard for the provisions of articles 5 and 6, 
in consultation with the affected State, to eliminate or mitigate such harm and, where 
appropriate, to discuss the question of compensation.
Article 8
General obligation to cooperate
1. Watercourse States shall cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality, 
territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good faith in order to attain optimal utilization 
and adequate protection of an international watercourse.
2. In determining the manner of such cooperation, watercourse States may 
consider the establishment of joint mechanisms or commissions, as deemed necessary 
by them, to facilitate cooperation on relevant measures and procedures in the light of 
experience gained through cooperation in existing joint mechanisms and commissions 
in various regions.
Article 9
Regular exchange of data and information
1. Pursuant to article 8, watercourse States shall on a regular basis exchange 
readily available data and information on the condition of the watercourse, in 
particular that of a hydrological, meteorological, hydrogeological and ecological 
nature and related to the water quality as well as related forecasts.
2. If a watercourse State is requested by another watercourse State to provide 
data or information that is not readily available, it shall employ its best efforts to 
comply with the request but may condition its compliance upon payment by the 
requesting State of the reasonable costs of collecting and, where appropriate, 
processing such data or information.
Article 7
324
3. Watercourse States shall emplo)' their best efforts to collect and, where 
appropriate, to process data and information in a manner which facilitates its 
utilization by the other watercourse States to which it is communicated.
Article 10
Relationship between different kinds of uses
1. In the absence of agreement or custom to the contrary, no use of an 
international watercourse enjoys inherent priority over other uses.
2. In the event of a conflict between uses of an international watercourse, it 
shall be resolved with reference to articles 5 to 7, with special regard being given to 
the requirements of vital human needs.
PART III. PLANNED MEASURES
Article 11
Information concerning planned measures
Watercourse States shall exchange information and consult each other and, if 
necessary, negotiate on the possible effects of planned measures on the condition of 
an international watercourse.
Article 12
Notification concerning planned measures with possible adverse effects
Before a watercourse State implements or permits the implementation of 
planned measures which may have a significant adverse effect upon other watercourse 
States, it shall provide those States with timely notification thereof Such notification 
shall be accompanied by available technical data and information, including the 
results of any environmental impact assessment, in order to enable the notified States 
to evaluate the possible effects of the planned measures.
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Period for reply to notification
Unless otherwise agreed:
(a) A watercourse State providing a notification under article 12 shall allow 
the notified States a period of six months within which to study and evaluate the 
possible effects of the planned measures and to communicate the findings to it;
(b) This period shall, at the request of a notified State for which the evaluation 
of the planned measures poses special difficulty, be extended for a period of six 
months.
Article 14
Obligations of the notifying State during the period for reply
During the period referred to in article 13, the notifying State:
(a) Shall cooperate with the notified States by providing them, on request, with 
any additional data and information that is available and necessary for an accurate 
evaluation; and
(b) Shall not implement or permit the implementation of the planned measures 
without the consent of the notified States.
Article 15
Reply to notification
The notified States shall communicate their findings to the notifying State as 
early as possible within the period applicable pursuant to article 13. If a notified State 
finds that implementation of the planned measures would be inconsistent with the 
provisions of articles 5 or 7, it shall attach to its finding a documented explanation 
setting forth the reasons for the finding.
Article 16
Absence of reply to notification
1. If, within the period applicable pursuant to article 13, the notifying State 
receives no communication under article 15, it may, subject to its obligations under 
articles 5 and 7, proceed with the implementation of the planned measures, in 
accordance with the notification and any other data and information provided to the 
notified States.
Article 13
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2. Any claim to compensation by a notified State which has failed to reply 
within the period applicable pursuant to article 13 may be offset by the costs incurred 
by the notifying State for action undertaken after the expiration of the time for a reply 
which would not have been undertaken if the notified State had objected within that 
period.
Article 17
Consultations and negotiations concerning planned measures
1. If a communication is made under article 15 that implementation of the 
planned measures would be inconsistent with the provisions of articles 5 or 7, the 
notifying State and the State making the communication shall enter into consultations 
and, if necessary, negotiations with a view to arriving at an equitable resolution of the 
situation.
2. The consultations and negotiations shall be conducted on the basis that each 
State must in good faith pay reasonable regard to the rights and legitimate interests of 
the other State.
3. During the course of the consultations and negotiations, the notifying State 
shall, if so requested by the notified State at the time it makes the communication, 
refrain from implementing or permitting the implementation of the plaimed measures 
for a period of six months unless otherwise agreed.
Article 18
Procedures in the absence of notification
1. If a watercourse State has reasonable grounds to believe that another 
watercourse State is planning measures that may have a significant adverse effect 
upon it, the former State may request the latter to apply the provisions of article 12. 
The request shall be accompanied by a documented explanation setting forth its 
grounds.
2. In the event that the State planning the measures nevertheless finds that it is 
not under an obligation to provide a notification under article 12, it shall so inform the 
other State, providing a documented explanation setting forth the reasons for such 
finding. If this finding does not satisfy the other State, the two States shall, at the 
request of that other State, promptly enter into consultations and negotiations in the 
manner indicated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 17.
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3. During the course of the consultations and negotiations, the State planning 
the measiires shall, if so requested by the other State at the time it requests the 
initiation of consultations and negotiations, refrain from implementing or permitting 
the implementation of those measures for a period of six months unless otherwise 
agreed.
Article 19
Urgent implementation of planned nkeasures
1. In the event that the implementation of planned measures is of the utmost 
urgency in order to protect public health, public safety or other equally important 
interests, the State planning the measures may, subject to articles 5 and 7, 
immediately proceed to implementation, notwithstanding the provisions of article 14 
and paragraph 3 of article 17.
2. In such case, a formal declaration of the urgency of the measures shall be 
commimicated without delay to the other watercourse States referred to in article 12 
together with the relevant data and information.
3. The State planning the measures shall, at the request of any of the States 
referred to in paragraph 2, promptly enter into consultations and negotiations with it 
in the manner indicated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 17.
PART IV. PROTECTION, PRESERVATION AND MANAGEMENT
Article 20
Protection and preservation of ecosystems
Watercourse States shall, individually and, where appropriate, jointly, protect 
and preserve the ecosystems of international watercourses.
Article 21
Prevention, reduction and control of pollution
1. For the purpose of this article, "pollution of an international watercourse" 
means any detrimental alteration in the composition or quality of the waters of an 
international watercourse which results directly or indirectly from human conduct.
2. Watercourse States shall, individually and, where appropriate, jointly, 
prevent, reduce and control the pollution of an international watercourse that may 
cause significant harm to other watercourse States or to their environment, including
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harm to human health or safety, to the use of the waters for any beneficial purpose or 
to the living resources of the watercourse. Watercourse States shall take steps to 
harmonize their policies in this connection.
3. Watercourse States shall, at the request of any of them, consult with a view to 
arriving at mutually agreeable measures and methods to prevent, reduce and control 
pollution of an international watercourse, such as:
(a) Setting joint water quality objectives and criteria;
(b) Establishing techniques and practices to address pollution from point and 
non-point sources;
(c) Establishing lists of substances the introduction of which into the waters of 
an international watercourse is to be prohibited, limited, investigated or monitored.
Article 22
Introduction of alien or new species
Watercourse States shall take all measures necessary to prevent the introduction 
of species, alien or new, into an international watercourse which may have effects 
detrimental to the ecosystem of the watercourse resulting in significant harm to other 
watercourse States.
Article 23
Protection and preservation of the marine environment
Watercourse States shall, individually and, where appropriate, in cooperation 
with other States, take all measures with respect to an international watercourse that 
are necessary to protect and preserve the marine environment, including estuaries, 
taking into account generally accepted international rules and standards.
Article 24
Management
1. Watercourse States shall, at the request of any of them, enter into 
consultations concerning the management of an international watercourse, which may 
include the establishment of a joint management mechanism.
2. For the purposes of this article, "management" refers, in particular, to:
(a) Planning the sustainable development of an international watercourse and 
providing for the implementation of any plans adopted; and
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(b) Otherwise promoting the rational and optimal utilization, protection and 
control of the watercourse.
Article 25
Regulation
1. Watercourse States shall cooperate, where appropriate, to respond to needs or 
opportunities for regulation of the flow of the waters of an international watercourse.
2. Unless otherwise agreed, watercourse States shall participate on an equitable 
basis in the construction and maintenance or defrayal of the costs of such regulation 
works as they may have agreed to undertake.
3. For the purposes of this article, "regulation" means the use of hydraulic 
works or any other continuing measure to alter, vary or otherwise control the flow of 
the waters of an international watercourse.
Article 26
Installations
1. Watercourse States shall, within their respective territories, employ their best 
efforts to maintain and protect installations, facilities and other works related to an 
international watercourse.
2. Watercourse States shall, at the request of any of them which has reasonable 
grounds to believe that it may suffer significant adverse effects, enter into 
consultations with regard to:
(a) The safe operation and maintenance of installations, facilities or other 
works related to an international watercourse; and
(b) The protection of installations, facilities or other works from willful or 
negligent acts or the forces of nature.
PART V. HARMFUL CONDITIONS AND EMERGENCY SITUATIONS
Article 27
Prevention and mitigation of harmful conditions
Watercourse States shall, individually and, where appropriate, jointly, take all 
appropriate measures to prevent or mitigate conditions related to an international 
watercourse that may be harmful to other watercourse States, whether resulting from
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natural causes or human conduct, such as flood or ice conditions, water-borne 
diseases, siltation, erosion, salt-water intrusion, drought or desertification.
Article 28
Emergency situations
1. For the purposes of this article, "emergency" means a situation that causes, or 
poses an imminent threat of causing, serious harm to watercourse States or other 
States and that results suddenly from natural causes, such as floods, the breaking up of 
ice, landslides or earthquakes, or from human conduct, such as industrial accidents.
2. A watercourse State shall, without delay and by the most expeditious means 
available, notify other potentially affected States and competent international 
organizations of any emergency originating within its territory.
3. A watercourse State within whose territory an emergency originates shall, in 
cooperation with potentially affected States and, where appropriate, competent 
international organizations, immediately take all practicable measures necessitated by 
the circumstances to prevent, mitigate and eliminate harmful effects of the emergency.
4. When necessary, watercourse States shall jointly develop contingency plans 
for responding to emergencies, in cooperation, where appropriate, with other 
potentially affected States and competent international organizations.
PART VI. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Article 29
International watercourses and installations in time of armed conflict
International watercourses and related installations, facilities and other works 
shall enjoy the protection accorded by the principles and rules of international law 
applicable in international and non-intemational armed conflict and shall not be used 
in violation of those principles and rules.
Article 30
Indirect procedures
In cases where there are serious obstacles to direct contacts between watercourse 
States, the States concerned shall fulfil their obligations of cooperation provided for in 
the present Convention, including exchange of data and information, notification.
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communication, consultations and negotiations, through any indirect procedure 
accepted by them.
Article 31
Data and information vital to national defence or security
Nothing in the present Convention obliges a watercourse State to provide data or 
information vital to its national defence or security. Nevertheless, that State shall 
cooperate in good faith with the other watercourse States with a view to providing as 
much information as possible under the circumstances.
Article 32
Non-discrimination
Unless the watercourse States concerned have agreed otherwise for the 
protection of the interests of persons, natural or juridical, who have suffered or are 
under a serious threat of suffering significant transboundary harm as a result of 
activities related to an international watercourse, a watercourse State shall not 
discriminate on the basis of nationality or residence or place where the injury 
occurred, in granting to such persons, in accordance with its legal system, access to 
judicial or other procedures, or a right to claim compensation or other relief in respect 
of significant harm caused by such activities carried on in its territory.
Article 33
Settlement of disputes
1. In the event of a dispute between two or more Parties concerning the 
interpretation or application of the present Convention, the Parties concerned shall, in 
the absence of an applicable agreement between them, seek a settlement of the dispute 
by peaceful means in accordance with the following provisions.
2. If the Parties concerned cannot reach agreement by negotiation requested by 
one of them, they may jointly seek the good offices of, or request mediation or 
conciliation by, a third party, or make use, as appropriate, of any joint watercourse 
institutions that may have been established by them or agree to submit the dispute to 
arbitration or to the International Court of Justice.
3. Subject to the operation of paragraph 10, if after six months from the time of 
the request for negotiations referred to in paragraph 2, the Parties concerned have not 
been able to settle their dispute through negotiation or any other means referred to in
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paragraph 2, the dispute shall be submitted, at the request of any of the parties to the 
dispute, to impartial fact-finding in accordance with paragraphs 4 to 9, unless the 
Parties otherwise agree.
4. A Fact-finding Commission shall be established, composed of one member 
nominated by each Party concerned and in addition a member not having the 
nationality of any of the Parties concerned chosen by the nominated members who 
shall serve as Chairman.
5. If the members nominated by the Parties are unable to agree on a Chairman 
within three months of the request for the establishment of the Commission, any Party 
concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to appoint the 
Chairman who shall not have the nationality of any of the parties to the dispute or of 
any riparian State of the watercourse concerned. If one of the Parties fails to nominate 
a member within three months of the initial request pursuant to paragraph 3, any other 
Party concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to appoint a 
person who shall not have the nationality of ¿my of the parties to the dispute or of any 
riparian State of the watercourse concerned. The person so appointed shall constitute a 
single-member Commission.
6. The Commission shall determine its own procedure.
7. The Parties concerned have the obligation to provide the Commission with 
such information as it may require and, on request, to permit the Commission to have 
access to their respective territory and to inspect any facilities, plant, equipment, 
construction or natural feature relevant for the purpose of its inquiry.
8. The Commission shall adopt its report by a majority vote, unless it is a 
single-member Commission, and shall submit that report to the Parties concerned 
setting forth its findings and the reasons therefor and such recommendations as it 
deems appropriate for an equitable solution o f the dispute, which the Parties 
concerned shall consider in good faith.
9. The expenses of the Commission shall be borne equally by the Parties 
concerned.
10. When ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the present Convention, 
or at any time thereafter, a Party which is not a regional economic integration 
organization may declare in a written instrument submitted to the Depositary that, in 
respect of any dispute not resolved in accordance with paragraph 2, it recognizes as 
compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement in relation to any Party 
accepting the same obligation:
(a) Submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice; and/or
(b) Arbitration by an arbitral tribunal established and operating, unless the 
parties to the dispute otherwise agreed, in accordance with the procedure laid down in
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the annex to the present Convention. A Party which is a regional economic integration 
organization may make a declaration with like effect in relation to arbitration in 
accordance with subparagraph (b).
PART VII. FINAL CLAUSES
Article 34
Signature
The present Convention shall be open for signature by all States and by regional 
economic integration organizations from ... until... at United Nations Headquarters in 
New York.
Article 35
Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
1. The present Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession by States and by regional economic integration organizations. The 
instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. Any regional economic integration organization which becomes a Party to 
this Convention without any of its member States being a Party shall be bound by all 
the obligations under the Convention. In the case of such organizations, one or more 
of whose member States is a Party to this Convention, the organization and its 
member States shall decide on their respective responsibilities for the performance of 
their obligations under the Convention. In such cases, the organization and the 
member States shall not be entitled to exercise rights under the Convention 
concurrently.
3. In their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, the 
regional economic integration organizations shall declare the extent of their 
competence with respect to the matters governed by the Convention. These 
organizations shall also inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of any 
substantial modification in the extent of their competence.
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Entry into force
1. The present Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day following 
the date of deposit of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. For each State or regional economic integration organization that ratifies, 
accepts or approves the Convention or accedes thereto after the deposit of the thirty- 
fifth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, the Convention 
shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the deposit by such State or regional 
economic integration organization of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession.
3. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, any instrument deposited by a 
regional economic integration organization shall not be counted as additional to those 
deposited by States.
Article 37
Authentic texts
The original of the present Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, 
French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned plenipotentiaries, being duly 
authorized thereto, have signed this Convention.
Article 36
DONE at New York, this _ 
hundred and ninety-seven.
day of one thousand nine
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ANNEX
ARBITRATION
Article 1
Unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree, the arbitration pursuant to 
article 33 of the Convention shall take place in accordance with articles 2 to 14 of the 
present annex.
Article 2
The claimant party shall notify the respondent party that it is referring a dispute 
to arbitration pursuant to article 33 of the Convention. The notification shall state the 
subject matter of arbitration and include, in particular, the articles of the Convention, 
the interpretation or application of which are at issue. If the parties do not agree on 
the subject matter of the dispute, the arbitral tribunal shall determine the subject 
matter.
Article 3
1. In disputes between two parties, the arbitral tribunal shall consist of three 
members. Each of the parties to the dispute shall appoint an arbitrator and the two 
arbitrators so appointed shall designate by common agreement the third arbitrator, 
who shall be the Chairman of the tribunal. The latter shall not be a national of one of 
the parties to the dispute or of any riparian State of the watercourse concerned, nor 
have his or her usual place of residence in the territory of one of these parties or such 
riparian State, nor have dealt with the case in any other capacity.
2. In disputes between more than two parties, parties in the same interest shall 
appoint one arbitrator jointly by agreement.
3. Any vacancy shall be filled in the manner prescribed for the initial 
appointment.
Article 4
1. If the Chairman of the arbitral tribunal has not been designated within two 
months of the appointment of the second arbitrator, the President of the International
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Court of Justice shall, at the request of a party, designate the Chairman within a 
further two-month period.
2. If one of the parties to the dispute does not appoint an arbitrator within two 
months of receipt of the request, the other party may inform the President of the 
International Court of Justice, who shall make the designation within a further two- 
month period.
Article 5
The arbitral tribunal shall render its decisions in accordance with the provisions 
of this Convention and international law.
Article 6
Unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree, the arbitral tribimal shall 
determine its own rules of procedure.
Article 7
The arbitral tribimal may, at the request of one of the Parties, recommend 
essential interim measures of protection.
Article 8
1. The parties to the dispute shall facilitate the work of the arbitral tribunal and, 
in particular, using all means at their disposal, shall:
(a) Provide it with all relevant documents, information and facilities; and
(b) Enable it, when necessary, to call witnesses or experts and receive their 
evidence.
2. The parties and the arbitrators are under an obligation to protect the 
confidentiality of any information they receive in confidence during the proceedings 
of the arbitral tribunal.
Article 9
Unless the arbitral tribunal determines otherwise because of the particular 
circumstances of the case, the costs of the tribunal shall be borne by the parties to the 
dispute in equal shares. The tribunal shall keep a record of all its costs, and shall 
furnish a final statement thereof to the parties.
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Any Party that has an interest of a legal nature in the subject matter of the 
dispute which may be affected by the decision in the case, may intervene in the 
proceedings with the consent of the tribunal.
Article 11
The tribunal may hear and determine counterclaims arising directly out of the 
subject matter of the dispute.
Article 12
Decisions both on procedure and substance of the arbitral tribunal shall be taken 
by a majority vote of its members.
Article 13
If one of the parties to the dispute does not appear before the arbitral tribunal or 
fails to defend its case, the other party may request the tribunal to continue the 
proceedings and to make its award. Absence of a party or a failure of a party to 
defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings. Before rendering its final 
decision, the arbitral tribunal must satisfy itself that the claim is well founded in fact 
and law.
Article 14
1. The tribunal shall render its final decision within five months of the date on 
which it is fully constituted unless it finds it necessary to extend the time limit for a 
period which should not exceed five more months.
2. The final decision of the arbitral tribunal shall be confined to the subject 
matter of the dispute and shall state the reasons on which it is based. It shall contain 
the names of the members who have participated and the date of the final decision. 
Any member of the tribunal may attach a separate or dissenting opinion to the final 
decision.
3. The award shall be binding on the parties to the dispute. It shall be without 
appeal unless the parties to the dispute have agreed in advance to an appellate 
procedure.
Article 10
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4. Any controversy which may arise between the parties to the dispute as 
regards the interpretation or manner of implementation of the final decision may be 
submitted by either party for decision to the arbitral tribunal which rendered it.</p>
Notes
1. For the report of the Sixth Committee on the work of the Working Group at 
its first session, held from 7 to 25 October 1996, see document A/51/624.
2. Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, Supplement 
No. 10 (A/49/10), chap. III. D.
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APPENDIX B. HELSINKI RULES ON THE USES OF THE 
WATERS OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS
(Selected Chapters)
Adopted bv the International Law Association at its Fifty-second Conference held at
Helsinki in 1966
CHAPTER I
GENERAL 
Article I
The general rules of international law as set forth in these chapters are applicable 
to the use of the waters of an international drainage basin except as may be provided 
otherwise by convention, agreement or binding custom among the basin States.
Article II
An international drainage basin is a geographical area extending over two or more 
States determined by the watershed limits of the system of waters, including surface and 
underground waters, flowing into a common terminus.
Article III
A “basin State” is a state the territory of which includes a portion of an 
international drainage basin.
CHAPTER II
EQUITABLE UTILIZATION OF THE WATERS OF AN 
INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASIN
Article IV
Each basin State is entitled to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial 
uses of the waters of an international drainage basin.
Article V
(1) What is a reasonable and equitable share within the maining of Article I is to 
be determined in the light of all the relevant factors in each particular case.
(2) Relevant factors which are to be considered include, but are not limited to:
(a) The geography of the basin including in particular the extent of the drainage area in 
the territory of each basin State;
(b) The hydrology of the basin, including in particular the contribution of water by each 
basin State;
(c) The climate affecting the basin;
(d) The past utilization of the waters of the basin, including in particular existing 
utilization;
(e) The economic and social needs of each basin Sate;
(f) The population dependent on the waters of the basin in each basin State;
(g) The comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the economic and social 
needs of each basin State;
(h) The availability of other resources;
(I) The avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of waters of the basin;
(j) The practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-basin States as a means of 
adjusting conflicts among uses; and
(k) The degree to which the needs of a basin State may be satisfied, without causing 
substantial injury to a co-basin State.
(3) The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance in 
comparison with that of other relevant factors. In determining what is a reasonable and 
equitable share, all relevant factors are to be considered together and a conclusion reached 
on the basis of the whole.
Article VI
A use or category of uses is not entitled to any inherent preference over any other 
use or category of uses.
Article VII
A basin State may not be denied the present reasonable use of the waters of an 
international drainage basin to reserve for a co-basin State a future use of such waters.
341
Article VIII
1. An existing reasonable use may continue in operation unless the factors 
justifying its continuance are outweighed by other factors leading to the conclusion that it 
be modified or terminated so as to accommodate a competing incompatible use.
2. (a) A use that is in fact operational is deemed to have been an existing use from 
the time of the initiation of construction directly related to the use or, where such 
construction is not required, the undertaking of comparable acts of actual implementation.
(b) Such a use continues to be an existing use until such time as it is discontinued 
with the intention that it be abandoned.
3. A use will not be deemed an existing use if at the time of becoming operational 
it is incompatible with an already existing reasonable use.
CHAPTER VI
PROCEDURES FOR THE PREVENTION AND 
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Article XXVI
This chapter relates to procedures for the prevention and settlement of 
international disputes as to the legal rights or other interests of basin States and of other 
States in the waters of an international drainage basin.
Article XXVII
1. Consistently with the Charter of the United Nations, States are under an 
obligation to settle international disputes as to their legal rights or other interests by 
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice are not 
endangered.
%
2. It is recommended that States resort progressively to the means of prevention 
and settlement of disputes stipulated in Articles XXIX to XXXIV of this Chapter.
Article XXVIII
1. States are under a primary obligi'tion to resort to means of prevention and 
settlement of disputes stipulated in the applicable treaties binding upon them.
2. States are limited to the means of prevention and settlement of disputes 
stipulated in treaties binding upon them only to the extent provided by the applicable 
treaties.
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Article XXIX
1. With a view to preventing disputes from arising between basin States as to their 
legal rights or other interests, it is recommended that each basin State furnish relevant and 
reasonably available information to the other basin States concerning the waters of a 
drainage basin within its territory and its use of, and activities with respect to, such 
waters.
2. A State, regardless of its location in a drainage basin, should in particular 
furnish to any other basin State, the interests of which may be substantially affected, 
notice of any proposed construction or installation which would alter the regime of the 
basin in a way which might give rise to a dispute as defined in Article XXVI of this 
Chapter. The notice should include such essential facts as will permit the recipient to 
make an assessment of the probable effect of the proposed alteration.
3. A State providing the notice referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article should 
afford to the recipient a reasonable period of time to make an assessment of the probable 
effect of the proposed construction or installation and to submit its views thereon to the 
State furnishing the notice.
4. If a State has failed to give the notice referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, 
the alteration by the State in the regime of the drainage basin shall not be given the 
weight normally accorded to temporal priority to use in the event of a determination of 
what is a reasonable and equitable share of the waters of the basin.
Article XXX
In case of a dispute between States as to their legal rights or other interests, as 
defined in Article XXVI, they should seek a solution by negotiation.
Article XXXI
1. If a question or dispute arises which relates to the present or future utilization of 
the waters of an international drainage basin, it is recommended that the basin States refer 
the question or dispute to a joint agency and that they request the agency to survey the 
international drainage basin and to formulate plans or recommendations for the fullest 
and most efficient use thereof in the interests of all such states.
2. It is recommended that the joint agency be instructed to submit reports on all 
matters within its competence to the appropriate authorities of the member States 
concerned.
3. It is recommended that the member States of the joint agency in appropriate 
cases invite non-basin States which by treaty enjoy a right in the use of the waters of an
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international drainage basin to associate themselves with the work of the joint agency or 
that they be permitted to appear before the agency.
Article XXXII
If a question or a dispute is one which is considered by the States concerned to be 
incapable of resolution in the maimer set forth in Article VI, it is recommended that they 
seek the good offices, or jointly request the mediation of a third State, of a qualified 
international organization or of a qualified person.
Article XXXIII
1. If the States concerned have not been able to resolve their dispute through 
negotiation or have been unable to agree on the measures described in Articles XXXI and 
XXXII, it is recommended that they form a commission of inquiry or an ad hoc 
conciliation commission, which shall endeavor to find a solution, likely to be accepted by 
the States concerned, of any dispute as to their legal rights.
2. It is recommended that the conciliation commission be constituted in the 
manner set forth in the Annex.
Article XXXIV
It is recommended that the States concerned agree to submit their legal disputes to 
an ad hoc arbitral tribunal, to a permanent arbitral tribunal or to the International Court of 
Justice if
(a) A commission has not been formed as provided in Article XXXIII, or
(b) The commission has not been able to find a solution to be recommended, or
(c) A solution recommended has not been accepted by the States concerned, and
(d) An agreement has not been otherwise arrived at.
Article XXXV
It is recommended that in the event of arbitration the States concerned have 
recourse to the Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure prepared by the International Law 
Commission of the United Nations at its tenth session in 1958.
Article XXXVI
Recourse to arbitration implies the undertaking by the States concerned to 
consider the award to be given as final and to submit in good faith to its execution.
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Article XXXVII
The means of settlement referred to in the preceding Articles of this Chapter are 
without prejudice to the utilization of means of settlement recommended to, or required 
of, members of regional arrangements or agencies and of other international 
organizations.
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APPENDIX C. THE DELFT DECLARATION
UNDP Symposium - A Strategy for Water Resources Capacity Building -Delf, The 
Netherlands, 3-5 June 1991
We, the participants in the UNDP Symposium - A Strategy for Water Resources 
Capacity Building - held in Delft, The Netherlands, June 3-5, 1991, coming from 
developing countries. External Support Agencies and supporting institutes, are committed 
to a new initiative for capacity building and have, therefore, prepared recommendations 
as a contribution to a global policy dialogue as a basis for local, national and international 
action.
Global Needs for a New Strategy for Water Sector Capacity Building
in the Next Century
Between 1950 and 2000, the world population will have more than doubled. By 
2000, of 22 metropolises of more than 10 million people, 18 will be in the developing 
countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. By 2025, 60% of the world population, more 
than 5 billion people, will be living in cities. Water directly affects their public health and 
economic development opportunities. In addition, large proportions of the rural 
population are likely to remain unserved.
The challenge to satisfy the water needs of the exploding cities is daunting, given 
the equally increasing need for water for irrigated agriculture and the problems arising 
from urban and industrial pollution. In addition, to do this in a sustainable way, measures 
have to be taken to protect and conserve the water as a major resource and unifying 
element of our environment.
Experience shows that institutional weaknesses and malfunctions are a major 
cause of ineffective and unsustainable water services. This requires urgent attention to 
building institutional capacity at all levels. Pressure for improved local delivery of water 
services suggest that development of institutional capacity be more demand-responsive. 
Also, the need to better manage overall water resources coherently and facilitate 
allocation of water among all users suggests an expansion of national, integrated 
planning. The critical, new institutional challenge is to become much better in developing
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policies, rules, organizations and management skills to address both needs simultaneously 
without constraining the major aims of each.
An improved strategy, stressing capacity building in the water sector, has been 
proposed in Delft. It will, if initiated in a timely fashion, assist the developing countries to 
meet their future needs.
Countries and External Support Agencies (ESAs) increasingly recognize the 
importance of the capacity building process for sustainable development at national, sub­
regional and local levels. Capacity building consists of three basic elements;
- creating an enabling environment with appropriate policy and legal frameworks;
- institutional development, including community participation; and
- human resources development and strengthening of managerial systems.
Capacity building is foremost a global concept and a strategic element in the 
sustainable development of the water sector; it is a long-term, continuing process that has 
to permeate all activities in the sector. Capacity building also entails the application of a 
number of specific techniques to strengthen performance of sector and sector supporting 
organizations.
With regard to a strategy for water sector capacity building, it must first of all be 
recognized that each country and region has its specific characteristics and requirements 
with respect to its water resources situation and its institutional framework. Therefore 
operational strategies must be tailor-made. To achieve this it is recommended that, based 
on the insights emerging from this Symposium, water sector assessments be initiated to 
provide a basis for country strategies.
The strategy involves several approaches:
Developing improved policy and legal frameworks, institutional development and a 
commitment to development of human resources and managerial systems for the 
sector;
Managing water and environmental resources, including modifying demand by 
pricing, conservation, reclamation and reuse of waste water, thereby reducing fresh 
water demands and pollution;
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Having the ESAs adopt capacity building as an essential element of their assistance 
efforts, including such initiatives as supporting community and water user 
associations, on farms and in the cities, so that they can participate productively in 
investments made on their behalf; continued attention needs to be given to the pivotal 
role of women in water related activities, and their proven capabilities to fulfill 
managerial tasks at all levels;
Urging governments to coordinate ESA activities in their coxmtries, and encouraging 
the ESAs themselves to coordinate their agendas;
Involving, where appropriate, the private sector in managing or providing water 
related services;
Encouraging local and foreign universities, institutes, consulting organizations, 
professional associations and others to participate in capacity building as is most 
appropriate to their own capacities; and ESAs are urged to facilitate this effort;
Encouraging countries to conduct water sector assessments; these assessments must 
include the need for capacity building in addition to traditional technical, social and 
economic aspects; and
. Creating awareness of the vital role and fmiteness of water on the part of decision­
makers and the public at large.
In view of the pressing need in the water sector, this strategy is being presented to 
the countries and the ESAs for their adoption and in^mediate implementation.
Having considered the results of the deliberations of the participants in working 
groups and in the plenary sessions, which are presented in an annex, we recommend the 
following actions:
1. That developing countries adopt strategies and launch, intensify or expand capacity 
building activities in the water sector in partnership with ESAs. UNDP is invited to 
take a leading role.
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2. That the Delft Declaration be transmitted to the 1992 Dublin Conference on Water 
and Environment, and subsequently to the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, to emphasize the special 
importance of capacity building in integrated water sector management.
If we are to satisfy the acute needs of hundreds of millions of people today, and those 
of billions tomorrow, we must take a quantum leap by doing things differently and start 
doing them now.
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APPENDIX D. THE DUBLIN STATEMENT ON WATER 
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Scarcity and misuse of fresh water pose a serious and growing threat to 
sustainable development and protection of the environment. Human health and welfare, 
food security, industrial development and the ecosystems on which they depend, are all at 
risk, unless water and land resources are managed more effectively in the present decade 
and beyond than they have been in the past.
Five hundred participants, including government-designated experts from a 
hundred countries and representatives of eighty international, intergovernmental and non­
governmental organizations attended the International Conference on Water and the 
Environment (ICWE) in Dublin, Ireland, on 26-31 January 1992. The experts saw the 
emerging global water resources picture as critical. At its closing session, the Conference 
adopted this Dublin Statement and the Conference Report. The problems highlighted are 
not speculative in nature; nor are they likely to affect our planet only in the distant future. 
They are here and they affect humanity now. The future survival of many millions of 
people demands immediate and effective action.
The Conference participants call for fundamental new approaches to the 
assessment, development and management of freshwater resources, which can only be 
brought about through political commitment and involvement from the highest levels of 
government to the smallest communities. Commitment will need to be backed by 
substantial and immediate investments, public awareness campaigns, legislative and 
institutional changes, technology development, and capacity building programmes. 
Underlying all these must be a greater recognition of the interdependence of all peoples, 
and of their place in the natural world.
In commending this Dublin Statement to the world leaders assembled at the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de 
Janeiro in June 1992, the Conference participants urge all governments to study carefully 
the specific activities and means of implementation recommended in the Conference 
Report, and to translate those recommendations into urgent action programmes for water 
and sustainable development.
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Concerted action is needed to reverse the present trends of over consumption, 
pollution, and rising threats from drought and floods. The Conference Report sets out 
recommendations for action at local, national and international levels, based on four 
guiding principles.
Principle No. 1
Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resources, essential to sustain life, 
development and the environment. Since water sustains life, effective management of 
water resources demands a holistic approach, linking social and economic development 
with protection of natural ecosystems. Effective management links land and water uses 
across the whole of a catchment area or groundwater aquifer.
Principle No. 2
Water development and management should be based on a participatory approach, 
involving users, planners and policy-makers at all levels. The participatory approach 
involves raising awareness of the importance of water among policy-makers and the 
general public. It means that decisions are taken at the lowest appropriate level, with full 
public consultation and involvement of users in the planning and implementation of water 
projects.
Principles No. 3
Woman play a central part in the provision, management and safeguarding of water. This 
provotal role of woman as providers and users of water and guardians of the living 
environment has seldom been reflected in institutional arrangements for the development 
and management of water resources. Acceptance and implementation of this principle 
requires positive policies to address women’s specific needs and to equip and empower 
women to participate at all levels in water resources programmes, including decision­
making and implementation, in ways defined by them.
Guiding Principles
351
Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized 
as an economic good. Within this principle, it is vital to recognize first the basic right of 
all human beings to have access to clean water and sanitation at an affordable price. Past 
failure to recognize the economic value of water has led to wasteful and environmentally 
damaging uses of the resource. Managing water as an economic good is an important way 
of achieving efficient and equitable use, and of encouraging conservation and protection 
of water resources.
Principle No. 4
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APPENDIX E. GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS & 
WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
A river basin is often considered to offer the most suitable geographical 
framework in which data collection, analysis, forecasting and planning can take place. 
The advantages of using the watershed to demarcate hydrological management 
boundaries are:
... disparate data sets can be compiled and examined;
...water supplies can be more effectively regulated thus reducing the threats of 
drought and flooding;
...conflicts between demand from different parts of the catchment can be more 
easily resolved; and
...water management is more effective through integration.
As the above categories illustrate, the first and basic step for managing water in a 
particular river basin is the complying and examining of objective data. Concerns about 
data availability, validity, and reliability are common to all on water supply and demand. 
In the Middle East, however, these concerns rise almost to the point of becoming another 
dimension of crisis. As such, many countries in the region keep most data on water 
availability and use confidential. In other cases, data may be released but may be 
purposely misleading. In still other cases data are not available simply because the 
country lack any regular monitoring programme. Also there is a problem with 
complementarity, as each country typically has its own set of data and is unwilling to 
accept the often conflicting data from another country. ^  A basic problem in the Middle 
East, as well as in many regions of the world, is inadequate knowledge both of the natural 
and potential water resources and of present and forecasted water demand. The supply of 
water resources is controlled by a set of stochastic variables. It is thus essential to know 
not only their average values but also their spatial and temporal distributions. Therefore 
the countries in the region need to establish a regional information network and data base 
for hydrometerology and water use. Experience elsewhere in the world suggests that the 
countries in the region wouyld benefit from establishing an institutional framework for 
conventional remote-sensing data programmes. This framework should set data collection 
standards, monitor and integrate water data from all sources, and generate regular and
 ^ Stephen C. Lonergan and David B. brooks. Watershed: The Role of Fresh Water in the Israeli- 
Palestinian Conflict, Ottawa: IDRC, 1994, pp. 8-9.
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intermittent data compilations and studies. The recent advances in GIS recomends the use 
of this technology to the region.^
In an international river basin, data is collected nationally. Thus, water management 
(including river basin planning) must be viewed in the context of overall national 
strategy. National strategy is by definition implemented within the state. However, the 
watershed or catchment of a particular river basin is unlikely to coincide with political 
boundaries and this raises the question of the most suitable spatial unit for planning. From 
the hydrological viewpoint, the catchment, a complete system, is taken as the basis for 
study. Therefore, when data is dealt by scientific authorities it is found to be rather 
subjective and biased. Moreover, even in national context ever-increasing volumes data 
are becoming available to the water resource manager, but the size and complexity of data 
presents problems. The manager must be able to assess the quality of the information and 
cope with its complexity.
The implication of the greater amount of information and the broader spectrum of 
sources is that decision-makers will be faced with information that comes from unfamiliar 
disciplines. These people, both in national level and in an international river basin 
authority, if there exists, will therefore not have the body of knowledge, from training and 
experience, with which to form a judgement on the value of the information. In part, this 
problem stems from the different groups oi experts involved in this field. On the one 
hand, there are scientists in both natural and social science fields who provide data and, 
on the other, policy-makers and implementers who use data.
Throughout the history of the development of geographic information systems the 
primary goal has been to take raw data and transform it, via overlays and analytical 
operations, into new information which can support the decision-making process. GIS 
and related technology will help greatly in the management and analysis of that large 
volumes of data coming from existing maps and satellite images (digital information), 
allowing for better understanding of nature and better management of its resources. To 
manage an international watercourse which flows across the borders of three different 
nations, the policy-makers face the difficulty of assessing enormous data which are 
claimed to be very subjective and biased. GIS technology can be used for scientific
^ Abdul-Karim Sadik and Shawki Barghouti, "The Water Problems o f  the Arab World: 
M anagement o f  Scarce Resources" in Peter Rogers and Peter Lydon (eds.). Water in the Arab 
World, M assachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1994, pp. 32-33.
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investigations, resource management, and development planning. Water-resource 
management has proved a fertile field for GIS technology. Linkage of GIS to computer 
models is particularly prevalent for surface and subsurface hydrologic applications. 
Nevertheless, GIS use in water resource management currently lags behind that in 
forestry, urban and regional planning, resource inventory and assessment, land and 
cadastral information. However, these other applications also involve water resources. 
Given the critical role of hydrosphere in the human and natural environment in areas of 
abundance (and more so in the areas of scarcity), management of water is central to the 
management of environmental problems. In turn, representation and analysis of water- 
related phenomena by GIS facilitates their management.
A. How Does a GIS Work ?
i. Relating Information From Different Sources:
A GIS, which can use information from many different sources, in many different 
forms can help with such analyses. The primary requirement for the source data is that the 
locations for the variables are known. Locations may be annotated by x,y, and z 
coordinates of longitude, latitude, and elevation, or by such systems as ZIP codes or 
highway mile markers. Any variable that can be located spatially can be fed into a GIS.
ii. Data Capture:
Putting the information into the system is the time-consuming component of GIS 
work. Identities of the objects on the map must be specified, as well as their spatial 
relationships. Note that a GIS can only use digitized data. If the data to be used are not 
already in digital form that computers can recognize, various techniques can capture the 
information. Maps can be digitized, or hand-traced with at computer mouse, to collect the 
coordinates of features. Electronic scanning devices will also convert map lines and 
points to digits.
iii. Data Integration:
A GIS makes it possible to link, or to integrate, information that is difficult to 
associate through any other means. Thus, a GIS use combinations of mapped variables to 
build and analyze new variables. Map information, in a GIS must be manipulated so that 
it registers, or fits, with information gathered from other maps. Before the digital data can 
be analyzed, they may have to undergo other manipulations -projection conversions, for 
instance- that integrate them into GIS. Projection is a fundamental component of map­
making. A projection is a mathematical means of transferring information from the
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Earth's three-dimensional curved surface to a two-dimensional paper or computer screen. 
Since much of the information in a GIS comes from existing maps, a GIS uses the 
processing power of computers to transform digital information, gathered from sources 
with different projections to a common projection.
A GIS can be used to analyze a timely indicator of land uses (=image data from 
satellite) in conjunction with classical mapping. Also using scanned aerial photographs, 
you can ask a GIS about the geology or hydrology of the area concerned. A GIS, however, 
can be used to depict two and three dimensional characteristics of the Earth's surface, 
subsurface, and atmosphere from information points. And a GIS can recognize and 
analyze the spatial relationships among mapped phenomena. Conditions of adjacency, 
containment and proximity can be determined with a GIS.
Using maps of various kind, the GIS might produce a new map layer or overlay the 
ranks of various hydrological variables according to their relative sensitivity. GIS would 
be very beneficial in this regard, bearing in mind that its technology is essentially 
dependent on the knowledge and the skill of the operating personnel. Education and 
training of water resource managers and operatives is the most essential element in 
improving the resource provision. With the same token, to have managers well aware of 
the essence and the application of the GIS technology to the management of water and 
land resources would be very useful in complying and organizing objective data base. 
Thus, technical expertise is very much needed in applying GIS to a specific case such as 
the efficient and equitable allocation and management of the water resources of the 
Euphrates-Tigris river-basin. Each state within the basin should support the initiation and 
the development of GIS technology. Many disciplines can benefit from GIS techniques. 
There are remarkable developments in the software and hardware components of GIS 
which, in turn, result in a much wider application of the technology throughout the 
government, business, and industry. In river-basin planning, for instance, maps are very 
useful to explore and to exploit the land and water resources. However, GIS technology, 
as an expansion of cartographic science, has enhanced the efficiency and analytical power 
of traditional mapping. Now as the scientific community recognizes the environmental 
consequences of human activity, GIS technology is becoming an essential tool in the 
effort to understand the global change. Various map and satellite information sources can 
be combined in modes that simulate the interactions of complex natural systems. Through 
a function known as visualization, a GIS can be used to produce images- not just maps, 
but drawings, animations, and other cartographic products. These images allow
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researchers to view their subjects in ways that literally never have been seen before. In a 
river-basin such as the Euphrates-Tigris river-basin GIS would contribute to accumulate 
objective data on the land and water resources of that river-system so that evident 
mismatches between supply and demand can be circumvented.
A critical component of a GIS is its ability to produce graphics on the screen or on the 
paper that convey the results of analysis to the people who make decisions about 
resources. Wall maps and other graphics can be generated, allowing the decision-maker to 
visualize and thereby understand the result of analyses or simulations of potential events. 
A GIS can combine map types and display them in realistic three-dimensional perspective 
views that convey information more effectively and to wider audiences than traditional, 
two-dimensional maps.The images, that GIS provides, are equally helpful in conveying 
the technical concepts of GIS study subjects to river-basin planners and even to the final 
decision-makers in charge of allocating and managing water resources. It would be very 
stimulating to have the maps, three-dimensional images and other cartographic products 
of the Euphrates-Tigris river-basin in the process of making evaluations about the 
allocation and the management of the land and water resources.
The real world is dynamic with short-term changes in demand associated with 
climate, agricultural and industrial activity and domestic consumption; and long-term 
changes associated with population growth and redistribution. Source availability also 
changes in the short and long-term through such factors as drought and system failures. 
Thus, GIS technology gives researchers the ability to examine the variations in Earth over 
days, months, and years. In the utilization of the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris river- 
basin, complying data within a time span is very critical both in the making of current 
matching between supply and demand and in making long-run planning for the entire 
river basin.
B. GIS and Its Applications
A GIS is a computer system capable of assembling, storing, manipulating, and 
displaying geographically referenced information, i.e. data identified according to their 
locations. Practitioners also regard the total GIS as including operating personnel and the 
data that go into the system. Geographic information systems is a rapidly evolving suite 
of technologies that consist of computer-based programs containing specialized 
algorithms and associated data-base management structures, frequently in an integrated 
package. These systems are expressly designed to store information about the location.
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topology, and attributes of spatially referenced objects (such as rivers, wetlands, political 
boundaries, and roads). GIS can also provide the analysis of the spatial properties (such as 
length, area, and perimeter) of these geographic objects. GIS can support many data-base 
queries tied to spatially referenced objects and their associated attributes. GIS provide 
other more-specialized spatial analysis functions: finding shortest paths in a network or 
calculating the areal extent of a watershed draining through a specified point given a 
Digital Elevation Model (DEM).^ One can claim that there are four principal functions of 
GIS. First, it performs the complex map overlays and spatial analysis to develop input 
data for the hydrologic models. Second, it provides the linkage mechanism between 
models with different spatial representations. Thirdly, the GIS provides the conversion of 
digital landforms of different projections and scales to a standardized format 
(georeferencing). Finally, the GIS provides post simulation graphics output display and 
spatial analysis for evaluating hydrologic simulation results. For instance in a typical 
application, land use, soil type, and topography are georeferenced by the watershed 
catchment. These individual map layers'^ are converted to a common scale and projection 
before analysis. Once the georeferencing is complete, the first task of the GIS is to 
determine the average conditions over the subbasins, e.g., slope, soil type, and average 
land use. Next, the attributes^ or characteristics tagged to a map are added to the GIS 
environment and the attributes are then averaged in vector or raster format, and the results 
are written to a data file to be read prior to hydrologic simulation. Thus the incorporation 
of GIS into hydrologic modelling provides for an increased detail of evaluation, 
minimizes user subjectivity in parameter sele«.tion.
GIS is an institutional entity, reflecting an organizational structure that integrates 
technology with a database, expertise and continuing financial support over time.
3 Digital elevation m odels are one o f  the essential com ponents o f  GIS along with air, surface, 
and satellite photographs. DEM  can sim ply be described as converting classical topographical 
maps to the computer environment. The primary requirement o f  these m odels are that the 
locations for tha variables are known. Locations may be annoted by x (longitude), y  (latitude), 
and z (elevation) coordinates. These three dim ensional maps (when OEM s are com plem ented by 
satellite im ages) are very helpful in land and water resource-management.
^ For the spatial data requirements, eight map layers must be obtained or created (digitized or 
scanned) in digital form for GIS m odelling. The required eight map layers are: 1) Land use and 
vegetative cover; 2) soil type; 3) surface topography; 4)hydrography elem ents (streams, rivers, 
ponds, and lakes definition); 5) watershed; 6) water-table contours; 6) surface contours; 7) 
groundwater confining layer elevations.
^ Attributes can better be illustrated by exam ples such: in soil maps som e characteristics or 
attributes can be classified as sand, silty sand, clay, gypsiferious soil, organic soil, etc..
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Thinking of GIS in this way takes this technology beyond being just a package of 
technology-hardware and software capable of performing GIS-types of functions. 
Application and implementation related activities must precede full-scale project-oriented 
work. Phases of implementation process include feasibility studies; selection of software, 
hardware; system installation; training; data conversion; data-base development; and 
finally preliminary product generation. The authors^ have defined the first stage as "GIS 
Awareness" which includes the instructions to be followed to become familiar with GIS 
and to use it properly. They advised the professionals who are to apply GIS to water 
resources planning and management to follow the recent publications in that field such as 
reference books, source books, journals and trade magazines; also the proceedings of the 
leading conferences; consulting the users groups^.
Second stage includes defining the current and future role of GIS in meeting the needs 
of the water resources planning and management in a specific river basin. A GIS is often 
acquired as part of a specific project with a very limited time frame and goals. Although 
this mode of GIS acquisition and use may conform to fiscal realities, results are often 
disappointing in terms of data-base development and product generation. The user who 
acquires a system with only one project on mind rarely gets a good return on investment 
simply because GIS is such a versatile tool if properly applied. The development of a GIS 
for a specific application can often support other analysis or management activities that 
utilize the same data base. For example, digital soil survey data developed for agricultural 
applications can be used in water quality studies, or vice versa. The role of GIS should be 
defined both in terms of supplementing or replacing current organizational functions 
(such as manual cartography) and also in terms of future possibilities. Feasibility studies 
are the subcategory of the second stage. Before committing resources to the acquisition or 
upgrade of a GIS, the manager in the field of water resources will perform a study of what 
the system will be used for and what resources are currently used to perform those 
functions. Feasibility studies are difficult because-many factors relevant to the analysis 
are uncertain. The state of the technology is constantly evolving in terms of functionality 
and costs, the new generation of GIS packages are less expensive than their main frame
^ Mark R. Leipnik, Karen K. Kemp, and Hugo A. Loaiciga, "Implementation o f  GIS for Water 
Resources Planning and Management", Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management, 
Vol. 119, N o. 2, March/April, 1993. 1993.
^ Several users' groups for specific GIS system s hold annual m eetings, including those o f  ARC- 
INFO, from Environmental System s Research Institute (ESRI); MGE from Intergraph 
Corporation; and GRASS. These meetings provide a forum for the discussion o f  specific GIS 
packages.
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predecessors. Yet still the decision not to adopt or upgrade a GIS, and to continue to rely 
on past practices, is deceptively easy to quantify in terms of costs and results. But the 
results of the traditional methods when compared with the graphic impact, speed, and 
analysis capabilities afforded by a properly implemented GIS are often judged inferior by 
a rapidly growing number of resource managers. Another subcategory of the second stage 
(defining the needs) is the functional requirements studies (FRS). An FRS details the 
products to be produced by the GIS, the required data and the GIS functions that must be 
available. An FRS can be used to define the scope of the project and the basic structme of 
the implemented GIS. If the FRS is properly performed, it can become the primary 
planning document for the rest of the GIS implementation process emd the basis of a 
request for proposals (RFP). Along with the FRS the authors explained the last 
subcategory of the second stage which is about a wide range of survey study submitted to 
the as many vendors as possible to find out the best alternative for GIS software. This is 
called the request for proposals stage (RFP) which should not be so narrow that it 
suggests only a single software solution; it should describe in detail the nature of the 
proposed data-base contents, the functions needed to create and manipulate the data-base, 
and the products that are anticipated. The results from a well-structured RFP should give 
management the information needed to make informed and defensible decisions.
The third stage includes the selection of appropriate software and hardware. There are 
several kinds of software such as the university-developed software, government- 
developed software and private-sector software. Among them to choose the best one for 
application to water resources assessment and management is very crucial.^ Within this 
stage choosing the best computer platform to apply the software is also very significant. 
UNIX workstations appear to be the GIS workhorses of the 1990s. They offer an 
excellent compromise between the ease of access and simplicity afforded by a PC and the 
power of mainframe. The rapidly increasing power and the relative affordability of 
workstations now provide the user access to powerful GIS coupled to large and complex 
data set and other decision support tools such as hydrologic models, statistical packages, 
etc. Third stage comprises some more sophisticated technical steps such as the selection 
of data input and conversion devices, and output devices.
 ^ A m ong them the governm ent-developed software the GRASS which is created by United 
States Army Corps o f  Engineers is notable for its application to water resources and 
environm ental-im pact-assessm ents. Yet, in Turkey a few  researchers use Environmental System s 
Research Institute's (ESRI) ARC/INFO which has many succesful applications to natural 
resources management.
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In the fourth stage system implementation is described in its various subcontents. 
Training and human resources development is the one of essential elements of this stage. 
Since GIS is a relatively new technology, individuals with a strong background in its 
theoretical foundations and the necessary specific technical skills are rare. An 
interdisciplinary approach is perhaps a more desirable solution, because of the diverse 
talents needed to utilize a GIS optimally. GIS should function as an integrating 
technology, allowing individuals and departments that previously worked autonomously 
to interact in new ways. An interdepartmental team composed of professional water- 
resource engineers, systems analysts, cartographers, data-entry operators, and others is 
probably the best able to meet the challenges posed by the GIS implementation and 
development. The more that the members are aware of concepts from other disciplines 
the more satisfactory the outcome is likely to be. Once a system has been acquired, 
installed, and tested and trained personnel are available to operate it, the data-base- 
development and product-generation process begins. Rather than launch into 
development of a GIS covering all aspects the resource management problem under 
consideration, it is advisable to select a representative geographically circumscribed 
"slice" of the overall area or problem for use in a pilot project. Pilot studies must have 
realistic and specific goals and timetables and should be designed to rapidly generate 
modest, yet representative products such as site-specific maps or sample data-base 
schema. Such products can be a tangible demonstration of GIS capabilities and will help 
to encourage a further investment in longer-term GIS development. It is also important to 
gauge more accurately the costs of the whole project. Another significant subcategory of 
the third stage is data base development. The most time-consuming part of the GIS 
implementation process is data-base development. In the U.S. statewide GIS data bases 
on water resources are being developed in many states. Also U.S. Geological Survey, the 
Defense Mapping Agency, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, etc., are offering 
many forms of digital data. To alleviate the disadvantages which stem from the dissimilar 
contents, formats, standards of data coverage sets, and cause real impediment to find the 
specific source of digital data for a given area. Federal Government has adopted the 
Spatial Data Transfer Format to standardize formats for all federal spatial data. Data-base 
should be the key product and center of attention during the GIS development effort. 
Colorful graphics and maps may have a powerful visual impact and utility, but the real 
value of GIS is determined by the underlying data and analytical functions, which allow 
that data to be used to make decisions. Data-base development ideally should involve the 
creation of several views that support the special needs of different users.
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The last stage is entitled as operation and maintenance. Ongoing maintenance of the 
data base is essential to a successful GIS. Most map data bases include information that 
changes with development, administrative activities, the evolution of natural processes, or 
other events. As a result, data are added, modified, archived, or deleted as conditions 
change to maintain the data base's currency. As changes are made, procedures must be 
invoked to ensure that the integrity of the data base is protected. Data base maintenance 
procedures should be incorporated into the operating activities of those who routinely use 
and manage the GIS and, to the greatest extent possible, should be part of the normal, 
day-to-day activities of the GIS users. In the following of all the above described stages 
one will notice some special issues pertinent to the water resources management. Unique 
aspects of water and water-related problems suggest a special approach for handling in a 
GIS. For instance in deciding to use raster or vector-based systems^, one should bear in 
mind for more precise applications in water-resource-related data like sewer locations 
vector-based systems are more convenient, yet for fuzzy data the application of raster- 
based system is appropriate. Even rivers that are precisely represented on maps are often 
in reality highly variable that’s why raster format is applied to them in general. Data used 
in water-resource management also have special characteristics. Water bodies vary in 
their boundaries and properties: tributaries vary daily, rivers vary seasonally and in 
response to storm events. Dynamic phenomena may be represented by taking snapshots at 
several time intervals and running them sequentially to create a computerized movie, 
something only achievable by GIS technology applications. Water resources by their very 
nature contains dynamic and fuzzy data which could only be transferred into being a 
decision-making tool by means of GIS rather than the traditional methods of cartography.
C. A Brief Survey on the Achievements in the Applications of GIS in
Universities and Institutions in Turkey
The stage of "GIS Awareness" has already been exceeded in many state and 
private institutions in Turkey. To name few number of remote sensing laboratories have
^ Data can be stored in a number formats in geographic information system s. One is a vector 
data inwhich the latitude and longtitude coordinate system is used. This is a traditional map 
formating system  with x and y coordinates. Yet raster data are represented by uniform grid cells  
and they are exactly in the sam e format o f  satellite images. In a grid-based data structure, the 
attribute information e.g. soil types is collected in a system o f  grid cells. These ce lls are often 
referred to as picture elem ents (p ixels) and can be analysed and displayed as if  they were 
"images" much like a rem otely sensed image. Current technology that GIS reached can utilize 
both formats i.e. data obtained via air photographs or satellite im ages can easily  be converted to a 
GIS and can be applied as one system .
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been established mostly under the auspices of state universities such as Remote Sensing 
Laboratory of Hydrogeology Engineering Department at Hacettepe University, Ankara; 
Remote Sensing Laboratory of Civil Engineering Department at Middle East Technical 
University, Ankara; Remote Sensing Laboratory of Çukurova University, Adana. 
Moreover in some leading state institutions such as the State Institute of Statistics (DIE), 
Southeastern Anatolian Project (GAP) Regional Development Agency, Mine Exploration 
and Research Institute (MTA), the Division of Cartography in the Army, Ministry of 
Forestry, Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Development, and in some mxmicipalities 
like in Ankara and Istanbul had initiated the application of GIS in their field of interests. 
Also some private companies such as SUIS and SETAN are using GIS technology in their 
business. Among those the most institutionalized ones in terms of GIS applications are 
Remote Sensing Laboratory of Hydrogeology Engineering Department at Hacettepe 
University, the State Institute of Statistics (DIE), and the Southeastern Anatolian Project 
(GAP) Regional Development Agency. The activities of these institutions in the field of 
GIS and its applications will be dealt in more detail in the following paragraphs.
The State Institute of Statistics established its Remote Sensing Division in 1992 to 
make use of advanced technology along with the conventional data collection and 
statistical interpretation activities. Due to the importance of agricultural sector in 
economy, they first launched the project of "Crop Yield Predictions by Remote Sensing", 
and a method of prediction has been devised as a statistical model approach based on 
stratified area sampling.
Subsequent to this project the Institute initiated a joint project with the Hydrogeology 
Engineering Department of Hacettepe University. With this project which will be the first 
initiative in Turkey in the application of GIS technology to a river-basin as a whole, the 
authorities envisaged to fulfil all the phases cf implementation process of this technology 
and end up with a data bank covering all the peculiarities of that river-basin. The project 
covers one of the largest (in terms of its drainage-basin area) river-basins of Turkey, 
namely the Sakarya River Basin. The project is started in 1995 with the joint initiatives 
of both the Hacettepe University and the State Statistical Institute. It is financed by the
Sakarya River Basin situates in Central Anatolia com prising the main urban areas o f  the that 
region, nam ely Eskişehir and Ankara. The drainage-basin area is 58,160 km^; average quantity o f  
water in yearly basis is 6 ,40 km^. Total plain area is 2 ,07,100 ha. The total amount o f  irrigable 
area is 1,671,600 ha. The electric energy already produced is 1061,3 MW; the potential amount 
o f  energy is 2362 Gwh. The amount o f  investment on the w hole basin is 14,973,261 xlO^ TL.
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State Planning Organization. ^   ^ More or less all the stages have been accomplished in the 
implementation of GIS. A pilot study has been initiated. ^ 2 "gjs Awareness" stage has 
already been fiilly reached in the Department of Hydrogeology Engineering of Hacettepe 
University. The leading professors of the department have been engaged in the 
application and teaching of GIS technology since the late 1980s. Yet, they established a 
remote sensing laboratory and trained many graduate students in the use of GIS software 
and most importantly in developing DEMs of the selected areas and combining them with 
satellite images. With such a solid background and the technical and financial support of 
the state institutions such as the State Statistical Institute and the State Planning 
Organization, scholars from that Department with graduate students' team have launched 
this project. They started to define all the layers 3^ relation to the hydrogeological
structure of the Porsuk tributary as a pilot project area and subsequently the Sakarya basin 
as a whole. Concerning the hydrology of the river-basin, beginning from most tiny natural 
water ways to the wells their positions and some basic peculiarities (minimum and 
maximum fiows of the wells, their output product status) will be defined in the area. All 
the hydrography elements (streams, rivers, thalwegs, ponds, storages, and lakes); 
watershed, water quality, water-table contours, surface contours, groundwater 
confining layer elevations will be included into the main input layers of the GIS. In 
addition to those main input units, meteorology elements will also be incorporated into 
the main GIS structure. Flow gauging stations will be positioned according to 
chronological order. Other basic hydrometeorological parameters such as temperature, 
humidity, atmospheric pressure will all be attended in the study. Besides the elements 
concerning the hydrogeology of the river-basin will also be incorporated to the GIS 
analysis. First the geological structure will be determined, then the soil maps^^ will be 
included. In the project the main implementation stages of GIS until the pilot study have 
been done very rapidly since both institutions have been endowed with the necessary 
assets of GIS technology. Feasibility studies have done very easily since the competence 
of the team was certain then. System selection was also very straightforward since the
^ T h e  cost o f  the project is estimated as 22 billion TL.
'2  One o f  the substantial tributaries o f  Sakarya, Porsuk has been chosen as pilot project area.
By means o f  GIS technology these individual map layers are converted to a com m on scale and 
projection before analysis. In other words, these layers constitute input data for functioning o f  
GIS.
Water quality is a real concern in the Sakarya river-basin due to the rapid industralization and 
intensive irrigation practices. Thus within the project pollution m odels w ill be supported by the 
GIS technology.
Soil maps com prise only the cultivable area o f  the river-basin. Soil quality can also be 
determined.
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team has already been very familiar with both the hardware and the software of the GIS 
technology J 6 The ultimate goal of the project is to develop a data-base comprising all 
the hydrogeological parameters in the river-basin. This study is envisaged to constitute a 
starting point for other generations of research in the application of GIS technology to the 
rest of the significant river-basins in Turkey. Turkey has bulk of hydrometeorological and 
hydrogeological data concerning the each river-basins under the archive of several state 
institutions. The amount is huge, and most of the times they are not organized and 
updated. The GIS technology is very operative in the harmonization of the so-called data 
in an accurate and reliable manner. As it is argued in certain places of this thesis Three 
Stage Plan is a unique methodology to study the river-basin as a whole. Yet, the GIS 
technology is the right method to actualise this methodology starting first in the Turkish 
proportion of the Euphrates-Tigris river-basin and subsequently extending it to the whole 
river-basin including Syria and Iraq. Needless to say, this kind of technological 
cooperation basically needs the exchange of the national data of each riparian during the 
series of constructive negotiations which are based on mutual trust and good-will.
The authorities in the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) Regional Development 
Agency engaged in the application of the GIS technology into their field of studies in 
March 1995. Some of the staff of the Agency had a training of two months in the 
headquarters of ARCH/INFO (a GIS software company) in the USA. As a pilot project 
area the Southeastern Anatolia Project is selected as a whole. They used air photographs 
as the basic component of the GIS. They created rather large scale maps for the whole 
GAP region: 1/250,000; medium scale maps for main province of the region (Şanlıurfa): 
1/25,000; and small scale maps for small project locations (Karaköprü) : 1/1000. By 
means of the GIS technology, borders of the provinces, transportation routes, cultivated 
and irrigated areas; cultural sites, etc., are all positioned on these maps (see Map). The 
users of the GIS in the Agency claim that this technology will be used for deciding the 
future water use as well as to determine the amount of the fields to be irrigated in the 
region. They give considerable importance to the data maintenance since there are rapid 
evolutions overall the region in terms of urbanization and rural development. ^  ^
ARC/INFO has been used as the software o f  the project. Yet, the team is currently 
considering G RASS to be used in the project.
An Interview was held with Mr. Barbaros Ozdemii* (industrial engineer), at the headquarters 
o f  GAP Regional D evelopm ent A gency, who is one o f  the prominent members o f  the staff o f  the 
A gency, and had a training in the field o f  GIS technology.
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